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Abstract 
Despite considerable interest in the BBC European Service and the role of transnational 
broadcasting during the Second World War, surprisingly little attention has hitherto been paid to 
the BBC Polish language broadcasts. As the first full length academic study of the wartime 
BBC Polish Service, this thesis aims to provide an in-depth examination of previously 
unanalysed primary sources, both Polish and British, in order to establish the extent to which 
Polish Service broadcasts during World War II were considered as a significant and reliable 
source of information.  
The study is primarily based on the BBC Written Archives records, in particular, the scripts of 
the BBC Polish language bulletins, the European News Directives and Minutes of Meetings as 
well as the Political Warfare Executive (PWE) directives for the Polish Service from the 
National Archives at Kew. These directives are central in answering the principal research 
question, namely the extent to which the Polish Service was required to follow official British 
government policy. To this end, the analysis is supported by Polish government-in-exile 
documents and the Polish Underground reports stored at the Polish Institute and Sikorski 
Museum and the Polish Underground Movement Study Trust in London. These archives 
represent a valuable resource for studies of wartime broadcasting, censorship and propaganda. 
Together the various archives (in conjunction with other privately held documents) offer 
historians a rich source of material from which the organisation and functioning of the BBC 
Polish Service over this period can be constructed.  
Given the volume of material related to World War II, the scope of the study is concentrated 
upon Whitehall and BBC policy with regards to the Polish Service coverage of the Polish-
Soviet affairs from the period when diplomatic relations between Poland and the USSR were re-
established in 1941 to the withdrawal of recognition of the Polish government-in-exile by the 
Allies in 1945. The analysis demonstrates that, although the Polish Service attempted to be 
objective, impartial and neutral, this was achieved by selectiveness rather than by presenting 
both Polish and Soviet sides of the argument in territorial and political disputes. In particular, 
after the secret agreement between the Big Three was signed at Tehran in 1943, attempts were 
made by British officials to use the Polish Service as a platform to convince the Polish 
Underground and, by extension, the Polish population, to agree to Stalin’s demands. In general, 
any subjects which could be perceived by Stalin as offensive were labelled as ‘sensitive’ and 
expunged from the broadcasts. The evidence in this thesis therefore suggests that the overall 
output of the Polish service was at times subject to wider constraints determined by allied 
foreign policy goals and in particular the relationship between Britain and the Soviet Union in 
the defeat of Nazi Germany.  
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Preface 
 
During the Second World War the BBC Polish Service broadcasts became an important source 
of information in Poland. Despite the fact that listening to or possession of a radio set was 
punishable by death under the German occupation, Poles were willing to risk their lives in order 
to access news. Although listening to radio was not forbidden under Soviet occupation, harsh 
action was taken against those who accessed non-Soviet station. For many, the BBC remained 
the only contact with the outside world, whilst listening itself became a symbol of resistance. 
The broadcasts from London had an enormous impact on listeners in Poland. After the fall of 
France in June 1940, the Polish government took refuge in England, and its representatives 
often spoke on the air, thus playing an important role in maintaining public morale. BBC Polish 
Service broadcasts were seen as an essential source of information, given the fact that Britain 
was considered Poland’s most important ally and that the BBC had established itself as the 
‘Voice of Britain’. 
A close examination of the current state of knowledge demonstrates the limited nature of the 
work to date on the Polish Service during the Second World War. The importance of the Polish 
Service broadcasts in this period has in fact been neglected by both British and Polish scholars: 
the Polish Service is mentioned in the context of the history of broadcasting but not from the 
specific perspective of its importance as a source of information for occupied Poland.  
This doctoral thesis builds on my BA dissertation which, based on the BBC records, brings into 
question the BBC claim that it reported objectively about the wartime political situation. My 
undergraduate research allowed me to observe that large amount of primary sources on the 
Polish Service remained to be unanalysed and, more importantly, that these documents had the 
potential not only to contribute significantly to the history of the BBC, but also to our 
understanding of the complexity of wartime diplomatic relations between the allies and of the 
origins of the communist era in Poland, as well as to studies of wartime transnational 
broadcasting, censorship and propaganda.  
 
Aims  
The main aim of this thesis is to provide in-depth comprehensive analysis of primary sources, 
both Polish and British, in order to establish to which extent the Polish Service broadcasts were 
considered as an important and reliable source of information. Paying special attention to the 
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Polish audience’s response and feedback, it will be equally important to investigate BBC 
awareness of and reaction to these issues.  Given the limited discussion to date on the work of 
the Polish Service in general, an additional aim is to provide a far more panoramic picture of the 
work of the Polish Service and its employees. 
Research questions 
This study seeks to answer a number of questions. The BBC European Service was recognised 
by the British government as a tool of propaganda. The main question which this thesis aims to 
answer, then, is the relevance of this stance for the Polish Service: to what extent was the 
coverage of the Polish Service objective and unbiased? There are good reasons to pose this 
question. The BBC claimed after the war that it had sustained a considerable degree of 
independence from the government and, in particular, from the Political Warfare Executive 
(PWE). Britain’s main goal was maintenance of the unity of the allied coalition. This principle 
remained uninterrupted even in the face of evidence of crimes committed against Polish citizens 
by the Soviets and Stalin’s political manoeuvring. The British Foreign Office policy favouring 
the USSR’s claims to the Curzon line and avoidance of news which in anyway could undermine 
the Soviet Union’s position as an important and reliable ally, was reflected in the BBC 
broadcasts. This approach, however, was questioned and criticised by the Polish authorities in 
London, the Polish Underground and, by extension, the Polish listeners, thus leading to another 
question, notably, what was the impact of the Polish Service broadcasts on the Polish audience, 
considering its information and propaganda roles. 
Organisation of the thesis 
Chapter one discusses the present state of knowledge about the BBC Polish Service during 
WWII, other scholars’ contributions to this topic, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of 
their arguments. Starting with an overview of transnational broadcasting and the recognition of 
radio as a new medium of diplomacy and propaganda, the chapter draws on important issues 
such as the theory of propaganda and wartime propaganda and censorship. Prominence is given 
to the relationship between the government and the BBC and, in particular, between the 
Political Warfare Executive (PWE) and the BBC European Service, and also to an analysis of 
the extent to which the latter followed the official line of the British government. The main 
emphasis, however, is on the Polish Service, its relations with the BBC, the British and Polish 
governments and the broadcasting arm of the latter, namely, Radio Polskie. In this context, the 
chapter also discusses listenership in occupied Poland, the way in which the Polish broadcasts 
were syndicated and an appraisal of their news value.  
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Chapter two provides an explanation and justification of methodological approaches employed 
in the study and its limitations; it also details the data accessed from the archives.  
Given, the complexity of issues covered in this thesis, it was felt that a separate chapter 
providing the reader with historical background on the Second World War was necessary. 
Rather than scrutinising the role of the BBC in this period, Chapter 3 provides a contextual 
account of relevant wartime military and diplomatic developments in chronological order. (A 
timeline of Second World War in Annexe III outlines developments concerning Poland in 
World War II and key Soviet-Polish relations, allowing for quick reference).  
Chapter 4 examines the listening conditions under German and Soviet occupation, focusing on 
the importance of the Polish Underground’s role as a main monitor and distributor of the Polish 
Service broadcasts; thus the Polish clandestine press is also an object of an examination. 
Additionally, it draws on information on audience access to broadcasts and estimates of 
numbers of radio sets under the German and Soviet occupations.  
Chapter 5 discusses the origins, structure and organisation of the Polish Service, exploring its 
relations with the BBC, the Polish government-in-exile and Radio Polskie. Particular attention 
is paid to the role of the key figures involved in policy making, including the Director of the 
European Service, Noel Newsome, the European Service Controller, Ivone Kirkpatrick, the 
PWE Polish Region Editor, Moray Maclaren, and the Polish Service Editors, Michael Winch 
and his successor, Gregory Macdonald.  
Chapters 6–9 discuss wartime propaganda and censorship, particularly in relation to the 
conformity of Polish Service bulletins with British foreign policy. Each chapter covers a 
different period. Chapter 6 deals with the time from the Polish-Soviet reconciliation in June 
1941 to the breaking off of diplomatic relations after the discovery of the graves of the Polish 
officers at Katyń in April 1943. Chapter 7 covers the period from April 1943 to July 1944. 
Chapter 8 analyses the coverage of the Warsaw rising by both the BBC Polish and Home 
Services, and chapter 9 the period after the collapse of the uprising in October 1944 to the 
German surrender and the allies’ withdrawal of the recognition of the Polish government in 
London in July 1945.  
Chapter 10, the conclusion, summarises the main findings of the thesis. In addition, three 
annexes can be found at the end of the thesis, namely, biographical notes on the Polish Service 
employees (annex I), a glossary of key Polish, British and Soviet personas mentioned in this 
work (annex II); and the Second World War time line of World War II and key events in Soviet-
Polish relations already mentioned (annex III).
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Propaganda through the airwaves  
 
Introduction 
In order to provide a context for the present study, it is essential to present an overview of two 
complementary areas of study. The first concerns the role of the transnational broadcasting and, 
in particular, scholarly contributions to the study of the BBC European Service during World 
War II, in general, and, more specifically, the current state of knowledge of the BBC Polish 
Service during World War II. A central issue for these transnational broadcasts is the part which 
they played in serving the interests of the British government. The second area of interest is thus 
the role of British wartime propaganda, the government relationship with the BBC and the 
extent to which the Corporation was influenced by the censorship policy. Here, special attention 
is given to the power struggle between the Political Warfare Executive and the European 
Service. The chapter draws also on important issues such as the theory of propaganda and 
wartime propaganda, providing an important background for further analysis. The main 
emphasis, however, is on the Polish Service, its relations with the BBC, the British and Polish 
governments and Radio Polskie. In this context, the chapter also discusses listenership in 
occupied Poland, in particular, the role of the Polish Underground as the main monitor and 
syndicator of the BBC Polish language broadcasts.  
The role of transnational broadcasting 
In many respects, the Second World War differed from previous international conflicts, 
primarily because the agenda of the Nazis and Communists was not only based on the need for 
territorial expansion but, more importantly, on the supremacy of their respective ideologies over 
western democracy.1 The social and geopolitical changes in the interwar years saw the evolution 
of mass media – a development recognised by totalitarian leaders seeking to influence public 
opinion at home as well as gaining international support for their ideologies. With the expansion 
of telegraphy in the late 19th century, the technological infrastructure for global communication 
had already been established, making immediate and direct communication possible with the 
masses, irrespective of their social status, political views, literacy and, most importantly, 
nationality and citizenship.2  Arguably, the realisation of the potential of this new medium to 
reach an international audience can be seen as the most important development of the 1920s and 
1930s; it was not an accident that this new medium became the main instrument of propaganda 
                                                          
1 Ferguson, N., The War of the World: History's Age of Hatred (London: Penguin, 2012). 
2 Wasburn, P.C., Broadcasting Propaganda: International Radio Broadcasting and the Construction of 
Political Reality (New York: Praeger, 1992); Welch, D., Propaganda: Power and Persuasion (London: 
The British Library, 2013). 
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for Stalin and Hitler. This was, however, two-ways process – the interwar period saw the arrival 
of newly politicised audiences, interested not only in domestic but also in foreign affairs.  
Whilst totalitarian leaders recognised the wireless as an essential instrument in shaping public 
opinion, the British government remained reluctant to use this new medium as means of 
furthering national interest until 1938, the main reason being that the BBC was developed as a 
public service, focused on education and a high standard of entertainment programmes, whilst 
the British press, which saw this new medium as its main competitor, successfully lobbied 
against the Corporation’s attempts to introduce its own news service.3  It was only in 1934 that 
the BBC established its own regular news service. 
Although the BBC Empire Service had already been inaugurated in 1932, the importance of 
broadcasting in foreign languages did not crystallise until 1938. The fact that the memory of the 
First World War and the techniques used were still alive helps to explain the reluctance of the 
BBC to engage in any forms of propaganda. There was also another reason: it was the 
conviction of the first BBC Director-General, John Reith, that the Corporation should not 
become a mouthpiece of the government.4  
Yet, transnational broadcasting was to play a key role in wartime diplomacy. The British 
government, although initially hesitant to use the airwaves for propaganda, changed course after 
hostilities broke out. By the end of 1940 the BBC was already broadcasting in thirty-four 
languages, of which twenty-five had been added since September 1939.5 As Seul and Riberio 
point out, ‘the BBC was employed to further the British government’s diplomatic, strategic and 
economic interests’.6  Cruickshank goes even further, arguing that the BBC European Service 
was both recognised as ‘The Fourth Arm’ and served as such during World War II.7  
Poland, too, acknowledged the necessity for transnational broadcasting. Polskie Radio, founded 
in 1925, was operating by the beginning of World War II one national and nine regional 
channels, transmitting in six foreign languages (German, Czech, Hungarian, French, English 
and Italian) targeted at Europe, North and South America.8 According to the British Embassy in 
                                                          
3 Weďď, A., ͚AuŶtie Goes to Waƌ AgaiŶ: the BBC EǆteƌŶal SeƌǀiĐes, the FoƌeigŶ OffiĐe aŶd the EaƌlǇ Cold 
Waƌ͛, Media History, 12 (2), 2006, pp. 117-32; Williams, K., Get me a murder a day!: A history of media 
and communication in Britain (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2010), pp. 90-2. 
4 Curran, J., & Seaton, J., Power without Responsibility: Press, Broadcasting and the Internet in Britain 
(London: Taylor & Francis, 2010), p. 107. 
5 Mansell, G., Let Truth Be Told: 50 Years of BBC External Broadcasting (London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson,1982), p. 104. 
6 Seul, S. & ‘iďeƌio, N., ͚Revising Transnational Broadcasting: The BBC foreign-language services during 
the Second World War, Media History, Special Issue 21 (4), 2015, pp. 365-377. 
7 Cruickshank, C., The Fourth Arm: Psychological Warfare: 1938-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1981). 
8 Pszenicki, K., Tu Mówi Londyn: Historia Sekcji Polskiej BBC  (Warsaw: Rosner & Wspolnicy, 2009), 
p. 33.  
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Warsaw, Polskie Radio offered an ‘efficient and unbiased news service’, so much so that the 
inauguration of the BBC Polish Service was only considered after the war broke out.9 
With the German and Soviet occupation of Poland, the Polish stations were overtaken by the 
invaders and consequently used for their own propaganda.10 Subsequently, the BBC Polish 
Service, inaugurated on 7 September 1939, was a significant source of information from the 
beginning. It is therefore the aim of this thesis to investigate and establish the role played by the 
broadcasts of the Polish Service during the years 1939-1945. 
Scholarly contributions to the study of the BBC European Service during World War II 
In comparison with the BBC Home Service, the BBC foreign services have received relatively 
little attention from scholars. The wartime Director of the BBC External Services, Edward 
Tangye Lean, an early contributor to discussions of this topic, acknowledges the limitations of 
his 1943 account: 
‘This is not a guidebook, handbook or Official History of the War. I have been too much 
involved in it to be impartial. I wanted as far as possible to write only of what I had 
heard with my own ears, choosing Germany’s offensive against France instead of her 
attack on Jugoslavia, reporting speakers on whom I had my own notes, and where my 
languages gave out and my ignorance of different audiences set in, it did not worry me 
that the treatment became sketchy’.11 
The BBC Year Books and Handbooks published during the war provide a great account of work 
of the BBC in this period, it is, however, Asa Briggs, the former official BBC historian, who 
offers by far the most exhaustive account to date of the work of the BBC European Service 
during World War II in the third volume of his History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom 
– the War of Words, which provides an in-depth analysis of its structure, organisation and 
internal relations as well as its position on warfare.12 Nonetheless his discussion of individual 
foreign language services, with the exception of the German and French Services, is limited. 
The need for a more analytical approach to the subject was recognised in 1980’s by the former 
Managing Director of the BBC External Services, Gerard Mansell.13  His study, based, 
primarily on analysis of BBC and official records and, more importantly, interviews with 
                                                          
9 Undated note by J.B. Clark in Briggs, A., The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom: The War 
of Words, Vol. 3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 75. 
10 Morriss, A., Cross Border Broadcasting in an Occupied Country: The Case of Poland, in Arnold, K., 
Preston, P., Kinnebroch, S., (eds.), The Handbook of European Communication History (New Malden, 
MA: Wiley-Blackwell, in press 2016). 
11 Tangye Lean, E., Voices in the Darkness: The story of European Radio War (London: Secker & Warburg, 
1943), p. 3. 
12 Briggs, op. cit. 
13 Mansell, op. cit. 
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former BBC staff involved not only in news production but also policy making, makes a 
significant contribution to the field of transnational wartime broadcasting.  Mansell, also makes 
use of memoirs, in particular those of Ivone Kirkpatrick, the wartime Foreign Advisor to the 
BBC and later the BBC European Controller and the Political Warfare Executive (PWE) 
official, as well Bruce Lockhart, the PWE Director-General.14 While Andrew Walker also 
acknowledges the importance of the BBC European Service during the war, he concentrates on 
the post-war era, what is understandable, given that his expertise comes from his experience as 
the former BBC World Service Defence and Commonwealth correspondent.15 The main 
contributions of both writers in relation to the present study lies in providing contextual 
background for the historical analysis of primary sources.  
Yet the history of the European Service attracted not only scholars interested in communication 
studies. In particular, the release of Foreign Office and Cabinet papers in the 1970’s was the 
catalyst for a debate on the British broadcaster involvement in political warfare. Primarily, those 
who were able to combine personal experience in this field with an analysis of archival 
documents and, in particular, Michael Balfour, the Ministry of Information and, later, the PWE 
official, Charles Cruickshank, employee of the Ministry of Supply and David Garnett, the PWE 
Director of Training, contributed greatly, providing new perspectives on Foreign Office 
involvement in transnational broadcasting.16 Given the vast material on the topic, these first 
attempts to synthesise the role of the BBC broadcasting for propaganda purposes underlined the 
challenges of delivering a thorough analysis of European Services as a whole. Consequently, 
scholars focused on the German Service and propaganda to enemy countries in general; the 
narrative of these studies is driven by the attempt to understand the extent to which propaganda 
through the airwaves influenced German public opinion and had an impact on ending the war. 
Scholars working in this area faced other obstacles, too. In particular, Garnett’s official history 
of the PWE waited over 50 years for clearance to be published. As Andrew Roberts explains in 
an introduction to this volume, the author’s account was viewed as judgmental and prejudiced, a 
‘chronique scandaleuse’ found offensive by many former PWE officials, who in the 1950s were 
still actively involved in politics.17 However, with the value of hindsight, while they fail to 
provide a comprehensive overview, these publications are notable for the fact that they initiated 
a dispute over the British government using the BBC as the instrument of propaganda.  Philip 
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M. Taylor’s more recent work, in particular, throws new light on this subject.18  This topic is 
also discussed at some length by the BBC official historian, Jean Seaton, in her book Power 
without Responsibility.19 
In the new millennium came publications offering a new approach. Michael Stenton’s 
examination of the impact of the BBC broadcasts on resistance movements in France, Denmark, 
Poland and Yugoslavia, for instance, provides new perspective on the Corporation’s role in 
wartime diplomacy and maintaining public morale in occupied Europe.20 What makes this study 
distinctive, however, is the author’s emphasis on the attempts of the allied governments-in-exile 
to influence the BBC programmes. Despite the fact that it has been over 60 years since the war 
ended, the work of the European Service clearly still interests historians, and is substantially 
referenced in studies on communication, propaganda, psychological warfare and wartime 
diplomacy.21 
In recent years, too, a shift can be observed from the more general treatment of the European 
Service to an examination of the role and impact of the different foreign services, recognised by 
Briggs as each having ‘its own identity and its own ethos’. 22  Although the BBC attempted to 
speak with one voice and consistency was considered as a guiding principle for wartime 
broadcasting, it was evident that this was difficult to achieve and, by the middle of the war it 
had become apparent that the initial distinction of broadcasting to enemy, enemy-occupied and 
neutral countries was unworkable. The ever changing military situation as well as diplomatic 
turbulence between the allies required constant revaluation of policy and, despite the fact that 
the main objective of the European Service was to act as the ‘Voice of Britain’, adjusting to the 
needs of listeners was also crucial. In this respect, the study of individual sections of the 
European Service offers new opportunities for in-depth examination, allowing for cross-
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reference of the BBC and other foreign archival material and throwing new light on our 
understanding of importance and impact of BBC broadcasting beyond borders. 
With the exception of Jeremy Bennett’s study of the Danish Service conducted in the mid-
1960’s, the BBC foreign services have attracted scholarly examination only recently.23 The 
work of the BBC French Service is particularly well documented. A leading scholar in this 
field, Kay Chadwick, has examined the impact of BBC broadcasts on listeners in both ‘Free 
France’ and under the Vichy administration.24 The subject has also attracted other historians, 
namely Aureline Luneau and Claire Launchbury, with the former investigating the impact of 
BBC French programmes on collective national memory and the latter focusing on cultural 
aspects of wartime broadcasting, paying special attention to sound, poetry and propaganda.25 
Stephanie Seul and Hans-Ulrich Wagner make important contributions to our understanding of 
the BBC German Service, as does Nelson Ribeiro  in relation to the Portuguese Service.26  
The aims of German and Portuguese Service broadcasts differ in important respects: the first 
addressed the audience in an enemy country while the latter targeted a neutral state. 
Nonetheless, these scholars share the same objective, notably, to demonstrate the extent to 
which the British government used the BBC foreign programmes as the instrument of 
propaganda. In contrast, Gloria García González has a narrower focus, investigating the BBC 
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Spanish programmers’ role in supporting the allied cause.27 Given the importance attached by 
the British government to the Balkans during the war, Ioannis Stefanidis’ study of BBC 
broadcasts to Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece and Yugoslavia further enhances our 
knowledge of the importance of the European Service, as does Ester Lo Biundo’s publication on 
the Italian Service.28 The importance of the Czech Service has been recognised by Erica 
Harrison in spite of the significant barriers posed by the fact that the Czech Service bulletins did 
not survive the war. For this reason, her PhD thesis focuses instead on the Czech government-
in-exile’s broadcasts from London.29 
The investigation of individual European services greatly benefits our understanding of the 
service as a whole, as demonstrated by a recent Special Issue of Media History project which 
brings together analyses of the various BBC foreign services in the wartime period mentioned 
above, also to be published in book form.  However, as noted by Seul and Riberio, the editors of 
the Media History Special Issue, this collection is by no means the last word on the European 
Service but rather an important step forward in the synthesis of the BBC transnational 
broadcasting. The present study, for instance, highlights an important gap in our current 
understanding: the importance of the BBC Polish broadcasts has in fact been largely neglected 
by both English and Polish scholars.  
Current state of knowledge of the BBC Polish Service during World War II 
Both Asa Briggs and Gerard Mansell have considered the BBC Polish Service within the 
historical framework of the BBC European Service.30 Briggs’ account, however, is limited – the 
main focus is on Radio Polskie, the broadcasting arm of the Polish government-in-exile, 
transmitting on BBC wavelengths. The author also discusses the listening conditions in Poland 
under German occupation and the role of the Polish Underground in monitoring the BBC 
broadcasts as well as in distributing their content through the clandestine press. Moreover, he 
highlights the importance of the BBC Polish Service in sabotaging German actions in Poland. In 
contrast, Mansell presents a more comprehensive account of the BBC Polish Service, drawing 
on interviews with former employees, including its Editor, Gregory Macdonald. The book also 
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offers insight into the origins of the Service, its relations with the PWE and the Polish 
government-in-exile in London, and its internal affairs. Nevertheless, as is the case with Briggs, 
the Polish Service is only mentioned in the context of the overall structure and work of the BBC 
European Service; the analysis does not explore the actual content of the BBC Polish 
broadcasts. With the exception of these two studies, the work of the Polish Service during 
World War II has been neglected by other British scholars interested in wartime BBC foreign 
language broadcasts.  
Three publications, published in London by the former Polish Service employees, namely, 
Czesław Halski, Antoni Pospieszalski and Zbigniew Grabowski, have greatly contributed to 
state of knowledge in this field. Yet it is only the latter who worked for the Polish Service 
during the war.31 His short article, takes a rather narrow approach to the subject, as does 
Pospieszalski’s. In contrast, while Halski devotes only few paragraphs to the Polish Service 
during the war, primary because he worked for Radio Polskie in this period, he includes a list, 
albeit incomplete and without dates of employment, of Polish Service staff. 
In Poland, too, coverage of this field is rather limited. The earliest study on this subject was 
conducted by Piotr Chróściel in 1995.32 His MA dissertation ‘Zarys dziejów Sekcji Polskiej 
radia BBC: 1939-1995’ [History of the Polish Section BBC: 1939-1995] devotes only a chapter 
to the wartime period and his main focus is on the communist era in Poland. It is evident that 
Chróściel considered the Service’s work during the World War II as a background context, as 
he draws only on secondary sources, primarily Briggs, Mansell, Grabowski, Halski and 
Pospieszalski. 
Pszenicki’s Tu Mówi Londyn: Historia Sekcji Polskiej BBC [London Calling: A History of the 
Polish Section of the BBC] provides a more detailed and therefore more valuable synthetisis of 
the above mentioned works.33 His focus too, however, is on the communist period, dedicating 
only a chapter to the wartime period and origins of the Polish Service. Pszenicki, who worked in 
the BBC World Service from 1973 and, later, from 1988, as Director of the Polish Service, 
gives a wide-ranging account of internal affairs and provides the reader with interesting 
anecdotes. The book, although non-academic, is an excellent source of information about those 
who worked in the Polish Service who, in many cases, the author was privileged to meet in 
person. He does not, however, introduce new material in the chapter on the wartime period or 
reference sources, despite the fact that he clearly relies heavily on the works of Briggs and 
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Mansell. It is also evident that the author makes use of but does not reference a booklet on work 
of the Polish Service written after the war by Wolferstan and Earley.34 This booklet is held at 
the BBC Written Archives and has not been published. 
Other publications which significantly contribute to the state of knowledge on the work of the 
Polish Service include Jan Nowak’s Kurier z Warszawy [Courier from Warsaw], a wartime 
account of Polish courier and a member of the Polish Underground who visited London in 1943 
and 1944.35 His well-documented diary providing information about listening conditions in 
Poland and responses to BBC Polish broadcasts is an indispensable source for scholars. More 
importantly, Nowak himself, had the opportunity to meet many of the BBC staff during his stay 
in the UK as well other Polish and British officials involved in the policy making. His 
comments on BBC programmes as well as policies and the extent to which listeners considered 
them a mouthpiece of the British government are particularly interesting. 
This topic is also a focus for Michael Stenton, who examines Radio London’s impact on the 
Polish Underground. Concentrating on 1943, the author discusses the role of the British police 
in difficult Polish-Soviet diplomatic turbulence.36 Although he does not analyse the Polish 
Service bulletins, he makes extensive use of the BBC and PWE directives, which the Service 
was required to follow. These directives are also the object of examination by P.M.H. Bell.37 
Though his main research question is to which extent public opinion influenced British foreign 
policy towards the USSR, this issue is analysed through the prism of two case studies, namely 
government censorship and propaganda regarding the discovery of the graves of the Polish 
officers at Katyń in 1943, and the Warsaw rising of 1944. Bell, too, makes no use of the BBC 
Polish bulletins, focusing instead on an in-depth examination of the BBC and PWE directives 
for the Polish Service, as well as analysis of the British press and the BBC Home Service 
programmes, to explain the BBC and British government policy towards the Polish audience. 
Finally, scholars examining Radio Polskie’s role during the war, such as Tadeusz Wyrwa, 
Zbigniew Grabowski, Wojciech Włodarkiewicz and, more importantly, wartime Radio Polskie 
Director, Janusz Meissner add to the breadth of coverage.38  Cooperation between the Polish 
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Service and Radio Polskie as well as the extent to which the Polish government-in-exile 
exercised influence on the BBC broadcasts is an important element in understanding the work 
of the Polish Service. The focus of scholars is on Radio Polskie and its difficult relationship 
with the BBC attributable to a censorship policy which was interpreted as pro-Soviet. However, 
the Polish Service programmes and in particular, the Polish Service editors are the subject of in-
depth examination of these publications. Also worth mentioning is Michael Fleming’s 
Auschwitz, the Allies and Censorship of the Holocaust, which includes an analysis of the papers 
and bulletins of the BBC Polish Service. However, the main focus of this study is on the BBC 
coverage and censorship of German atrocities committed in Auschwitz.39  
Theory of Propaganda 
‘The greatest triumphs of propaganda have been accomplished, not by doing 
something, but by refraining from doing (…) by simply not mentioning certain 
subjects’.40 
Any examination of wartime propaganda requires an understanding of its theoretical 
underpinnings. Defining ‘propaganda’ is a difficult task. Over the centuries there has been a 
marked change from the view of propaganda as neither ‘good’ nor ‘bad’ to ‘the attempt of the 
converted to persuade the uncovered’, to being synonymous with ‘lies, distortion, deceit, 
manipulation, mind control, psychological warfare, brainwashing and palaver’.41 The term did 
not originally have negative connotations but instead was used in a neutral way in relation to the 
mobilisation of citizens to participate in public spheres such as social, health or electoral 
reforms and its redefinition came as the result of the two World Wars.42 The word itself 
originated from modern Latin ‘to propagate’, which means to disseminate or promote particular 
ideas; it was used for the first time in 1622 by the Catholic Church with the establishment of the 
Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide (the sacred congregation for propagating the faith).43 
As O’Donnell and Jowett suggest, it was at that point that the word ‘propaganda’ lost its 
neutrality, since the purpose of the Congregation was to spread Catholicism and to oppose 
Protestantism; they argue that the Pope’s plan ‘laid the foundations for modern propaganda 
techniques in that it stressed the control of opinions and, through them, the actions for the 
people in the mass’.44 This interpretation, however, is challenged by Diggs-Brown who argues 
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that the term first took on pejorative connotations in the mid-19th century with the emergence 
of mass society and its influence in the political sphere.45 While Taylor claims that the standards 
in modern propaganda were set up during the First World War, suggesting Britain as the 
precursor of the ‘negative model to follow’, Thore, on the contrary, observes that propaganda 
until the Second World War meant nothing more than ‘harmless exaggeration’.46 Despite this 
scholarly disagreement, there is a broad consensus on the influence of the communication 
revolution and emergence of a mass audience.47 More importantly, since the Second World 
War, propaganda has developed as a systematic peacetime instrument of the national and 
foreign policy of most states.48 
During the 20th century, the term was associated with deliberate persuasion, serving political 
actions or ideologies. However, the term propaganda in our modern understanding did not come 
into use until the end of the First World War.49 It was between 1914 and 1918 that propaganda 
emerged as a significant tool in controlling the public and influencing wider perceptions of 
national self-image.50 As Welch points out, the propaganda was directed ‘towards the home 
population to support the war, towards neutral countries as a means of influence, and towards 
the enemy as a weapon’.51 In Britain, in order to justify the war and to gain public support, the 
government used the press to disseminate atrocity stories in which Germans were presented as 
barbarians and murderers. Under the Defence of the Realm Act (DORA), a system of 
censorship was introduced, requiring editors to submit all material before printing. As Knightley 
concluded: 
‘to enable the war to go on, the people had to be steeled for further sacrifices, and this 
could not be done if the full story of what was happening on the Western Front was 
known. And so began a great conspiracy. More deliberate lies were told than in any 
other period of history, and the whole apparatus of the state went into action to 
suppress the truth’.52 
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After the war, when people learnt the truth, propaganda became associated with the actions of a 
government which sought to lie and distort information in order to achieve its ends. In 
consequence, the First World War created the feeling of mistrust not only between nations but, 
more importantly, between the government and the public. It had such a profound effect that, 
when information about the Nazi extermination camps was broadcast during World War II, the 
public dismissed it as an atrocity story created by the Allies.53 
In the interwar years many scholars, including Lippmann, Dewey and Ponsonby examined the 
patterns and techniques used in the wartime propaganda, leading them to similar conclusions, 
namely, that propaganda is used for manipulation of the masses and maintaining control.54 
According to Ponsonby, propaganda in war time becomes ‘the enemy of independent thought 
and an intrusive and unwanted manipulator of the free flow of information and ideas in 
humanity’s quest for peace and truth’.55 He emphasises that, when passions and emotions are 
high, people are easier to manipulate while democracies are ‘reluctantly forced to accept that 
they might need to fight back’.56 It was important, then, to understand the extent to which people 
were driven by ‘crowd psychology’ rather than rationally crafted political persuasion, 
particularly because it was claimed that the latter was responsible for shortening  the war.57 Both 
Ponsonby and Lippmann, however, agreed that propaganda describes actions of the enemy in 
terms which emphasise that ‘we’ tell the truth and stand by the principles of morality and 
justice.58 In short, politicians, in recognising the ‘power’ of mass persuasion, used traducing and 
lying as the means of vindicating the war and mobilising public opinion. Lasswell had already 
observed in 1927 that propaganda has become an epithet of contempt and hate, and the 
propagandists have sought protective coloration in such names as 'public relations council’, 
'specialist in public education,' 'public relations adviser’.59 
These interwar analyses apply equally to the Second World War. Both Hitler and Stalin 
mastered methods of propaganda in order to implement their totalitarian ideologies, seen as 
offensive to democratic western societies. Interestingly, Goebbels modelled his ministry on 
British First World War propaganda apparatus which he considered a perfect prototype.60 In the 
interwar years, however, British propaganda was based on appeasement whilst the Germans and 
Soviets, on the other hand, focused on racism and communism respectively. Although there are 
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many similarities between Soviet and German propaganda aims, such as state control and 
indoctrination, the main difference laid in the distinction between propaganda and agitation in 
Bolshevik terminology. 61 Whilst Goebbels did not distinguish between the two, the Soviet 
interpretation the aim of propaganda was to spread Marxist-Leninism ideology among the party 
members while the aim of agitation was to influence the masses through ideas and slogans.62 
According to Thorne and Somerville, however, it was Allied propaganda which associated the 
term with totalitarian regimes.63 As was the case for First World War propaganda, it is ‘we’ who 
tell the truth contra the enemy. Jackall challenges this notion claiming that it was Nazi 
propaganda which gave the term a bad name.64 An examination of the Second World War 
propaganda led Taylor to offer a more moderate interpretation; in his view, it was ‘an 
instrument to be used by those who want to secure or retain power just as much as it is by those 
wanting to displace it’.65 
In analysing propaganda, it is important to distinguish between its different forms. Based on the 
source of the information and motivation of the person or organisation, we can distinguish 
between black, grey and white propaganda. Although the goal is the same – namely to gain 
public support in order to justify the war and undermine the enemy – they differ in very 
important respects. The term black propaganda is associated with covert psychological 
operations. It can only work if the recipient is unaware of the deception; the author must 
therefore have sufficient understanding of the capacity of the intended recipient to be deceived 
in order to avoid misunderstanding, suspicion or failure.66 Black propaganda is used by 
governments as overt communication, where the recipient understands that the information they 
have been given originates from an opposing source and also for diplomatic purposes where a 
government does not want to be seen as actively disseminating information which could be 
detrimental to its foreign policies.67 White propaganda differs in that there is no attempt to 
deceive the recipient as to where the information originates and propagandists are open about 
their intentions and aims. Typically, a government will engage in both white and black 
propaganda, the former being used to obfuscate the latter. Grey propaganda on the other hand, 
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describes a situation where the recipient is unaware of where the information originates and 
does not know whether is an example of white or black propaganda.68  
In all forms of propaganda, manipulation of what O’ Donnell calls the ‘symbolic environment’ 
and suppression of information play a very important role.69 As Huxley points out, ‘the greatest 
triumphs of propaganda have been accomplished, not by doing something, but by refraining 
from doing (…) by simply not mentioning certain subjects’.70 The association of propaganda 
only with lies and falsehood, then, is a serious misconception. As Welch observes, ‘it operates 
with many different levels of truth – from the outright lie, to the half-truth, to the truth out of 
context’.71 
More recently there has been a move to a more neutral position. Jowett and O'Donnell, for 
instance, come to the conclusion that ‘propaganda is the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape 
perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behaviour to achieve a response that furthers the 
desired intent of the propagandist’.72 Nelson presents more comprehensive description: 
‘propaganda is neutrally defined as a systematic form of purposeful persuasion that 
attempts to influence the emotions, attitudes, opinions, and actions of specified target 
audiences for ideological, political or commercial purposes through the controlled 
transmission of one-sided messages (which may or may not be factual) via mass and 
direct media channels. A propaganda organization employs propagandists who engage 
in propagandism – the applied creation and distribution of such forms of persuasion’.73 
These definitions, then, focus on the communicative process or, more precisely, on the purpose 
of the process, and allow propaganda to be interpreted as positive or negative, depending on the 
perspective of the viewer or listener. This approach is also shared by Taylor who emphasises 
that we should take propaganda as a ‘value-neutral concept, as a process rather than as 
negative label’.74 The most recent studies concentrate on examination of the impact of mass 
media on shaping and influencing public opinion and behaviour and on the maintenance of 
public order. Herman and Chomsky see the mass media as the main vehicle of disseminating 
propaganda arguing that it ‘manufactures consent’ by ‘filters’ such as ownership, advertising 
and news makers that protect the interest of those in control, limit debate on important social 
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and political issues and shape collective memory.75 In this respect, scholars also investigate the 
role of the media as a ‘soft power’, a concept introduced by Joseph Nye in attempting to 
establish its part in securing national interests and influencing international diplomacy without 
using military force.76 
British Propaganda during the Second World War  
‘The war holds a unique position as the benchmark against which the heroism, brutality 
and futility of modern industrialised warfare had come to be measured.’.77 
The outbreak of the war caught Britain unprepared. Whereas the Nazis had developed a well 
organised propaganda apparatus, British propaganda seems to depend on improvisation.78  To a 
large extent this was the result of the British interwar foreign policy of appeasement, based on 
an assumption that compromise and acceding to Hitler’s demands could preserve peace in 
Europe. It was also a reflection of pacifist tendencies in Britain and the nationalist movement in 
Europe, influenced by fresh memories of the First World War and the global economic crisis. In 
contrast, the German long term strategy had already been articulated by Hitler in the interwar 
years, namely to ‘destroy the enemy from within, to conquer him through himself’ and ‘mental 
confusion, contradiction of feelings, indecision, panic’.79  Yet, the lack of a strategic approach 
to propaganda was also the outcome of government actions taken after 1918. Propaganda was 
considered unimportant and ‘unsuitable’ in peacetime foreign policy, therefore the Ministry of 
Information (MoI) and the Crewe House (the organisation responsible for propaganda against 
Germany in the First World War) were disbanded.80 The association of propaganda with lies 
and distortion employed during World War I had such a profound effect that the British 
government even attempted to ban the word ‘propaganda’ from diplomatic vocabulary.81 
Consequently, until the mid-1930s, the British government did not engage in overseas 
propaganda other than the ‘official service’ provided by the News Department of the Foreign 
Office transmitting news abroad and the British Council, established in 1934 with the task of 
spreading British culture throughout the world.82 The BBC Arabic Service was inaugurated in 
January 1938 in order to counter anti-British German radio propaganda to the Middle East. Yet 
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the importance of the BBC transnational broadcasting was not truly recognised until the Munich 
Crisis in September 1938. 
An assumption was, however, made that German people were not united in supporting Hitler 
and his party. Thus Britain positioned itself as an acquaintance of the German common people 
subjected to totalitarianism, in an attempt to attack and weaken the Nazi organisation from 
within.83 Although on his return from Munich, Neville Chamberlain, officially stood by his 
policy of appeasement, he secretly ordered Sir Campbell Stuart, the director of The Times to 
form a new propaganda department. It was not until spring 1939, however, that the value of 
propaganda against Germany was recognised. The department of which Stuart was a chairman 
was first based at Electra House (EH) and, after the war broke out, was moved to Woburn 
Abbey in Bedfordshire, changing its name to the Department of Propaganda in Enemy 
Countries, also known as ‘the country’.84  The Foreign Office also had its own Political 
Intelligence Department, led by Rex Leeper, which was later attached to EH.  
Equally problematic was the government’s approach to propaganda at home – the MoI was not 
reconstructed until a day after Britain declared war on Germany. But it was clear that mistakes 
made during the First World War could not be repeated. In order to distance itself from fascism 
and communism, the MoI outlined its policy as ‘to tell the truth, nothing but the truth and, as 
near as possible, the whole truth’ as ‘distrust breeds fear much more than knowledge of the 
reverse’.85 The principles driving home propaganda laid in convincing the public that it was the 
‘People’s War’ and, for the first time, the average worker was addressed in BBC broadcasts.86 
Confidence in the government was to be achieved by it assurance of honesty. Scholars, 
however, seem to disagree to which extent the ‘strategy of truth’ was applied in reality. While 
Balfour, Mansell and Briggs argue that the government was averse to the deliberate perversion 
of the truth, McLaine questions this view, recalling MoI directives from March 1940 which 
proposed that a pragmatic approach should be taken, because 
‘truth (…) is what is believed to be the truth. A lie that is put across becomes the truth 
and may, therefore, be justified. The difficulty is to keep up lying … it is simpler to tell 
one big, thumping lie that will then we believed’.87  
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It can also be argued that Balfour, Mansell and Briggs’ assessment of British wartime 
propaganda is based on comparison with German propaganda because, as Carruthers observes, 
‘freedom of speech was, after all, one of the ‘Four Freedoms’ for which the war was 
being fought, as FDR (Franklin D. Roosevelt) and Churchill framed the Allied purpose 
in 1941’s Atlantic Charter’.88  
She goes further by asserting that: 
‘British and American wartime-managers self-consciously set themselves apart from 
their German foe and Soviet ally by cultivating a ‘strategy of truth’, but ‘truthfulness 
was a strategic choice as much as an ideological imperative. A degree of candour 
would encourage citizens to feel that their leaders trusted them to accept even bad news 
with unruffled equanimity’.89  
This notion, however, is challenged by Welch who demonstrates that the government 
recognised the limited capacity of the public to absorb bad news and therefore excluded 
material from dissemination.90 As in the previous war, selectiveness of information became an 
important element of propaganda, both at home and overseas. This practice was not limited to 
bad news; censorship was applied to all information which could undermine the unity of the 
allies’ coalition, weaken public morale or, in general, did not follow the official line of the 
government. Not by lying, but by the selection of news, the government was able in Welch’s 
words ‘to distort reality’. As he explains: ‘silence – even when the facts are known – becoming 
a means of preventing the proper understanding of those facts by modifying the context.’ 91 This 
questions the BBC policy of ‘bad news first’ as it indicates that not all defeats of the allies were 
reported. Seaton, however, argues that, although the government limited the amount of news, 
‘the public knew more than might have been expected’.92 
Despite the government commitment to truth, in the first months of the war ‘official policy 
toward the media remained so shambolic that reporters feared a return to the ‘‘Dark Ages’ of 
1914–15’’.93 As Carruthers points out, ‘in an echo of August 1914, the military imposed a total 
news blackout on the British Expeditionary Force’s dispatch to France’.94 It was only after the 
fall of France in June 1940 that the necessity of coordinating and expanding all agencies 
involved in both overt and convert propaganda was recognised. It was on the initiative of 
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Winston Churchill, who succeeded Chamberlain as Prime Minister in May 1940, that Special 
Operations Warfare (SOE) was established with the task ‘to co-ordinate all action by way of 
subversion and sabotage against the enemy overseas’.95 The Minister of Economic Warfare, 
Hugh Dalton, who was put in charge, divided the SOE into SO1, which took over secret 
propaganda from EH, and SO2, responsible for sabotage. Further attempts to co-ordinate, also 
following Churchill’s intervention, took place in August 1941 with the creation of the PWE, 
with the Ministerial Committee of three in charge: Bruce Lockhart representing the FO, Rex 
Leeper the MoI, and Major General Brooks the Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW), shortly 
replaced by Hugh Dalton.96 As the BBC European Service became recognised as an important 
instrument of propaganda, Ivone Kirkpatrick, who acted as Adviser of Foreign Policy to the 
BBC from February 1941, was invited to join the Committee. This link proved to be particularly 
important as it was the PWE which became responsible for issuing directives to the BBC 
European Service. By the beginning of 1942 it was acknowledged, however, that the work of 
the PWE Ministerial Committee was not effective, resulting in its disbandment and a reshuffle 
of responsibilities: Lockhart was appointed the PWE Director-General; the Foreign Secretary, 
Anthony Eden, took overall charge of propaganda policy; and the newly appointed Minister of 
Information, Brendan Bracken, was responsible for administration. 97  
The main challenge to British propaganda came with Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union in 
1941. The British government took the initiative to convince the public that the Soviet Union 
was no longer an enemy whilst Churchill, who had previously attacked the USSR and warned 
the public about the danger of the communism, addressed Stalin as an ally and called for Anglo-
Russian co-operation.98 As Briggs points out, ‘the USSR entry into the war transformed the war 
in real terms as well as in terms of propaganda’.99 As the main thrust of Britain’s policy was to 
maintain the unity of the allies’ coalition, uncomfortable facts about Stalin’s regime or his 
political manoeuvring in Eastern and Northern Europe became taboo. The BBC played a key 
part in projecting Stalin as an ‘architect of enduring peace and the Red Army as liberator’.100 
References to communism were omitted to the extent that the BBC was required to use ‘Russia’ 
instead of the Soviet Union in their broadcasts.101 Political aspects of the Anglo-Soviet alliance 
are discussed in chapter 3. 
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It was, however, the Atlantic Charter which became the backbone of British propaganda. 
Freedom and the right of nations to self-determination provided an alternative to communism, 
attacking Nazi dogma at its core.102 Less successful was the use of ‘unconditional surrender’ 
towards Germany sprung by Roosevelt at Casablanca in January 1943, as it encouraged the 
Germans to fight to the end and disheartened resistance in Germany. Churchill did not welcome 
this propaganda line; aware of Soviet domination in Eastern Europe, he hoped that, together 
with Germany, Britain would be able to stop the fall of the iron curtain, but officially, in the 
name of allied unity, he supported it, as did the BBC.103 After the end of the war, many scholars, 
including Newcourt, expressed the view that the Casablanca Declaration had a negative effect; 
not only did it give ammunition to the propaganda of Goebbels and strengthen the military and 
civilian morale of the Germans but it empowered Stalin. In fact, he argues, that the war could 
have ended two years sooner.104 
The BBC relationship with the Government 
‘States take uncommonly invasive measures to shape what can be said and shown of 
war, armed with a battery of justifications. Sensitive information must be kept from 
enemy hands; bereaved relatives must be protected from the sight of their loved (…), 
‘morale’ must be maintained – on the home front as at the front line. ‘The ‘fog of war’ 
hints at more than the atmospheric and perceptual murk that envelops battlefields. It 
also alludes to the haze of deception that commonly masks why war is waged and how 
is fought’.105 
Both the independence and the monopoly of the BBC were established before the war by Royal 
Charter in 1927. However, in 1935 the Committee of Imperial Defence decided that, in case of 
war, the government would take over the control of the BBC and all broadcasting.106 A year 
later the same conclusion was drawn by the Ullswater Committee. It was also decided that the 
MoI would be responsible for censorship of all BBC broadcasts. In addition, Reith and an 
official of the Post Office, Thomas Gardiner, had reached an agreement that, if war broke out, 
the BBC Board of Governors would be ‘out of commission’ and the BBC Director-General and 
his Deputy would represent the board whilst the MoI would issue censorship guidelines.107 As 
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Seaton points out, it is surprising that the BBC, which echoed the government appeasement 
policy, was secretly preparing for the war. 108 
Reith considered the agreement a notable achievement because, although Director-General was 
going to be responsible to MoI, he would not be subordinate to it. However, the removal of the 
Governors was met with criticism; it was understood that special measures had to be applied in 
time of war, but it was felt that it was equally important to maintain the perception of the BBC 
as an independent institution. As Briggs points out, given that no specific arrangements were 
outlined, the extent of the control over broadcasting was open to government interpretation and, 
in consequence, both the BBC and the government had gone to war without knowing what their 
relationship would be and, more importantly, what role the BBC was going to play.109   
A few months before the outbreak of the war, the BBC job was defined as to: 
‘mediate information and to convince the educated minority through ‘subtle and 
indirect’ propaganda and for the less educated masses having simple and direct 
massages focused on a defined object and appealing to instinct rather than reason’.110 
Despite the many voices inside Whitehall advocating for the control of Broadcasting House, the 
BBC continued to argue for its independence and recognition of its prominence in supporting 
the war effort. According to Briggs, in the initial stage of war, authority and responsibility 
remained in hands of the BBC, while censorship was defined as ‘indirect, informal and 
voluntary’.111 Yet, as Carruthers observes, during the Phoney War, under the blanket of security 
and military secrecy, the BBC was prevented from broadcasting important information and, 
whilst regular programming was suspended, the BBC ‘crank[ed] out hours of organ music and 
unedifying diet’.112 Whilst the BBC was formally independent, it had clearly ‘entered into 
gentlemen’s agreement’ with the government to accept official guidelines in their treatment of 
public affairs, requiring it to conform to official policy.113 
In fact, the first two years of the war were not the BBC’s ‘finest hour’, primarily because the 
state did not recognise its potential.114 The relationship between the Corporation and the 
government was not defined until Brendan Bracken became MoI in July 1941. Bracken 
recognised the importance of the BBC and saw its independence as a vital factor in winning 
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public trust.115 Rather than control, he sought to establish cooperation with the BBC and 
therefore restored the number of Governors and appointed Home and Foreign Advisers to the 
BBC, Ryan and Kirkpatrick, with the task to carry out official policy. The power struggle 
between the BBC and the MoI, however, continued until the end of the war.   
The extent to which the BBC could exercise its independence remains a subject of debate 
among scholars. While Briggs claims that that censorship was based on the principle of 
voluntarism, Lockhart, argues that ‘there were times (…) when there was more political warfare 
on the home front than against the enemy’.116 In particular, the Admiralty pressed for a 
complete silence regarding war issues and its relationship with the BBC remained very tense 
throughout the war. Yet, according to Lord Normanbrook, the BBC did not always follow the 
MoI directives.117 Whilst Briggs, Mansell and Walker argue that the BBC managed to maintain 
a very substantial measure of independence, Seaton points out that: 
‘“Bias” and opinion are fundamental conditions of the production of news, not 
accidental pathologies. Hence the work of the BBC during the war has been viewed 
with greater scepticism. A belief in its independence is little more than a self-adulatory 
part of the British myth’118 
It is understandable that security measures had to be applied during the war. Yet, by the same 
token, the government used its ‘emergency powers’ to censor broadcasts. Therefore, Seaton’s 
conclusion that the BBC was as independent as the war circumstances allowed is arguably more 
persuasive.119 On the other hand, the BBC knew that it was bound by ‘silken cords’ which 
sometimes felt like ‘chains of iron’.120 Yet, not many people knew that incoming cables from 
the Press Association and Reuters were routed directly into the MoI at their Bloomsbury 
headquarters, allowing MoI censors to excise ‘damaging’ material before wire service 
subscribers received the cables on which many radio broadcasts were based’.121 Moreover, 
broadcasts in foreign languages had to be approved in advance by the security and policy 
censor, whilst the so-called switch censor present during transmission had permission to stop 
the broadcast if variation from the script occurred.122  As Taylor points out, this pre-censorship 
not only allowed the BBC to be seen as a truth telling station but it was ‘so efficient that many 
British and overseas observers were not aware of what was taking place; instead everyone 
                                                          
115 Briggs, op. cit., 1995, pp. 31-32. 
116 Lockhart, op. cit., 1972, p. 96. 
117 Lord Normanbrook, INF, 1/869, 9 July 1941, cited in McLaine, op. cit. 
118 Curran & Seaton, op. cit., p. 139.  
119 Ibid. 
120 Expression used by Sir Allan Powell, 8 December 1943; cited in Briggs, op. cit., 1995, p. 31. 
121 Pronay, N., & Spring, D. W., Propaganda, Politics and Film, 1918-45 (London: Macmillan, 1982); 
Carruthers, op. cit. 
122 Meissner, op. cit. 
 35 
believed that the BBC was telling the truth’.123 On the other hand, editors and reporters became 
their own censors because of their ‘patriotic consciousness’; it was not necessary for officials to 
develop policies in this area as colleagues checked each other ‘for any infractions of the 
officials’ rules with hawk-like vigilance’.124  
The principles of wartime broadcasting 
‘The BBC emerged from the war as both a symbol and an agent of the victory. More 
than at any other time, the BBC was part of, and seen to be part of, the history of the 
nation.’125 
Although the relationship between the BBC and the MoI remained complex throughout the war, 
they shared the same goal notably: 
‘to explain the significance of events as they occur; to keep the essential issues before 
the nation; to inspire determination to see the war through; to reflect the personal 
experience of the men and women in the front line; and to tell the ordinary citizen what 
he must do, and how and why, to cope with the practical problems that confront him in 
the new conditions of total war’.126 
However, this policy, Burns observes, presented the BBC with a ‘perpetual and unresolvable 
dilemma’ because 
‘it has come to be regarded as occupying a position of political power, while it sees 
itself as a politically neutral custodian of the nation’s interests in the uses to which 
broadcasting, as an instrument for the exercise of the political power, may be put’.127  
Thus Burns argues that the position of the BBC during the war was ‘one of responsibility 
without the power’.128 
Broadcasters, however, understood that they could win public trust only by telling the truth.  
Therefore, honesty, credibility, accuracy, comprehensiveness, consistency and objectiveness 
were identified as the main principles of wartime broadcasting.129 It was a tribute to the BBC 
policy of ‘bad news first’, reporting on the allied defeats that the audience were persuaded of 
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their credibility.130 As Walker notes, if the news had not made reference to defeats, listeners 
would not believe later in the victories, as was indeed the case for Germany.131 With the 
expansion of the BBC Overseas Service, consistency became particularly important because 
listeners had tuned not only to programmes in their own language, but also to other foreign 
broadcasts. Many people in Europe understood more than one language and suspicions of 
propaganda resulted in cross-listening.132 Yet, abroad, the BBC was considered as a ‘Voice of 
Britain’ and, after 1940 when Hitler occupied most of Europe, familiarisation with the official 
line of the British government continuing fight against the Axis, was seen as crucial. Unlike 
newspapers, radio reached a wider audience and the BBC broadcasts were considered as ‘an 
authoritative reﬂection of ofﬁcial policy and opinion’.133 This argument demonstrates that, in 
fact, listeners abroad did not care about the constitutional status of the Corporation but, as 
Cruickshank observes: 
‘to both friend and foe – it was the British government and not the BBC that spoke to 
them; and the reason that what was said on British radio had a great impact was not 
that it came from a body known to be independent, but that years of wartime listening 
persuaded listeners that what they heard was the truth’.134 
Foreign listeners also tuned to the BBC Home Service, partly because it was considered free 
from propaganda, partly because the European Service in English was badly jammed.135  British 
broadcasts were listened to in Poland, France, Belgium and as far as North Africa and the 
Middle East.136 
As O’ Donnell points out: 
‘the truthfulness of the BBC was a very powerful weapon; by the end of the war 
German civilians, too, were listening to the BBC in order to find out about conditions in 
their own country’.137 
It was thus truthfulness rather than technological advances, O’Donnell concludes, that helped to 
ensure that the BBC came out of the war as a winner.138  Recent studies, however, question the 
objectivity of the BBC during the war. As Welch observes, selectiveness of information is one 
                                                          
130 Franks, op. cit., pp. 22-3.  
131 Walker, op. cit. 
132 Mansell, op. cit., p. 91. 
133 Curran & Seaton, op. cit. 
134 Cruickshank, op. cit., pp. 180-1. 
135 Briggs, op. cit., 1995, p. 445. 
136 Ibid, pp. 444-5; Walker, op. cit.; Mazur G., Biuro Informacji i Propagandy: SZP-ZWZ-AK, 1939-45 
(Warsaw: Instytut Wydawniczy Pax, 1987). 
137 Jowett & O’Donnell, op. cit., p. 198. 
138 Ibid. 
 37 
of the techniques of propaganda.139 An analysis of the BBC broadcasts, both in English and in 
foreign languages, demonstrates that news had to comply with the Foreign Office guidelines, 
meaning that information which conflicted with the allies’ objectives were censored. Very 
importantly, too, Webb points out that objective does not necessarily mean neutral. 140As 
Cruickshank argues:  
‘although open broadcasting was confined to the truth, on the grounds that honesty is 
the best policy, it did not necessarily have to be the whole truth. While the white 
broadcasters were required to promote the current approved propaganda themes no 
less than were their black brethren, some truths would support them better than others, 
and some were best left untold’.141 
On the other hand, Seaton demonstrates that the ‘BBC’s claim to accuracy and objectivity was, 
in itself, a propaganda weapon – a demonstration of the superiority of democracy over 
totalitarianism’.142 
The BBC European Service as a weapon of war 
‘The BBC itself did more than any other comparable agency both to pull together 
different elements of resistance in each separate European country – by giving news, 
the most important of all its tasks, by providing ideas and inspiration, and at certain 
stages by passing on operational orders – and to spread relevant information between 
the countries. The feeling of generalised ‘resistance’ in Europe, a movement with some 
kind of ‘solidarity’, owed much to BBC reports of what was happening, often 
spontaneously, in scattered countries’.143 
Ten years after the establishment of the British Broadcasting Corporation, the BBC Empire 
Service was launched. In January 1938, programmes in Arabic were introduced as the 
‘counterattack’ to German broadcasts to the Middle East and, two months later, in Spanish and 
Portuguese for Latin America for the same reason. As a result of the Munich crisis, broadcasts 
in French, German and Italian were inaugurated on 27 September 1938. Yet, after the crisis had 
passed, the importance of maintaining broadcasting to Germany, France and Italy was not 
immediately recognised, and a decision to continue these foreign language programmes was 
made on daily basis.144 In May 1939, the Afrikaans Service was inaugurated, but it was not until 
the war broke out that the government considered broadcasting to other important countries. 
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The Hungarian Service started on 5 September, the Polish on 7 September and a day later the 
Czechoslovakian. High demand for reliable news – especially regarding the allies’ military 
progress since, in the countries under German occupation, all radio stations were controlled by 
the Nazis and listening to other broadcasts was forbidden – resulted in rapid expansion of the 
Overseas Service from 10 foreign services in 1939 to 45 by 1945.145 The growing importance of 
addressing people living under the occupation, as well as the  increase in output, personnel and 
number of transmitters, led to a reorganisation in October 1941 which detached the European 
from the Overseas Service. In addition, a special English Service ‘London Calling’, based on 
important items ‘likely to be of appeal to continental listeners’ was introduced. In the beginning 
of 1941 the European Service took the initiative to stimulate resistance activities in occupied 
countries with broadcasts in Morse, bringing the latest news to editors of the underground press. 
In July 1943 their needs were further addressed with a special series of broadcasts in French, 
German, Dutch and English that were read slowly.  
Sponsored by a Treasury Grant, the European Service became the main instrument of British 
propaganda.  As Kirkpatrick points out, it was the only contact with people living under 
German occupation and the only possible tool of propaganda.146 Thus, Nicholas concludes that 
propaganda to occupied countries was not only considered as necessary but 
‘desirable’.147According to Garnett, the European Service 
‘remained a separate organisation with its own hierarchy and outlook throughout the 
war and for long periods pursued its own policy little influenced by the various 
departments which nominally controlled it’.148 
In the beginning of the war, the importance of foreign language broadcasts was not recognised, 
nor was their effect on people living in occupied countries. As Franks observes, the European 
Service: 
‘was viewed by the propaganda effort as a means of stimulating potential insurgency – 
but those who did rise up in the early months and years were doomed because the 
prospects were so hopeless’.149  
Garnett sees the lack of the British Government long-term propaganda policy for occupied 
countries as the main cause of this state of affairs.150 However, the need for centralisation was 
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quickly acknowledged. In June 1940, Noel Newsome, the European News Editor and, from 
December 1941, the Director of the European Service, stated that: 
‘The principle has been accepted in the highest quarters that the Europe Service shall 
act as entity, as an army attacking clearly defined object, and using a strategy laid 
down broadly by the Commanding Officer, and not as a series of guerrilla bands or 
groups of partisans, with no cohesion and entirely self-ordinated plans and aims’.151
     
Although Mansell argues that until 1942 there was no overall plan for the broadcasts to Europe, 
this position can be challenged: from January 1941 the European Service was engaged in the 
‘V’ Campaign aimed at sabotaging Germans actions, while the establishment of PWE in August 
of 1941 laid the foundations for political warfare on occupied countries to be achieved through 
the BBC.152 Its policies informed both the European Service and the black stations, namely: 
‘To prevent the economic exploitation of the countries by Germany and in particular to 
prevent the recruiting and deportation of labour to Germany. 
To build up resistance movements and to service the clandestine press. 
To educate the population in sabotage. 
To organise attacks on the moral(e) of the German occupying forces. 
To discredit and terrorise quislings and collaborators. 
To maintain control of opinion in moments of crisis and to educate the various sections 
of the population on the parts they should play during the liberation’.153 
Mansell’s argument is based on the grievances expressed by the Minister of Information at that 
time, Duff Cooper, at the failure of Churchill and the War Cabinet to recognise broadcasting as 
a ‘weapon of war’.154 Cruickshank, however, disagrees, pointing out that Churchill took a great 
interest in the BBC foreign programmes, particularly when related to military operations.155 
Moreover, if Cooper was right, why did the government attempt to control it? 
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As Briggs asserts, ‘the staple diet in broadcasting to Europe was straightforward news – good 
or bad, told simply but with a punch’.156 Yet those broadcasts had to be comply with the 
political situation and resistance activities in each country, and more importantly, with the grand 
alliance policies towards them. Therefore, different directives applied towards Germany, neutral 
and occupied countries.157 
Each Service had ‘its own identity and its own ethos’ and much depended on the experience and 
personality of the editor and his crew.158 In the beginning of the war, however, before the 
regional structure of the European Service was established, this ethos owed its existence to 
groups of translators. Mansell explains: 
‘Foreign announcers/translators (…) were grouped together in a pool and operated 
under the eye of a team of language supervisors and switch censors – linguists of 
British nationality and known dependability whose job was to ensure both accuracy of 
translation and a faithful reading of the text at the microphone’.159 
All the European Service bulletins were compiled by the Bush House Central Desk. It had full 
access to all available news sources, including: material from news agencies such as Reuter, 
Associated Press, British United Press and Exchange Telegraph, digests of enemy, neutral and 
Soviet Union broadcasts prepared by the BBC Monitoring Service and the official and 
clandestine foreign press. The wires, as it has been noted above, had been pre-censored. Digests 
from the German press and the clandestine press in occupied countries such as Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Holland, Belgium and Norway came through the Stockholm news 
agency in form of cabled extracts in English.160 The material from wires was first checked by 
the copytaster for accuracy and only second for its news and propaganda values.161 When ready, 
stories were distributed to regional editors who added local details and gave ‘policy “slants” 
according to other instructions’.162 Although regional newsrooms exercised a considerable 
degree of independence in the arrangement and wording of the bulletins, as Mansell points out, 
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‘no bulletin could be broadcast without first being checked and stamped by the Policy 
Editor of the day – one of the Centre Desk seniors – so that whatever variations of 
treatment might arise from regional rewriting; consistency of approach was always 
safeguarded in the end’.163 
The power struggle between the European Service and the Political Warfare Executive 
The European Service received policy instructions from PWE through the BBC Controller, 
Ivone Kirkpatrick, with the former being responsible to the MoI and MEW. As a member of 
PWE, Kirkpatrick acted as an important link between the BBC and PWE, yet his appointment 
as Controller was met with reservations because it came from Whitehall and was seen by some 
as a government attempt to take control.164 They were, however, proved wrong: from his first 
day in the office, Kirkpatrick argued for European Service autonomy.165 The Director of the 
European Service, Noel Newsome, who also held the title of Director of Propaganda, was in 
charge of conveying policy to the staff.166 In early 1942, it became evident that the overlapping 
of the BBC and PWE intelligence departments had resulted in confusion. Therefore, in line with 
the recommendation  of the Browett Committee, ‘regionalisation’ was implemented, bringing 
research, analysis and policy under the management of one person, dealing with one country.167 
Consequently, the BBC European Intelligence Section, including its Record Unit which 
prepared Surveys of the European Audience and a Monthly Intelligence Report, and the BBC 
Overseas Research Unit, responsible for analysing foreign propaganda, were disbanded and its 
staff transferred to PWE. Moreover, in order to establish closer cooperation, PWE was moved 
to Bush House in February 1942. This process was fraught with many obstacles, particularly in 
relation to finding suitable staff; for example, separate directors for Poland and Czechoslovakia 
were not appointed until September 1943.168 The regional directives had to be in line with PWE 
central directives, and during weekly meetings at which all PWE Regional Directors were 
present, the general direction of propaganda in broadcasting was discussed. Before reaching 
each of the foreign-language newsrooms, decisions also had to be approved by Kirkpatrick or 
his deputy Harman Grisewood.169 
Nevertheless, as Kirkpatrick notes, the new arrangement did not work in practice because the 
Regional Directors were giving directives directly to the editors without consulting him. 170 
Newsome, who produced his own propaganda directives and Propaganda Background Notes 
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which, in many cases, contradicted official guidelines, was also unhappy about regionalisation 
and threatened to resign.  Garnett, however, criticises Kirkpatrick for his complaint, pointing 
out that the regional structure was put in place because the work of the European Service up to 
that point was deemed unsatisfactory.171 Besides, it was the aim of the reorganisation to 
establish closer cooperation between the Regional Directors and the editors.  
The extent to which the BBC was bound to follow PWE directives remains a subject of dispute 
among scholars. Whilst, according Lockhart and Garnett, PWE gained control over policy and 
output after it moved to Bush House, Briggs argues that the European Service maintained ‘a 
substantial degree of independence’ from PWE and, in fact, its directives were ‘never 
universally obeyed’ allowing for individual judgment.172 He also asserts that the regional editors 
could challenge the directives, which were only circulated after being accepted by the BBC.173 
Yet, what Briggs saw as an advantage, Newsome considered a handicap: he advocated for 
centralisation and for all European Services to act as one entity.174 Briggs also questions 
Bennett’s statement that the PWE had total control of the European output ‘which was its by 
right’, pointing out that his conclusion was based exclusively on analysis of the Danish Service 
and one should not generalise about the European Service where much depended on the 
relationship between individual editors and PWE Regional Directors.175 For example, the Polish 
Editor, Gregory Macdonald, had a considerable share in the preparation of the PWE 
directives.176 Whilst Mansell follows Briggs’ argument, Walker seems to disagree, 
demonstrating that throughout the war the relationship between the two remained ‘fuzzy round 
the edges’.177 Cruickshank too, notes that PWE had the last word regarding the content of the 
broadcasts and how they should be ‘tailored’.178 However, irrespective of the extent of BBC 
independence from PWE, the FO always had the last word regarding policy; it is indisputable 
that BBC broadcasts had to be consistent with the official line of the government, as did the 
PWE directives. As Lockhart points out, ‘PWE did not make policy, it executed it’ and 
Kirkpatrick was perfectly aware of this.179  
The Polish Section of the BBC 
The outbreak of the war had a major influence on the inauguration of the BBC Polish Service. 
Not only was Polskie Radio well established in Poland, operating one national and nine regional 
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channels, but it also broadcast in six foreign languages.180 Therefore when the Foreign Office 
approached its embassy in Warsaw a few weeks before the outbreak of the war regarding the 
possibility of setting up Polish-language broadcasts from London, the answer was that it would 
‘not have a very useful purpose’ and it might be ‘thought impertinent by the Polish authorities 
who now, in fact, have an efficient and unbiased news service of their own’.181 Yet, the 
effectiveness of Polskie Radio was not the only reason why the BBC was reluctant to introduce 
broadcasts in Polish; it was understood that such programmes would have political implications 
and could result in the BBC being accused by Germans of propaganda.182 
The first Polish programme was aired on 7 September 1939 with an opening speech by the 
Polish Ambassador in London, Count Edward Raczyński, followed by the news read by 
Zbigniew Grabowski.183 It should be noted that Polskie Radio continued to broadcast after the 
German invasion, but as the Luftwaffe destroyed major power stations and transmitters, it was 
impossible to maintain regular transmissions. In this period the Polish Service played an 
important role informing people about the situation in the country as well the international 
response to the German attack on Poland. On 21 September, the Polish Service aired a 
memorable speech delivered by the Lord Mayor of London expressing his gratitude to the 
fighters of Warsaw. The next day, the Mayor of Warsaw, Stefan Starzyński, responded on 
Polskie Radio. The last broadcast from Warsaw was heard on 30 September; two days after 
capitulation.184  
In the beginning, the Polish Service was allowed only three 15-minute announcements per day, 
but the time was constantly expanded, transmitting six broadcasts daily by 1944.185 The increase 
of output was reflected in the growing number of the Polish Service personnel. Whilst in 1939, 
the BBC had been employing only three Polish translators/announcers, namely Konrad Syrop, 
Tadeusz Lutosławski and Zbigniew Grabowski, by 1944 over 16 people worked in the Polish 
newsroom.186 The Polish Service worked closely with Radio Polskie, the broadcasting arm of 
the Polish government-in-exile, even when it was still in France and the programmes were sent 
to be re-broadcast in London. Further cooperation was established when, on the invitation of the 
BBC, the Director of Radio Polskie, Krzysztof Eydziatowicz, visited London in March 1940.187 
As a result, a decision was made to include Polish officials’ material in the Polish Service 
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Wednesday and Saturday broadcasts. It should be noted that the Polish Minister of Information, 
Stanislaw Stroński, changed the name ‘Polskie Radio’ to ‘Radio Polskie’ in order to 
disassociate it with pre-war Polish ‘Sanacja’ regime which nominally controlled it.188 After the 
fall of France the Polish government took refuge in London, but failed to secure a ‘free time’- 
the air time allocated to allied governments’ in London, assumed to be ‘free’ from the BBC 
control. Despite this, Radio Polskie continued to prepare material which was, in its view, 
important to Polish listeners, to be used in the Polish Service programmes as well as the Home 
Service. It was only in January 1942 that Radio Polskie was allowed to broadcast on the BBC 
wavelengths. Radio Polskie and the Polish Service maintained close cooperation throughout the 
war as it was in the interest of both that all Polish transmissions were of high quality. Thus, for 
example, Radio Polskie loaned the Polish Service its announcer, the pre-war famous anchor, 
Józef Opieński, whose voice was widely recognised in Poland.189 
Despite the introduction by the German occupiers of the death penalty for listening to or 
possession of radio sets, Poles did not hesitate to tune to the BBC. However, as most of the 
transmitters had been confiscated or destroyed, it was the Polish Underground which monitored 
the BBC bulletins and distributed them in the form of clandestine newspapers and leaflets.190 
Consequently, the BBC ‘V’ Campaign followed by the ‘go slow campaign’ aimed at 
interrupting the work in German factories were widely known and acted upon.191 In addition, a 
special musical code system administered by the Sixth Bureau of the Polish General Staff in 
London was included in some of the Polish Service broadcasts in order to pass classified 
military information or to notify the Underground about the time and place of ammunition 
dropping etc.192  
The work of the Polish Service, however, was overshadowed by Polish-Soviet diplomatic 
turbulences, particularly after the USSR joined the allies’ coalition and demanded annexation of 
territory east of the Curzon line (see chapters 6-9). As Walker points out, the Polish Service was 
‘the most fraught of all’.193 The BBC did not want to be accused of partiality and, more 
importantly, of anti-Soviet propaganda. Issues such as disputes over the eastern border, 
imprisonment of the Polish people in the gulags or the discovery of the Polish officers’ graves 
in Katyń were labelled as ‘sensitive’, thus not reported in detail and forbidden to be commented 
on.194 The Warsaw Uprising of 1944 remained the most controversial issue; Nicholas goes as far 
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as to argue that ‘the British government deliberately misled the BBC about the Uprising’ while, 
at the same time, threatening Russia to reveal the truth’.195 In contrast, Briggs claims that the 
rising was fully reported by the BBC.196 Macdonald, however, admitted that the rising was 
played down by the BBC Home Service and that the British press had intervened in Whitehall 
regarding this issue (see chapter 8).197 The same observation was made by the Director of Radio 
Polskie, Janusz Meissner, confirming that the BBC refused to include reports from Warsaw in 
their broadcasts.198 As Pszenicki points out, after 1941 the BBC became very sensitive about 
Poland’s eastern border, and to any reference to the Soviets. Anything considered anti-Soviet 
was expunged; what fell under this category, however, was fluid and depended on the current 
state of relations between London and Moscow.199 Nonetheless he also maintains that the Polish 
Service was not used as an instrument of British propaganda and reported impartially regardless 
of the political situation. Nowak, however, speaking as someone who personally knew Polish 
Service employees during the war, argues that objectivity was understood by BBC employees as 
merely appearing ‘objective’ to the listeners.200 
In spite of the many competing factions in relation to propaganda policy on Poland, including 
the Foreign Office, the BBC and the Polish government-in-exile, the importance of the 
broadcasts to Poland should not be underestimated. They became a major source of information 
not only for occupied Poland but also for other Poles who, after the German and Soviet 
invasion, took refuge in other countries, as well as for the Polish Army fighting in Europe, 
North Africa and the Middle East. By the middle of the war, London Radio, as it was called by 
Poles, was widely listened to among Polish slave workers in Germany, Polish miners in France 
and Belgium, by the Polish community in London, and Polish refugees in Kenya, where large 
settlements were established, and even in the concentration camp in Auschwitz and by Jews in 
the Warsaw Ghetto.201 A very important role was played by the so-called ‘agony column’ which 
helped to reunite the families of those who managed to escape from Poland after the German 
invasion.202 The Service also connected Poland with the rest of the world and enabled different 
parts of Poland to understand what was happening elsewhere in the country.  
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The broadcasts from London had enormous impact in connecting listeners with the Polish 
government which in 1940 took refuge in Britain as Sikorski became a symbol of independent 
Poland. More importantly, the United Kingdom was seen as Poland’s most important ally and, 
after the collapse of France, the only hope that the fight against the Nazis would continue. 
Britain was not only trusted but also glorified.  The fact that the news came from London 
created a ‘false geographic egocentrism’ and the delusion that Poland was the centre of world 
attention.203  Poles were convinced that the British government knew about German and Soviet 
crimes against Polish citizens and would act to protect them. As Nowak asserts, Poles were 
unaware of their country’s weak diplomatic position whilst the Polish Service encouraged the 
unrealistic belief that Poland was an important ally and confidence that Churchill supported 
Polish side in the Polish-Soviet territorial dispute.204 The Polish Underground, and by extension 
the Polish nation, were convinced that the contribution of the Polish Army fighting in many 
different countries and the fact they had not collaborated with Germans would earn them the 
title of significant ally. 
Polish Service Editors 
Robin Campbell was the first person in charge of the Polish Service.  His position, however, 
was reduced to language supervisor, because in the beginning of the war the foreign language 
services had no separate identity and operated rather as a group of translators.205 He had not 
held the position for long before volunteering for military service in 1940.206 He was succeeded 
by pre-war Reuters correspondent in Warsaw and naturalised Russian, Michael Winch, who was 
in charge of both Polish and Czech Services; his relationship with staff and the Polish 
government-in-exile, however, was particularly difficult, leading to his relocation the 
Portuguese Section.207 His successor, Gregory Macdonald, a graduate of the School of Slavonic 
Studies and devoted Catholic, established a very good relationship with the personnel as well as 
with the Polish government-in-exile, and remained in this post to the end of the war.208 A visit 
to Poland in 1927 and his comprehensive knowledge of Polish history and culture allowed him 
to see the Polish-Soviet conflict from different perspective than his colleagues and he refused: 
‘to seek to bombard Poland either with the kind of anti-Russian broadcasts which black 
stations might have initiated or with optimistic Allied propaganda which assumed that 
there were no political differences between Great Britain and Russia’.209  
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As Briggs points out, Macdonald believed that the most important duty of the Polish Service 
was ‘to report truly and faithfully both news and comment about the war, whatever the political 
situation’.210 Kirkpatrick considered Macdonald as a ‘pre-eminently well qualified and able 
man’ allowing him to exercise a considerable degree of independence in the preparation of the 
bulletins; his views were also taken into consideration by the PWE Polish Region Director, 
Moray Maclaren.211 His commitment and personal attachment to the Polish case were probably 
best expressed in his refusal to carry out an official directive, recommending Poles to accept the 
settlement reached between the Big Three at Yalta Conference in February 1945.212 
The BBC and the Polish Government in Exile 
The relationship between the BBC and the Polish government in exile was threatened at first 
due to repeated attempts by the latter to guide the Polish Service editorial policy, and in 
November 1940, even to gain complete control over output by exerting pressure via contacts in 
the Foreign Office.213 Within the Polish Government some understood the futility of such 
attempts and thought a moderate influence would suffice. The Polish authorities suggested co-
ordination as a means of having its voice heard but even this was dismissed. Finally, a request 
that the BBC allow Polish officials to familiarise itself with content before broadcast was also 
denied.214 Moreover, all items, even official communications from the Polish government, had 
to be first vetted and stamped by a security censor and then by a Morning Editor to check 
compliance with current guidelines. The Polish government was under great pressure as it was 
assumed by Polish listeners that it took part in the preparation of the programmes, therefore all 
complaints were addressed not to the BBC but to the former.215 Whilst in the beginning the 
BBC Polish broadcasts were criticised for having poor news value, after the breaking off 
diplomatic relations between Poland and the USSR, the focus of concern was on pro-Soviet 
propaganda.216 Nevertheless, accommodation to the Underground’s needs was discussed at the 
highest level, particularly before 1942, when the only broadcasts in Polish from London 
available to Polish listeners were those of the Polish Service.217  
The tension between the BBC and the Polish government was also personal in nature. Both 
Winch and Newsome saw the Polish government as ‘feudal reactionaries’ and were openly 
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expressing their dislike of efforts to interfere in broadcasting.218 Grisewood, who personally 
knew Newsome, notes that he ’tended to look on foreigners as lesser people’ and did not 
hesitate to remind them that Britain was the guarantee of freedom in Europe; ‘it mattered little 
to him that such attitudes might be out of place in addressing audiences with their own attitudes 
and sensitivities’.219 Yet, whilst he attacked PWE for being pro-Polish, Stanton’s analysis of 
PWE documents led him to conclude that PWE was pro-Soviet.220 Newsome, was also 
convinced that both the Polish resistance movement and the Polish Home Army ‘were fictions 
created by the Polish government’ and in fact ‘did not exist’.221 Not only had Newsome argued 
that Poles supported Polish communists and sought to compromise with Stalin on the issue of 
frontiers – in contrast with the Polish Underground and Polish authorities in London who he 
saw as anti-Soviet – but he also blamed the latter for the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact and starting 
the war.222 As Mansell observes, the Director of the European Service looked at the Soviet 
Union ‘through rose-tinted spectacles’ and believed in the rightness of Soviet claims to the 
Polish eastern territories; it took the Warsaw rising when Stalin’s political manoeuvring came 
into the open, to change his view.223 
After Macdonald became Editor of the Polish Service, the relationship with the Polish 
government-in-exile improved and, whilst they continued to express their dissatisfaction 
regarding Polish programmes, they also showed appreciation.224 Macdonald invited Count 
Jundziłł- Baliński, the Polish MoI Liaison Officer with the BBC, to sit in at weekly meetings as 
he understood that maintaining close cooperation with the Polish authorities was essential, 
given that the Polish Underground was the main receiver and syndicator of the Polish Service 
broadcasts. More importantly, it was thanks to the communication between the Polish 
government in London and the Polish Underground that the BBC was able to learn both about 
the situation and listening conditions under German and Soviet occupation in Poland and to 
receive feedback.225Additionally, a network of traveling couriers was established between 
London and Poland, usually traveling through neutral Sweden; these were able to give direct 
reports on the situation in Poland and, while in London, were also questioned by the BBC.226 
Nevertheless, the relationship between the BBC and the Polish government remained tense to 
the end of the war, primarily because whilst the former took a pro-Soviet outlook, the latter 
remained reluctant to compromise on issues central to the Polish case. The Polish MoI regularly 
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attacked the BBC arguing that censorship was too extensive, especially when the Polish Service 
failed to report on Soviet government political manoeuvres or crimes committed against Polish 
citizens. Protests were also made after Polish officials were banned from addressing the 
population east of the Curzon line and, after January 1943, from talking about the Polish-Soviet 
border or mentioning that Poland was the only country without quislings.227 Whilst Stalin’s 
speeches and the Soviet newspapers open attacks on the Polish government and questioning its 
position as a representative body of the nation were constantly quoted in the British press and 
by the BBC, the Polish government was left without the right of response. By the beginning of 
1944, Poland was seen as a ‘the inconvenient ally’ and, as the conflict between Poland and the 
USSR deepened, pro-Soviet equalled anti-Polish publicity.228 According to the British 
ambassador to the Polish government-in-exile, Owen O’Malley, this sentiment was: 
‘stimulated by all Government departments, nearly all newspapers, the BBC, the Army 
Bureau of Current Affairs, the Army Education Department, the Political Warfare 
Executive, and every other organ of publicity susceptible to official influence’.229  
Any comments from Polish officials were seen as a threat to the Polish-Soviet relationship 
which, in consequence, could affect allied relations. Nicholas notes that the BBC at that time 
was preoccupied with picturing the Soviet Union as an important ally.230 The ‘Russian 
commentary’, broadcast by the BBC from the same year and dispatched by the Sunday Times 
correspondent, Alexander Werth played a significant role in this process. Werth held the view 
that the USSR was friendly towards Poland and that their main interest was in peace.231 He 
argued that Polish demands with regard to the eastern territories and accusations that Stalin had 
committed atrocities were unreasonable. According to the British Institute of Public Opinion, by 
mid-1942 Russia had become the most popular ally.232 The references to public opinion are 
important with respect to the Polish Service broadcasts. Both Nicholas and Bell demonstrate 
that public opinion had a direct influence on the British government’s foreign policy which, in 
consequence, had a significant impact on BBC programmes.233  Anxiety over upsetting Stalin 
worked as a censorship policy in itself. In this respect, the BBC Czech Service was able to 
maintain more freedom and the Czech government-in-exile was subject to less censorship than 
Polish, due to its cooperation with the USSR. The fact, however, that the Czech Service Editor, 
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Sheila Grant Duff was married to the Director of the European Service Director, Noel 
Newsome, should also be taken into consideration. 234 
It can be argued that the internal affairs of the Polish MoI had as much negative impact on its 
relations with the Polish Service as its attempt to interfere in the BBC broadcasts. Both directors 
of Radio Polskie, Józef Kisielewski and his successor, Janusz Meissner, describe their 
relationship with the Polish Minister of Information, Stanislaw Stroński, as ‘difficult’.235 Things 
improved during the time of Stanisław Kot and Adam Pragier, the two people that succeeded 
him, who allowed for more freedom in the preparation of bulletins and personal judgment. The 
last Director of Radio Polskie, Karol Wagner, in particular, enjoyed more conducive liaison 
with Polish officials. 
Listening Conditions in Occupied Poland 
In the part of Poland occupied by the Germans, listening to, or possession of, a radio set was 
punishable by death and the only legal access to news was provided in German via street 
megaphones.236 Poles were ordered to return their sets. However, this policy was so ineffective 
that the same order continued to be published in the local German newspaper until March 1940. 
The Volksdeutsche, namely Poles of German ethnicity, and the German administration were 
allowed to listen to radio, but accessing non-German stations was forbidden. Kwiatkowski 
points out that during the war, ‘the possession of the radio sets next to weapons was seen by 
Germans as a direct attack on the Third Reich’.237 People were very reluctant to return their 
radio sets and many of them remained well hidden throughout the war, while others were 
purposely destroyed before they could be found by the authorities.238 The hunger for 
information and the feeling of being cut off from the outside world meant that many Poles 
disobeyed the orders and were willing to risk their lives in order to listen to the BBC. With 
growing terror and evidence of crimes committed against Polish citizens, listening to the radio 
became a symbol of resistance. Moreover, after the German attack on the USSR, sets were also 
offered as a bribe to those who voluntarily signed the Volksliste, with the aim of spreading anti-
Soviet propaganda rather than providing reliable information. The death penalty for tuning to 
non-German stations remained in place to the end of the war. 
For all these reasons, the majority of the population did not have access to the radio; it was the 
Polish Underground which monitored the BBC stations and clandestinely distributed news in 
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various forms, from professional papers and leaflets to the little so-called ‘strips’.239 The 
Underground monitored not only broadcasts in Polish but also in German, French and English. 
The hunger for reliable information on the progress of the war pushed people to take extreme 
action. For example, Witold Pilecki organised the monitoring of the BBC Polish broadcasts in 
Auschwitz and shared the content with his camp mates, whilst recently published research 
demonstrates that, even in the Warsaw Ghetto, Jews were listening to the BBC and 
disseminated information in form of clandestine papers.240  
The control of broadcasting was also important for the Soviets, but for different reasons. Listing 
to or possession of wireless sets was not forbidden under Soviet occupation. However, in this 
largely rural area, radio density was never significant. Already on the first day after entering 
Polish territory, Russians occupied Polish stations in Barnowice, Wilno and Lwów. 241 
Broadcasts in Polish, Ukrainian, Byelorussian, Lithuanian, Russian and Yiddish were used 
purely for communist propaganda. Therefore, not only were Poles allowed to listen to the radio, 
but, as Jasiewicz points out, they were encouraged to do so.242 In addition, as the Germans had 
done in the west of Poland, the Soviet authorities distributed radio sets to those regarded as 
future collaborators and supporters of the regime.  But in contrast with the Germans, the Soviet 
regime considered indoctrination as their main objective. Consequently, shops selling and 
repairing radio sets were opened. Although there was no law in place forbidding listening to 
foreign stations, those caught were usually arrested and detained.243 The same measures were 
applied to those who spread information. Poles were also required to register their sets but they 
disregarded the order.244 Given communist indoctrination and the fact that Stalin claimed that 
the Polish State had ceased to exist, spreading news about the Polish Army and the Polish 
government-in-exile was seen as criminal and ‘counter-revolutionary activity’.245 There has, 
however, been very limited research to date regarding listening conditions and audiences in the 
Eastern part of Poland. 
Coverage of the Holocaust 
The coverage of the persecution and extermination of the Jews remains one of the most 
controversial issues of the Second World War and, although scholars disagree with regard to 
when the allied governments learnt about it, there is consensus that the Holocaust was not given 
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prominence by the BBC.246 Seul, whose work concentrates on an analysis of the BBC German 
Service, points out that, although the British government was already aware of the persecution 
of Jews in Germany in 1938, it considered this ‘an internal German affair’ which, given 
Chamberlain’s policy of appeasement, it was not willing to challenge.247 In fact, it was not until 
the allied declaration on the fate of Jewry in December 1942 that the Holocaust was addressed 
in BBC German broadcasts, primarily because Germans were considered anti-Semitic and 
‘propaganda sympathising with the Jews or appearing to be under Jewish inﬂuence was 
doomed to be ineffective’.248 In October 1939 the British White Paper on concentration camps in 
Germany was presented to Parliament by Lord Halifax, but remained classified, not because the 
sources of this report were considered unreliable, but because it was feared that the British 
government would be accused of atrocity propaganda, as was the case after World War I, 
consequently giving ammunition to Goebbels.249 In contrast, both in 1939 and in the years 
following the war, special attention was given to assurances that the Jews were not the only 
oppressed ethnic group.250 In order to attack the German propaganda at its core it was essential 
not to imply that the war was fought to save the Jews; the acknowledgment of the Holocaust 
meant that the Allies would be forced to act, something they were not prepared to do.251 
The main intelligence reports came from Poland as this was the place which the Nazis chose for 
their death camps and genocide of Jews from all over Europe. Despite the fact that Hitler’s plan 
for ethnic cleansing had been outlined in Mein Kaempf, this was not a matter of debate in 1939, 
a time when more non-Jewish than Jewish Poles were subject to persecution.252 Initially the 
Auschwitz camp had been for Polish POW’s and it was only thanks to Witold Pilecki, who 
volunteered to go to the camp, that German plans were exposed.253 Although his reports were 
passed to the Polish government in London, their reliability was questioned. In early 1942 allied 
                                                          
246 See Wasserstein, B., Britain and the Jews of Europe: 1939-1945 (London: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 
1979); Laqueur, W., The Terrible Secret: Suppression of the Truth about Hitler’s Final Solution, 
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1980); Gilbert, M., Auschwitz and the Allies: How the Allies 
responded to the news of Hitler’s Final Solution (London: Michael Joseph, 1981); Silberklang, D., 
‘The Allies and the Holocaust: A Reappraisal’, in Yad Vashem Studies 24, 1994, pp. 147–176; Terry, 
N., ‘Conﬂicting Signals: British Intelligence on the Final Solution through Radio Intercepts and Other 
Sources’, 1941–1942’, in Yad Vashem Studies 32, 2004, pp. 351–396. Seaton, J., ‘Reporting 
atrocities: the BBC and the Holocaust’, in Seaton. J., and Pimlott. B., (eds.), The Media in British 
Politics (Aldershot: Gower, 1987), Seaton, J., ‘The BBC and the Holocaust’. European Journal of 
Communication, 2 (1), London, 1987, pp. 53-80; Harris, J. D., ‘Broadcasting the Massacres: An 
Analysis of the BBC’s Contemporary Coverage of the Holocaust’, in Yad Vashem Studies 25, 1996, 
pp. 65–98; Seul, S, The Representation of the Holocaust in the British Propaganda Campaign 
directed at the German Public, 1938–1945, Leo Baeck Institute Year Book 52 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007); Fleming, op. cit. 
247 Seul. op. cit. p. 271. 
248 Ibid, p. 273. 
249 Kushner, The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination, pp. 41, in Seul, op. cit., p. 277. 
250 Wasserstein, op. cit. 
251 Seul, op. cit. p. 280. 
252 Snyder, T., Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin (London: Basic Books, 2012). 
253 Cyra, A., Ochotnik do Auschwitz – Witold Pilecki 1901–1948 (Oświęcim: Rytm, 2000). 
 53 
intelligence, however, learnt about the Nazis plans for the final solution and it was eventually 
decided that the issue should be made public. In July 1942, the British Minister of Information, 
Brendan Bracken, organised the press conference at which the extermination of the Jewish 
population in Poland was addressed by the media. Stenton, however, argues that it was done in 
response to the atrocities committed on Poles by the Soviets in order to ‘fill minds with Nazi 
horror as to leave no room for the dread of other oppressions’.254  
The most influential report was delivered to the West by the Polish courier, Jan Karski, in 
November 1942. It was followed by an official statement delivered in London by the Polish 
Foreign Ministry entitled The Mass Extermination of Jews in German Occupied Poland. Based 
on authentic documents, it provided evidence of the scale of the extermination of Jewish Poles 
already carried out by the Germans; although acknowledged by the allied governments, little 
action was actually taken. As Lagueur and Seaton point out, the extent of Nazi atrocities against 
the Jews went beyond human imagination; the post-war claim that the allies were not in 
possession of reliable data, demonstrates that this was an issue of belief. 255 Seaton concludes: 
‘the BBC and the Foreign Office refused to accept that extermination of Jews was part of an 
intended program’, but also, there was no will to act.256 Only with the final defeat of Germany, 
Churchill and Roosevelt argued, could help be given to European Jewry.257 
The lack of action from the Allied powers during the Warsaw Ghetto rising in 1943 drove 
Shmuel Zygielbojm, the representative of the Jewish Bund in London to the Polish exile 
government, to take drastic measures.  In order to show his support, he burnt himself in his 
apartment, thus identifying himself with ‘the fate of his fellow Jews in Warsaw’.258 As Seaton 
and Seul point out, after December 1942 the genocide of Jews was not given prominence in the 
BBC broadcasts.259 This was a reflection of British government policy; apart from the allies 
above mentioned declaration in December 1942, no other official protest to Hitler was issued 
nor was the Holocaust considered a propaganda theme.260 Yet, as demonstrated above, the BBC 
was in the possession of material documenting the Holocaust. 
The liberation of the concentration camps in 1944 initiated a discussion among scholars, 
journalists and politicians, endeavouring to explain why the Allies had failed to respond to the 
Final Solution and why the media offered such limited coverage of the Holocaust. From the 
1960s onwards, scholars attempted to answer these questions, suggesting as the main reasons: 
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lack of understanding; anti-Semitism; and in particular, the fact that saving the Jews was not 
one of the allies’ war aims.261 Seaton also demonstrated that anti-Semitism among the BBC staff 
as well as the British public was a big factor.262 A recently published book by Fleming throws a 
new light on our knowledge and understanding of this subject, by providing an analysis of 
previously undiscovered documents and, demonstrating that wartime censorship was the main 
obstacle to the dissemination of news.263  
 
Conclusion 
Issues of censorship and propaganda during the Second World War, and the role of the BBC in 
this process, have received widespread attention in the literature. In particular, Briggs provides a 
comprehensive analysis and, as demonstrated in this literature review, other scholars built up 
their arguments based on his primary research. Nonetheless, the BBC European Service has not 
been subjected to the same in-depth examination as the Home Service. Furthermore, there has 
been very limited discussion of the Polish Service, which is surprising given the importance 
attached to the Polish broadcasts by listeners in Poland and the Polish government-in-exile. Nor 
has the role of the PWE impact on broadcasting been examined in depth: Garnett’s book on the 
history of the PWE waited over 50 years for clearance to be published. Most importantly, this 
literature review demonstrates that the BBC claim to objectivity and neutrality is questionable; 
the European Service was designed as an instrument of British propaganda and therefore was 
demonstrably not neutral. Broadcasting to Europe was selective in nature and all information 
was censored before it could be transmitted. This was particularly evident in coverage of the 
Soviet political manoeuvring, the Warsaw rising and the Holocaust.  
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Methodology 
 
Introduction 
This chapter provides an explanation and justification of methodological approaches employed 
in the present study. Documentary analysis within a qualitative research framework is used to 
demonstrate the extent of the conformity of Polish Service broadcasts with British government 
foreign policy during World War II. This analysis, approached from two main angles – the 
history of the BBC and the history of wartime Grand Alliance diplomacy – and is based mainly 
on primary sources, the most important of which are the BBC papers and, in particular, the 
scripts of the Polish Service bulletins and Political Warfare Executive (PWE) directives for the 
Polish Service. These sources, however, are supplemented by other archival materials, both 
Polish and British, such as minutes of meetings, private correspondence, official memoranda, 
surveys of Polish audiences, and general guidelines and directives of relevance to the main 
research question. Given the limitations of collective and individual memory, which as recent 
studies demonstrate, can fundamentally contradict long established historical accounts, memoirs 
and dairies are used only for purposes of support and cross-reference.1 Difficulties related to 
accessibility and trustworthiness of these various sources will be discussed.     
Historical research 
Historical research involves examination and analysis of primary sources, with a view to 
minimizing the bias introduced by retrospection and reconstruction associated with both 
individual and collective memory. As Nora points out, individual memory is: 
‘in permanent evolution, open to the dialectic of remembering and forgetting, 
unconscious of its successive deformations, vulnerable to manipulation and 
appropriation, susceptible to being long dormant and periodically revived’.2 
There is also a close correlation between individual and collective memory; both, in an attempt 
to reconstruct the past, offer relatively limited and subjective accounts of historical events. This 
can be observed, for instance, in the memoirs of Churchill and Eden which, although written in 
the form of a diary, omit certain political developments, concentrating instead on the vindication 
of their decisions. A similar observation can be made in relation to the wartime history of the 
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BBC and the PWE. Lockhart, as the head of the PWE, argues that the BBC had to follow the 
PWE directives, while Kirkpatrick, acting as the Controller of the BBC European Service, 
maintains that these directives were open to interpretation and that the last word belonged to the 
BBC. It can be argued that an awareness of ‘writing history’ shapes recollection of the past. 
This argument is also relevant to the recollection of the war events by the Polish politicians and 
the members of the Polish Underground. Therefore, in this study, both Polish and British 
sources will be used in order to present as neutral and impartial account as possible. 
Sources 
BBC Written Archives, Caversham 
The thesis primary draws on records from the BBC Written Archives in Caversham, such as 
bulletins of the Polish Service, news directives for the European Service and the minutes of 
meetings of the Polish Service as well as papers dealing with organisation and work of the 
European Service in general. In addition, attention will be paid to intelligence documents on 
audience and listening conditions in occupied Poland, details of the personnel working for the 
Polish Service and information on the BBC Monitoring Papers, all of which potentially provide 
valuable supportive evidence for the analysis of the BBC sources. In all cases, the limitations of 
these sources will be considered. 
Bulletins of the Polish Service 
The thesis is based on the written scripts of the Polish Service bulletins. This collection is, 
however, incomplete. The most probable explanation is that, given the difficult war 
circumstances, storage of the bulletins was not a BBC priority. The BBC History Manager, John 
Escolme, points to another possible explanation: ‘as the Polish Service would have operated 
with limited funds and budgets for archiving were not covered centrally, this may have resulted 
in documentation being lost’.3 There are no bulletins from 1939–1940; the first available 
bulletin dates from 8 April 1941. Other extensive gaps, namely, December 1941–December 
1942, August 1943–April 1944 and November 1944–February 1945, have served as obstacles to 
analysis, as well as smaller gaps sometimes extending over weeks or months. However, the 
content of the bulletins was often also discussed during the meetings or in the news directives as 
well as private correspondence, making it possible to establish what was broadcast. 
Table 2.1 below provides detailed data of surviving and missing bulletins where bulletins that 
survived the war are indicated in blue. 
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Table 2.1: Bulletins which survived the war 
The Polish Service bulletins available at Caversham are not written in in English but in Polish. 
This is due to strict wartime censorship which required that all bulletins had to be checked for 
security and compliance with official policy and vetting and could be done only by British 
nationals. As the European Service was recognised as the ‘Voice of Britain’, charged to provide 
news from the British point of view, the ‘main story’ of the day in all European broadcasts came 
from the Central Desk whilst the regional editors added material addressed to the audience of 
the country they were broadcasting to. In order to safeguard consistency and accuracy, all 
bulletins had to be stamped by policy and security censors. However, the BBC was also well 
aware that not all European Service programmes could broadcast the same information. In the 
case of the Polish Service, information dealing with the Soviet Union was seen as particularly 
sensitive; thus it was important that censors followed the PWE directives. Yet the general 
subject of the Soviet Union was problematic, given that, before the war broke out, Churchill 
openly attacked Stalin’s regime. After the German attack on the USSR in 1941 when the Anglo-
Soviet alliance was signed, the BBC responded to the government’s foreign policy by omitting 
communist titles and using Russia instead of the Soviet Union in the broadcasts, in order to 
avoid the connotations associated with the communist political system and illegal annexation of 
the eastern territories to Russia.4 
Each of the bulletins contains a stamp with either ‘pass for security’ and the initials of the 
person who checked it in blue, or ‘pass for policy’ with initials in regular grey pencil. 
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According to a Kirkpatrick memorandum, the policy vetting could be done only by: The 
Director of the European Service or his Assistant, the Chief Sub-Editor of the day or night, the 
Dawn Editor or his Assistant and the European News Editor or his Assistant.5 Only then were 
the bulletins sent to the language supervisor whose job was to assure that there was no variation 
from the English text in the translated copy. However, according to the BBC Staff list from 
1942, rather than require the European Service Director or other editors to vet bulletins for 
policy, the BBC appointed separate Policy Editors namely, J.S. Dean, C. Hulme and A.R. 
Birley, whilst the latter’s initials appear also on the security stamp of the Polish Service 
bulletins.6 With regards to the security editors, among other initials such as JWF, F, GA, GP, 
AC it was possible to identify only the one which belongs to the European Productions 
Supervisor, Gibson Parker. 
The colours correspond to marking on the scripts, but regular pencil is also used for editing. 
However, it is evident that grey pencil was also used for erasing terms and sentences which 
could be found offensive to Polish listeners or which expressed views contrary to British 
government political principles. In addition to the BBC Polish bulletins, the BBC Home Service 
news bulletins were used (see chapter 8) in order to compare the coverage of the Warsaw rising 
of 1944. It should be clarified that the present study uses wartime terminology. Therefore, what 
today is known as the BBC Domestic Service is referred to as the Home Service. Its wartime 
bulletins are available only on microfilm. 
BBC News Directives and Minutes of Meetings for the Polish Service  
Given the main issues discussed in this study, notably wartime propaganda and censorship, the 
European News Directives are a particularly important source of information. Issued until 
October 1944 by the Director of the European Service, Noel Newsome, and later by his 
successor, Douglas Ritchie and, occasionally, by his assistant, Donald Edwards, they provide an 
essential framework for the analysis of Polish Service output. Nonetheless, they need to be 
approached with caution, since even important political developments such as the breaking off 
diplomatic relations between Poland and the USSR, the discovery of the graves of the Polish 
officers at Katyń, the Warsaw Ghetto rising and the Warsaw rising, receive minimal attention in 
these documents, possibly because of their extreme sensitivity or the fact that the fate of Poland 
was not main concern of the British government. However, Newsome’s personal political views 
may also have played a role. The Propaganda Background Notes written by Newsome and other 
papers criticising the Polish government-in-exile and the Polish Underground clearly 
demonstrate his pro-Soviet and anti-Polish outlook (see chapters 5-6). It should, however, be 
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clarified that the contemporary understanding of the term ‘propaganda’ did not have the same 
negative connotations as it has today. It was a term used at the time in government foreign 
policy documents, and by extension, the BBC (see chapter 1). 
Equally important were the minutes of the meetings dealing with the Polish Service broadcasts. 
Although Pszenicki mentioned these minutes (without referencing), it has been impossible to 
locate them in the BBC Written Archives or other archives. The only minutes of meetings 
available in Caversham refer to the Committee which was established in 1940 to deal with 
coverage of all affairs related to Poland by all BBC Services and, in particular, the Polish 
Service, Radio Polskie and the BBC Home Service. During these weekly meetings, all issues 
related to politics, output and staffing were discussed. Chaired by the Director of the European 
Service, they were attended by the Editor of the Polish Service and Radio Polskie, PWE the 
Regional Editor, the Language Supervisor, the Liaison Officer between the BBC and the Polish 
Ministry of Information and the BBC Intelligence Officer for Poland. The first meeting took 
place in November 1940, indicating that, although the BBC would seem to have considered 
feedback from the Polish authorities as interference, there was political pressure to take 
broadcasting to Poland seriously by addressing the needs of the Polish Underground and the 
views of the Polish government in London. As is case of the Polish Service bulletins, however, 
not all the minutes of these meetings survived the war. For example, there are notable gaps in 
April and May, the exact time when the graves of the Polish officers at Katyń were discovered 
and when the rising in the Warsaw Ghetto was taking place, causing real difficulties for analysis 
of BBC policy regarding the coverage of these events. Other files at Caversham discussing the 
work of Radio Polskie and correspondence between the Polish Ministry of Information and the 
BBC are also pivotal in understanding the relationship between the two and how they impacted 
the Polish Service. 
Audience and listening conditions in occupied Poland  
Issues of audience and the accessibility of the Polish Service broadcasts in Poland need separate 
explanation. It was essential for the purpose of this thesis to establish who listened to the Polish 
Service broadcasts. Given the wartime circumstances, and the fact that listening to the BBC was 
punishable by death under the German occupation, it was the Polish Underground which 
monitored and disseminated the content of the Polish broadcasts in form of the clandestine press 
and leaflets. In particular, Radio Journal [Dziennik Radiowy], edited by the Radio Department 
of the Polish Bureau of Intelligence and Propaganda (BIP), is an invaluable source of 
information, some copies of which can be found in the Central Archive of Modern Records in 
Warsaw. However, the Underground monitored not only the BBC Polish programmes but also 
French, German and English broadcasts, as well as Radio Polskie. Everything was written in 
Polish and, in most cases, there was no indication of which broadcast the content was based on 
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and thus it was impossible to establish the source of the information. For this reason, the Radio 
Journals were not used as cross-reference material. 
Listening to foreign stations was not forbidden by law under the Soviet occupation, but given 
the low density of listeners before the war and the fact that, after the entry of the Red Army, 
Polish homes were exposed to looting, not many radio sets survived. It is true that the Soviet 
occupants distributed sets and there is no shortage of evidence that Poles were listening to 
Radio Moscow. But very limited research to date has focused on the listening habits and 
number of radio sets in the part of Poland annexed by the USSR. Equally, not much was known 
about it by the Polish Underground during the war. Whilst the Germans kept detailed reports, 
the Soviet documents are preoccupied with radio indoctrination rather than foreign broadcasts. 
However, this conclusion is based on Polish and British sources. Further research, requiring 
knowledge of the languages spoken in countries which formed part of Poland before the war, 
would be necessary to support this thesis.   
I have also tried unsuccessfully to locate surviving listeners. Even the placing of announcements 
in the Worldwide Association of the Polish Home Army Soldiers’ newsletter failed to bring 
results. For the reasons listed above and the fact that over 65 years had passed since the war, it 
became evident that this quest would be impossible.  
Detailed analysis of listening conditions, audience estimates, the number of radio sets and 
feedback on BBC Polish broadcasts can be found at Caversham. Reports prepared by the Polish 
Underground and made available to the BBC through the Polish government-in-exile, and 
which also include accounts of witnesses who escaped from Poland, provide great scope for 
researchers. However, given that communication between Soviet and German zones was 
extremely difficult, the exact number of listeners and wireless sets was impossible to establish. 
It should also be noted that an unknown number of sets had been destroyed and hidden. A 
further obstacle is that estimates of radio sets remaining in Polish hands under German occupied 
territory are based on German reports of sets which had either been confiscated and distributed 
to Volksdeutsche (Poles of German ethnicity) and, while it is acknowledged that there were 
more sets in USSR occupied Poland, there is no data available on exact numbers. In addition, 
many reports do not distinguish between crystal and valve sets and, as foreign broadcasts could 
be accessed only on valve sets with a shortwave band, it is impossible to establish how many 
people actually listened to the BBC Polish Service, how many were Polish nationals and, how 
many had become German subjects.  
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Personnel of the Polish Service 
Establishing who worked in the Polish Service and when was a very difficult task since only the 
staff lists from 1939, 1940 and 1942 survived the war. Of these, only the staff lists from 1940 
and 1942 include a detailed list of employees. The first, located at the BBC Written Archives, 
was created in August 1940 after the French surrender, at which point the German attack on 
Britain became inevitable and Broadcasting House was preparing for evacuation. It mentions all 
BBC employees at that time, from cleaners, page boys and catering personnel to BBC directors. 
The introduction states that the list should be updated each week; in a time of all-out war, 
changes among staff were very common with many volunteering for military service; this 
resulted, in some cases, in less experienced colleagues taking their places. The other staff lists 
(1939 and 1942) show only the name of the editor and his secretaries; the 1942 list, which, 
includes only staff of the Polish Service, surprisingly, is to be found at the Churchill Archives 
Centre in Cambridge and not at Caversham.7  
Therefore, the staff lists used in this study are based on examination and cross-reference of: 
names of the announcers provided on the written copy of the bulletins, memoirs, BBC internal 
documents and secondary literature. None of these sources give full lists. Thus the discussion of 
staffing in chapter five is based on an attempt to reconstruct the information from multiple 
sources. The year 1944-45, in particular, is incomplete and does not account for everyone 
working in the Polish Service at that time.  
Other complications arise from the fact that, at the time this research was undertaken, all 
employees of the Polish Service had died and none had left a memoir. However, I have 
interviewed two post-war Polish Service employees, namely Teresa Myskow and Waleria 
Sawicka. Mrs. Myskow, who currently lives in Luxemburg, worked as the Polish Service 
Programme Assistant Producer in the 1960s, when some of the Polish wartime broadcasters 
were still working for the BBC. Mrs. Sawicka, worked as the Polish Service Programme 
Secretary in the 1970s and still lives in London. Their accounts were particularly helpful in 
providing important biographical details of the Polish Service wartime employees.   
In addition, the BBC Human Resources files stored at Caversham provide valuable biographical 
information, as well as discussion of Polish Service internal affairs. The biographical index of 
the Polish Service employees in Annex 1 is based, to a large extent, on information from these 
files. It is complemented by data from Pszenicki’ s History of the Polish Section BBC as well as 
observations from the memoirs of Radio Polskie staff, in particular, Halski, Meissner and 
Budny, cross referenced with primary sources. However, the BBC does not hold the files of all 
                                                          
7 Other materials at the Churchill Archives Centre are duplicates of documents from the BBC WAC and 
the National Archives.  
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the Polish Service employees and other sources also provide limited data on Polish Service 
wartime personnel. Therefore, the biographical index does not include all the people who 
worked for the Polish Service during the war. 
The personal collection of Gregory Macdonald 
 
It was, however, the personal collection of the Polish Service Editor, Gregory Macdonald, 
which offered greatest insight on the work of the Polish Service, its relations with the BBC 
management, the Polish government-in-exile and Radio Polskie.  
It was thanks to the kindness of Macdonald’s son, who I contacted via the magazine for BBC 
pensioners, Prospero, that I was able to access previously unpublished documents, letters and 
hand written notes which Macdonald had preserved since the war. Since Macdonald’s death in 
1987, all his writing is in possession of his son who lives in France. Gregory Macdonald, a great 
friend of Poland, dedicated his life after the war to exposing the political manoeuvres of the 
communist regime. His personal library includes books of major wartime figures, such as 
Warsaw rising Commander Bór-Komorowski, General Anders, head of the Polish Forces in the 
USSR in 1941 and later in Italy, and Jan Karski, a Polish courier who brought the information 
about the Holocaust to London. All these books include a personal note in which the authors 
acknowledge his support for Polish interests whilst addressing him as a close friend. Of 
particular interest were his comments on Jan Nowak’s book, counter-arguing the author’s claim 
that the Polish Service was not objective or impartial, and also his review of Brigg’s third 
volume of The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom, which is also available at 
Caversham in the collection of Macdonald’s essays and articles.  
BBC Monitoring Papers  
This study also draws on the BBC Monitoring Service transcripts stored by the Imperial War 
Museum at Duxford and the Monitoring Digests kept in the BBC Written Archives at 
Caversham. There were no Polish broadcasts from Poland after September 1939 until the period 
of the Warsaw rising (August-October 1944) when insurgents were able to set up a broadcasting 
station in Warsaw. Therefore, only transcripts and digests from the periods mentioned above 
have been analysed, as German broadcasts from Polish stations under the occupation are not the 
focus of this study. Both Duxford and WAC collections have great historical value, in 
particular, the transcripts of the insurgents’ broadcasts, as this was the first time that the 
Underground was able to directly address on air its country men and, more importantly, western 
leaders and the Polish government-in-exile. The transcripts’ significance also lies in 
demonstrating what was known in Britain about the Soviet atrocities and what information had 
been expunged, in comparison with the BBC Polish and Home Service broadcasts. 
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Additionally, while the Imperial War Museum holds a huge body of material on the Second 
World War, none of these sources are related to listening conditions or the Polish Service. 
However, there are also two files on the monitoring of the insurgents’ radio station Błyskawica 
during the Warsaw rising which are still not open for external researcher. These files, currently 
held at the BBC Written Archives in Caversham, need special vetting from the Monitoring 
Service. Unfortunately, a request to open these files for my research was denied. 
The National Archives  
Another focus of research was the National Archives based at Kew. The thesis draws primarily 
on the PWE directives for the BBC Polish Service as well as the PWE Central directives since 
the PWE regional directives were only complementary to the former. Given that that they 
express the official line of the government, they were used in order to demonstrate Polish 
Service compliance with the former. The PWE papers, inherited after the war by the Foreign 
Office, were opened for research in 1976. Yet, as Taylor rightly observes ‘even the more 
experienced scholars struggled with their largely chaotic and patchy nature with the result that, 
even today, there is no definitive volume chronicling PWE’s story’.8 This made analysing the 
PWE papers particularly difficult as well as lack of the secondary literature on the subject. The 
most comprehensive history of the PWE, written after the war by David Garnett, had to wait 
over 50 years to be printed, the main reason being that the author was critical of many 
personalities working for the PWE who lived until the late 1990s. Moreover, as Sefton Delmer 
explains in his autobiography, given the organisation’s secret status, large number of files were 
burnt after the war.9 This helps to explain why so many directives are missing, in particular no 
directives for the Polish Service after November 1944 were found.  
Polish Sources 
The Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum at South Kensington and the Polish Underground 
Movement Study Trust at Ealing Common, all based in London, hold documents pertaining to 
the Polish government-in-exile and the Polish Underground. This thesis draws primarily on 
papers from the Polish Institute discussing the work of the Polish Ministry of Information and 
Radio Polskie, and, in particular, memoranda and reports written by Baliński reporting back to 
the Polish Minister of Information on his work as the Liaison Officer with the BBC. There are, 
however, substantial gaps in the records, the main reason being that, after the British 
government had withdrawn recognition of the Polish government in London, a considerable 
                                                          
8  Taylor, P. M., Allied propaganda in World War II: the complete record of the Political Warfare 
Executive (FO 898):  from the Public Records Office London, Microfilm (London: National Archives, 
2003-2005). 
9  Delmer, S., Black Boomerang: An Autobiography (London: Secker & Warburg, 1962). 
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number of files were burnt by Polish officials, in case British government was going to pass 
them to the newly established Communist government in Poland.10 In addition, many 
documents were given to the Polish Institute by family members of the representatives of the 
Polish government-in-exile and it is believed that some of the papers are still in their 
possession.11  
Created in 1947 by the Polish Home Army soldiers who stayed in Britain after the war, the 
Polish Underground Movement Study Trust also offers a wide range of material. The reports 
sent from Poland by the Polish Underground dealing with the political situation and occupant 
policies are considered an important source of information in this study. Other documents which 
can be found in the archive are the memoranda and reports of Radio Polskie employee, 
Stanisław Kmiecik, who also worked for the BBC Polish Service. Yet, here again access to the 
records was difficult. Some of the documents have been digitalized and can be accessed on line, 
but the cataloging is still in progress. Substantial elements of the thesis were however, drawn 
from six volumes of documents organised and published between 1970 and 1989 by Polish 
historians in London. The collection consists of original documents and reports sent from 
Poland, communication between the Polish government in London and the Polish Underground, 
and letters from British authorities as well as official statements issued by Polish officials.  
Abbreviations 
In this thesis, the names of the archives are abbreviated in the references as follows: 
 The BBC Written Archives BBC WAC  Churchill Archives Centre - CAC  Imperial War Museum -  IWM  Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum- PISM  Polish Underground Movement Study Trust PUMST  Macdonald Private Collection MPC 
Conclusion 
This thesis is based on a very wide range of both Polish and British archival material from 
various archives, primarily based in the UK. The main British sources are BBC Written 
Archives, the National Archives, the Churchill Archives Centre. The Polish sources included 
the Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum and the Polish Underground Movement Study Trust. 
                                                          
10 Suchcitz, A., & Ciechanowski, J., Losy archiwum polskiego wywiadu po 1945, in Dubicki, T., Nalęcz, 
D., Stirling, T., Polsko-Brytyjska Wspólpraca Wywiadowcza podczas II Wojny Ś wiatowej (Warsaw: 
Naczelna Dyrekcja Archiwów Państwowych, 2004), pp. 33-45. 
11 Ibid. 
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Additionally, dairies are used for purposes of support and cross-reference. There were, however, 
various obstacles. The main reason why the study does not cover the years 1939–1940 is the 
unavailability of Polish Service bulletins prior to April 1941. The analysis of important war 
events, for example, the Warsaw Ghetto rising, as well as the persecution of Jews in Poland, 
was hindered by the gaps in Polish Service bulletins, in the minutes of meetings dealing with 
BBC broadcasting to and about Poland, and in the PWE directives for the Polish Service 
throughout the war. Finally, the fact that all Polish Service employees had died by the time the 
research was undertaken was a further disadvantage.
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Historical Background  
 
Introduction 
This chapter provides a historical context for the discussion of censorship and propaganda 
during the Second World War, concentrating on the diplomatic relations between the allies and, 
in particular, between Poland, Britain and the Soviet Union. Special attention is paid to the role 
of the Polish government-in-exile and the Polish Underground whose activities in the years 
1939-1945 had expanded far beyond the resistance and sabotage witnessed in other countries 
under German occupation to the creation of a Secret State with a quasi-parliament and 
administrative, educational and judicial apparatus. Taking into account that in wartime the 
strength of the negotiation position was measured according to the contribution to the war 
efforts, this chapter also discusses the importance of the Polish Forces. Finally, with the 
imposition of a communist government subordinated to the USSR at the end of the war, the role 
of the Polish communists in this process is given prominence.  
German and Soviet invasion of Poland 
In 1918, after over 140 years of partition from Russia, Austria-Hungary and Prussia, the Polish 
Republic was restored. Stalin and Hitler saw Poland as a ‘bastard of the Treaty of Versailles’ 
which should be never reborn.1 Consequently, regaining territory lost during World War I 
became both leaders’ main objective. On 23 August 1939 Germany and the Soviet Union signed 
a Treaty of non-aggression – the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. Its secret protocol outlined plans for 
occupation and attack on Poland, subsequently followed by the German invasion of Poland on 1 
September and the Soviet Union invasion on 17 September 1939.2 
Despite Poland’s treaties with France and Britain assuring military assistance in the case of 
German aggression, these resulted in nothing more, as Stachura observes, than ‘moral and 
semantic assistance’.3 Although both countries declared war on Germany on 3 September 1939, 
no military action was undertaken to assist Poland and during the secret meeting of the Anglo-
French Supreme War Council in Abbeville on 12 September, a decision was made to not to 
                                                          
1 An expression used by the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vyacheslav Molotov, in his speech to the 
Supreme Soviet on 31 September 1939, in Davies, N., The God’s Playground: A History of Poland, 
Vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 291. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Stachura, P., Poland: 1918-45: An Interpretive and Documentary History of the Second Republic 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2004), p. 117. 
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launch an offensive against the Wehrmacht; the Polish authorities, however, were not 
informed.4  
The USSR aggression on Poland on 17 September was an important factor in the quick defeat of 
Poland which, after five weeks of fighting, surrendered. Unaware of the Ribbentrop-Molotov 
Pact, the Poles were not prepared for the defence of the east: Polish Commander-in-chief, 
General Rydz-Śmigły assuming that the Red Army had arrived to assist, ordered Polish units 
not to resist.5 Although, the Soviet invasion of Poland was a violation of international law, 
Stalin justified this action by claiming that the Polish government had abandoned the country 
and effectively had ceased to exist, and that the USSR had therefore been forced to act as a 
protector of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian minorities inhabiting eastern Poland.6 The attempt 
of the Polish ambassador in London, Edward Raczyńki, to pressure the British government to 
take action failed after he had been reminded that the Anglo-Polish agreement of military 
assistance signed in August 1939 specifically stated that it applied only to Germany.7 As 
Prażmowska points out, in Britain, ‘from the very beginning, the war was not seen as a struggle 
to liberate Poland but as one to defeat Germany’.8 
Already in October 1939, Stalin conducted show plebiscites and elections in the territory east of 
the Ribbentrop-Molotov line, in which, allegedly, the Ukrainians and Byelorussians voted for 
incorporation in the Soviet Union. In accordance with the phoney plebiscites, this territory was 
annexed to the USSR as West Ukraine and West Byelorussia in the beginning of 1940, whilst 
the Polish city of Wilno, previously part of Poland, was given to Lithuania until it, too, became 
part of the USSR in June 1940. The Soviet occupation of eastern Poland became a problematic 
issue. Whilst the British Prime Minister at that time, Neville Chamberlain, criticised Stalin’s 
action, he also noted that it was not unexpected. 9  Chamberlain was not alone in this view; there 
was a widespread consensus among British politicians such as Halifax, Beaverbrook and Lloyd 
George that the Polish-Soviet border ratified in the Riga Treaty in 1921 went far beyond that 
proposed in 1919 by the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon who gave his name to the 
Curzon line, the term employed during the war in disputes over the Polish-Soviet border.10  Not 
many, though, were aware that in fact the territory demarcated by the Curzon line did not differ 
much from that agreed between Ribbentrop and Molotov in August 1939.  However, the Polish-
Soviet frontier was not the only issue stopping British government involvement in armed 
                                                          
4 Karski, J., Story of a Secret State: My Report to the World (London: Penguin, 2012), p. 427. 
5 Kadell, F., Katyn w Oczach Zachodu (Warsaw: PWN, 2012), p. 13. 
6 Kochanski, H., Eagle Unbowed: Poland and the Poles in the Second World War (London: Penguin, 
2012), p. 77. 
7 Ibid, p.78. 
8 Prażmowska, A. J., Britain and Poland, 1939-1943, The Betrayed Ally (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), p. 33. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Dennis P., Conflict and Chaos in Eastern Europe. (London: St. Martin's Press, 1995), p. 210. 
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conflict or political dispute with Stalin. In fact, Chamberlain sought to improve diplomatic 
relations with the USSR and refused any kind of confrontation which could negatively affect 
rapprochement. More importantly,  
‘as long as there was the slightest hope of persuading Stalin to join the anti-German 
block Britain could not commit itself to view the Soviet Union as German’s ally, and 
Britain’s enemy’.11 
Faced with defeat, in mid-September, the Polish government attempted to escape to France 
where it hoped to mobilise the army and continue the fight against the aggressors. Although an 
arrangement for safe passage had been made with the Romanians, the Polish government and 
the President, Ignacy Mościcki, were interned in Romania and not allowed to proceed to 
France.12 Maintaining continuity was a particularly important matter since both Stalin and Hitler 
argued that the Polish government had been disbanded. At this point, Mościcki passed his 
power to General Bolesław Wieniawa-Długoszowski who had managed to escape to Paris. 
When his candidacy was opposed by the French, a compromise was reached after long 
deliberations whereby Władysław Raczkiewicz became president and Władysław Sikorski 
Prime Minister as well as Supreme Commander of the Polish Armed Forces. In contrast with 
the pre-war so-called Sanacja government, which opposed parliamentary democracy, the Polish 
government-in-exile included from the beginning representatives of the four major Polish 
parties namely: the Peasant Party (PSL), the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), the National Party 
(SN), and the Working Party (SP). A quasi-parliament-in-exile was also formed – the National 
Council [Rada Narodowa] which included representatives of each party. However, its power 
was limited, as Sikorski had a decisive voice in all political and military matters.13 Although 
Sikorski’s aim was to purge the new government of Sanacja supporters, he was not completely 
successful, particularly in relation to army circles where high ranging officers still supported the 
old regime. Determined to remove those who opposed his authority, he ordered their detention 
first in France and later on Isle of Bute.14  Yet, the opposition to this strong position also came 
from the members of the National Council, with President Raczkiewicz disagreeing with 
Sikorski’s foreign policy and attempting to limit his authority. Although it was understood that 
in time of total war political differences should be put aside, the Polish government in France 
had already, as Prażmowska points out, became ‘a hive of intrigue and a permanent 
                                                          
11 Prażmowska, op. cit., p. 47. 
12 Zamojski, J. E., Social History of Polish exile: 1939-1945, in: Europe in Exile: European Exile 
Communities in Britain: 1940-45, (ed.) Conway, M., & Gotovitch, J., (Oxford: Berghahn, 2001), p. 
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13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
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battleground between various coteries and factions’, having negative impact on its relations 
with other allies. 15 
German invasion of Europe and the Battle of Britain 
Although France and Britain were officially in a state of war with Germany, in reality no 
military action was undertaken and the so-called Phoney War lasted until May 1940. In April 
1940 Hitler invaded Denmark and Norway and, in May the same year, France, Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Luxemburg. In the meantime, Stalin attacked Finland in March 1940 and in 
April annexed Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. In June 1940, France surrendered and the country 
was divided into two zones, notably the North, occupied by Germany and Italy (Italy had 
attacked France on 10 June 1940) and the South, the Vichy zone, an officially neutral state led 
by Philippe Pétain. The Polish Army played a significant role in France’s defence, mobilising 
83,000 men of which 34,000 came from Poland whilst others came from the well-established 
Polish community in France.16 In July 1940, after Hitler’s peace settlement was rejected by the 
British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, who succeeded Chamberlain in May 1940, Germany 
waged war against Britain. 
After the fall of France, the Polish government, together with the Polish troops, was evacuated 
to Britain, but due to lack of coordination only 23.5 % (27,614) of the army men arrived.17 16, 
092 men were taken prisoner and 54,647 remained in France or made their way to Switzerland 
or Spain. Direct military contribution to the allied effort was fundamental to Sikorski’s political 
and military strategy which, after the fall of France and reduction in size of the army, suffered a 
major setback.18 Yet, by mid-1940, Poland remained Britain’s only fighting ally and its 
participation in the Battle of Britain was appreciated, particularly that of the Polish pilots who 
had shot down 20% of all Luftwaffe aircraft. On 5 August 1940, an addendum was signed 
between two countries specifying further military cooperation. It was agreed that all Polish land, 
navy and air forces would be organised and subordinated to the British High Command but 
remain as the Polish Forces.19 It followed the formation of the Polish units in Scotland and from 
September 1940, in collaboration with the Special Operational Executive (SOE), a special 
paratroop unit was created. Parachuted to occupied Poland, the ‘Silent Unseen’ [Cichociemni] 
played a significant role in passing secret information and delivering weapons and money to the 
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18 Ibid. 
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Polish Underground. Established air bridges were also used for transporting Polish couriers to 
and from Poland.20 
The Barbarossa offensive and restoration of Polish-Soviet relations 
On 22 June 1941 Germany attacked the USSR. This changed the situation not only in military 
terms but, more importantly, in terms of diplomacy. Churchill, who had previously attacked the 
USSR and warned the public about the danger of communism, acknowledged that ideological 
differences must be put aside in times of total war. Restoration of diplomatic relations with the 
USSR became central to the allies’ political and military strategy, resulting in the signing of a 
treaty between Britain and the Soviet Union on 12 July 1941. One of the most important points 
of the agreement was the guarantee that the USSR would not sign a separate peace treaty with 
Germany.21 
Unlike Britain, Poland was in state of war with the Soviet Union and the resumption of 
diplomatic relations between the two countries became a controversial issue, dividing the Polish 
government and community-in-exile into those who supported Sikorski’s policy of 
rapprochement with Stalin and those who opposed it.22 The main obstacle lay in the Soviet 
refusal to acknowledge the pre-war Polish-Soviet border, as established by the Riga Treaty in 
1921. Agreement between Poland and the USSR was only reached when British Foreign 
Minister, Antony Eden, persuaded Sikorski that territorial issues would be discussed after the 
war and guaranteed that Britain would not recognise any changes which had already occurred or 
would occur during the war.23 Therefore the Polish-Soviet Treaty, also known as the Sikorski-
Maisky Treaty, signed on 30 July 1941, invalidated the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact without 
reaffirming borders. As a result, three Polish officials resigned in protest, namely a member of 
the Polish Cabinet, Marian Seyda, the Minister of the Foreign Affairs, August Zalewski, and 
Kazimierz Sosnowski, then responsible for liaison with the Polish Underground.24 In diplomatic 
terms, the Treaty was a big success as Stalin, who had previously argued that the Polish 
government had ceased to exist, was now officially recognising its legitimacy. However, the 
Polish-Soviet alliance did not lead to the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Poland.  
Determined to gain international recognition of the annexation of the provinces east of Curzon 
line, Maisky argued only a day after the Treaty was signed that a new Europe would be built on 
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the basis of ‘self-determination of the people’.25 Referring to the minorities inhabiting eastern 
Poland who allegedly had opted for incorporation into the USSR in the show plebiscites, this 
criterion became central to future Soviet territorial demands. Yet, self-determination of the 
people also became a slogan employed by the British Foreign Office. Despite previous 
assurances that territorial changes during the war would not be recognised, when announcing 
the agreement in the House of Commons, Eden clarified that Her Majesty’s Government 
(HMG) would not adhere to this position ‘unless they took place with the free consent and 
good-will of the parties concerned.’26 In his view, that held well with territorial changes 
effecting Poland since 1939. 27 He concluded by stressing that HMG was not guaranteeing 
frontiers in Eastern Europe. Kochanski argues that Stalin interpreted this statement as British 
consent to settle the Soviet-Polish border on his terms.28 Nevertheless, the British government 
continued to assure the Polish government that the changes which occurred after September 
1939 were invalid. Drafted in August 1941 by Churchill and Roosevelt, the Atlantic Charter 
bound its signatories, including Stalin, not to seek territorial aggrandisement and to allow 
nations to choose their own government, thus, in principle, guaranteeing Poland’s pre-war status 
quo.29 Yet, the self- determination of people put at the core of the Charter became a threat to the 
integrity of the Polish State and the backbone to Stalin’s demands (see chapter 6). 
The Sikorski-Maisky Treaty also guaranteed the formation of the Polish army in the USSR 
under Polish command but subordinated to the Soviets and an ‘amnesty’ to all Polish citizens 
detained on Soviet territory.30 The process of discharging people from gulags and prisons was 
hectic; many people died as a result. In fact, on the eve of signing the Treaty, half of them were 
already dead. Those who reached the army headquarters were in such poor condition that they 
were unfit to fight. The plan to form the Polish army was also based on the assumption that over 
8,000 Polish officers who had been taken prisoner by the Red Army in 1939 would be 
released.31 While the Polish intelligence service was unable to trace their whereabouts, Stalin 
informed Sikorski during his visit to Moscow in January 1942 that they must have escaped to 
Manchuria ignoring the fact that he had signed the order for their execution in 1940.32 It was 
only in spring 1943 that the Germans discovered their graves at Katyń.33 
By the beginning of 1942 it became evident that the Soviet authorities were not fulfilling the 
terms of the Treaty as not all Polish citizens had been released from the gulags. In addition, in 
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March 1942 Stalin informed the Commander of the Polish Army in the Soviet Union, General 
Władysław Anders, that he was not able to feed all the Polish soldiers. 34 Despite Poland being 
included in an American Land-Lease aid program, the Polish Army in the USSR did not receive 
supplies directly but through the Soviet command, whose priority lay in providing for its own 
solders.35 Yet, it was Lord Beaverbrook, who after becoming the Chairman of the Allied 
Supplies Executive in October 1941, decided not to aid the Polish Amy.36 This move, in Stalin’s 
view, demonstrated that in fact the allies did not attach much importance to the Polish Army in 
the USSR.37  In response to this situation, and without Sikorski’s authorisation, Anders 
evacuated 77,000 Polish soldiers and over 37,000 Polish refugees, including women and 
children, to the Middle East where the British Army was stationed.38 As a result, the Polish 
government’s plan for using the Polish Army to liberate Poland collapsed whilst power to 
bargain with Stalin decreased, if not vanished.  
The Polish Underground State 
Over 100 years of partition from Prussia, Austria-Hungary and Russia had resulted in the 
creation of an ‘underground state’ with an army and, administrative, judicial and educational 
apparatus which, after Poland’s downfall in 1939, was resurrected.39 During the September 
Campaign in 1939, the structure of resistance was already organised. On the orders of 
Commander-in-chief, Marszałek Rydz-Śmigły, a military organisation, the Service for Poland’s 
Victory [Służba Zwycięstwu Polski] (SZP) was formed. From the beginning, the Polish 
Underground was subordinated to the Polish authorities-in-exile. By the end of 1939, the SZP 
had been transformed into the Union of Armed Struggle [Związek Walki Zbrojnej] (ZWZ). 
General Kazimierz Sosnowski became the Commander-in-chief of this organisation whilst 
Colonel Stefan Rowecki and General Michał Tokarzewski were in charge of ZWZ under the 
German and the Soviet occupation respectively. In 1940, however, Tokarzewski was arrested by 
the NKVD and sent to Siberia.40 After the fall of France, Rowecki was appointed the 
Commander-in-chief of the ZWZ and became responsible for military matters in both occupied 
zones. It was also at that time that it became apparent that the war would not finish soon and 
more than military resistance was necessary. As a result, ZWZ established the underground 
administration of occupied Poland. Communication between the Polish government-in-exile and 
the Polish Underground had been established from the beginning and the so-called Government 
Delegation for Poland, also known as Delegatura, was created, acting as the equivalent of the 
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Polish government under the occupation and responsible to the Polish government-in-exile. 
Henceforth, the first Government Delegate for Poland, Cyryl Ratajski, was responsible for 
political and administrative issues in the country, and at the same time acted as Deputy Prime 
Minister.41 
In 1942 ZWZ was transformed into the Polish Home Army [Polska Armia Krajowa] (AK) 
under the command of Stefan Rowecki who remained in the post until he was arrested by the 
Gestapo in June 1943.42 He was succeeded by Tadeusz Bór-Komorowski. In October 1944, 
Leopold Okulicki took charge of the AK, after Bór-Komorowski was taken into captivity. From 
the beginning, there was separation between the political and military wings of the 
Underground, but the Delegate had powers of veto with regards to the Home Army’s budget.43 
After 1941, the relationship between the Polish government-in-exile and Delegatura became 
edgier, particularly because the latter, exposed to Soviet torments and political manoeuvring, 
saw giving up the eastern territories of Poland as treason.44 Moreover, it established its own 
quasi-parliament in which representatives of the four major parties were included, as well as 
minorities such as the Jews, though the communists were excluded. Yet, as the war progressed, 
there seems to be disparity between what the Polish underground tried to achieve and the 
understanding of these aims on the part of the Polish authorities in London. At the same time, as 
Zamojski observed, there was a progressive move on the part of the Polish Underground 
towards autonomy from the Polish government-in-exile, ‘a shift from subordination to 
partnership, culminating in the success of the principle that it was the country that had the final 
say’.45 
Sikoƌski͛s foƌeigŶ policy 
Sikorski’s foreign policy was built on the assumption that Great Britain and, in particular, the 
USA which entered the war in December 1941, would have a casting vote regarding the post-
war shape of Europe; he thus believed that, as long as he had the support of Roosevelt and 
Churchill, restoration of Polish pre-war frontiers was secured.46 Yet, whilst Poland’s military 
contributions to the war effort were welcomed and appreciated, it was understood that the 
Soviet Union was a more important ally.47 In addition, as Britain and the USA failed to open a 
second front on the insistence of Stalin, their position in negotiations weakened. An analysis of 
the private correspondence between Churchill and Roosevelt demonstrates that they shared the 
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same view, notably, that Poland should be left in the Soviet sphere of influence and Stalin’s 
demands to the Curzon line recognised.48 However, their stance was not made public or 
disclosed to Poles until 1944.49 Instead, the Polish government was pressured throughout 1942-
1944 to reach compromise with Stalin which in fact meant accepting his ultimata.  
Sikorski seemed to misinterpret the direction of British and American foreign policy and 
continued to stand by appeasement towards the USSR in the name of allied unity.50 Soldiers and 
civilians rescued from the USSR were forbidden to discuss their experience whilst the Polish 
press in Britain and in the US was banned from publishing anything on this topic because, as 
Umiastowski points out, the Polish Prime Minister ‘hoped that this one-sided allegiance to the 
Soviet partner would be repaired and an honest settlement of the relations would follow’; for 
this reason he publicly emphasised good relations and cooperation with Stalin. 51 There was also 
another reason why Sikorski supressed this information: as long as diplomatic channels with the 
USSR was open, there was hope for rescuing Polish citizens from the Soviet Union. His plan, 
however, proved to be fruitless. Stalin, annoyed by the Polish Prime Minister’s persistence at 
British involvement in the territorial negotiations and seeking support for his case in 
Washington in December 1942, was not willing to compromise on any issues.52  Ironically, all 
future decisions regarding the Polish-Soviet frontier were made between the Big Three without 
the presence or consent of the Polish authorities. Understanding that the strength of the nation’s 
diplomatic position was measured according to military success, after the Red Army had 
defeated the Wehrmacht troops at Stalingrad in February 1943, the Soviet leader became 
unreceptive to requests for dialogue and firm in his demands. 53 Nine days after the German 
surrender, Moscow announced that the Baltic States and Bessarabia were part of the USSR and 
on 1 March 1943 Polish eastern territories were added to the list.54 
However, in anticipation of victory, Stalin had already launched an open attack on the Polish 
government in London in January 1943, stating that 
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‘in spite of the goodwill shown by the Soviet Government, the Polish government had 
adopted a negative attitude to the agreement of 1941 by putting forward claims to 
eastern Poland, claims which conflicted with the Soviets’ sovereign right’.55 
These claims, he further argued, were ‘contrary to the Atlantic Charter and unworthy of Lord 
Curzon’.56 In attacking the Polish government for being unrepresentative and denying people’s 
right to self-determination, Stalin contended that the Polish-Soviet Treaty did not take into 
account the plebiscites and election conducted in eastern Poland in 1939 in which Ukrainians 
and Byelorussians voted for incorporation into the USSR. In allegations, handed to Tadeusz 
Romer, the Polish ambassador to the USSR in Kuibyshev, it was also claimed that the term 
‘amnesty’ used in the Treaty ‘was a proof of the Polish government’s recognition of the Soviet’s 
sovereign rights to this country, since no government can bestow amnesty to the citizens of 
another Power.’57 In addition, Polish citizenship would be withdrawn from Poles left in the 
Soviet Union, meaning that they automatically became Soviet subjects. Every means was also 
taken to minimise the Polish contributions to the allied war efforts. The accusations were 
predominantly directed against Anders, for unwillingness to fight, and against the AK for 
allegedly collaborating with the Germans.58 Whilst the Polish government’s refutation to the 
Soviet accusations achieved nothing, it exposed Stalin’s hitherto concealed war aims. The 
Soviet propaganda directed against the Polish government and the Underground was now in full 
swing (see chapter 7).  
The KatǇń MassaĐƌe 
In this climate, in early 1943, the Germans discovered the graves of the 8,000 missing Polish 
officers at Katyń. Further investigation revealed that executions carried out by the NKVD, the 
Soviet law enforcement agency, in spring 1940 also included police officers, representatives of 
the intelligentsia, white collar workers and landowners, in short, anyone classified by Stalin as 
an ‘enemy of the people’. In total, 25,000 people were murdered.59 Finding missing Polish 
officers was central to the Polish government’s plan to form an army in the USSR and from 
1941 they unsuccessfully made enquiries to the Kremlin regarding their whereabouts.60 The 
Soviet government denied committing the murders and assigned the blame to the German army 
which in spring 1941 occupied the region. Although Churchill acknowledged that the German 
allegations were ‘nearly certain’, the Foreign Office fostered the Soviet version of events.61 
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Special care was taken to play this down and prevent contradictory accounts from circulation 62 
(see chapter 6). It was understood that the unity of the allied coalition was a priority but, more 
importantly, Britain could not be seen as an ally of the country which was perpetrating the same 
crimes as the Nazis.63  In order to save the Grand Alliance from falling apart, Eden attempted to 
persuade Sikorski from publically responding to the German announcement and instead to 
accuse Goebbels of fabrication.64 The Polish government, however, felt that it was necessary to 
find the truth and appealed to the International Red Cross for investigation. Yet, the 
International Red Cross could not proceed without approval of all parties involved and the 
Soviet government did not give its consent.65  The Germans conducted their own investigation 
and also appealed to the Red Cross. Moreover, they invited forensic experts and press from 
other countries including Poland to the scene. The evidence pointing to Soviet guilt was 
overwhelming.66 Not only did the Soviet government continued to deny carrying out the 
executions but, after recapturing the Katyń area in September 1943, a series of cover-ups took 
place. The most significant was undertaken by the Soviet Commission of Inquiry into the Katyń 
Massacre (the Burdenko Commission) in January 1944, which concluded that Wehrmacht guilt 
was definitive.67 In fact, the Soviet government did not accept responsibility until 1990.68  
In propaganda terms, the discovery at Katyń was a gift to Goebbels. Not only had he achieved 
his goal, namely breaking the allies’ coalition, but he also used the evidence pointing to Soviet 
guilt in order to convince Poles that, in fact, communists were worse than Nazis.69 It was also 
not a coincidence that Goebbels, who had already learnt about the discovery at Katyń in March 
1943, waited to release the information until April, the exact time when the liquidation of the 
Warsaw Ghetto for Jews was taking place. It is evident that he had done so in order to divert 
world attention from the mass murder of the Jews.70 Aware of German plans, the Jews in the 
Warsaw Ghetto rose against the oppressor on 19 April 1943. This desperate act resulted in the 
death of 7,000 Jews whilst those who survived were transported to the death camp at 
Treblinka.71  
The Polish government appeal to the Red Cross for an inquiry into the discovery at Katyń 
aggravated the already tense relationship with the Kremlin. On 25 April 1943 Molotov handed a 
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note to the Polish ambassador to Moscow, Tadeusz Romer, with information that the USSR was 
breaking off diplomatic relations with Poland on the grounds that the Poles had collaborated 
with the Nazis and endeavoured to use the Katyń massacre to pressure the Soviet government to 
obtain territorial concessions.72 In Stalin’s view, the Polish government’s request to the Red 
Cross was offensive and violated ‘all regulations and standards of relations between two Allied 
States’.73 In response, the Polish government issued a statement affirming that their policy was 
‘a friendly understanding between Poland and the Soviet Union on the basis of the integrity and 
full sovereignty of the Polish Republic’; it denied the charges whilst emphasising that it had 
continuously asked for the whereabouts of the Polish officers before and after the graves were 
discovered.74 
The attempts to fix relations with the USSR were ill-fated. Stalin now argued not only that the 
Poles must accept the Soviet ultimatum with regards to the Curzon line, but also the dismissal 
of the members of the Polish government-in-exile who, in his opinion, were hostile to the Soviet 
Union, namely, President Raczkiewicz, Stanisław Kot, the previous ambassador to Moscow and 
from 1943 Minister of Information, and Marian Kukiel, the Minister of War responsible for 
Polish prisoners of war.75 From this point to the end of the war, accusations that the Polish 
government was pro-Nazi and anti-Soviet became a mantra used by Stalin in all negotiations in 
order to demonstrate the unrepresentative character of the Polish government in London, and to 
convince the other allies that, in fact, it was the USSR which was anxious about its sovereignty 
and unfriendly neighbours after the hostilities ended. Yet Sikorski understood that renewal of 
diplomatic relations between Poland and the USSR was essential. The evidence suggests that he 
was going to respond to Stalin’s demand to ‘improve the composition’ of the Polish 
government, as he put it.76 However, he informed his National Council that he would not agree 
to changes on the eastern border and that his stance had the full support of Britain.77 He was 
going to do so after vising the Polish troops in the Middle East. Unfortunately, he died in a 
plane crash in Gibraltar on 4 July 1943 on his way back to London.   
Yet the fact that Stalin himself signed the death warrant for the Polish officers leads Davies to 
assert that he knew exactly what he was doing. In fact, ‘he was testing the political waters of the 
Grand Alliance to see how far he could go’.78 The evidence pointing to the conclusion that 
                                                          
72 Woodward, op. cit., p. 204. 
73 Molotov to Romer: Breaking off diplomatic relations with Poland by the USSR, 25 April 1943, in 
Czarnocka, H. et al., Armia Krajowa w Dokumentach: Vol. 3 (Wrocław: Ossolineum,1990), nr. 428, p. 
505. 
74 Ibid, Response of the Polish government regarding breaking off diplomatic relations by the USSR, 28 
April 1943, nr. 431, p. 508. 
75 Raczyński, op. cit., pp. 146-53. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Duraczyński, op. cit., pp. 235 -237. 
78 Davies, N., ‘isiŶg͛ϰϰ: The Battle for Warsaw (London: Macmillan, 2003), p. 48. 
 78 
Stalin used the controversy surrounding the discovery at Katyń forest as a pretext rather than 
cause for breaking off diplomatic relations with the Polish government is overwhelming. After 
the Polish-Soviet Treaty was signed, he parachuted prominent Polish communists to Poland in 
order to restore the Polish Communist party whilst continuing support for Soviet partisan 
activities aimed at destroying the Polish Underground.79 He also attempted to create a Polish 
governmental body on Soviet soil which, he argued, could be transferred to Poland after the 
Wehrmacht was defeated. 80 This proposal suffered a setback in 1941 because both the British 
and the Polish governments discounted the idea, but, by the beginning of 1943, his plan for 
establishing a Polish puppet government was already in full swing. 
Polish Communists 
In March 1943, on the initiative of Polish communists in the USSR (Wanda Wasilewska, Hilary 
Minc and Wiktor Grosz), the Union of the Polish Patriots [Unia Polskich Patriotów] (UPP) was 
created, despite the fact that non-Russian organisations were not allowed on Soviet territory.81 
Recognised by Stalin, the UPP adopted a programme in line with Soviet foreign policy, notably, 
alliance between Poland and the USSR, the Curzon line, and the discrediting of the London 
government as a legitimate governmental body. Yet in many respects their manifesto was 
similar to that of the Polish government; there was no reference to communist ideology, and 
instead equal rights irrespective of nationality or religion and patriotism were at core of their 
programme. The main difference, however, lay in the promise of the incorporation of the 
German north and east territories after the war, something that the Polish government in London 
could not do. In their propaganda, special care was taken to convince the public that they 
expressed the views and aspirations of the Polish nation, emphasising that the UPP was made up 
only of Polish citizens. Positioning themselves as the guarantors of the freedom and 
independence of Poland, the UPP endeavoured to manipulate the Poles’ emotions by placing 
patriotism and pro-Soviet attitudes on the same level.82 This was evident in the names chosen 
for their organisation (Polish Patriots), its newspaper (Free Poland), and the radio station 
Kosciuszko broadcasting in Polish, named ironically after a national hero who led an uprising 
against Russia in the eighteen century. 
Kościuszko was also the name given to the Polish division formed under Soviet auspices and 
political control of the UPP in May 1943 in the USSR, with the aim of joining the Red Army in 
the liberation of Poland. In March 1944 it expanded to become the First Polish Army, also 
known as the Berling Army, after its commander, Zygmunt Berling.83 It played a significant 
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role in assisting Polish communists in establishing their administration on the liberation from 
German Polish territory and in purging the AK.84  
The Soviet Union also supported activities of the Polish communists in Poland. Before the 
outbreak of the war, the Communist International Organisation, Comintern, had ordered the 
suspension of the Polish Communist Party and execution of its leaders.85 After the Wehrmacht 
launched the Barbarossa operation in June 1941, however, Stalin decided to reconstruct it.86 In 
December 1941, Marcel Nowotko, Paweł Finder and Bolesław Mołojec were parachuted into 
Poland from the USSR. In order to disassociate itself with Communism, the newly established 
party was named the Polish Worker’s Party [Polska Partia Robotnicza] (PPR). Yet, while their 
manifesto in March 1943 included the same postulates as the UPP, it also argued for the 
nationalisation of industry and state control of all aspects of the public domain.87 The PPR’s 
military wing, the People’s Guard [Gwardia Ludowa] (GL), served as competition for the Polish 
Home Army and claimed to be the true resistance force in Poland.88 Despite the fact that GL 
numbers were never high, its activities caused a great deal of trouble, resulting in the exposure 
of the organisation of the Polish Underground and the persecution of civilians.89 In December 
1943, the PPR transformed itself into the Homeland National Council [Polski Komitet 
Narodowy] (PKN) with Bolesław Bierut as chairman. Established as a competitor to the Polish 
government-in-exile, it claimed to be: 
‘the actual political representation of the Polish nation, empowered to act on behalf of 
the   nation and manage its affairs until the time of Poland's liberation from the 
occupation’.90  
It foreshadowed the creation of a provisional government of Poland and the taking of control 
over all Polish armed forces. It also transformed the GL into the People’s Army [Armia 
Ludowa] (AL). The formation of the KRN, however, met with Stalin’s disapproval, first 
because he was not informed about it and, secondly, because given the UPP presence in the 
USSR, he was opposed to factions within the Polish communist camp.91 
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MikołajĐzǇk͛s diploŵaĐǇ  
In August 1943, Stanislaw Mikołajczyk became the second Prime Minister of the Polish 
government-in-exile. However, in contrast to his predecessor, he did not hold the posts of both 
Premier and Commander-in-chief; the second position was given to Kazimierz Sosnowski. 
Given that diplomatic relations between Poland and the USSR had broken down, both Britain 
and the USA acted as mediators between the two neighbours.92 Consequently, Mikołajczyk’s 
foreign policy was based on the assumption that Churchill and Roosevelt supported restoration 
of Poland’s pre-war borders, and their mediation with the Kremlin was not only welcomed but 
also insisted upon.93 Yet, given the Red Army victories and the inability of Britain and the USA 
to open the second front, it became apparent that east Europe would be left in the Soviet sphere 
of influence.94 This also meant that the USSR was considered a more important ally than Poland 
and, in order to maintain good relations with Moscow, Stalin’s demands had to be addressed. 
In August 1943, the Foreign Office suggested offering confidential Anglo-American assurance 
to Stalin to support his claims to the Curzon line and to compensate Poland with Danzig, East 
Prussia and part of Upper Silesia.95 It was acknowledged that Britain was acting contrary to the 
Atlantic Charter, ‘but there was no other way of securing or getting Anglo-Soviet collaboration 
after the war or getting an improvement in Polish-Soviet relations’.96 The American 
government opted for settling territorial matters after the war, yet Eden highlighted that the 
reconciliation between Poland and the USSR was of high importance: the Polish government 
was asking Britain to supply arms to the AK, something that would be interpreted as an act 
against the USSR, given that Stalin supported communist organisations and the Berling Army, 
hostile to both the Polish government and the Polish Underground.97 This issue became 
particularly problematic as the Red Army was approaching the Polish border and it was 
uncertain if it was going to act as liberator or occupant. The Polish authorities in London were 
also following the line of Delegatura, which opposed any territorial concession whilst holding 
that future negotiations with Moscow could only take place if the latter safeguarded the 
authority of the Polish government and the Underground’s administration of land liberated from 
the Germans.98 As a result, no agreement had been reached between the allies with regard to the 
future Polish-Soviet border.  
In November 1943, the first conference between the Big Three took place in Tehran, at which 
the Polish-Soviet frontier was the main subject under discussion. Both Churchill and Roosevelt 
                                                          
92 Kochanski, op. cit., pp. 351-2. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Prażmowska, op. cit., p. 170. 
95 Woodward, op. cit., p. 250. 
96 Ibid, p. 251. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid, p. 252.  
 81 
agreed to Stalin’s territorial demands and to extend Poland westwards as far as the river Oder.99 
This decision was made without the knowledge or authorisation of the Polish government and 
remained undisclosed until October 1944.100 
In January 1944, the Red Army crossed the pre-war Polish-Soviet border. At this point, conduct 
towards the Red Army became highly problematic, given that diplomatic relations between 
Poland and the USSR had not been re-established and that the Curzon line was not officially 
recognised as the Polish-Soviet frontier and, more importantly, that the Soviet government had 
shown nothing but hostility to the Polish authorities in London and to the Polish Underground. 
In October 1943 the Polish Underground had already outlined plan ‘Tempest’ which envisaged 
cooperation with the Soviet army in an assault on the retreating German armies in the eastern 
Poland and setting up of a civilian administration on liberated territory.101 This, however, was 
only achievable if the AK revealed itself to the Soviet command. In 1944, ‘Tempest’ was put in 
action, but proved to have fatal consequences: the AK soldiers were subject to arrests, 
deportations and killings by the Soviets.102 After being informed about Soviet misconduct, the 
British Foreign Office responded by stating that they believed this information to be true but 
nothing could be done other than to emphasise the Polish Underground resistance activities and 
their willingness to cooperate with the Soviet Union.103 
On the eve of the Red Army crossing of the Polish-Soviet border, Mikołajczyk made an official 
statement in which he acknowledged that the Red Army had entered Poland and expressed 
willingness for reconciliation with the USSR.104 Yet, according to Stalin, the Polish-Soviet 
border lay on the Curzon line and he therefore argued that the Red Army had not entered 
Poland. Nevertheless, he responded to Mikołajczyk’s statement that he was open to renewing 
diplomatic relations with Poland, but on condition that the Curzon line would be accepted by 
the Polish government.105 
Both Churchill and Eden tried to reason unsuccessfully with the Polish Premier to accept 
Stalin’s terms. The prospect of compromise between Poland and the USSR was further 
complicated by the fact that Stalin argued for removing anti-Soviet officials and replacing them 
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with communists.106 In addition, the Polish government was asked to make an official statement 
acknowledging German responsibility for the Katyń massacre.107 
In response to this situation, as well as to the growing importance of the Polish communists, the 
Delegatura established the Council of National Unity [Rada Jedności Narodowej] (RJN) in 
Poland with Kazimierz Pużak as its chairman.108 Among other points, their manifesto argued for 
the pre-war Polish-Soviet border. In February, while Churchill officially supported the Soviet 
claims to the Curzon line, however, the final decision regarding the border was to be left until 
the post-war peace conference. With Soviet troops on Polish territory, it was understood that 
Poland’s sovereignty was at stake. As Prażmowska points out, both Churchill and Roosevelt 
permitted  
‘the establishment of Soviet supremacy over decisions concerning the future of Central 
and South-eastern Europe (…) (it) was the deliberate British and American decision to 
concentrate on conciliating their own still slender victories. In effect the western Allies 
had established no avenues for influencing Soviet policies in liberated territories, 
irrespective of public statements to the contrary and official massages to the Soviet 
authorities that they should not think of retaining territories acquired in September 
1939 and subsequently’.109  
As a result, the south-east part of Europe was left in the Soviet sphere of influence and political 
changes applied by the Soviets on liberated territory remained unchallenged. The status of 
Poland was reduced to an ‘inconvenient ally’ and all means had to be applied to persuade 
Mikołajczyk to accept Stalin’s terms.110 Yet, this stance was not clearly explained to the Polish 
Prime Minister who, reporting back to the Polish Underground government on his visit to the 
USA in June 1944, stated that Roosevelt had assured him that he supported Poland’s claims to 
the pre-war territory and had made his stance clear to Stalin at the Tehran conference.111 
In June 1944, Polish communists in Poland and in the USSR, namely the KRN and the UPP, 
joined forces and established the Polish Committee of National Liberation [Polski Komitet 
Wyzwolenia Narodowego] (PCNL), also known as the Lublin Committee, recognised by Stalin 
as the only legal administrative apparatus in all Polish liberated territory.112 At the same time the 
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AK operation ‘Tempest’ in the east proved to be a fiasco: the AK units which liberated east 
provinces had been taken to captivity by the Soviets.113 
Yet Poles still believed that, with the backing of Britain and the USA, Poland could retain its 
independence. It was assumed that Poland’s contribution to the allied war effort was recognised, 
particularly the Polish pilots’ in the Battle of Britain, the Polish Army successes in the battle of 
Monte Casino during the Italian campaign and the part played by the Polish Air Forces and 
navy in the D-Day landings in June 1944.  
The Waƌsaǁ ƌisiŶg aŶd estaďlishŵeŶt of the ĐoŵŵuŶists͛ ƌule iŶ PolaŶd 
The gradual defeat of Wehrmacht troops in Western Europe and the approach of the Red Army 
towards the gates of Warsaw in last days of July 1944 resulted in the evacuation of the German 
administration from the capital. In addition, whilst the assassination attempt on Hitler in July 
1944 had weakened German morale, it had boosted resistance activities across Europe. The 
developments were major considerations in the decision by the leaders of the AK to launch the 
uprising in Warsaw (see chapter 8). Given the establishment of the communist administration 
on ‘liberated’ Polish territory, the Underground felt that it was their last chance to demonstrate 
their commitment to fight the German foe and to maintain control in the capital after it was 
liberated.114  
The rising which lasted 63 days, had catastrophic consequences. It has been estimated that 
between 150,000 and 200,000 civilians were killed whilst those who survived were expelled 
from the city.115 On Hitler’s orders, the capital was literally burnt to the ground. Using 
flamethrowers and explosives, the Nazi demolition squads methodically wiped out house after 
house, including monuments, museums and archives.116 Over 15,000 AK soldiers were killed in 
action, 5,000 wounded and approximately the same number were taken into the Germans 
captivity.117 Although the reasons for the downfall of the Warsaw uprising remain a point of 
disagreement between historians, the lack of Soviet help and their refusal to allow allied aircraft 
to land on Soviet bases were the main reasons why the insurgents could not succeed.118 More 
importantly, the evidence that Stalin called off the advance of the Soviet troops on the Polish 
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capital is overwhelming.119 Given that operation ‘Tempest’ had failed in eastern Poland whilst 
Stalin supported the Lublin Committee, the idea that the Soviets would cooperate with the AK 
and recognise their authority was, as Siemaszko points out, totally irrational.120 As he observes, 
this decision  
‘was based on the idea, that regardless of consequences, the Polish nation could not 
remain passive in a time when the German occupation was going to be replaced with 
the Soviet, and on the assumption that military defence in these circumstances was a 
historical necessity’.121  
Moreover, Mikołajczyk’s visit to Moscow in August 1944 did nothing to resolve the Polish-
Soviet disputes. In Stalin’s view, it was the Lublin Committee which was the political 
representative force in Poland and the Polish communists, with the backing of the USSR, were 
not willing to compromise on the future structure of the Polish government.122 The Lublin 
Committee offered the Polish government-in-exile four of the eighteen seats in the future 
government. Yet, during a second meeting in October 1944, at which Eden and Churchill were 
also present, Mikołajczyk was proposed as the leader of the future Polish government but 75% 
of its composition was to be in communists’ hands. 123 It was also at point that Mikołajczyk 
learnt about the decision reached at Tehran, notably Churchill and Roosevelt’s concession to the 
Curzon line.124 Despite his rejection of the PCNL offer and in contrast with the Polish Council 
of Ministers, Mikołajczyk was willing to accept the Curzon Line. The crisis within the Polish 
Cabinet caused by this difference of opinion led to his resignation on 24 November 1944.125 He 
was succeeded by a member of the Socialist Party, Tomasz Arciszewski, evacuated from Poland 
just before the outbreak of the Warsaw rising.  
This change met with Churchill and Roosevelt’s disapproval, primary because Mikołajczyk, in 
contrast to Arciszewski, was willing to reach a compromise with Stalin and the Lublin 
Committee.126 On 31 December 1944, Stalin recognised the Lublin Committee as the 
provisional government of Poland. Both Churchill and Roosevelt still considered the Polish 
government-in-exile as the only legitimate government of Poland but it became apparent that, as 
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the communists were taking charge of administration in the liberated territory, the return of the 
Polish government from London to Poland was highly unlikely.  
By mid-January 1945, the Red Army and the Polish First Army liberated all major Polish cities 
including Warsaw and Cracow and were marching towards Berlin. From this point on, the 
majority of the country was in the hands of communists who were persecuting members of the 
AK. As a result, on 19 January, the AK commander, General Leopold Okulicki, who succeeded 
General Bór-Komorowski after the collapse of the Warsaw rising, ordered its disbanding. The 
Delegatura remained in place until June 1945, hoping to be invited to join the future 
government.127  
Yalta Conference and the end of the war 
During the conference at Yalta in February 1945, among other issues, such as the final defeat of 
Germany and USSR support in the war against Japan, the main topic on the agenda was the 
future of the Polish state. Representatives of the Polish government-in-exile were not invited. 
The decisions concerning the future of Poland were made without their knowledge or 
consent.128 Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt recognised Soviet rights to the Curzon line and 
outlined a plan for the creation of the Polish Provisional Government which was to be based on 
the existing Provisional Government in Poland but should also include representatives of the 
Polish government in London.129 The ambassadors of the USSR, USA and Great Britain, 
namely Molotov, Harriman and Clark Kerr respectively, were put in charge of supervising the 
meeting of all parties involved and  the ‘reorganisation’ of the Polish government. The newly 
established Polish Provisional Government would then be pledged to hold free and ‘unfettered’ 
elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot.130 It was also 
stressed that all democratic and anti-Nazi Parties had the right to take part and put forward their 
candidates. The Yalta declaration concluded that only then would the British, American and 
Soviet governments establish diplomatic relations with the newly formed Polish government.131 
In spite of an official protest issued by the Polish government-in-exile regarding the Yalta 
declaration, which it compared to the fifth partition of Poland, the agreement was imposed on 
the Polish nation. 132  
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Only a few weeks after the Yalta conference it became apparent that Soviet interpretation of the 
agreement differed from that of other signatories: Molotov asserted that the Provisional 
Government already established in Poland should be given the right to veto other Polish 
candidates before they were invited to Moscow.133 As the Polish communists rejected most of 
the names put forward by the British and American governments, including Mikołajczyk, the 
talks reached an impasse.134  Yet, both Churchill and Roosevelt insisted on a fast resolution 
because of the upcoming conference of the United Nations in San Francisco planned for April 
1945 at which post-war security and peace were to be discussed, and it was expected that 
Poland would join other signatories. It was not, however, in Stalin’s interest to speed up 
negotiations; Soviet troops were in Poland and the Lublin Poles were purging Poland and 
liquidating any signs of nationalism; contrary to what Stalin had claimed earlier, the process of 
collectivisation and nationalisation was already in progress, whilst most Polish industry was 
moved to the USSR.135 Stalin further argued that only Poles who publicly accepted the Crimean 
declaration would be considered as candidates for joining the Moscow talks; none of them did. 
In addition, as the Kremlin did not recognise the Polish government-in-exile while the USA and 
Britain did not consider the Provisional Government as legitimate, Poland was not represented 
at the United Nations conference in San Francisco (see chapter 9). 
Despite the agreement reached at Yalta, all Polish armies continued fighting until the 
capitulation of Germany. On 7 May 1945 the war in Europe was officially over, but Polish 
soldiers remained reluctant to return home because with the communists in power; they were 
anxious that they would be subjected to persecution. Their angst was not without foundation; in 
March 1945, 16 leaders of the Polish Underground who, after being invited to Moscow to take 
part in negotiations with regard to the composition of the future Polish government, were 
arrested by the NKVD and put in prison on charges of diversionary activities against the Red 
Army, collaboration with the Germans and maintaining illegal radio transmitters in the Soviet 
area.136 13 of 16 defendants who were put on trial in Moscow received a prison sentence. As 
Davies observed, the trial at which the AK was labelled as illegal organisation was: 
‘An archetypal show trial, replete with absurd accusations, brainwashed defendants, 
and suborned witnesses, it had nothing to do with real offences. It was staged to show 
that the Soviets were all-powerful, that ‘Soviet justice’ could prepare the most blatant 
injustices with impunity, and that the Western powers were impotent to prevent it’.137 
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It demonstrated that the Soviets were prepared to act above the law in order to establish 
communist rule in Poland and that those who opposed it, would be treated as criminals. 
According to the British ambassador to Moscow, Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr, the main aim of the 
trial was to discredit the Polish government-in-exile on the international and national scene as 
well as destroying opposition to communist authority in Poland, in which, in his view, Stalin 
succeeded.138  
It was also not a coincidence that the meeting between the Polish communists and the Polish 
politicians approved by Stalin was taking place at the same time as the trial. It resulted in an 
agreement on the composition of the Polish Government of National Unity on 21 June 1945 
whereby the Polish communists took 17 seats out of 21 with Osóbka-Morawski as the Prime 
Minister, whilst Mikołajczyk was offered the post of the Minister of Agriculture.139 As a 
consequence, on 6 July 1945, the British and American governments withdrew recognition of 
the Polish government-in-exile. 
Conclusion 
The foreign policy of the Polish government-in-exile was based on the assumption that, as long 
as Poland was contributing to the war effort, Poland’s position within the allies’ camp was 
strong. They seemed to misinterpret Stalin’s strategy, as his ultimata remained the same 
throughout the war. Not at any point did the Soviet leader show willingness to reach a 
compromise. Instead other demands were added to the list, such as replacing anti-Soviet Polish 
politicians with communists. The Polish authorities also failed to recognise that the USSR was a 
more important ally than Poland and, that for both Churchill and Roosevelt, the priority laid in 
safeguarding the interests of their own countries. This situation was further complicated by the 
fact that both leaders were not upfront with the Polish government about agreements reached 
with Stalin which consequently weakened Poland’s position in negotiations with the Polish 
communists.  The fact that the Curzon line accepted at Yalta as the Polish-Soviet border was 
approximately the same as the Ribbentrop-Molotov line agreed between Germany and the 
Soviet Union on the eve of their invasion of Poland became a sticking point. Moreover, the 
Polish Underground was seen as anti-Soviet and their accounts of Soviet crimes and political 
manoeuvring were therefore questioned. Recognition of the Polish Government of National 
Unity by the allies was considered as betrayal. Yet, the question as to what else could have been 
done is still an issue of a debate among historians. Not without reason, the final chapter of 
Churchill’s memoirs is titled ‘Triumph and Tragedy’. Already in summer 1945, Churchill 
foresaw that Stalin’s alleged commitment to democratic elections in Poland was not going to 
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materialise.140 While he started planning an attack on the USSR, he did not, however, gain 
support to put this plan into action.141 Britain offered citizenship to the Polish soldiers and 
politicians who feared Soviet persecution and, after the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1946 the 
exiled government was reconstructed. 
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Listening conditions and audiences under German and Soviet occupation 
 
Introduction 
‘Polish broadcasts are regarded as a most reliable source of information. In addition to 
this, they have enormous prestige in so far as they are connected in Polish minds with 
the Polish Government in London, whose existence is universally held as a symbol of 
the continuity of the Polish State, even by those Poles who may disapprove of its 
composition or policies.’ 1 
After the German and Soviet attacks on Poland in September 1939, the Polish Service of the 
BBC became the main source of information, particularly after the fall of France in June 1940 
when Radio Polskie stopped broadcasting from France and the Polish government took refuge 
in London. Taking as a starting point the policies of both German and Soviet occupiers towards 
Polish citizens, this chapter discusses listening conditions under the occupation and their impact 
on the accessibility of the Polish Service broadcasts. It concentrates on the character of the 
audience in Poland, paying particular attention to the role of the Polish Underground as the 
main receiver and distributor of the Polish Service broadcasts. By 1941 after the German 
authorities had introduced the death penalty for listening or possession of radios and extensive 
numbers of sets had been destroyed after the German and Soviet armies entered Polish territory 
in September 1939, it was necessary to repurpose the Polish Service to provide news for 
professional listeners disseminating Polish broadcasts rather than a mass audience. Therefore, 
the discussion also concentrates on the establishment and influence of the clandestine press. In 
addition, Soviet policy with regard to broadcasting in Poland is examined, as is the impact of 
the German attack on the Soviet Union, resulting in the recognition of the radio as a weapon of 
anti-Soviet propaganda in Poland.  
Listening condition under the German occupation 
Following the invasion in September 1939, Germany directly annexed the western and northern 
parts of Poland to the Third Reich whilst, in the remaining Polish territory west of the Curzon 
line, Hitler created a separate state, the General Government [Generalne Gubernatorstwo], 
administrated by Hans Frank.2 It was inhabited by 11.5 million people and comprised 95,500 
km², expanding eastwards after the Wehrmacht attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941 to 
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encompass an area of 141,000 km².3 Controlled by the SS and Gestapo, the General 
Government become ’a lawless state of Nazi racial ideology’ and ‘reservoir of force free 
labour’.4 It was in this part of Poland that major German concentration camps and Jewish 
ghettos were located and where Jews and Poles unsuitable for Germanisation were ‘resettled’. 
Hitler’s main goal was the complete destruction of the Polish State and creation of 
‘Lebensraum’ – a living space for Germans in which the status of Poles was reduced to serfdom 
in the form of economic exploitation and forced labour in support of Germany’s war effort. 
Hitler’s final goal, however, was the extermination of Polish nation, to be achieved after the 
hostility had ended, with the exception of small percentage of Poles who were to be used as 
slaves. Germans targeted all aspects of Polish identity. German was introduced as an official 
language, schools and universities were closed down and education restricted to a few years of 
elementary school. Ethnic cleansing, terror and mass execution became an everyday occurrence. 
In particular, Jews, the Polish intelligentsia, army men, members of the Underground and 
political leaders were targets for extermination. German occupation resulted in the death of 
approximately 6 million Poles, half of whom were Polish Jews.5  
In accordance with Nazis policies, every means was to be employed to disconnect Poland from 
the rest of the world. In order to help achieve this goal, the Germans introduced the death 
penalty for listening to or possession of a radio, and to those who distributed information.6 As 
Kwiatkowski points out, the possession of radio sets, next to sabotage activates, was seen by 
Germans as a direct attack on the Third Reich.7 Consequently, by 5 October 1939 Poles were 
ordered to return all radio sets.8  
In the General Government Germans introduced the so-called Volkliste or German people list, 
with the aim to classify people according to their heritage. The main division was between those 
of Aryan origin – ethnic Germans and Germans from the Reich and non-Aryans, also referred to 
as subhumans.9 Despite the fact that in the beginning all non-Germans were in the second 
category, in 1940 the occupants extended the first category to Poles, who in their view were 
suitable for Germanisation.10  
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Volksdeutsche, namely Poles of German ethnicity or of German descent, and Reichsdeutsche, 
the German settlers, could keep the sets but were not allowed to listen to foreign stations, 
including the broadcasts of Germany’s allies.11 The process of returning radios, however, was so 
inadequate that the same order continued to be published in German newspapers until March 
1940.12 According to the diary of Hans Frank, in a detailed account of his work as the 
Governor-General, by 2 March only 60% of the 140,000 radios registered before the war in 
Warsaw were returned.13 The hunger for information and the feeling of being cut off from the 
outside world meant that many Poles disobeyed the orders and continued to listen to the BBC. 
In fact, many sets remained well hidden throughout the war and used for listening, while some 
were purposely destroyed before they could be found by the authorities. Given the importance 
of propaganda and indoctrination, wireless sets were also offered as a bribe to Poles who signed 
the Volkliste and in 1941, 28,000 sets were released specifically for these purposes. 14 However, 
there were also other reasons; those enrolled on the list were subject to military service and 
Germans expected collaboration from people who took the wireless sets.  
It was also common to offer sets to Volkdeutsche and German settlers in the Polish territory 
directly annexed to the Third Reich, likely to have been obtained from Poles in the General 
Government, although German newspapers in Poland reported that they came from Goebbels’ 
fund. 15 However, listening to the foreign stations on those sets was not possible as they did not 
have a shortwave band and listening to the BBC was only possible on valve sets. Aware of this, 
the Germans distributed only crystal sets which allowed listeners to tune to German sponsored 
broadcasts. 
In most cases, however, signing the Volkliste was not voluntary and many people were put in a 
position where they had to choose between accepting German citizenship or to being sent to a 
concentration camp. Despite this, Poles remained reluctant to abandon their nationality, leading 
to Frank’s complaint in January 1943 that there were only 30,000 Volkdeutsche licence holders 
in the General Government.16  
Although the Germans had failed to find collaborators in Poland, from the beginning of the 
occupation it was hoped that, after the Wehrmacht attack on the Soviet Union, Poles would be 
willing to cooperate in the struggle against the common enemy.  Therefore, it was felt that more 
direct propaganda had to be employed, given the alarming reports of the Polish population still 
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listening to the foreign broadcasts.17 Disputing the Red Army victories became a priority, 
particularly after the defeat of German troops at Stalingrad in February 1943. But Frank also 
attempted to influence Polish public opinion by allowing for the use of the previously forbidden 
Polish language in announcements and Polish music, delivered in the streets by megaphones.18 
This gesture of a good will, Frank argued, would stop people from listening to the BBC 
programmes.19 Attitude of Poles to the occupier, however, remained unchanged, as did their 
willingness to risk their lives in order to listen to the BBC broadcasts. In fact, Frank 
acknowledged that the change of policy did not have any impact and that Poles continued to 
listen to the BBC.20   
Monitoring of the BBC Polish Service broadcasts 
Taking into account the death penalty for listening to or possession of a radio and the fact that 
an extensive number of sets had been confiscated, it was the Underground which became the 
major audience for the BBC Polish Service broadcasts. After the collapse of the September 
Campaign in 1939 when all Polish stations were taken over for German propaganda, the 
monitoring of foreign stations became the Underground’s priority.21 The Polish Underground 
differed considerably from other resistance movements in Europe. Over 100 years of partition 
from Prussia, Austria-Hungary and Russia had resulted in the creation of an Underground State 
with army, administrative, juridical and educational apparatus which, after Poland’s downfall in 
1939, was resurrected (see chapter 3).  Consequently, the framework for conspiracy and 
sabotage against the occupant was already in place. 
The first monitoring post was organised by Radio Polskie staff under the supervision of 
Professor Wacław Borowy when the fighting in Warsaw was still in progress. The material 
distributed to the press and to civil and military administrative units became well-known and 
valued.22 Within the civilian unit of the Underground, the Bureau of Information and 
Propaganda [Biuro Informacji i Propagandy] (BIP) was created with headquarters in Warsaw 
and branches all over Poland, including territory occupied by the Soviet Union.23 BIP, directed 
by Jan Rzepecki, saw its main task as providing reliable and unbiased information regarding the 
political situation and exposing German crimes, but it was also involved in sabotage and anti-
German propaganda. Knowing that the news distributed by the Germans was false, the 
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monitoring of foreign stations and news agencies became an important part of its activities. For 
this purpose BIP created the Radio Department which concentrated on monitoring the BBC 
programmes in English and Polish and Reuters’ communiqués in Morse.24 The Polish 
Underground monitored the BBC Home Service, partly because it considered it ‘more sober 
and sincere’ but also because breaking news appeared faster on the Home Service than on the 
Polish Service.25 It was thanks to the installation of the high-power short-wave transmitter at 
Start Point in Britain that, from 20 January 1940, the BBC Home Service broadcasts could been 
heard as far as Poland.26 
Monitoring BBC programmes in French and German was also very popular, as knowledge of 
these languages was more common among Poles. Yet the Polish courier, Jan Karski, recollects 
that when he was assigned to monitor foreign stations in 1941, he was instructed to listen to 
Turkish and Russian broadcasts not to the BBC Polish programmes from London ‘nor to 
English propaganda’ on the BBC Home Service.27 Of course the most importance was attached 
to Radio Polskie broadcasts. However, whilst the Polish authorities were given air time after 
escaping to France in 1939, it was only in January 1942 that they were able to transmit from 
London on the BBC wavelengths (see chapter 1). 
In addition to the monitors of the Radio Department situated in the capital, there were other 
monitoring posts all over the country; some were well organised and staffed, others were 
operated by one person. According to data provided by the Underground, there were 350-500 
monitoring posts all over Poland by March 1943, equipped with powerful shortwave receiving 
sets operated by circa 1,500 people.28  
The individuals who usually undertook the monitoring jobs were former Polskie Radio 
employees, professional technicians and in many cases people who knew other foreign 
languages because, as previously mentioned, BBC broadcasts in French, Germans, English and 
Italian were also monitored. It was very a dangerous and difficult job as Germans, aware of the 
Underground activities, introduced van detectors able to locate a radio signal.29 In consequence, 
the monitoring posts, hidden in private flats, deserted houses and ruins, had to be constantly 
relocated. As the work of the Underground became more efficient and more people were willing 
to participate, alarm posts were created, trained to spot approaching Gestapo.30 Thus, 
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monitoring was not a one-man job: it involved a number of people, constantly working under 
enormous stress, because if caught, not only one’s own life was at stake, but the Gestapo usually 
killed also all the neighbours. 
The Underground work, however, was considered as a patriotic duty, a form of resistance and 
sabotage, and people were willing to risk their lives in order to keep the nation informed. 
Monitoring was further complicated by jamming and German broadcasting in Polish on the 
Polish Service wavelengths, disguised as Polish Service broadcasts. In towns and cities 
additional obstacles included heavy traffic during the day as well as curtailment of the hours 
during which electricity was available.31 In general, there were more monitoring posts in the 
urban than in the rural areas.32  One of the ‘monitors’ (name not given) described his daily 
routine as follows: 
‘Our bulletin is taken down fairly fully in shorthand, to be edited and printed later; half 
an hour is left for producing stencils which are then taken to another place and rolled 
off, each of several members of the small organisation taking home one sheet which on 
the following day is united with the remaining sheets of the bulletins ready for 
circulation.  News is provided daily chiefly by means of these stencilled bulletins; the 
weekly printed newspapers being largely based upon a collection of seven daily sheets. 
33 
While the Underground also produced its own sets and transmitters, some equipment was also 
delivered from the west by parachute.34 Yet, the construction of sets, in particular from parts 
stolen from German factories, was also very common. This issue will be discussed at further 
length below. 
Figure 4.1 below shows the BBC Services which the Polish Underground monitored: 
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Figure 4:1 BBC Services monitored by the Polish Underground 35 
Obtaining information from occupied Poland 
It was the Polish government-in-exile which supplied the reports received from Poland to the 
BBC.36 As the Polish Home Army Commander during the Warsaw rising of 1944, Tadeusz Bór- 
Komorowski, recalls, the Underground intelligence reports were regularly dispatched by radio 
to London and in years 1942-1944, 300 reports per month were transmitted.37 It was thanks to 
the long-distance radio-telegraphic station situated at Barnes Lodge near Kings Langley in 
England and made available by the British government to be used by the allied governments, 
which served as both listening and receiving stations, that the Polish authorities in London were 
able directly to communicate with the Polish Underground.38 More importantly, as all telephone 
and telegraphic lines were destroyed during the sustained bombing of Poland by the Luftwaffe 
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in September 1939, the station at Barnes Lodge acted also as a communication switchboard 
between the Home Army Central Command and its branches all over the country.39 Yet, whilst 
the Polish government-in-exile was able to provide a few full-time telegraphists, setting up and 
maintaining listening and receiving posts in Poland was very difficult since destroying the 
Underground’s communication network, and more importantly, communication with London, 
was one of the main priorities of the Germans. This meant that the location of the apparatuses 
very often had to be changed, consequently resulting in delays in responding to important 
messages. For instance, Siemaszko, one of the wartime Polish telegraphists working at Barnes 
Lodge, who analysed correspondence between the Polish authorities in London and the Polish 
Underground during the Warsaw rising in 1944, demonstrates that some of the messages sent by 
insurgents were only received and decrypted two months after the collapse of the uprising.40  
Reports and important documents were also delivered to London by Polish couriers in the form 
of micro-films, which were easily concealed during the journey. Whilst in Britain, Polish 
couriers were interviewed by the BBC and other intelligence departments, both of which 
considered witness accounts as a very important source of information. For the BBC, it was also 
an opportunity to obtain audience feedback regarding their programmes as well as to learn about 
listening habits and the main obstacles to access radio and reception. Jan Nowak and Jan Karski 
are the two most famous Polish couriers, with the latter bringing reports on German 
extermination of Jews in Poland to the west.41 
It was also due to effectiveness of communication between Poland and London that the 
Germans failed to discover that the black radio station Dawn [Świt], disguised as a Polish 
station transmitting from Poland, in fact operated from Bletchley near London.42 Stefan 
Korboński, the Head of the Home Army Directorate of Non-military Combat unit and also 
responsible for civilian communication, used a private cipher to supply Dawn with information, 
making it possible to create the impression that the station was broadcasting from Poland.43 The 
station, created by the British Political Warfare Executive (PWE) in cooperation with the Polish 
government-in-exile, was allowed to criticise Radio Kosciuszko, a station operated by the 
Polish communists in the USSR that from February 1943 became a platform for the propaganda 
of the Union of the Polish Patriots, an embryo of the Polish puppet government created by 
Stalin. Newcourt, however, argues that in fact it was used by the British government ‘to weaken 
the Polish resolve not to give in to Soviet demands, whether territorial or political’.44 His 
argument is not without justification as, despite Dawn’s popularity, it was eventually closed 
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down in November 1944 after the collapse of the Warsaw rising when convincing the Polish 
public to accept Stalin’s territorial and political ultimatums became the British government 
priority. More importantly, the Foreign Office, saw the main obstacle to resolving the territorial 
dispute between Poland and the Soviet Union as the Polish Underground leaders’ unwillingness 
to accept Stalin’s ultimate and therefore attempted to censor and control all communication 
between Poland and the Polish government-in-exile in the post-rising period (see chapter 9). 
Audience under the German occupation 
Listening to the Polish Service was also popular among civilians, particularly in workshops 
where German radio sets were left for repair. According to a witness (name not given) who left 
Poland at the end of 1943, Germans had to wait very long time for their sets to be fixed, 
sometimes as long as six months, as priority was given to Polish owners who covertly used the 
service.45 As Germans took over all Polish business and enterprise, all the factories were run by 
a German national who was allowed to own a radio set.  Therefore, when the management was 
away, Poles used this as an opportunity to listen to the Polish broadcasts.46 It was also common 
to access German residents’ wireless sets when they were at work. The evidence demonstrates 
that Germans including the representatives of the German police SS listened to the BBC Polish 
Service too. According to the witness (name not given), SS officers who lived above his flat 
were listening to the Polish broadcasts every day.47 Moreover, booklets on how to construct 
wireless sets were distributed all over the country and, since obtaining parts on the black market 
was easy, many people were able to build their own sets. 48 The Underground also organised 
courses where one could learn how to make a radio.49  In addition, pocket size radios with 
headphones were developed, which gained in popularity because one could listen to the 
broadcasts without being noticed.  
The evidence also demonstrates that Poles were able to access Polish broadcasts in German 
labour camps and camps for prisoners of war (POW). Detailed reports on listening conditions 
and reception were supplied by the Underground. In addition, Poles who managed to escape 
from German captivity and make their way to Britain were subject to MI19 interrogation where, 
as well as queries regarding occupant policies, question were posed about the accessibility of 
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the BBC broadcasts and general feedback.50 These reports were widely circulated among the 
BBC and the British and American intelligence and propaganda departments.51 
According to Mr. C. Radsyński, who was held in the Stalag camp for POWs in Torun in 1942, 
prisoners managed to hide a high-power Philips transmitter and listen to the Polish broadcasts 
daily.52 Radsyński recollects that German guards were easily bribed and after receiving a 
payoff, often left the power on overnight, allowing prisoners to listen to the radio. Even in the 
concentration camp in Auschwitz, a member of the Polish Underground, Witold Pilecki, who 
allowed himself to be arrested in hope of reporting back on the situation in the camp, built a 
transmitter which permitted him to communicate with the Underground and to listen to Polish 
broadcasts.53 According to Garliński, Pilecki monitored only Radio Polskie broadcasts from 
London. It is evident, however, that he listened to the Polish Service too, as air time was 
allocated to Radio Polskie by the BBC only in January 1942 and, there is evidence that, until 
May 1941, Pilecki was able to access Polish Service broadcasts on concealed in the hospital 
radio transmitter.54 In addition Polish electricians in the camp listened to the Polish broadcasts 
whilst repairing SS-men’s wireless sets. 55 
Nor did the harsh conditions in the Jewish Ghetto in Warsaw prevented people from listening to 
foreign stations. Recent research based on an analysis of surviving typed and hand written scrips 
shows that, as was the case outside the Ghetto walls, the BBC Polish Service broadcasts were 
monitored and the content of the bulletins disseminated in a form of underground papers and 
leaflets.56 Both monitoring and distribution were organised by a secular Jewish youth group 
called the Ha Shomer Ha Tzair [The Young Guard]. Yet, not only were the Polish broadcasts 
objects of interest. but Radio Moscow, the American Foreign Information Service and Reuters 
were also considered important sources of information.57 
It should be emphasised that the efficiency of the Underground network would not have been 
possible without the involvement of civilians. Although untrained in covert operations, people 
were willing to risk their lives in order to support the resistance movement. In particular, the 
theft of parts from factories manufacturing wireless sets, which reopened in Poland after the 
German attack on the USSR in June 1941, played a significant role in the construction of the 
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monitoring stations and wireless sets. Not only did the Underground ever experience a shortage 
of parts, but the radio station Błyskawica, broadcasting from Warsaw during the Warsaw rising, 
was to a large extent built from stolen parts.58 Although all factories were under strict military 
control, the German newspaper Litzmannstaedter Zeitung reported in January 1942 that 
equipment worth 5000 RM (Reich marks) was lost in Warsaw every month because of theft. 59 
Germans not only reopened pre-war Polish factories namely Telefunken, Philips, State Tele-
Radio Technical Works and Kosmos, but also set up new German factories, such as Tungsram 
and Deutsche Empfanger Fabrik, primarily for military purposes but also to produce crystal sets 
in order to spread anti-Soviet propaganda on Polish territory previously occupied by the Soviet 
Union.60  
Syndication of the BBC Polish Service bulletins 
Given limited accessibility, the BBC Polish Service bulletins were distributed through the 
clandestine press rather than being directly heard on radio. The news was circulated in all forms, 
from professional papers and leaflets to little ‘strips’. Over 150 clandestine newspapers were 
published every week in Poland, 87 of which in Warsaw itself.61 The Radio Department of BIP 
not only monitored foreign broadcasts but also played a leading role in dissemination of news. 
Its Radio Journal [Dziennik Radiowy], was mainly based on the Polish Service bulletins and 
Reuters.62 It was printed in Warsaw from December 1939 and, after the Warsaw rising, in 
Cracow. It consisted of 3-4 pages of verbatim news without any comments.63 The monitored 
material was stencilled in the same studio and 200 copies were printed every day.64 The Radio 
Journal was circulated among members of the Underground, particularly those involved in 
propaganda, and clandestine press editors who reprinted news in other papers.65 There were also 
regional radio bulletins in the Soviet occupied zone, based on local monitoring. From October 
1941, the Radio Department also produced Bulletin Sztabowy, later known as the Bulletin, 
comprising speeches of eminent British politicians and the Allied Forces chief commanders.66 
In the beginning it appeared weekly for 50 issues but, from 1942, the print run was irregular. As 
Britain became Poland’s only fighting ally after the fall of France, BIP was considered essential 
source of information on British foreign policy and military strategy as well as economic and 
social problems.67 The Bulletin was distributed strictly among high ranking members of BIP and 
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the Home Army (AK). It was forbidden to copy the Bulletin which had to be returned after 
being read for safety reasons. The death penalty applied not only for accessing foreign stations 
but also for the distribution of news and conspiracy work in general.68 
‘Strips’ have a special place in the history of the Polish clandestine press. Type written, through 
carbon paper, without any spaces or margins and turned into small rolls so they could be easily 
hidden in match boxes, cigarettes tips or gloves, they were the most popular form of spreading 
the news.69 Halina Seydowa was one of the first people who organised their distribution. Strips, 
which later appeared under the title Bulletin Agencji Radiowej, were based on BBC Polish 
Service broadcasts. Seydowa continued her work until she was shot by the Gestapo in February 
1944.70 In fact, all Polish clandestine papers included news broadcasts by the BBC.71  
Not only had the Polish Service established itself as a reliable source of information, but Britain 
was seen as Poland’s most important ally. Thus the BBC broadcasts were recognised as a 
significant vehicle for the British government’s foreign policy. More importantly, after the 
Polish government took refuge in London, Polish listeners assumed that the Polish authorities 
were actively involved in the preparation of the Polish Service programmes; the fact that they 
could hear Polish officials’ speeches resulted in the popularity of the BBC Polish Service 
broadcasts, particularly between June 1940 and January 1942 when Radio Polskie was not 
broadcasting to Poland (see chapter 5). The Germans were aware of impact the broadcasts from 
London on the Polish population, as reflected in the severe penalties for listening to foreign 
stations and the distribution of news from other than German sources. A special unit was 
created by the German authorities to investigate the political purposes of the broadcasts from 
London and orders were sent to governors requiring them to take more direct steps to stop the 
spread of allied propaganda.72 
According to an Underground report, between 350,000 and 500,000 people on average were 
receiving news sheets every day; however, the number of people who were able to familiarise 
themselves with the content was much greater.73 Because of the limited access to printed copies 
and the death penalty for possession of or distribution of the clandestine press, special copies 
were marked S.R.A., which stands in Polish for ‘I heard English Radio’ [Słyszałem Radio 
Angielskie] with the instruction ‘read it and pass it on’.74 The Germans tried unsuccessfully to 
sabotage these publications by circulating their own bulletins also marked S.R.A with false 
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information. Word of mouth, however, was the most efficient and the fastest way of spreading 
information. According to a witness who escaped from Poland in 1944, everyone was well 
informed about the political situation.75 People were sharing information everywhere; doctors 
and nurses in hospitals were spreading the news as well as people in the shopping queues, while 
in the countryside, peasants memorised the content of the broadcasts and shared it with others.76 
Mr Junosza, writing in the New Republic on 31 March 1941 on listening conditions in Poland, 
reported that news from the Polish Service broadcasts was spreading very rapidly; only four 
hours after the RAF raid on Gdansk in December 1940, all Poland knew the details of the 
fight.77 The same observation was made by Polish courier, Jan Nowak, in 1944. Interviewed by 
BBC officials, Nowak confirmed that Polish Service broadcasts were circulated within 5-6 
hours in Warsaw, adding that, if the information was of particular significance, it became well 
known within 3 hours.78 Of course, in towns with small populations and villages the process 
was much slower. Nowak observed that, in general, Poles were better informed than Germans.79  
Penalties for illegal listening 
Although listening to foreign stations was forbidden for both Poles and Germans, the sanctions 
for Germans were much lighter, usually 6 to 12 months’ imprisonment.80 For propaganda 
purposes, Poles were put on trial for listening to the radio and the outcomes were widely 
publicised; if proved to have connections with the Underground Movement, the accused was 
shot on the spot without trial, as were their neighbours.81 Money rewards were offered for 
denouncing not only those who illegally possessed or listened to the radio, but also those 
distributing news sheets and or indeed anyone reading them.82 The highest reward, 10,000 złoty, 
however, was given for information resulting in the closure of a secret transmitter.83  According 
to an Underground report, on average 30 victims per month lost their lives in 1941. In January 
and April 1941, 48 and 36 people were killed respectively. 84 In October 1941, 46 people were 
arrested for listening to the radio: 5 were released, 14 sentenced to death, 15 to three to six 
years’ imprisonment, and the rest remained in custody. 85 In May 1942, 500 people were 
arrested in Rzeszow and Krosno for listening and distribution.86 With the exception of the last 
report, the place of arrest is not mentioned. However, the information with regard to those found 
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guilty is contradictory.  On the one hand, it is reported that, rather than putting the accused on 
trial, the Gestapo shot people on spot in order to save time, but, on the other hand, the results of 
the trials were publicised to foreworn people and to demonstrate that the German authorities 
executed the law. It is evident that the German occupant struggled with Poles’ disobedience of 
the law. 
German officials also attacked the BBC Polish Service for spreading British propaganda, 
stressing that all programmes were edited by British nationals whilst the news was presented 
from the British point of view which, in their opinion, worked against Polish national interests. 
Therefore, they argued, it was foolish to risk one’s life by listening to the broadcasts from 
London.87 As the German prosecutor stated in the trail of “Mr. S” in Lublin (full name not 
given) who was sentenced to death:  
‘Listening in to London wireless is not only a crime but it is also an utter stupidity. 
Polish broadcasts from London are not done by the Poles but by the English who will 
never let anybody use their transmitters. The language used to present the news is stiff 
and ungraceful and does not carry conviction. Besides, every Pole who listens in can 
feel for himself the utter ignorance of Polish mentality on the part of those who produce 
these broadcasts’.88 
In some respects, however, this statement was accurate. First of all, it was BBC policy that only 
British nationals could serve as editor of any of the BBC European Services, and consequently, 
all the wartime Polish Service editors were British (see chapter 5). Secondly, the Polish Service 
broadcasts were the subject of widespread criticism concerning not only the language of the 
broadcasts but, more importantly, their content. The Polish Underground complained to the 
BBC in 1941 that the Polish programmes were not only unsatisfactory, but scandalous, ‘doing 
more harm than good’.89 The BBC was charged with using ‘unsatisfactory language, ignorance 
of the Polish mentality, sickeningly sweet tone of bulletins and fooling listeners with undue 
optimism instead of telling the truth’.90 The report concluded that the fact that the BBC did not 
take into account that Poles were risking their lives in order to access the BBC was offensive. 
The broadcasts were called ‘trivial’ (see chapter 5).91  
Moreover, Germans who monitored the BBC Polish Service were quite aware that no reference 
was made in the broadcasts to the part of Poland occupied by the Soviets. It became one of their 
main propaganda themes, even before the Wehrmacht attacked the USSR. Poles living under the 
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German occupation were told that the Polish Prime Minister in exile, Władysław Sikorski, had 
already sold the eastern part of their country to Stalin and that therefore he neither addressed 
Poles living in this part of the country nor criticised the Soviets leader for atrocities committed 
against the Polish nation in his speeches. 92  In fact, the Polish Service was forbidden to mention 
the Soviet occupation in their broadcasts. 93 Subjects such as living conditions, deportations, 
arrests and murder of the Polish intelligentsia and army men were outlawed, as was reference to 
the population inhabiting territory occupied by the USSR. Although the Polish government 
protested, the Foreign Office argued that even information indirectly related to Soviet foreign 
policy could not be mentioned in the Polish broadcasts (see chapter 6).94 Yet, the lack of 
reference to the eastern part of Poland was not the only subject of criticism by the Polish 
audience. A listener in France, for instance, complained that, whilst Poles tuned to the BBC 
Polish Service to hear news about the achievements of the Polish Army, the programmes were 
dedicated almost exclusively to the glorification of the Red Army.95 
 Listening conditions in the Eastern part of Poland 
The part of Poland incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1939 comprised 201,000 m², which 
represented 52% of Poland’s overall territory.96  Poles were the largest single ethnic group in 
this area but the region was also inhabited by Ukrainians (33%), Jews (8, 3%), Byelorussians (7, 
6%), and small percentage of Russians (0, 6%), and Germans (0, 6%).97 Stalin used forged 
plebiscites and elections as a springboard for the incorporation of West Ukraine and West 
Byelorussia into the Soviet Union; the Polish city Wilno previously part of Poland, was given 
first to Lithuania and then in 1940 the whole country was annexed to the USSR (see chapter 3). 
Consequently, Poles living east of the Curzon line became Soviet citizens. As Kochanski points 
out, there were three categories of people under the Soviet occupation: ‘those who were in 
prison, those who are in prison, and those who will be in prison’.98 Poles were subject to mass 
deportations, executions and terror. As in other Soviet republics, communist ideological and 
economic policies were applied. History, religion and geography were removed from the school 
curriculum and instead Marxist-Leninist doctrine was taught. Further sovietisation was to be 
achieved by collectivisation and suppression of Polish identity, history and culture. In particular, 
the intelligentsia, Polish Army officers, government officials, political leaders and clergy were 
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seen as ‘the enemy of people’ and subsequently exterminated or deported to gulags.99 Moreover, 
Stalin used the national aspirations of Ukrainians and Byelorussians to purge the Polish 
population in the area. Although diplomatic relations were restored between Poland and the 
USSR in 1941, Soviet policies towards the Poles did not change, and in fact worsened (see 
chapter 3 & 6). 
Listening to or possession of wireless sets was not forbidden under the Soviet occupation. 
However, in this largely rural area, radio density was never significant.100 Among other items, 
radio transmitters were also regarded as valuable, and were looted by the Red Army.101 The 
Soviet authorities also took a great interest in Polish broadcasting stations and firms 
manufacturing transmitters. According to a witness who left Poland in March 1943, all the 
personnel and all the plant of the Polish Electrit factory producing wireless sets in Wilno was 
taken to Leningrad in 1939.102 Moreover, while some stations were stripped and taken away to 
the Soviet Union, others remained in place for propaganda reasons. Already on the first day 
after entering Polish territory, the Russians occupied Polish stations in Barnowice, Wilno and 
Lwów. 103 Broadcasts in Polish, Ukrainian, Byelorussian, Lithuanian, Russian and Jadish were 
used purely for communist propaganda and used extensively to increase agitation prior to 
plebiscites. Therefore, not only were Poles allowed to listen to the radio, but, as Jasiewicz points 
out, they were encouraged to do so.104 In addition, as Germans had done in the west of Poland, 
Soviet authorities distributed radio sets to those regarded as future collaborators and supporters 
of the regime.  But in contrast with the Germans, the Soviet regime considered indoctrination as 
their main objective. Consequently, shops selling and repairing radio sets were opened.105  
Although there was no law in place forbidding listening to foreign stations, those caught were 
usually arrested and detained.106 Poles were also required to register their sets but they 
disregarded the order.107 The same measures were applied to those who spread information. 
Given communist indoctrination and the fact that Stalin claimed that the Polish State had ceased 
to exist, spreading news about the Polish Army and the Polish government-in-exile were seen as 
criminal and ‘counter-revolutionary activity’.108 Nonetheless, the evidence demonstrates that 
listening to the BBC Polish Service broadcasts was popular in big cities, especially in Wilno 
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and Lwów where the density of Poles was over 50%.109 The reception of BBC Polish 
broadcasts, however, was much worse than in the western part of Poland, to a large extent 
because of jamming by Germans. Nonetheless, the Polish Underground managed to set up 
monitoring posts in the region and, as under the German occupation, the news was distributed 
via the clandestine press. Radio bulletins based on BBC broadcasts were produced in Brześć 
and Łomza and further colportaged.110 Students in Wilno produced wireless sets which were 
later sent to territory occupied by the Germans.111 In addition, the Polish Service was receiving 
letters from eastern parts of the country and there was even a case of a letter being sent by a 
Polish officer from a labour camp in the Caucasus, who stated that Polish broadcasts were very 
popular in the camp.112  
However, the situation changed after Germany launched the Barbarossa offensive in June 1941, 
as the Nazis also introduced the death penalty for listening or possession of a radio in the 
territory east of the Curzon line also. Nonetheless, according to two Poles (names not given) 
who managed to escape from Poland in November 1943, the confiscation of sets was carried out 
rather negligently.113 Thus many Poles were able to save their sets while crystal sets were not 
confiscated at all. According to witnesses, this was due to staff shortages.114 In addition, 
between 1941 and 1943, the Germans distributed previously confiscated sets to the 
administration in areas taken over from the Soviets. 
Stalin also recognised the propaganda value of broadcasting in Polish and from 22 June 1941 
Radio Moscow inaugurated programmes in Polish.115 A month later, on the initiative of the 
Polish communists in the Soviet Union, Radio Kosciuszko started broadcasting from Moscow 
in Polish, disguised as a Polish station transmitting from Poland. From 1943 it became a 
platform for the propaganda of the Union of the Polish Patriots (UPP), an embryonic version of 
the Polish puppet government in-waiting, created by Stalin (see chapter 7). Yet, neither the UPP 
political programme nor their broadcasts included communist propaganda; instead they 
appealed to patriotism and nationalism.116 After the Red Army liberated the Polish city of 
Lublin in 1944, the Polish communists also inaugurated broadcasts in Polish from this city. Yet, 
after the collapse of the Warsaw rising, the Lublin Committee, a joint body of Polish 
communists in Poland and the USSR, introduced the death penalty for listening to foreign 
stations (see chapter 9).117 According to Underground reports, people caught listening or in 
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possession of a private radio were ‘shot in the head on the spot’ but, listening to official 
announcements in public or work places was allowed and encouraged.118  
Number of radio sets under German and Soviet occupation  
The reports regarding listening conditions and audience estimates were supplied by the Polish 
Underground, however, because communication between Soviet and German zones was 
extremely difficult, the exact number of listeners and wireless sets was impossible to establish. 
It should also be taken into consideration that an unknown number of sets had been destroyed 
and hidden. Estimates of radio sets remaining in the hands of Poles were based on German 
reports regarding the confiscation and distribution of sets and, although acknowledged that there 
were more radio sets in the part of Poland occupied by the USSR, there is no data available on 
exact numbers.119 In addition, many reports do not distinguish between crystal and valve sets 
and, given that foreign broadcasts could be accessed only on valve sets with a shortwave band it 
is difficult to establish how many people actually listened to the BBC Polish Service. Moreover; 
as indicated in analysis below, it is not clear how many sets were in the possession of Poles and 
how many in the possession of those who signed Volkliste (see chapter 2).  
At the outbreak of war there were 1,100,000 licence holders in Poland and approximately 
100,000 unregistered owners.120 According to reports provided by the Polish Underground, in 
December 1940, 80,000 sets were still in Polish hands under German occupation, discounting 
crystal sets unable to receive broadcasts from London. It had been estimated that, including 
crystal sets, 120,000 remained in Polish ownership. In addition, it was acknowledged that the 
overall number in the whole of Poland was probably much higher, given that possession of 
radios was not forbidden under the Soviet occupation.121 The BBC European audience 
estimates, however, suggest that after July 1941, there were 1.8 sets per 100 population.122 As a 
result of the German attack on the USSR in June 1941 followed by the relaxation of law which 
allowed people to sign the Volkliste and the distribution of sets among those who did so, the 
number of radios owners increased.123 By January 1943, there were 100,000 sets in Poland. Yet 
here is no indication of how many were found under German or Soviet occupation and, more 
importantly, how many could tune to broadcasts from London.124 A report from April 1942, 
                                                          
118 Commandant of the Białystok region to the central command of the AK regarding the NKVD terror, 
13 March 1945, in Czarnocka, H., et al., Armia Krajowa w Dokumentach: October 1944-July 1945, 
vol. 5 (London: Ossolineum, 1981), nr.1460, p. 329.  
119 CAC, Neri 3/8, BBC monthly survey, December 1940. 
120 BBC WAC, E1/1150/1. 
121 CAC, Neri 3/8, BBC Monthly Survey of European Audience, December 1940. 
122 Ibid, 4 August 1943.  
123 BBC WAC, E2/188/2, European intelligence papers, BBC studies of European audience, October 
1942 –April 1944, report dated 24 April 1944. 
124 BBC WAC, E2/192/3, file 2a, Report from January 1942. 
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however, stated that between 10,000 and 15,000 could access the Polish Service broadcasts.125 
In June 1942, there were 26,964 sets owners in the General Government, in September 28,880, 
and in December 29,895.126 This increase can be explained by two factors, notably the growth 
of people on the Volkliste and the territorial expansion of the General Government. Yet, 
according to different reports, in July 1942 there were still 100,000 sets in German occupied 
Poland, of which 15,000 could receive the BBC.127 In March 1943 the Polish Underground 
estimated that 100,000 remained in whole Poland and in 1944 the German authorities continued 
to supply radio sets to Volksdeutsche.128 Although no data regarding radio sets from 1944 and 
1945 had been found, it was estimated after the war that, as a consequence of the German and 
Soviet attacks on Poland and six years of occupation, Radio Polskie had lost equipment worth 
£10,400,000. 129  
Conclusion 
Britain was regarded as Poland’s most important ally, particularly after the fall of France when 
the Polish government took refuge in London when it was assumed that Polish officials were 
actively involved in preparation of the Polish Service programmes.  As was observed by the 
BBC:  
‘Polish broadcasts are regarded as a most reliable source of information. In addition to 
this, they have enormous prestige in so far as they are connected in Polish minds with 
the Polish Government in London, whose existence is universally held as a symbol of 
the continuity of the Polish State, even by those Poles who may disapprove of its 
composition or policies.’ 130  
The Polish Service broadcasts not only played a significant role in transmitting news about the 
situation at the front and political developments, but also informed Poles about what was 
happening elsewhere in their own country. In addition, Polish government-in-exile 
representatives often spoke on the air, playing a vital role in maintaining public morale. The fact 
that the news came from London created the illusion that Poland was the centre of the world’s 
attention and that German crimes committed against Poles as well as Polish population 
resistance to the Nazi regime had been acknowledged. Therefore, regardless of the introduction 
of death penalty by the German authorities for listening or possession of a radio, Poles 
continued to listen to the Polish Service broadcasts. In fact, as Germany aimed at complete 
                                                          
125 Ibid, April 1942. 
126 BBC WAC, E2/201/2. 
127 BBC WAC, E2/460/5, Overseas Programme Development, file 2a January-June 1942, Compendium of 
planning information, 7 April 1942. 
128 BBC WAC, E1/201/2, March 1943. 
129 BBC WAC, E1/1150/1. 
130 BBC WAC, E2/184, European Audience Estimates, 1943-44, report from 4 August 1943. 
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destruction of the Polish state, listening to the BBC became a form of resistance and sabotage.  
The Polish Underground played a major part as a monitor and syndicator of the Polish Service 
broadcasts. It was so efficient that breaking news spread within hours in Warsaw. Yet Poles 
never gave up an idea of setting up their own radio station. Germans who used radio as their 
main tool of propaganda employed all means to stop the Underground from broadcasting. 
Nonetheless, the pre-war Radio Polskie, in particular, continued secretly preparing radio 
programmes, awaiting the circumstances which would allow them to broadcast not only in 
Poland but also to the wider world. 
The situation under the Soviet occupation was more complex. Although it was not forbidden to 
listen to or possess a radio, Polish citizens inhabiting territory east of the Curzon line were 
subject to collectivisation, nationalisation and anyone considered an ‘enemy of the people’ was 
killed or deported to Siberia – included in this category were those spreading information which 
in anyway could undermine communist ideology or USSR foreign policy. However, even prior 
to the outbreak of the war, possession of a radio was uncommon in this region and the majority 
of those who owned sets came from the ‘privileged class’. Acting on Stalin’s instructions, those 
who fell in this category were stripped of all their possessions by the Red Army soldiers after 
they crossed the Polish-Soviet frontier in September 1939.131 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
131 Kochanski, op. cit., pp. 120-30. 
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The Polish service 
 
Introduction 
 
 
‘The European Service tries to be: 
Accurate but graced with the qualities of imagination. 
Reliable without being dull. 
Honest and truthful without qualification. 
Sober without being lifeless or timid. 
Interesting without being superficial. 
Profound without being obscure. 
On the offensive but not arrogant. 
British without being narrow or insular’.1 
This chapter examines the role of the Polish Service as a part of the European Service, its 
organisation, output and structure as well as the cooperation with the Polish government-in-
exile, and its broadcasting arm- Radio Polskie. Taking as the starting point the origin of the 
Polish Service and importance of its broadcasts during the September Campaign in 1939, it 
provides detailed data on Polish Service personnel and analysis of sources and framework of its 
programmes. Special attention is given to Polish Service relations with the Political Warfare 
Executive (PWE) established in 1941 and people who throughout the war attempted to influence 
the BBC Polish language transmissions. 
Origin of the Polish Service 
The outbreak of the Second World War had a major influence on the creation of the BBC Polish 
Service. Not only was Polskie Radio well established in Poland, operating one national and nine 
regional channels, but it also broadcast in six foreign languages, namely: German, Czech, 
                                                          
1 BB WAC, E2/206/6, European Service, file 3b, 1943. Memo by Noel Newsome, 1 Jan 1943. 
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Hungarian, French, English and Italian and in Polish to Europe, as well as to North and South 
America, where there were large Polish communities.2 In June 1939, at the invitation of the 
BBC, the representatives of Polskie Radio visited Britain and closer cooperation between the 
two was established. 3 Therefore when the Foreign Office approached its embassy in Warsaw a 
few weeks before the outbreak of the war regarding the possibility of setting up Polish-language 
broadcasts from London the answer was that it would ‘not have a very useful purpose’ and it 
might be ‘thought impertinent by the Polish authorities who now, in fact, have an efficient and 
unbiased news service of their own’.4 Yet, the effectiveness of Polskie Radio was not the only 
reason why the BBC was reluctant to introduce broadcasts in Polish; it was understood that such 
programmes would have political implications and could result in the BBC being accused by the 
Germans of propaganda (see chapter 1).5  
The first Polish programme from the studio in Broadcasting House went on air on 7 September 
1939 with an opening speech by the Polish Ambassador in London, Edward Raczyński, 
followed by the news read by Zbigniew Grabowski (see figure 5.1 below).6 Polskie Radio 
continued to broadcast after the German invasion, but as the Luftwaffe destroyed major power 
stations and transmitters, it was impossible to maintain regular transmissions. In this period the 
Polish Service played an important role informing people about the situation nationally as well 
as the international response to the German attack on Poland. On 21 September, the Polish 
Service aired a memorable speech delivered by the Lord Mayor of London expressing his 
gratitude to the fighters of Warsaw. The next day, the Mayor of Warsaw, Stefan Starzyński, 
responded on Polskie Radio.7 The last broadcast form Warsaw was heard on 30 September; two 
days after the capitulation of the capital.8 
                                                          
2 Pszenicki, K., Tu Mówi Londyn: Historia Sekcji Polskiej BBC (Warsaw: Rosen & Współnicy, 2009), p. 
33.  
3 BBC WAC, E2/557/1, Tour of Foreign Broadcast, 1938-39. Letter from Foreign Liaison officer R.D. Marritt 
to P. Gorecki, 21 June 1939.   
4 Undated note by J.B. Clark, in Briggs, A., The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom: The War 
of Words, Vol. 3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 75. 
5 Mansell, G., Let Truth Be Told: 50 Years of BBC External Broadcasting (London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, 1982), pp. 97-98. 
6 Pszenicki, op. cit., p. 40. 
7 BBC WAC, E1/1147, Work of the Polish Service, p. 1. 
8 Kunert, A. K., Cztery pożegnania Polskiego Radia: 1939-1945, in Polskie Radio w Czasie Drugiej 
Wojny Światowej, (ed.) Budzyński, A., & Jasiewicz, K., (Warsaw: Polskie Radio SA, 2015), pp. 22-3. 
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Figure 5.1: Inauguration of the Polish Service by Polish Ambassador, Count Edward Raczyński, 7 
September 1939. Source: BBC Website. 
As noted earlier, the first broadcast of the Polish Service was transmitted on 7 September. 
However, according to the Polish Service employees Zbigniew Grabowski, Konrad Syrop and 
Tadeusz Lutosławski, the BBC had already taken the initiative to inaugurate a BBC Polish 
Service in the last week of August 1939. Zbigniew Grabowski, from 1937 the London 
correspondent of the Cracow Illustrated Daily Courrier and Polskie Radio, recalls that he 
accidentally ran into the Polish Embassy Press Attaché Franciszek Bauer-Czarnomski, shortly 
before the outbreak of the war and was advised to speak with Mr. E. F Ambler, the Assistant 
General Establishment Officer of the BBC staff Administration Department as the Corporation 
was planning to start broadcasting to Poland.9 The preliminary talks between the two took place 
on 25 August and Grabowski was then asked to come back to the studio on 27 August where, 
on the same day, he met his future co-workers: Konrad Syrop a correspondent for the Polish 
liberal newspaper, the Polish Courier, in London and Tadeusz Lutosławski, a former Polskie 
Radio broadcaster and press attaché at the Polish embassy in London.10 Grabowski recollects 
that Arthur Barker, then Foreign Language News Editor who for several years before the war 
had worked as a correspondent for The Times in Warsaw, was the main figure supervising the 
rapid expansion of the European Service in 1939, consequently playing an important role in the 
creation of the Polish Service.  
Syrop, too, recalls having run into Czarnomski in Portland Place a few days before the German 
invasion of Poland when he was informed of the BBC intention to start broadcasting to 
Poland.11  He was then invited for a voice test on 3 September at eleven o’clock in the morning; 
                                                          
9  Grabowski, Z., Sekcja Polska BBC, ͚Na AŶteŶie͛, nr. 119, February 1973, London, pp. 24-26. 
10 Ibid.  
11 Interview with Syrop in Mansell, op. cit., p. 100. 
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however, this was postponed as it was the day that Britain declared war on Germany and 
everyone was pre-occupied with listening to Chamberlain’s speech. The transmission was 
further suspended because of the first air raid which, de facto, failed to materialise. Syrop later 
recollects being invited to a BBC studio on 6 September with Grabowski and Lutosławski. 
Although Grabowki’s and Syrop’s accounts differ, they agree on one fact – that the first 
broadcast was aired on 7 September. 
Organisation and structure  
The European Service was financed by Parliamentary grant-in-aid and the government retained 
the right to decide the languages in which the BBC should broadcast and the duration of the 
programmes.12 Until October 1941 it was a part of the Overseas Service, and it was only on the 
initiative of Ivone Kirkpatrick, Foreign Advisor to the BBC and a PWE official,  that the 
European Service was separated from the former.13 From the beginning of the war, the output of 
broadcasts to Europe  progressively increased, yet it was only in January 1941 that the BBC put 
forward a proposal for further expansion in order to transform itself into a ‘weapon of war’ 
which aimed to:  
‘convey to all parts of the world truthful news and to prompt, clear and insistent 
exposition of British policy; to counter and discredit the enemy cause within the enemy 
countries and among populations subject to enemy occupation; to encourage the Allies 
(…) and serve better than it can at present (…) Allied Governments now seated in 
London’.14 
While the government supported the idea, little was done to put it into action. The BBC was 
also faced with another problem. After the bombing of Broadcasting House in December 1940, 
the European Service was relocated first to an abandoned glass roofed skating ring in Maida 
Vale and in March to Bush House. Yet on the eve of moving in, the building was far from ready 
to be used as a broadcasting centre. Some of the staff members had to work from hotel rooms; 
the studios ‘were so overcrowded as to be insalubrious’.15  The Director-General of the PWE, 
Bruce Lockhart, who inspected the building in July 1941 found the working environment 
‘terrible’.16 The conditions eventually improved when the issue was addressed by Philip Noel 
Baker in a House of Commons debate, arguing that the appalling working conditions in Bush 
House ‘were just one more proof that the Government was failing to take propaganda, 
                                                          
12 European Service of the BBC: Two Decades of Broadcasting to Europe, 1938-58 (London: BBC, 
1958). 
13 Mansell, op. cit., p. 85. 
14 Note on the Extension of the BBC Overseas Service, 14 January 1941. Cited in: Briggs, op. cit., p. 317. 
15 Mansell, op. cit., p. 116. 
16 Lockhart, R.H.B., The Diaries of Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, 1939-1965 (ed.) Kenneth Young 
(London: Macmillan, 1980), 24 July 1941, p. 111. 
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“especially through wireless”, sufficiently seriously’.17 Mansell, however, argues that the 
situation only changed after Brendan Bracken intervened when the PWE was moving to Bush 
House itself.18  
The European Service had three departments: Propaganda, making sure that the directives were 
written in accordance with British foreign policy; Intelligence, accountable for collecting the 
most up to date data regarding the war situation and conditions in the occupied countries and 
Germany; and Organisation, responsible for presentation. The latter was working in liaison 
with: the engineering department, language staff, microphone technicians, publicity and 
planning in order to ‘ensure that the right steps (were) taken at the right time to avoid growing 
pains’.19 
Whilst the European News Editor and from December 1941, the Director of the European 
Service, Noel Newsome, was also responsible for Propaganda; the Intelligence Department was 
headed by Jonathan Griffin, with G. Purves and W. Theimer as Intelligence officers for Poland 
with E.T. Kamieńska as a Junior Assistant.20 In November 1944 R.G Pearson became the 
Intelligence Officer for Poland.21 As Roberts points out, the work if the Intelligence Department 
was very important as the BBC ‘was concerned not only with producing ‘output’ but with 
assessing its impact’.22 The Department produced also ‘Studies of European Audience’ based 
on letters from listeners and interviews with refugees and in case of Poland, the reports prepared 
by the Polish Underground. The European Service was also organised according to the region it 
was broadcasting to. Poland together with Belgium, Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Holland, 
were in the North European group, under the supervision of C.H. Loveday.23 The main 
development in this period was the establishment of four different coloured networks –Red, 
Blue, Green and Yellow – with each group sharing studios, switch-gear lines and transmitters.24 
Poland, together with France, Germany, Italy, Belgium and Czechoslovakia belonged to the 
Blue network, broadcasting on short, long and medium wavelengths.25  
 
                                                          
17 Mansell, op. cit., p. 116. 
18 Cited in ibid. 
19 Briggs, op. cit., pp. 313-14. 
20 WAC BBC, Staff Book, 1942, Poland was in Intelligence group with Germany and Scandinavia. 
21 WAC BBC, Staff Book, 1944. Except Poland he was also responsible for Scandinavia, Switzerland, 
lower countries and Germany. 
22 Roberts, A. D., Michael Roberts and the BBC, paper presented at the British studies seminar, 
University of Texas, February 2012, unpublished. See Britannica on work of Michael Roberts. 
23 WAC BBC Staff books from 1942, 1944, 1945. 
24 BBC Year Book, 1942. Survey of the year’s work in broadcasting, p. 9. 
25 In 1942 Brown network was added for Near East and Latin America, and Yellow was reorganised to 
provide extra channels for additional European Service in Spain, Portugal, Balkans and Scandinavia. 
BBC Year Book, 1943, p. 22. 
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Output  
All the Polish Service bulletins were based on a 15-minute cyclical pattern increasing from one 
15 minute programme in September 1939 to seven by 1945 (see Table 5.1 below).26 By mid-
1940, 60 minutes were allocated to the Polish Service (30 minutes in the morning, 15 minutes in 
the afternoon and 15 in the evening), but in July the same year its time was decreased to 35 
minutes per day. This resulted in a protest from the Polish government which, pointed out that 
the Czechs had 30 minutes more per day than the Polish Service, thus refuting the BBC 
argument that the reduction was caused by the expansion of the European Service and, in 
particular, the need to make time for foreign governments’ broadcast.27 Eventually in September 
1940, the Polish Service regained the lost air time. 
 
Date Sep 1939 Sep 1940 Sep 1941 Sep 1942 Sep 1943 Sep 1944 Sep 1945 
Output 15 min 60 min 
 
60 min 1:15min 1:45min 2:25min 2:40min 
No. of 
bulletin
s 
1 4  4 5 5 7 7 
 
Table 5:1 Daily Output 1939-1945 28 
From 1942, other Polish programmes from London were inaugurated, notably, Radio Polskie, 
acting as a broadcasting arm of the Polish government-in-exile, and America Calling Europe in 
Polish which was rebroadcast by the BBC (see Table 5:2 below).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
26 BBC WAC, E2/350/1, Guide to the Overseas Service, April 1941; BBC Year Books: 1939- 1945. 
27 BBC WAC, E1/1148/1 Polish broadcasts: Minutes of meetings, file 1a, November 1940- December 
ϭϵϰϭ. Meŵo ďǇ JaŶ JuŶdziłł,- Baliński, uŶdated. 
28 BBC Year Books, 1939-1945. 
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Polish Service 1:15-1:30 
Polish Service 5:20-5:30 
Polish Service 6:20-6:30 
Radio Polskie 7:20-7:30 
Polish Service 8:20-8:30 
Radio Polskie 10:15-10:30 
America Calling Europe 11:15-11:30 
Radio Polskie 12:45-13:00 
Polish Service 16:45-17:00 
Polish Service 18:45-19:00 
America Calling Europe 00.15-00.30 
 
Table 5:2 Example of the daily schedule of broadcast in Polish, September 1943 29 
It was not only people in Poland who listened to the Polish Service broadcasts. Many Poles 
managed to escape after the German and Soviet invasions in 1939 and took refuge in other 
countries.30 The BBC Polish programmes were also popular among the Polish Army soldiers 
fighting in Europe, North Africa and Middle East. By the middle of the war, London Radio, as it 
was called by Poles, was widely listened to by Polish slave workers in Germany, Polish miners 
in France and Belgium, by the Polish community in London, Polish refugees in Kenya, where 
large settlements were established, and even in concentration camps in Auschwitz and the 
Warsaw Ghetto for Jews (see chapter 4). 31 As explained in the previous chapter, Poles, and in 
particular the Polish Underground, also listened to programmes in languages other than Polish, 
primarily German and French, as knowledge of these languages was very common among the 
Polish population (see chapter 4). Figure 5:2 below illustrates the audibility and reception of the 
BBC European Service. 
                                                          
29 BBC Year Book, 1943. 
30 Mansell, op. cit. 177. 
31 Iďid. OŶ listeŶiŶg iŶ AusĐhǁitz see Gaƌliński, J., Fighting Auschwitz-The Resistance Movement in the 
Concentration Camp (London: Julian Friedmann Publishers Ltd.1975); on listening in the Jewish 
Ghetto in Warsaw see Ferenc Piotrowska, M., & Zakrzewski, F., Archiwum Ringelbluma. Konspiracyjne 
Archiwum Warszawy, NasłuĐhy radioǁe ǁ getĐie ǁarszaǁskiŵ, vol. 22, Warszawa, in press. Also 
FeƌeŶĐ, M., ͚The ‘iŶggelďluŵ historiaŶs use of radio as a sourĐe oŶ the progress of the ǁar͛, paper 
presented at the BBC Monitoring Servcie and the Second World War workshop, Imperial War 
Museum, London, January 1916. 
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Figure 5.2: Audibility and reception of the BBC European in 1943 32 
 
 
Editors 
Robin Campbell was the first person in charge of the Polish Service. His relations with the 
Polish staff were very good. His position, however, was reduced to a language supervisor, 
because, as Mansell explains, in the beginning of the war the foreign language services had no 
separate identity except as groups of translators: 
‘Foreign announcer/translators … were grouped together in a pool and operated under 
the eye of team of language supervisors and switch censors – linguists of British 
nationality and known dependability whose job was to ensure both accuracy of 
translation and a faithful reading of the text at the microphone’.33  
In this period, Michael Urich worked as a switch censor for the Polish and the Czech Service. 
Campbell had not held the position for long before volunteering for military service in 1940.34 
He was succeeded by pre-war Reuters’ correspondent in Warsaw, Michael Winch, who was 
responsible for both the Polish and Czech Service with the title European News Sub-Editor.35 It 
                                                          
32 BBC Year Book, 1943. 
33 Mansell, op. cit., p. 81. 
34 BBC WAC, E1/1147, Work of the Polish Service, pp.1-5. 
35 BBC WAC, Staff Book August 1940. 
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was only 1941 when the regional structure was in place that each section had its own editor (see 
chapter 1). Winch’s relations with the Polish staff and the Polish government in London were 
particularly difficult, leading to his relocation to the Portuguese Section in February 1942.36 
Already dissatisfied with Winch in January 1941, the Polish authorities in London had 
unsuccessfully attempted to replace him with Gregory Macdonald, who was well known and 
liked among the Polish community in London, particularly for his work at the Polish Research 
Centre.37 As a graduate of the School of Slavonic Studies, Macdonald knew Polish history, 
culture and language well. Before the outbreak of war, he had been secretary of the Anglo-
Polish Society and later the Polish Relief Fund. In addition, Macdonald worked as a consultant 
to the Polish Embassy in London. 38 From June 1941, he took a job as scriptwriter at the BBC 
European News Department. A month later, however, he was called up for a military service 
and it was only the intervention of the Polish Embassy that allowed him to escape 
conscription.39 It was recognised at this point that Macdonald was a perfect candidate to take 
charge of the Polish Service. However, in the view of the European Programme Editor, Tudor 
Jones, he needed more experience in order to take up this post.40 He was appointed Sub-editor 
of the Spanish/Portuguese Service and it was not until February 1942 that he became Editor of 
the Polish Service, remaining in this post until the end of the war. 
Macdonald established a very good relationship with the staff who often described him as a 
partner rather than a boss.41 Throughout the war he also maintained good relations with the 
Polish government and, in particular with Count Jundziłł -Baliński, the Polish Ministry of 
Information-in-exile liaison officer to the BBC (appointed in November 1940), who was 
allowed to sit in on meetings of the Polish Service and with Radio Polskie staff, broadcasting 
from January 1942 on BBC wavelengths. 42  Yet, in the view of Douglas Ritchie, Assistant 
Director of the European Service and from 1944 the Director, his success lay in keeping Poles 
in line, especially the Polish government.43 According to Macdonald, however, his relationship 
with the Polish authorities and Radio Polskie was harmonious, though he noted that Poles did 
not hesitate to express both, their ‘complaints and appreciations’.44 
                                                          
36 Winch later joined the army. He lost both legs in an attack on Rommel’s headquarters in North Africa, 
in Pszenicki, op. cit., p. 41.  
37 BBC WAC, L1/1, 183/1, Gregory Macdonald personal file, application for appointments and transfers 
of staff, 18 February 1943. 
38 MPC, Gregory Macdonald’s notes, undated. 
39 BBC WAC L1/1, 183/1, Application for appointments and transfers of staff, 18 February 1943. 
40 Ibid, BBC Internal memo by the European Programme Director, John Tudor Jones, 1941. 
41 Pospieszalski, A., ‘Wojna na Słowa’,Wiadomości, London, 25 April 1971. 
42 Pszenicki, op. cit., p. 41. 
43 BBC WAC, L1/1, 183/1, Annual confidential report, 13 August 194, 3 also signed by Newsome.  
44 BBC WAC, E2/13/2, Allied governments broadcasts: Poland, file 1 b, 1943-45, dated April/ May 1943, 
Macdonald to Assistant Controller, undated. 
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As the conflict between Poland the USSR deepened, Macdonald became an outspoken advocate 
for the Polish case believing that the most important duty of the Polish Service was ‘to report 
truly and faithfully both news and comment about the war, whatever the political situation’.45 
He constantly intervened in the preparation of the BBC Home and European Service bulletins, 
assuring that the Polish national and political interests were not played down, especially when 
Polish-Soviet disagreement regarding the Polish eastern territory became an issue. The 
European Service Controller, Ivone Kirkpatrick recognised that it was best to give Macdonald 
leeway as he was a ‘pre-eminently well qualified and able man’.46 His views and personal 
attachment to the Polish case were probably best demonstrated during the Warsaw rising when 
he openly attacked the Soviets for not giving assistance to the insurgents and, in 1945, in his 
refusal to carry out an official directive mandating that Poles should accept the Yalta 
settlement.47  
Macdonald’s hard work and commitment were also recognised by important wartime Polish 
figures. His personal library books include inscriptions from authors such as Warsaw rising 
Commander Bór-Komorowski, General Anders, who was in charge of the Polish Forces in 
USSR in 1941 and later in Italy, and Jan Karski, a Polish courier who brought the information 
about the Holocaust to London, all acknowledging his support for the Polish interests whilst 
addressing him as a close friend.48  
Personnel 
In September 1939, when the European Service was still a part of the Overseas Service, the 
organisation of the foreign services lacked cohesion and suffered staff shortages. The first 
Polish Service employees, namely Syrop, Grabowski and Lutosławski, were required to work as 
both announcers and translators.49 They were shortly joined by Bolesław Leitgeber, previously 
correspondent for the Courier Pozńanski, first in Berlin and later in London. However, he did 
not stay in the Polish Service long before moving to the Polish Embassy in London where he 
became First Secretary.50 On 20 September, Hanna Duszyńska was employed as the first Polish 
Service secretary; regrettably, she died in 1940 during the Blitz.51 Further staff appointments 
were mediated by the Polish Embassy in London. As the Service expanded, however, the BBC 
attempted to employ people without consulting Polish officials, resulting in a disagreement 
                                                          
45 Briggs, op. cit., p. 467. 
46 BBC WAC, Kirkpatrick to Bruce Lockhart, 22 Nov 1941, cited in: in Mansell, p. 85. 
47 Mansell, op. cit., p. 180. 
48 Gregory Macdonald’s private library. In the possession of his son, France, Angers. For his biography 
and post-war work see Annex I. 
49 BBC WAC, L1/ 1,552/1, Zbigniew Grabowski’s personal file. 
50 Leitgeber, B., Bez Przesądow i Lęku: z Albumu Poznańskiego Dyplomaty, Malarza i Podróżnika 
(Poznań: Media Rodzina of Poznań, 1979), p.165. 
51 BBC WAC, L1/ 1,552/1. 
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between the two. 52 It was then decided that Poles would provide the BBC with a list of 
candidates whilst the BBC agreed not to employ applicants disapproved by the Polish 
government.53 By January 1940 the Polish Service was employing seven announcers/translators 
and three typists/secretaries (see Table 5:3 below).  
Position Name 
Editor Michael Winch 
Announcer/translator Tadeusz Lutosłaǁski, ZďigŶieǁ Graďoǁski,  KoŶrad Syrop, 
WaĐłaǁ Alfred Zďyszeǁski, AŶtoŶi Soďański, Marek Żułaǁski, 
MiĐhał BudŶy 
Typist/secretary M. MaliŶoǁska, HaŶŶa Duszyńska and M. Machota. 
  
Table 5:3 The Polish Service staff (January 1940) 54 
In November 1940 Budny left after being offered the position of Second Secretary position the 
Polish Embassy whilst Zbigniew Grabowski joined the Radio Department of the Polish MoI in 
1941.55 In the same year, Antoni Sobański died.56 Faced with the increased output and shortage 
of staff, Polish Service employees submitted an official staff protest in April 1941 as they felt 
overworked and, more importantly, were not included on the BBC pension scheme.57 Shortly 
afterwards four new announcers/ translators were recruited: Karol Wagner, Bolesław Zieliński, 
Mr. Litawski (given name not found), Leopold Koziebrodzki and Florian Sokolow, who in 
October 1942, after a complaint from Newsome, was replaced by Ludwik Gottlieb.58 Sokolow, 
however, remained working in the Polish Service, writing the political weekly reviews. 
In addition, in November 1941 on Winch’s recommendation, Syrop was promoted to the 
Programme Assistant position. Winch regarded Syrop’s work as outstanding, especially his 
articles and news commentaries.59 Unlike the others, Syrop had good relationship with Winch, 
but when his application was considered for the position of liaison officer with the Polish MoI, 
Winch opposed it on the grounds that it would look as if the recommendation had come from 
the Polish authorities.60 However, not everyone shared Winch’s sympathy for Syrop. Macdonald 
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regarded him as ‘politically timid’ and difficult to deal with.61 Teresa Myskov who worked with 
Syrop after the war, agrees with his observation adding that he disowned his Polish origins.62  
With the expansion and reorganisation of the European Service in late 1941 the Polish Service 
personnel had also grown (see table 5:4 below). 
Position Name 
Editor Gregory Macdonald 
Editoƌ͛s seĐƌetaƌǇ Miss G.C.T. Burnham 
Editorial assistants  Miss A.B.V Drew; Lt. Kamil Dziewanowski,  
Lt. Edǁaƌd KŵieĐik, StaŶisłaǁ FaeĐheƌ, StaŶleǇ SiŵpsoŶ  
Programme assistant  Konrad Syrop 
Language supervisor G. Adams, G. Flowers, J. Lavrin 
Announcer/ translator Ludǁik Gottlieď, Leopold Kozieďƌodzki, Oskaƌ SłaďoszeǁiĐz, 
Kaƌol WagŶeƌ, Bolesłaǁ )ieliński, ‘óza )uĐkeƌďeƌg, Maƌek 
Żulaǁski 
Language typists Mƌs. M. KapuśĐińska, Miss. E. Kukuk, Mƌs. M. Gƌiffel, A.H 
Zamoyska  
News Typists Miss C.W.J. KiŶg ;lateƌ MaĐdoŶald͛s seĐƌetaƌǇͿ, Mƌs. J.H.A. 
Fergusson 
 
Table 5:4 Polish Service staff, December 1942 63 
Only the detailed staff list from 1940 and 1942 survived the war, but as the name of announcer 
was printed on the script of the bulletins, it was also possible to establish who held this post in 
1943 (see chapter 2). Although increase in number of broadcasters can be observed, some 
appeared only sporadically, for example Opieński or Laciński, whilst on one of the bulletins the 
name Van Dee is printed; this is not a Polish name and does not appear in any other documents. 
 
 
 
                                                          
61 MPC, personal notes, undated. 
62 Interview with Teresa Myskov. Conducted in April 2013. 
63 CAC, Neri 3/2, Staff list, December 1942. 
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Position Name 
Editor Gregory Macdonald 
Sub-editor ‘egiŶald Wileński, EǀelǇŶ )azio, StaŶleǇ SiŵpsoŶ 
Announcer Oskaƌ SłaďoszeǁiĐz, Maƌek Żulaǁski ;‘PͿ, Bolesłaǁ )ieliński, Witold Leitgeďeƌ 
HeŶƌǇk MuŶd, Józef JuŶgƌaǁ ;‘PͿ, Leopold Kozieďƌodzki ;‘PͿ, BoĐheński ;‘PͿ, 
Ludǁik Gotllieď ;‘PͿ, Józef Opieński ;‘PͿ, Józef ŁaĐińki, Mƌ. Godleǁski, JaŶusz 
Meissner (RP) 
[RP: Radio Polskie, appears after the name when the announcer worked also 
for Radio Polskie] 
Dawn editors Edǁaƌd KŵieĐik, MaƌiaŶ Kaŵil DzieǁaŶoǁski, StaŶisłaǁ FeaĐheƌ 
 
Table 5:5: Polish Service Staff, July 1943 
 
As closer cooperation with Radio Polskie was established many of the presenters worked for 
both Radio Polskie and the Polish Service, as illustrated in Table 5:5 above. Radio Polskie was 
happy to lend its announcers and, in particular, Józef Opieński, whose voice was widely 
recognisable in Poland.64 To establish who worked for the Polish Service in 1944 and 1945, 
however, is more difficult because, after 1943, instead of announcers, the sub-editors’ name 
were printed on the bulletins. Nonetheless, it is possible to confirm that Simson and Zazio 
remained in their posts until the end of the war whilst Wileński was replaced with Mr. Oliver in 
February 1945. Based on analysis of other sources, such as private correspondence, memoirs 
and minutes of meetings, it can be concluded that in 1944 Słoboszewicz, Opeński, Łaciński, 
Mund, Żulawski and Bocheński still worked as announcers and were joined by Maksymilian 
Szyprowski and Mr. Hrehorowicz (given name not found). In addition, in 1945, Leithgeber and 
Sokolow were sent to Germany as war correspondents. In his memoir, Czesław Halski, who 
worked in Radio Polskie from March 1944 and in the Polish Service from July 1945, also refers 
to people who worked for the Polish Service, but he does not specify in which year their 
employment started or finished and his list is incomplete.65 In addition to those already 
mentioned, Halski refers to Bauer-Czarnomski and Jan Zarzeski, and secretaries: Rene 
Gellesow, Maryla Griffel, Olive Gregg, Aldona Lubieszko, Halina Niedźwiedzka, Zofia 
Perelman, Melita Thorneloe, Marjorie Hillier and Bobbie Ormonde.66  
                                                          
64 Halski, C., 6 Lat: Perypetie Wojenne, 1939-1945, (London: Caldra House, 1991), p. 92. 
65 Ibid. p. 91. 
66 Ibid. 
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Figure 5.3: Polish Service Newsroom (undated)  
From left to right: Zbigniew Grabowski, Antoni Pospieszalski, Czesław Halski, Ewa Fengler, 
Marek Żuławski. Source: BBC Website, Date unknown. 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Studio of the Polish Section in the Bush House (December 1943).  
From left to right: Reginald Wileński, Stanley Simpson, Ms Ford (on the phone), Evelyn 
Zazio and Gregory Macdonald. Source: BBC Website.  
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Framework of the programmes 
Presenting the news from the British point of view, accuracy and consistency were the main 
principles of the BBC wartime broadcasting, particularly important because of the cross-
listening of its worldwide audience (see chapter 1).67 The news, however, was selected in 
accordance with the foreign policy of the British government, which meant that the coverage to 
each country differed, but could not be contradictory.  Therefore the main news concerned with 
military development came from the Bush House Central Desk which had full access to all 
available news sources including Reuters, Associated Press, British United Press and the Soviet 
news Agency TASS, press digests from German, occupied and neutral countries, information 
supplied by the MoI and the Foreign Office, as well as the digests of broadcasts from all over 
the world prepared by the BBC Monitoring Service.68 In addition, working together with 
Central Desk were military, naval and air correspondents, General S.R Wason, Brian Tunstall 
and Air Commodore J.A Chamier respectively, ensuring the accuracy and consistency of 
news.69 The tapes from the news agencies machines and digests from monitoring were brought 
to one desk where they were sorted by the copytaster, combined with news from the press and 
connected with the latest news – this was known as a story.70 As Tangye Lean recollects, the 
copytester not only checked the material from news agencies for accuracy, but also for its 
propaganda values.71 Only then, he concludes, did the news ‘flow on in the form of finished 
stories to the regional editors, who add(ed) local detail and gave policy “slants” according to 
other instructions’.72 
 According to Ritchie, however, in the beginning of the war the Empire Service had priority in 
using news agencies tapes, and the European Service was able to obtain the tapes only when the 
former had finished with them.73 Typed and duplicated story was circulated in English to each 
of the European Service editors whose job was to make a bulletin from these ‘stories’. The 
editor then sent his selection to the translator who within the hour translated the material and 
five minutes before the broadcast handed the script to the announcer.74 This description written 
after the war relates only to the main story; each of the foreign services also included news only 
relevant to the country they were broadcasting to; more importantly, it does not mention that 
each bulletin needed to be stamped by the policy and security editor before airing. 
                                                          
67 Mansell, op. cit., p. 91. 
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72 Ibid. 
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In addition to the sources available from the Central Desk, the Polish Service used material 
provided by the Polish Telegraphic Agency (PAT), the Polish Underground and couriers, ready 
scripts prepared by the Radio Department of the Polish MoI in London, extracts from the 
English and Polish press printed in London and Scotland and newsletters and dispatches 
supplied by Polish correspondents spread all over the world (India, China, USA, Canada, 
Switzerland, Persia, Australia) which were received by telegram and cable.75 These dispatches 
were used as a source of information by all BBC Services, including the Home Service as they 
were recognised as outstandingly well written and highly valuable.76 As well as the main news, 
the bulletins included: press review, political and news talks, military talks announced by 
Colonel Bogusławski and every second week by an English military expert, religious talks on 
Sundays prepared by Father Staniszewski and, from December 1940, by Stanisław Kaczyński.77 
Thursday programmes included literary talks by Polish writers and readings of Polish classical 
and modern poetry. Friday was reserved for political speeches, mainly for representatives of the 
Polish government-in-exile but statesmen of other allied governments also appeared in the 
programmes.78 Even after Radio Polskie was granted free time, the Polish authorities insisted on 
broadcasting their speeches during the Polish Service bulletins because the time allocated to 
Radio Polskie was less suitable for the Polish Underground monitors (see chapter 4).79  
In 1942, the Polish Service in order to address the needs of the Polish Underground, introduced 
a 24 news cycle, from midnight to dawn.80 The first dawn bulletin gave the main news of the 
new day; the second, extracts from London press with editorial comment; the third, Polish news 
from all over the world; whilst the fourth served as stop press in case there was any sectional 
development for inclusion in Underground papers.81 These programmes, edited by Kmiecik, 
Dziewanowski and Faecher and supervised by Hodson, became the main source of the Polish 
clandestine press.82 
In the beginning of the war a very important role was played by the so-called ‘agony column’. 
After the German invasion many people who had escaped from Poland tried to find their 
relatives and thousands of letters reached the BBC asking for help. On 7 September 1939, at the 
request of the Polish Embassy in London, the BBC started broadcasting the names of Polish 
refugees looking to be reunited with their families.83 In the beginning the ‘agony column’ was 
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put at the end of the first morning Polish Service programme, then twice a day and, from May 
1940, a full 15 minutes were allocated in the morning for this alone.84 During this period over 
9,000 letters were received from all over the world including Russian occupied Poland. Over 
400 agony column broadcasts were made in which over 34,000 names were mentioned. The 
average number of names broadcast was the highest in June 1940: 10,620.85 The letters were 
handed to the Polish Liaison and Assistant for the War Victims whose job was to complete a 
card index. The service became very efficient thanks to close cooperation with the Red Cross, 
the relief organisations and a decision to attach a Polish translator to the Overseas Intelligence 
Department of the BBC. The ‘agony column’ or as it was called by Poles, ‘letter box’ helped to 
reconnect many families. It was so successful that other countries tried to introduce one for their 
own purposes. However, for security reasons the Ministry of Information decided on 9 July 
1940 to stop the service because, as the war progressed and communication between countries 
became more difficult, big delays were experienced between sending and receiving messages, 
causing confusion rather than helping to find missing relatives.86  
The Polish Service also took part in the BBC ‘Go slow campaign’ aimed at interrupting work in 
the German factories. The programmes consisted of communiqués addressing directly workers 
‘to work slow’, emphasising that the ‘slowing down’ of the German production of arms was the 
most efficient form of sabotage.87 In 1944, these programmes also included the song ‘Trojan 
horse’, announced as ‘the signal of cooperation and solidarity with fellow slaves of the Reich’.88 
Moreover, the Polish Service also took part in the BBC V Campaign with the purpose not only 
of sabotaging German actions, but also of uniting people in the fight against the occupier. 
The BBC V Campaign was well known in Poland and the symbol was painted on walls, streets 
and park benches.89 Speaking under pseudonym of Colonel Britton, Douglas Ritchie’s 
programmes were broadcast by the Polish Service and his appeals for sabotage were widely 
known in Poland.90 Garnett and Briggs claim that Colonel Britton’s broadcasts were features of 
BBC London Calling Europe, however, a written copy of a Polish bulletin from June 1941 
consists of Colonel Britton’s programme, which was also translated into Polish. 91 In contrast, 
the Polish Editor, Gregory Macdonald, argued after the war that the Polish Service did not take 
part in the V Campaign at all.92 His argument was based on two facts: firstly, Poles ‘had to be 
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restrained rather than encouraged’; and secondly, the ‘V’ sign which stands for ‘Victory’ 
translates into Polish as ‘Zwycięstwo’, hence in Poland it was the letter ‘Z’ which became a 
symbol of protest against German oppression. However, the Polish literature mentions the use 
of both ‘Z’ and ‘V’; it should be noted that Latin was taught in Polish schools and everyone 
understood the word ‘Victoria’. It is likely that by the time Macdonald became the editor, 
Colonel Britton’s broadcasts had stopped; this, however, cannot be confirmed as the Polish 
Service bulletins from September 1941 to March 1943 are incomplete (see chapter 2). 
Nevertheless, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the Polish Underground monitored not only 
Polish broadcasts but also others in German, French and English which points to the conclusion 
that, regardless of whether Colonel Britton’s programmes were aired after August 1941, they 
were definitely well known in Poland. Two facts support this argument: ‘V’ as a symbol of 
victory appears in the Polish clandestine press as well as in German-controlled newspapers in 
Poland, as the Nazis, too, adopted the sign as ‘the old German victory cry’.93  
From autumn 1941, a musical code system administered by the Polish government’s Sixth 
Bureau in London was included in songs played at the end of some of the Polish Service 
broadcasts in order to pass secret military information to Poland, such as details of supplies 
drops by the RAF or to confuse the enemy.94 The gramophone records were delivered to Bush 
House from the Polish government’s HQ at the Rubens Hotel in London by Lieutenant 
‘Peterkin’, real name George Zubrzycki. The codes which could only be changed by Radio 
Polskie employee, Halski, were incorporated in circa 50 Polish popular songs with melodies 
easily recognisable to Poles, and the Underground was informed in which songs special 
messages were included.95 Yet, as Macdonald recollects, there were embarrassing episodes 
related to these songs.96 After reporting on the death of Cardinal Arthur Hinsley, the Archbishop 
of Westminster and old friend of Poland, the Polish Service played the tune ‘Hurray, hurray , 
Maciek is dead’ [ hura, hurra, umrał Maciek umarł]. Another example concerns the choice of 
‘With the smoke of fires’ [‘Z dymem pożarów’], evoking failure of Warsaw revolt against 
Russians in 1831 to inform the Polish Home Army about air drops during the Warsaw rising in 
1944.97 In addition, so-called ‘ducks’[kaczki] – three numbers introduced by the announcer 
during his reading of the bulletin included secret information.98 
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Audience reaction and feedback to the Polish Service broadcasts 
Although the Polish Service bulletins were prepared at top speed and by 1941 the Polish Servcie 
had the reputation of being the most proficient when compared with other European Services, 
the content of the broadcast was widely criticised by Polish listeners. 99 In particular, in the first 
years of war, there was little reliance on BBC news as the Service was accused of presenting 
only the British point of view and pro-Soviet propaganda. A report from the Polish 
Underground supplied to the BBC in 1941 by the Polish Ministry of Interior stated that the 
programmes were not only unsatisfactory, but scandalous, ‘doing more harm than good’.100 The 
BBC was charged with using ‘unsatisfactory language, ignorance of the Polish mentality, 
sickeningly sweet tone of bulletins and fooling listeners with undue optimism instead of telling 
the truth’.101 Listeners were aware that elements of propaganda within the broadcasts were 
unavoidable but were frustrated that the content was not improved, given the huge risked posed 
by listening to it.102 They wanted ‘fighting radio’ and were prepared to hear even bad news 
instead of being fed with ‘conventional and affected optimism’.103 Further criticism came in the 
form of accusations of broadcasting trivial news to people listening in life threatening  
conditions where, on average, 30 people were losing their lives every month. In particular, 
religious talks, sermons and long talks were objects of criticism. One of listeners in Lisbon 
complained that the Polish broadcasts consisted of ‘only rubbish, simply to fill up the 15 
minutes’.104 However, it was not only the news value of the BBC Polish programmes that was 
under the attack. As emphasised in the Underground report, ‘unsatisfactory language’ was also 
criticised. This issue was also raised by the Polish authorities in London, complaining that the 
people responsible for translation did not know the Polish language well and constantly made 
mistakes.105  Another issue of concern was that the Polish Service broadcasts were ‘damaged by 
Jewish accent’.106 Although the name of the announcer is not given in the document, it can be 
assumed that they were referring to Konrad Syrop, who was a Jew. In response to the Polish 
government complaint, the Polish Service appointed an ‘assessor’ ‘primarily for the purpose of 
detecting traces of the Jewish accent and manner’.107  
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It was understood that victory over the Axis would not come easily, but in order to maintain 
public morale news confirming that the fight against Nazis would continue was essential. The 
broadcasts of the Polish Service improved after Macdonald became the Editor and the 
introduction of the dawn bulletins. Yet as those bulletins focused on the needs of the 
Underground press, the Polish Service continued to receive complains from regular listeners, 
who found these programmes ‘dry’ and substandard as the same information were repeated over 
and over again. The Underground, too, was not content with the dawn bulletins because, when 
compared with the Home Service which they also monitored, the news was not up to date (see 
chapter 4). After the USSR joined the allies’ coalition in 1941, it was felt that Polish military 
contributions to the war efforts were minimised while the Red Army victories were glorified. 
The complaints were even more stringent after 1943 when British foreign policy became more 
favourable to the USSR than to Poland and Polish officials were banned from addressing the 
population living east of the Curzon line, or mentioning the Polish-Soviet border or that Poland 
was the only country without quislings, thus questioning the trust and reliance of BBC 
broadcasts. 108 However, since the Underground considered the BBC a mouthpiece of the British 
government, it can be argued that, to a large extent, it was the Foreign Office pro-Soviet policy 
rather than the BBC which was the object of criticism (see chapters 6-9).  
Cooperation with the Polish government in-exile 
The cooperation between the Polish Service and the Polish government had already been 
established in September 1939 when the latter took refuge in France. After 30 September 1939, 
when Polskie Radio aired its last programme from Poland, the broadcasts of the Polish 
government from Paris and the Polish Service from London became the main source of 
information for people living under the occupation. Despite the fact that listening to or 
possession of radio set was punishable by death under the German occupation, Poles disobeyed 
the orders and continued to listen (see chapter 4). In order to ensure that the Polish broadcasts 
from France were not associated with Polskie Radio, the Polish Minister of Information in exile, 
Stanisław Stroński, changed its name to Radio Polskie; in his view, the former was ‘the most 
hated institution in the country’ sponsored by the Sanacja regime responsible for Poland’s 
downfall.109  
The relationship with the BBC began when the Polish Embassy in London arranged for the 
Polish Prime Minister, Władysław Sikorski, to speak on the Polish Service. Bolesław Leitgeber 
became the liaison officer between Radio Polskie and the BBC and closer cooperation was 
established between the two in March 1940 after the director of Radio Polskie, Krzysztof 
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Eydziatowicz, had visited London.110 It was agreed that 8-10-minute-long programmes would 
be broadcast on Wednesdays and Saturdays at 8:30pm on the Polish Service wavelengths, based 
on material supplied by the Polish MoI and announced as Radio Polskie bulletins.111  
When the Polish government took refuge in London in 1940, the cooperation between the BBC 
and the Polish authorities was tense; whilst the latter desired to be involved and consulted on 
coverage of Polish affairs by all BBC services and, more importantly, that the news was based 
on sources provided by the Polish MoI, the BBC and, in particular, the Polish Service editor at 
that time, Michael Winch, saw this as ‘intervention’ and an attempt to control all Polish 
broadcasts. Consequently, the Poles request to see the Polish Service bulletins before they were 
transmitted was declined.112  Nevertheless, the cooperation between the Polish authorities and 
the BBC ensured that the Polish Service played a pivotal role in informing the Polish Army in 
France about the evacuation to Britain.113 
In the beginning the main objective of the Polish authorities was to improve the Polish Service 
broadcasts rather than continue its own programmes, as suggested by Briggs, Mansell and 
Pszenicki.114 Although the Polish government wanted to inaugurate its own broadcasts from 
London, the main obstacle laid in the fact that not many people in London were suitable for 
preparing and announcing such programmes as, after the fall of France, not many of those who 
worked for Radio Polskie in France came to Britain. Instead some escaped to Spain or Portugal 
whilst others joined the Army.115 Moreover, the Polish Minister of Information-in-exile, 
Stanisław Stroński, held the view that his weekly speeches on the Polish Service provided 
sufficient information and propaganda.116 
The Polish MoI continued insisting on improving existing Polish broadcasts and being 
considered the main source of information about the situation in Poland and the Polish Army. It 
established its own Radio Department which, in addition to supplying the Polish Service, 
provided material for the BBC Home, Overseas and other European Services. Yet broadcasts to 
Poland were of the greatest importance. The so called ‘bulletins du jour’ and other political 
talks were supplied daily whilst Stroński spoke twice a week on air, updating his countrymen 
about the military and political situation.117 As was the case for any other items coming from the 
Polish MoI, the talks were subject to censorship and had to be delivered in English and Polish 
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12 hours before they were due for transmission.118 However, Polish officials’ speeches were 
subject to Foreign Office censorship whilst other items to BBC. The Radio Department also 
cooperated closely with the BBC London Transcription Service; some of the programmes 
prepared and recorded by Poles were sent by the BBC to various stations abroad, from where 
they were rebroadcast in many other languages.119 
In November 1940, a special Committee was established by the BBC in agreement with the 
Foreign Office to deal with the Polish broadcasts as well as all information related to Poland 
and its armed forces in other BBC Services. In the beginning its weekly meetings were chaired 
by V.D. Barker, the European language supervisor and, later, by Newsome or Ritchie. It was 
also attended by the Polish Service Editor (Winch, Macdonald), the liaison between the Polish 
Service and the Polish MoI, Baliński, the Radio Polskie Director, (Kisielewski, Meissner, 
Wagner), representatives of the BBC Intelligence Department for Poland, G. Purves and W. 
Theimer, the Assistant to the Director of the European Organisation, S. Stevens, and Frank 
Savery, the Foreign Office’s counsellor to the Polish Embassy in London, who was appointed as 
an East European language supervisor in 1941. Savery also acted as the main liaison between 
the British and Polish governments on the issue of BBC broadcasting to Poland. After the Polish 
Region of the PWE was established in 1942, Moray Maclaren was also invited to the meetings. 
Those meetings were dominated by Polish government complaints regarding BBC treatment of 
Polish affairs and consequently the discussion of British foreign policy.120 
Deepening divisions 
According to a BBC memorandum discussing cooperation with allied governments in London, 
the most satisfactory arrangements were made with the Polish and Czech authorities.121 
Although no details are provided of which grounds this conclusion was based on, the analysis of 
other documents–in particular, the minutes of meetings, Baliński’s reports from that meetings, 
and the private correspondence of BBC and Polish officials – demonstrates that this statement 
was far from the truth.  First, the BBC did not have the same relationship with the Polish as with 
the Czech government. The latter was subject to less censorship, the main reason being its pro-
Soviet policy.122 Secondly, Newsome, the Director of European Broadcasts also responsible for 
the European Service Propaganda Directives, openly expressed his dislike for the Polish 
government which, in his view, was made up of ‘feudal reactionaries’ spreading anti-Soviet 
propaganda and directly responsible for the outbreak of the war.123 Not only did he interpret the 
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Nazi-Soviet pact as ‘the inexorable product of the Polish defiance of power and logic’ but he 
also held the view that: 
‘Poland’s attitude towards the Soviet Union in 1939 and the British Government’s 
support of that attitude had brought about this war and its suffering by rupturing 
Anglo–Soviet relations and thus destroying the one combination capable of deterring 
the Reich from embarking upon the conflict’. 124125 
Moreover, he sympathised with communist ideology and admired Stalin, who he compared to 
Cromwell, whilst defending the Great Purge campaign of political repression in the Soviet 
Union from 1936 to 1938, which in his view, ‘strengthened Russia and tamed Revolution’.126 
He also held that the Communist party was widely supported in Poland, and both the Polish 
resistance movement and the Polish Home Army were fictions created by the Polish 
government-in-exile.127  The fact that in July 1942 Newsome married the Czech Service editor, 
Sheila Grant Duff, who according to Briggs was given free hand in the preparation of bulletins, 
further supports the conclusion that the Polish and Czech governments were not treated 
equally.128 The analysis of the relationship between the allied governments and the BBC led 
Harrison to conclude that 
‘the Poles were frequently, and unfavourably, compared to Czechoslovaks in 
discussions of exile government broadcasting at the BBC, often being cited as an 
example of the dangers of allowing foreign politicians to influence programming’.129  
In comparison with other governments, Poles were ‘closely supervised’ while the switch censor 
was advised to maintain a ‘special alert’ during Radio Polskie transmissions.130 
In fact, the relationship between the Polish Service and the Polish government-in-exile remained 
tense throughout the war. Whilst Poles insisted on cooperation and sought to be consulted 
regarding broadcasts to Poland or about Polish affairs on other BBC services, the BBC 
representatives, especially Winch, were hostile to any interference from the Polish MoI. In a 
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letter to Kirkpatrick, Winch, expressed the view that free time should be granted to Radio 
Polskie in order to free themselves of Stroński’s intrusion, saying ‘shall we ever be able to 
produce a more lovely Polish Service’.131 But even when Winch was replaced by Macdonald, 
Meissner argued that the relationship of the Polish MoI with the BBC was more problematic 
than with all other allied governments.132 
The reason behind this tension lay in the fact that, throughout the war, the relationship between 
the Polish Service and the Polish government was chiefly shaped by British government 
diplomacy, and its pursuit of pro-Soviet policy. The Polish MoI attempted to publicise Soviet 
political manoeuvring and crimes committed against the Polish people in order to gain 
international support for the repossession of the territory east of the Curzon line. However, 
Britain’s main objective was the unity of the allied coalition, resulting in acceptance of Stalin’s 
demands and its pro-Soviet stance and this was reflected in the BBC broadcasts (see chapter 6- 
9). The political implications of these differences were not the only source of tension between 
the Polish Service and the Polish government. Broadcasts to Poland were of great importance to 
the Polish authorities; therefore, they felt offended when the BBC did not use the material 
supplied by the Radio Department or chose other than Polish sources for broadcast. According 
to Sobański, who monitored Polish broadcasts, even when the items were accepted, they were 
not broadcast.133 Yet, in response to Polish accusations, Winch argued that the news received 
from the Radio Department was out dated or, in some cases, had been used in previous 
programmes. 134 This observation was shared by the Dawn Editor, Mr. Hodson.135 Winch also 
accused Poles of unprofessionalism, pointing out that in some material the date or source was 
not given.136 As an example, he referred to a report covering the two-month period, November–
December 1941, when only 25 out of 73 items were deemed suitable for broadcast.137 In 
addition, before free time was granted to Radio Polskie, the Polish government attempted to use 
the Polish Service programmes for its own propaganda. This stance met with strong opposition 
and not only for political reasons; lengthy Polish officials’ speeches, in the view of the BBC, 
were not what Poles wanted to hear and ruined their bulletins.138  
The scripts of the Radio Department did not survive the war and therefore it is difficult to judge 
the extent to which they were unsuitable for broadcast. The Polish government was, however, 
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faced with a more complex issue: Polish listeners heavily criticised the Polish Service 
broadcasts, and, assuming that the Polish government had a part in their preparation, as already 
mentioned, blamed the latter for the ‘trivial content and exaggerated optimism’.139 Given the 
huge risk posed by accessing radio, listeners expected that they grievances would be addressed.  
The assertion of the head of the Radio Department, Józef Kisielewski, that in fact they did not 
exercise substantial influence over the BBC Polish broadcasts, was met with condemnation. The 
Polish Underground argued that, if people were willing to jeopardise their lives in order to listen 
to the Polish broadcasts, the Polish authorities’ ‘excesses’ were not justified.140 Sikorski himself 
had already complained to the British MoI in February 1941 regarding the unsatisfactory Polish 
programmes.141 Broadcasts to Poland were of great importance not only to the Polish 
government. The fact that Churchill was also present during the meeting between Sikorski and 
Duff Cooper, the Minister of MoI at that time, indicates that the British government regarded 
the issue seriously.142 Cooper promised improvement, acknowledging that nothing had been 
done in that direction for a long time. Winch, however, disregarded complaints and any advice 
on how to improve the programmes. In his view, he knew better what Poles wanted to hear. The 
improvement in both the programmes and the relationship with the Polish authorities occurred 
only after Macdonald became the Editor, but even then Kisielewski continued to complain that 
the material prepared by the Radio Department had not been used. 
The internal affairs of the Polish MoI had as much negative impact on its relations with the 
Polish Service as its attempt to interfere in the BBC broadcasts. Stroński was widely criticised 
for lack of organisation and his relations with staff were tense, in particular, with the director of 
the Radio Department, angered because he had acted ‘behind his back’ and contradicted him. 143 
Although Kisielewski was not always consulted and did not have influence over the Polish 
Service programmes, he was held personally responsible when inaccurate news was broadcast, 
resulting in his resignation in June 1942.144 Macdonald shared Kisielewski’s view of the 
situation, adding that the Polish Minister of Information’s interference with the British MoI and 
the Foreign Office was disruptive and led to confusion and delays.145  When Kisielewski 
disagreed with BBC censorship, however, BBC officials maintained that the censorship was 
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done in according with MoI and the FO guidelines.146 Therefore it is not surprising that the 
Polish MoI, attempting to reverse the censorship policy, questioned the body responsible. 
In December 1942 Kisielewski was succeeded by the former Polish pilot and war 
correspondent, Janusz Meissner. His relations with Stroński were also far from perfect. 
Meissner sought to establish the Radio Department as autonomous and free from Stroński’s 
interference.  The main obstacle in achieving this goal was the dysfunctional communication 
between the Polish MoI and its Radio Department. Baliński, as liaison officer between the BBC, 
Polish and British MoI, updated only Stroński about his work whilst Meissner was kept 
uninformed.147 Baliński was also criticised for his lack of authority in BBC circles and 
ineffectiveness in securing Polish interests. 
Meissner, however, was determined to improve both relations with the Polish Service and the 
programmes of Radio Polskie. Major changes occurred under his management: Zbigniew 
Grabowski, former senior announcer of the Polish Service, Mieczysław Paczosa and Jerzy 
Szyszko-Bohusz were put in charge of preparation of the material in Polish for the Polish 
Service, whilst Karol Wagner, also an ex-Polish Service employee, was appointed Director of 
the Foreign Section of the Radio Department of the Polish MoI, responsible for editing news in 
English about Poland, the Polish Army and the Polish government for the BBC, including the 
Polish Service.148 As other European Services were reluctant to include information about 
Poland and the Polish navy and air forces in their programmes, Wagner came up with the idea, 
according to Meissner borrowed from the advertising industry, to print news on conspicuous 
green paper, a colour not used in the BBC.149  The copies with most recent information about 
Poland and the Polish forces were delivered to each department every day before they were 
published in the Polish press in London. In addition, Edward Domachowski, Editor and 
translator of English bulletins, cooperated closely with Macdonald and, in many cases, they 
worked together in Bush House on their preparation.150 Although the Foreign Section of the 
Polish Radio Department always suffered from a shortage of staff, their work was highly 
efficient. According to data provided by Wagner in 1943, in a three-month period, the Section 
supplied the BBC with 12920 lines of text with news, some 170 lines every day.151 In July 1943 
Meissner resigned and Karol Wagner was appointed Director of Radio Department and held this 
post to the end of the War. Other important changes also occurred in this period, which saw 
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Stanisław Kot taking office as a Minister of Information. Although his relationship with the 
Radio Department was good, he was very ill-favoured in BBC circles. Not much information 
has been found about Adam Pragier, the Minister of Information from 1944 to 1949.  
Policy and Censorship 
All bulletins had to be written in accordance with BBC general directives and it was the job of 
one of the Bush House Central Desk senior staff to assure that this was followed.152 Yet, during 
the war special safety measures had to be taken and all the European Service bulletins and talks 
had to be approved by security and policy officials. All ‘vetting’ had been done on scripts 
already translated into English. First, all items had to be stamped for security in order to check 
the accuracy of information from the frontline and that military secrecy had not been breached. 
Mr. Lovejoy was the head of the security department which by 1942 had seven full-time 
censors. Secondly, all scripts had to ‘pass for policy’. In fact, this was political censorship 
assuring that all bulletins were written in accordance with British foreign policy and policy 
censors were responsible to the FO.153 In order to assure consistency, Kirkpatrick argued in 
March 1942 that each script should be stamped and initialled by one of: the Director of the 
European Service or his Assistant, the chief Sub-Editor of the day or night, the Dawn Editor or 
his Assistant and the European News Editor or his Assistant.154 Only then could the bulletins be 
sent to the language supervisor whose job was to assure that there was no variation from the 
English text in the translated copy.  It was required that all officials responsible for policy, 
security and translation were British nationals. Additional security measures were applied, 
notably, a switch censor was required to be present during the transmission assuring a faithful 
reading of the text by the announcer. 
Between 1942 and 1945, Donald Edwards was appointed the European News Editor, F.G. 
Russell took the post of the day policy Editor and D.M. Hodson as the night policy Editor while 
J.M. Spey become Policy Editor of the dawn bulletins in 1944. He was succeeded in autumn the 
same year by J.A.P Thewes, who held this position until the end of the war. In addition, all talks 
had to be approved by the European Talks Editor, Allan Bullock. However, according to the 
BBC Staff list from 1942, rather than require the European Service Director or other editors to 
vet bulletins for policy, the BBC appointed separate Policy Editors, namely, J.S. Dean, C. 
Hulme and A.R. Birley, whilst the latter’s initials appear also on the security stamp of the Polish 
Service bulletins.155 Moreover, in 1943 Kirkpatrick informed Baliński that the Policy Editors 
were in fact responsible to the Foreign Office, not to the BBC.156 With regards to the security 
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editors, among initials such as JWF, F, GA, GP and AC, it was possible to identify only GP as 
belonging to the European Productions Supervisor, Gibson Parker.  
Although broadcasters understood that special measures had to be taken in wartime, the attempt 
of the MoI to interfere in the BBC policies was not welcome. The BBC agreed to follow the 
official policy but reserved the right to execute it in their own way. Yet, according to 
Kirkpatrick, this ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ did not work.157 The voices inside the Corporation 
argued for cooperation with, rather than the control of, the European Service, resulting in the 
appointment of H.R Cummings in 1939 as Foreign Office liaison-officer and A.F. Haig as BBC 
liaison officer with the FO dealing exclusively with the foreign broadcasts, excluding 
German.158 According to Ritchie, however, there was not much intervention from the Foreign 
Office or other governmental agencies until autumn 1940 when the directives ‘multiplied like 
leaves’; during the move from Broadcasting House to the ice rink in Maida Vale the chaos was 
such that the Service relied on improvisation.159 
The improvement of both cooperation and communication between the BBC and the 
government occurred only after Brendan Bracken succeeded Duff Cooper as the Minister of 
Information in July 1941. He appointed Ivone Kirkpatrick as the Controller of the European 
Service October1941. Both Bracken and Kirkpatrick, however, argued for European Service 
independence from the control of the government.160  
The PWE and government foreign policy in BBC Polish broadcasts 
In the beginning of the war, the MoI issued the guidelines for the European Service. Things 
changed in September 1941 when the PWE was established. It consisted of representatives of 
different ministerial departments and the BBC, namely Bruce Lockhart (FO), Brigadier Dallas 
Brooks (MoI), Rex Leeper (MEW) and the personal assistant of Churchill, Major Morton.161 
The BBC was represented by Kirkpatrick. The PWE was responsible to the Foreign Secretary 
for policy, to the MoI for administration and to MEW for liaison with the underground 
activities. In March 1942 the PWE underwent reorganisation resulting in Lockhart becoming the 
Director-General, and Leeper the Deputy Chairman, whilst Brooks took responsibility for the 
military wing and Kirkpatrick for administration (see chapter 1). As Lockhart was often away, 
Ritchie Calder was appointed as Director of Plans and Campaigns, in charge of issuing the 
Central Directives and coordination with the PWE Regional Directors. In February 1942, Moray 
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Maclaren became the Head of the PWE Polish Region, responsible for issuing weekly directives 
for the Polish Service. These directives, however, had to be written in accordance with the PWE 
Central Directives.162  
The Central Directives were circulated every Tuesday, and by Thursday the regional directives 
had to be completed for each Service, approved by the Foreign Office at 12pm on the same day 
and sent to the BBC at 3:30pm.163 Therefore, as Maclaren complained, by the end of the 
working week many strategic and political guidelines were invalid.164 Appliance of the PWE 
directives was, however, more problematic. As Kirkpatrick observed ‘the chain of 
responsibility’ and co-ordination had been broken because the PWE Regional Directors issued 
guidelines to the European Service Regional Editors without notifying him or Newsome.165 This 
was, however, far from the truth. In fact, it was the opposite; the BBC Regional Editors, when 
disagreeing with the Director of the European Broadcasts, sought support from the PWE 
Regional Director. Newsome often ignored the MoI and the PWE directives and pursued his 
own policy, although he claimed that there was no difference between his directives and those 
of the PWE.166 He argued that they were based on the PWE policy in agreement with 
Kirkpatrick and only then circulated to the PWE regional director as guidelines by the Central 
Planning Committee of the PWE of which he was a member. In Newsome’s view, his directives 
were consistent with the policy of HMG.167 
It was eventually agreed that the BBC Regional Editors would be responsible for selection and 
presentation of news as each of them had been appointed to this post because of their special 
knowledge of the country they were dealing with.168 It was Newsome’s job to provide the 
editors with more recent general news from the Bush House Central Desk together with the 
Daily Directives, previously approved by the PWE Executive Committee. Daily conferences 
were held at 5pm and 11am between Newsome, all Regional Editors and Bush House Central 
Desk staff at which all the important news of the day was discussed. The PWE Regional 
Directives were composed in consultation with the BBC Regional Editors before being 
submitted to Kirkpatrick and the PWE Exceptive Committee. This meant that Macdonald had a 
share in the preparation of the PWE directives and exercised influence on their direction. In 
order to assure cooperation between the PWE and the BBC, daily meetings were also scheduled 
between Kirkpatrick, Newsome and the PWE Regional Directors. In addition, the Propaganda 
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Policy Committee held meetings with the PWE Regional Directors, at which they received 
political guidelines from Lockhart and strategic guidelines from Brooks.169 
 In 1944, it was agreed that the directives could only be distributed if formally accepted by the 
BBC.  Editors were entitled to challenge any directive if they disagreed and the circulation of 
the directives was only possible when ‘the disagreement was thrashed out’.170  
Kirkpatrick became the key person responsible for coordination between the BBC and the PWE 
and, although his main job was to assure that the BBC followed the FO policy, he became a 
prominent advocate for the independence of the European Service. Briggs argues that his 
appointment to the PWE did not change his view and he continued to insist that the PWE 
directives should never be universally obeyed.171 It is, however, difficult to find support for this 
argument in primary sources. After all, the PWE was created in order to assure that the 
European Service broadcasts were consistent with British government foreign policy. As 
Lockhart asserted, ‘the PWE did not make policy, it executed it’ and the last word always 
belonged to the FO.172 Precisely for this purpose, the PWE was moved to Bush House and, for 
the same reason, Eden took charge of the ‘PWE foreign policy aspects of propaganda’ whilst 
Bracken was made responsible for administration in February 1942.173 In fact, the opposite 
argument is more persuasive, notably that it was Kirkpatrick’s job to assure that the PWE 
directives were universally obeyed. 
According to Newsome, however, the success of the European Service had been ‘due not to the 
creation of the PWE but either to PWE’s restraint or its ineffectiveness’.174 In Macdonald’s 
opinion, the relationship between the FO, PWE and Polish Service was harmonious.175 
However, the extent to which the Polish Service Editor was able to disobey the PWE directives 
is questionable. As will be demonstrated in the following chapters, the PWE directives could be 
treated flexibly as long they did not differ from the official line of HMG (chapter 6-9). On the 
other hand, as he was able to participate in their preparation, the question of disobedience is 
irrelevant; more pertinently, to what extent were his opinions taken into consideration?  
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Conclusion 
In the wartime period the Polish Service was recognised for its efficiency and professionalism. 
Its personnel not only had an impressive background in journalism, both in broadcasting and 
programme preparation, but were also deeply committed to the BBC aims, namely to support 
the resistance activities and to keep the listeners in occupied countries informed about the actual 
war situation. For many people living under German occupation, broadcasts form London 
remained the only source of information and were valued for their impartiality and accuracy. 
The competence and proficiency of the Polish couriers and correspondents network was well 
known in BBC circles and their reports were circulated across all BBC channels.  
The extent to which the PWE tried to control the output to Poland, as well as the degree to 
which Macdonald was able to challenge those directives is questionable. As the war progressed, 
especially after 1943, it became evident that the objectives of the British government and 
Poland were different. Whilst Churchill tried to convince his fellow countrymen about the Red 
Army’s importance in winning the war, the Polish government argued for disclosure of Soviet 
crimes committed against Polish citizens.  The relationship between the Polish government and 
the BBC was tense throughout the war. Any interference in BBC broadcasts was met with 
hostility whilst intervention by Polish officials in the Foreign Office or in the Ministry of 
Information, endeavouring to secure their interests, only worsened the situation.  
The Polish Ministry of Information desired the Polish Service to use the material prepared by 
their Radio Department, which in their opinion, was what the listeners wanted to hear and to be 
consulted regarding all other bulletins concerning Polish affairs, particularly political 
broadcasts. However, as much as the BBC was not content with the Polish Ministry of 
Information’s intrusion, it was also in their interest to maintain a friendly relationship with 
them, as the Polish Underground was the major receiver and syndicator of the Polish Service 
broadcasts, loyal only to the Polish government-in-exile.  It was also thanks to this cooperation 
that the Polish Service was able to improve and adjust their programmes to the Underground’s 
need.  
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Censorship and Propaganda June 1941-April 1943 
 
Introduction 
‘To tell bad news honestly and boldly is the surest sign of strength. To tell good news 
quietly but with justifiable punch and pleasure is the best form of propaganda’.1 
This chapter covers the period from German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941 to the 
breaking off of diplomatic relations between Poland the USSR in April 1943. The accession of 
the Soviet Union to the coalition of the allies changed the situation not only in military terms 
but also in terms of propaganda. It was acknowledged that ideological differences must be put 
aside in times of total war and restoration of diplomatic relations with the USSR became central 
to the Allies’ political and military strategy. Great Britain, unlike Poland, was not at war with 
the Soviet Union and did not perceive it as an enemy or ally of Germany.2 The British 
government did not desire any confrontation with Stalin; instead, from the outbreak of the war, 
attempts were made to persuade Stalin to join the anti-Axis coalition.3 Although no one believed 
that the Red Army could defeat Germany, Churchill, Roosevelt and the Polish Prime Minister, 
Władysław Sikorski, were anxious that Stalin might sign a separate treaty with Hitler, and 
therefore all means were employed to convince Stalin about the pro-Soviet attitude of the West.4 
Churchill, who had previously been critical of the USSR and warned the public about the 
danger of communism, after the Wehrmacht attack on the Soviet Union, addressed Stalin as an 
ally and called for Anglo-Russian co-operation.5 The situation for Poland, however, was 
different; the USSR had been considered as a foe since the invasion of Poland in September 
1939, followed by the annexation of territory east of the Curzon line. The population of this 
region had been exposed to terror, mass murders and imprisonment which could not be easily 
forgotten (see chapter 4). Nevertheless, as Poland and the USSR were now fighting a common 
enemy, it was hoped that, with the backing of the British and American government, Poland 
would be able to regain lost land.  
As a result, in the period 1941-1943 the BBC Polish Service was faced with a serious challenge, 
notably, it had to convince its listeners that the previous two years of Soviet occupation should 
be forgotten and that Stalin’s main interest was to seek a free and independent Poland, an 
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approach which could jeopardise the credibility of the BBC position. Nonetheless, it was 
understood that in the name of the unity of the coalition ‘uncomfortable’ subjects had to be 
avoided. Issues such as the dispute regarding the Polish eastern border, the release of Polish 
citizens from gulags, the disappearance of over 8,000 Polish officers in the USSR and the 
formation of the Polish Army in the USSR were labelled as ‘sensitive’, and a policy of 
‘avoidance’ was recommended. As the conflict between Poland and the Soviet Union deepened, 
not only were speeches of Polish officials subjected to severe censorship but also the Polish 
Press in London was banned from discussing Polish-Soviet relations. The BBC understood that 
in times of total war, following the governments’ official policy was essential.  
BBC European Service as a weapon of war and pro-Soviet propaganda 
The BBC European Service was the main instrument of British propaganda and throughout the 
war its broadcasts presented the official line of the government.6 This meant that the BBC 
Polish Service could not contradict the government’s foreign policy which, from June 1941, 
took a pro-Soviet position. The Soviet Union was recognised as a more important ally than 
Poland, therefore news which could undermine the USSR position was withheld from 
broadcast. The BBC Polish Service, as other European Services, was sponsored by a Treasury 
grant and required to follow the Political Warfare Executive (PWE) directives, written in 
accordance with Foreign Office policy. Issued weekly, the PWE directives ‘steered’ the 
European Service ‘in the right direction’ and outlined how the broadcasts should be ‘tailored’.7 
As Cruickshank points out: 
‘Although open broadcasting was confined to the truth, on the ground that honesty is 
the best policy, it did not necessarily have to be the whole truth. While the white 
broadcasters were required to promote the current approved propaganda themes no 
less than were their black brethren, some truths would support them better than others, 
and some were best left untold’.8 
The aim of BBC European Service was not only to provide reliable and up to date information 
but, more importantly, to support war effort. As outlined by Noel Newsome, the European 
News Editor and, from December 1941, the Director of the European Service, propaganda to 
Europe was based on psychological warfare, namely ‘strengthening or preserving the right 
frame of mind in our audience’ and ‘operational- – exploiting that frame of mind in a practical 
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direction’.9 As the Director of the European Service, Newsome defined the principles and 
purpose of the European Service as follow:  
‘We report nothing that we don’t believe in, we supress nothing of importance which we 
believe to be true. We give bad news promptly and prominently. We express no views 
which we do not believe to be justified by the facts. We decide upon our ‘line’ according 
to our own estimate of the facts and only to a very minor degree as a ‘counter’ to the 
enemy’s version. We seek to explain our views to the listener: we do not trim that view 
merely because of his susceptibilities (…) We always take an offensive line: we attack 
all the time. (Even when things looked blackest we were aggressive (…) we do not 
subject our broadcasts either to the enemy’s propaganda line or to the prejudices and 
tastes of our listeners, enemy, neutral or friends (although in methods of presentation 
we take account of the audience mentality (…) We use as our ammunition not mere 
words but ideas, expressed in words’.10 
Yet, in recognising radio as a weapon of war, Newsome also believed that it was a broadcaster’s 
job to make listeners ‘swallow the maximum dosage of propaganda’ without ‘doctoring’ though 
only to the extent that the interest and desire to continue listening was not minimised.11 In order 
to achieve this goal Newsome argued: 
‘All output must bear the stamp of authenticity and authority and must not be in danger 
of being exposed as otherwise (whether in fact it is or is not authentic and authoritative. 
(…) In short, if we depart from accuracy and the truth we must do so not accidently and 
carelessly but deliberately and systematically either because we know we shall not be 
found out or because it is considered essential to risk being found out for very special 
reason’.12 
Newsome’s approach to broadcasting was very influential and throughout the war his weekly 
directives had a significant impact on the content of foreign broadcasts. The Director of the 
European Service, however, often ignored the Ministry of Information (MoI) and PWE 
directives and pursued his own policy, although he argued that there was no difference between 
his and the PWE directives.13 Yet, this claim is questionable as he himself argued in December 
1943 that the success of the European Service ‘has been due not to the creation of the PWE but 
                                                          
9 BBC WAC, EϮ/ϭϯϱ, Papeƌ ͚PolitiĐal Waƌfare: Ingredients of Propaganda, N. Newsome, 23 September 
1941. 
10 BBC WAC EϮ/ϮϬϲ/ϲ, file ď, EuƌopeaŶ SeƌǀiĐe, ϭϵϰϯ, ͚The European Service. Principles and purposes, 
problems and policy points, Noel Newsome, 1 January 1943. 
11 BBC WAC, E2/135, Newsome: Political Warfare: Ingredients of Propaganda, N. Newsome, 23 
September 1941.  
12 Ibid. 
13 Garnett, op. cit., pp. 95-8. 
 143 
either to PWE’s restraint or its ineffectiveness’.14 In his view, however, the directives which he 
prepared expressed HMG policy.15 
Even prior to his nomination to the Director of the European Service post, Newsome produced 
his own Propaganda Background Notes, which were distributed to all European Service editors. 
Garnett, who worked for the PWE, maintains that those directives, written in ‘forcible 
language’, deviated from the political and strategic guidelines and that Newsome continuously 
made ‘howlers’.16 The Propaganda Background Notes, however, were valued by his 
subordinates, interested in their director’s views.17 In particular, Notes on Polish-Soviet affairs 
had a big impact on how Stalin’s territorial demands were interpreted, since knowledge of pre-
war Poland-Soviet relations was very limited in the BBC circles and many broadcasters relied 
on information and comments provided by the Director of the European Service. He did not 
hesitate to openly express his left wing political views and admiration for the Red Army:  
‘Russians (were) not only a great fighting nation and a mighty ally in war but also 
people who have set us, and the world, an example in many respects of how to pursue 
an ideal with wholehearted sacrifice’.18  
In fact, he went much further than supporting pro-Soviet foreign policy asserting that: 
‘without accepting Communism, we must convince Europe that Russia has remained 
civilized, and that the Anglo-Russian alliance holds out a fine promise of progress for 
European civilisation towards a system combining the best futures of socialism and 
liberal democracy’.19  
The issue of political warfare and the extent of governmental control over the BBC foreign 
broadcasts became a major point of disagreement between the BBC European Service and the 
PWE (see chapter 1). Both, however, acknowledged that broadcasting should ‘further the ends 
of HMG in political warfare’. 20 Ivone Kirkpatrick who, by autumn 1941, had held three 
positions, namely Controller of European Broadcasts, PWE official and BBC liaison with the 
Foreign Office, complained that the BBC was not a ‘charitable organisation’ providing a free 
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news service to occupied Europe and its success should not be measured by its scope.21 He 
questioned the principles of the European Service: 
‘Is the BBC a powerful propaganda weapon? Is it a primary aim to keep morale high so 
that conquered peoples may be ready to strike at the enemy on the day? If this is 
accepted then news becomes the handmaiden, not the mistress of broadcasting 
policy.’22 
Although it was commonly understood that every means should be taken to support the war 
effort, it was not entirely clear what role the BBC European Service should play. This lack of 
clarity was especially evident in case of Polish Service and Kirkpatrick himself admitted that 
there was a lack of an overall plan for broadcasting to Poland.23 His view was shared by the 
PWE Polish Regional Director of the PWE, Moray Maclaren complained as late as 1943 that 
this was the case.24  
This situation left room for ‘broadcasting warriors’ such as Newsome to impose their political 
views, directly influencing the content of the bulletins. He was present at the weekly meetings 
where issues relating to broadcasts to Poland of both the Polish Service and Radio Polskie were 
discussed, and when Polish-Soviet affairs were on agenda, he openly attacked the Polish 
government for their unwillingness to compromise.25 In fact, until the Warsaw rising of 1944, 
when it became evident that Stalin had attempted to manipulate international public opinion in 
order to establish communist rule in Poland, he supported Soviet territorial claims to eastern 
Poland and was openly challenging the position of the Polish Underground and the Polish 
authorities in London, fostering the belief that the main obstacle to friendly relationships 
between Poland the USSR rested in Poles’ anti-Soviet feelings (see chapter 7-8). 
Newsome’s political views were, however, only circulated in the BBC and the Foreign Office 
and criticism of Polish government was never openly expressed in the Polish Service bulletins; 
it was essential that the Polish broadcasts followed the official British government line which 
maintained that Poland was a valued ally. It was equally important that Britain was not accused 
of taking sides and was seen rather as a mediator in the Polish-Soviet disputes. More 
importantly, as Maclaren observed, those who disliked London Poles could not let their views 
be exposed because propaganda to Poland depended on good relations with the Polish 
government, which had the unquestionable support of the Polish Underground, and it was the 
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latter which disseminated the BBC broadcasts.26 As he emphasised in his directives for the 
Polish Service, ‘Polish listeners believed in anything said in line with the Polish government 
policy’.27 Yet, after the USSR joined the allies’ coalition, it was equally important that the BBC 
used the announcements of TASS, the official news agency,  in their broadcasts. This, however, 
became particularly problematic, since from 1943 onwards these broadcasts focused on 
challenging the Polish government-in-exile and the Polish Underground’s position.  
‘eĐoŶĐiliatioŶ of PolaŶd͛s diploŵatiĐ ƌelatioŶs ǁith the USS‘ 
The secret agreement between Stalin and Hitler, followed by the invasion of Poland in 
September 1939 and the Soviet annexation of territory east of the Curzon line, resulted in 
reluctance on the part of the Polish government to re-establish diplomatic relations with the 
USSR. Although Stalin was willing to annul the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, he was not prepared 
to recognise Polish-Soviet pre-war border. Sikorski, persuaded by Eden, eventually agreed to 
sign the Treaty on Soviet terms after receiving guarantees that the British government 
considered all territorial changes which occurred during the war as invalid. 28  The Polish-Soviet 
Treaty signed on 30 July 1941, also known as the Sikorski-Maisky agreement, not only restored 
diplomatic relations between the two neighbours but also authorised the release of prisoners 
captured by the Red Army during the September campaign and of Polish citizens from the 
Soviet gulags, as well as the creation of the Polish army in the USSR. Yet, instead of talking in 
terms of ‘release’, the document stated that the Soviet government agreed to an ‘amnesty’ for 
Polish prisoners of war and, although the Polish government protested as this term implied 
wrongdoing and was usually applied to criminals, it remained unchanged.29 
The signing of the Polish-Soviet Treaty was reported by all BBC channels, as well as in 
Sikorski’s speech, emphasising that the agreement with Russia had been reached ‘on 
honourable terms’.30 The Polish Service quoted the British press reports highlighting its 
importance as ‘a mile stone in the Allies’ diplomacy’ with The Times calling the Treaty a 
‘triumph of diplomatic good sense’ whilst the New York Times saw the restoration of the 
diplomatic relations between Poland and the USSR as ‘a miracle of conciliation’.31 According 
to the Soviet newspaper, Izvestia, also cited in the Polish bulletin, the Treaty had been signed 
‘for the sake of the common goal’, whilst at the same time it stated that it was in accordance 
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with Soviet Union recognition of Poland as the independent state.32 The positive aspect of the 
agreement was further acknowledged in congratulations to the Polish Prime Minister from 
Churchill, Roosevelt, Commander of the First Polish Army Corps, Marian Kukiel and Polish 
soldiers. At the same time, Eden confirmed that HMG did not recognise any territorial changes 
which had taken place since August 1939.33  
Polish newspapers, however, were not mentioned except the London Polish Daily which 
supported the Polish-Soviet Agreement and was cited in Polish Service broadcasts.34 The British 
government had forbidden the Polish press to publish anything during the Polish-Russian 
negotiations, but there was no ban after the Treaty was signed.35 Polish politicians and 
Underground leaders accused Sikorski of appeasement towards the USSR, in particular, because 
the Treaty did not guarantee the return of the eastern territory or the withdrawal of the Soviet 
troops. Not only did the Polish President, Władysław Raczkiewicz, openly criticise the 
agreement, but Marian Seyda, a member of the Polish Cabinet, August Zalewski, the Minister 
of the Foreign Affairs and Kazimierz Sosnowski, the Polish government-in-exile’s liaison 
officer with the Polish Underground, resigned in protest.36 Information about their resignation 
was reported by the Polish Service on 4 August 1941.37 
On 3 August, the Polish Service reported Sikorski’s visit to Scotland, where the Polish Army 
stationed. Although it had been announced a few days earlier that the soldiers and the 
Commander of the First Polish Army Corps, Marian Kukiel, had welcomed the Treaty, in fact it 
was met with suspicion. Sikorski, in addressing the rumours that Polish interests were 
compromised, assured the soldiers that it was not a peace treaty but just ‘a temporary 
understanding dictated by the necessities of the moment’.38 The Polish Prime Minister further 
issued a statement denying accusations of ceding the Polish cities of Wilno and Lwów to the 
USSR.39  
The Atlantic Charter, signed in August 1941 in which all signatories, including Stalin, pledged 
that their counties sought no expansion or territorial changes, at first sight seemed to work in 
favour of Poland. The arguments, however, continued. Just a day after the Treaty was signed, 
Maisky declared that, although the issue of frontiers should be settled after the hostilities ended, 
the new order should be based on the ‘self-determination of the people’.40  It is clear that he was 
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referring here to the forged plebiscites in eastern Poland conducted by the Soviet authorities, in 
which the minority population of this region had allegedly voted for the incorporation to the 
USSR (see chapter 3). Self-determination and free-will of the people became the prime criterion 
employed by Stalin in his demands on the territory east of the Curzon line, arguing that 
Ukrainians and Byelorussians had opted for incorporation to the USSR (see chapter 3).41 A 
similar approach had been taken by Eden who, when announcing the Treaty in the House of 
Commons, confirmed that HMG would not recognise any territorial changes which took place 
during the war ‘unless they took place with the free consent and good-will of the parties 
concerned’. 42 This, he added ‘(held) well with territorial changes which have been effected in 
Poland since August 1939’.43 Citing Churchill’s speech from September 1940, Eden reminded 
Members of Parliament that, in fact, the British government was not opposed to changes in the 
territorial structure of other countries and therefore could not guarantee frontiers in Eastern 
Europe, 44 demonstrating that the sphere of political influence was already established in 1941. 
According to Kadell, Stalin interpreted this statement as Britain’s consent to settle the Soviet-
Polish border on his terms.45 Yet, at the same time, the British government continued to assure 
the Polish government that it did not recognise the Soviet occupation of Polish and was 
committed to re-establishing Poland in its pre-war borders.  
Polish politicians played an important part in this process by convincing the nation of Churchill, 
Roosevelt and Stalin’s pledges of restoration of independent Polish State, as observed in the 
coverage of Sikorski’s visit to Moscow in December 1941 when the Polish Prime Minister 
informed listeners that there was great understanding and cooperation with Stalin whom he 
addressed as a friend.46 In fact, neither the details of the military cooperation nor the outstanding 
question of the frontier were settled during the meeting.  
By March 1942 the topic of the Polish-Russian frontier had become taboo. The PWE, aware 
that the Soviets monitored Polish broadcasts from London, stressed in directives to Poland that 
special attention was to be taken when addressing ‘any issues which could upset our ally’;47 
Polish bulletins should concentrate on the gallant fight of the Polish troops in the west and the 
Soviet’s in the east.48 
Interestingly, however, even prior to the Soviet Union joining the coalition, the Polish Service 
was forbidden to report on any matters which could offend Stalin. In fact, acting on the Foreign 
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Office directives, all BBC Services were prohibited to mention the Soviet attack or occupation 
of Poland.49 Subjects such as living conditions, deportations and the arrests and murder of 
Polish citizens were outlawed, as was reference to the population inhabiting occupied by the 
USSR. Although the Polish government protested, the Foreign Office argued that even 
information indirectly related to Soviet foreign policy could not be mentioned in the Polish 
broadcasts.50 As discussed in the previous chapter, listening to foreign stations was allowed 
under the Soviet occupation leading to complaints from listeners living in eastern Poland about 
the absence of information in the Polish broadcasts from that region and, more importantly, that 
Polish officials did not address this population in their speeches and talks (see chapter 4). 51 
Moreover, Germans, who monitored the Polish Service broadcasts, used the lack of information 
about the Soviet occupation for their own propaganda purposes, stating that Sikorski had sold 
out eastern Poland to Stalin (see chapter 4). Polish listeners, unaware that the ban was placed by 
the Foreign Office, blamed the Polish government-in-exile for not referring to eastern Poland. 
However, when in February 1941 Roger Stevens from the British Ministry of Information raised 
the issue of the prohibition on Polish officials on addressing the population of eastern Poland, 
he was told by Frank Roberts, the Head of the Central Department of the Foreign Office that the 
ban was ‘self-imposed’ by the BBC.52 According to Roberts it was done ‘not as might be 
supposed from fear of the effect on Anglo-Soviet relations but upon internal left wing opinion in 
this country’.53 Roberts further added that, although the Foreign Office did not forbid reporting 
about eastern Poland, the BBC should avoid the subject as ‘it irritates a certain section of the 
public in Great Britain and the USA.54 However, it is evident that the ban was written in 
accordance with the official line of British government foreign policy which, from the outbreak 
of the war, had attempted to persuade Stalin to join the anti-Axis coalition, and thus made no 
official protest when the USSR attacked Poland in September 1939 nor publicised Polish 
reports of Soviet crimes.  In fact, the ban to address Polish citizens as well as minorities living 
in the eastern part of Poland was not lifted after the diplomatic relations between Poland and the 
Soviet Union were restored, and continued to be in place until the end of the war.55 Even the 
Polish government request to include a communiqué in Ukrainian in the Polish Service 
broadcast in October 1942 in order to warn the population in this area about approaching 
German army was denied.56 A month later, when Poles put forward another request, this time to 
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address Lithuanians, they were told that such a proposal had to be first approved by the Soviet 
government.57 
Formation of the Polish army in the USSR 
The Sikorski-Maisky Treaty had also guaranteed the formation of the Polish army in the USSR 
and an ‘amnesty’ to all Polish citizens on Soviet territory. 58 Yet, the release of the Polish 
citizens was very problematic. As Kochanski points out 
‘what the Soviets had offered (…) and what the Poles were demanding in the practical 
application of those terms was unprecedented’. (…) The Soviets were notoriously 
suspicious of foreigners and yet they agreed to the formation of the foreign army on 
their soil whose loyalty rested with a foreign government based in London’. 59 
The process of discharging people from gulags and prisoners was extremely hectic; many 
people died as the result. Those who reached the army were in such poor condition that they 
were not fit to fight. In addition, Sikorski’s plan for the formation of the Polish Army on Soviet 
soil was based on the assumption that 8,000 missing Polish officers would be released. The 
Polish Prime Minister discussed the issue with the Soviet leader during his visit to Moscow in 
December 1941. Stalin, who had already signed the order for their execution in 1940, responded 
that they must have escaped to Manchuria.60  
By the beginning of 1942 it became evident that the military cooperation between the Polish 
and Red Armies was impossible as Stalin sought complete subordination of Polish soldiers to 
the Red Army command. Moreover, in March 1942, Stalin informed the Commander of the 
Polish Army in the Soviet Union, General Władysław Anders, that the Soviet government was 
able to feed only 44,000 of the 96, 000 Polish soldiers stationed in the USSR.61 In consequence 
Anders, disobeying Sikorski’s orders, evacuated over 77,000 Polish soldiers and over 37,000 
Polish refugees including women and children to the Middle East where the British Army was 
based.62 The information about the evacuation of the Polish Army and civilians was not to be 
broadcast until the War Cabinet made a public announcement on the matter. When it was 
eventually allowed on 25 April, the PWE stressed that the Polish broadcasts should highlight 
the shortage of food as the reason for the Polish troops’ evacuation, but at the same time it 
should be acknowledged that Britain sent adequate aid supplies to the USSR.63 Given tension 
                                                          
57 Ibid, 13 November 1942. 
58 Umiastowski, op. cit., p.  18.  
59 Kochanski, op. cit., p. 173. 
60 Ibid, p. 180. 
61 Kadell, op. cit., p. 53. 
62 Ibid, p. 54. 
63 NA FO, 371/31092, PWE Directives for Polish Service, week 25 April-1 May 1942. 
 150 
between Poland and the USSR, the PWE instructed the Polish Service to avoid referring to 
Polish-Soviet affairs in the broadcasts. It was understood that the recent developments, 
particularly the movement of the Polish Army to the Middle East, might result in anxiety among 
listeners, therefore the PWE advised to quote Churchill’s proclamations of the British assurance 
that Poland would regain its independence.64 
In April and May 1942 during the Anglo-Soviet negotiations regarding future military and 
political alliance, the Polish Region PWE directives were occupied with addressing the Poles’ 
suspicion and rumours that Great Britain was prepared to sell Eastern Europe to Stalin at 
Poland’s expense.65 The Anglo-Russian Treaty signed in May 1942 left Poles concerned that 
political and economic influence over Eastern Europe would be left to the USSR and that 
Poland had been abandoned by Britain.66 In response, the Polish broadcasts were to assure 
listeners of Britain’s commitment to the reconstruction of both West and Eastern Europe whilst 
the Polish-Russian disagreement would be resolved after the hostilities ended. In addition, the 
Polish Service was to stress that a strong and independent Poland was also in the interest of the 
USRR.67 As before, any Polish fears with regard to its sovereignty were silenced by recalling 
the Atlantic Charter, emphasising that no territorial aggrandizement would take place during the 
war. Yet, the second and third point of the Charter referring to the ‘free will of people’ who had 
a right to self-determination were to be omitted because they were central to Stalin’s argument 
for the incorporation of the territory east of the Curzon line into the USSR. Selective in nature, 
the Polish Service bulletins consisted of information which echoed the official line of the British 
government and, consequently, issues which could be interpreted by the Soviet ally as offensive 
were withheld. The PWE Polish Region directives continued to stress that the Polish-Soviet 
affairs should not be discussed in the Polish broadcasts, and instead attention should be given to 
Churchill’s admiration of the Polish Arm Forces and support of the Polish government.68 At the 
same time anti-German propaganda should be given greater prominence and a list of German 
officials involved in committing crimes in Poland should be published.69  
The Polish-Soviet crisis 
From January 1943 onwards the USSR launched an open attack on the Polish government and 
General Anders, accusing the Polish Army of unwillingness to fight and claiming at the same 
time that there were quislings in Poland.70 The question of the Polish-Soviet frontier remained 
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unresolved, but the situation became more problematic as Stalin had withdrawn Polish 
citizenship from Poles left in the Soviet Union, who were now considered as Soviet citizens.71 
In addressing Polish-Russian disagreements, Newsome argued that the best solution was 
frankness, therefore:     
‘We should do what we can to further amicable Soviet-Polish relations without 
outraging Polish susceptibilities and without damaging our relationship with Russia. 
(…)  On Polish expansionism and territorial questions, we tacitly recognise unspecified 
Polish claims but we are not allowed to commit ourselves.  Apart from that our attitude 
towards Poles is admiration and unreserved friendship’. 72 
The same line was maintained by the PWE directives for the Polish Service whilst prominence 
was to be given to the gallant fight of the Russian army and the importance of the Allied 
coalition. 73 
On 16 January 1943, Narkomindel, the Soviet Minister of External Relations, sent a note to the 
Polish government stating that: 
‘in spite of the goodwill shown by the Soviet Government, the Polish Government had 
adopted a negative attitude to the agreement of 1941 by putting forward claims to 
eastern Poland, claims which conflicted with the Soviets’ sovereign right’.74 
Although the British government did not make an official statement on this matter, a 
memorandum from the Foreign Office was circulated in the PWE where there was general 
concern about what should be broadcast to Europe regarding the Soviet declaration. It was 
stressed that: 
‘We made it clear (when the Polish-Russian Treaty was signed in 1941) that we did not 
guarantee Poland’s eastern border. (…) The Russians are entitled to say that they have 
different ideas about the future frontier between the USSR and Poland’.75 
In this situation, the Polish broadcasts became the subject of extensive censorship, especially 
the speeches of representatives of the Polish government, including those of the Minister of the 
Foreign Affairs, Władysław Raczyński and Sikorski. The Polish Prime Minister himself 
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complained to the Foreign Office that censorship was too extensive.76 While the Polish 
Government was accused by the Soviets for being unrepresentative, they were unable to 
comment on Russian claims to the eastern territories or address minorities inhabiting this 
region.77 Eden insisted that the British government had to take ‘Soviet susceptibilities into 
account in anything’ that was put out in broadcasts.78  
By the beginning of February, the PWE had adopted a policy of a complete avoidance of the 
subject. Nothing was to be said in the Polish broadcasts that could offend Russians or provoke 
despair among members of the Polish Cabinet, the Polish Army, Polish refugees in Britain and 
– foremost – people in Poland.79 The Polish-Russian relationship became such a sensitive matter 
that when the Anglo-Turkish Treaty was signed in February 1943, it was prohibited to make 
reference to the Polish-Turkish Treaty signed two centuries before uniting the countries against 
Russia in the Polish broadcasts.80 The same censorship measures were taken when information 
about the Czech Units fighting with the Red Army was broadcast across BBC channels. 
Maclaren stressed that any explanations why did the Polish Army formed in the USSR was now 
in the Middle East should be avoided. 81 In general, it was highlighted in all directives that 
‘every precaution should be taken to not to upset Russian’.82 However, Maclaren argued that 
whilst the Soviet claims to the eastern part of Poland should be broadcast across all channels, it 
was important that Polish listeners, and more importantly, the main audience for the Polish 
Service, the Polish Underground, heard the Polish government-in-exile’s statements on Poland’s 
rights to this region.83 
According to the BBC Polish Service Dawn Editor, Edward Kmiecik, on 26 January 1943 a 
meeting took place in the British Foreign Office where the political censorship of the Polish 
Service broadcasts was the main item on the agenda and it was decided that the pre-war Polish-
Soviet border could not be mentioned in Polish broadcasts.84 It is unclear from his report if he 
was present at this meeting or was just briefed about its outcome. Reporting back to the Radio 
Polskie Director, Janusz Meissner, Kmiecik stressed that not only the pre-war Polish-Soviet 
border but reference to the eastern part of Poland were to be cut from Polish Service broadcasts 
by the censor. He concluded by stating that ‘we are not allowed to speak about East Poland at 
                                                          
76 NA, FO 954/19B/479, Private Office Papers of Sir Anthony Eden, Eden to Sir. C. Dormer, 22 January 
1943. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 NA, FO 371/34555, week 4-10 February 1943. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid, week 11-17 February 1943. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid, ‘Output Report’, 19-25 February 1943.  
84 PUMST, 2.3.11.1; Notatka dla kpt. MeissŶeƌ, Uǁagi i oďseƌǁaĐje dotǇĐzące lini politycznej  BBC,  
 153 
all’.85 As Kmiecik explained, even the names of the Polish cities in this region were to be 
expunged from the bulletins. Furthermore, he argued that the BBC followed the view expressed 
by The Times, which asserted that the Soviet Union was right in its territorial demands and that 
Poland should accept this situation. Yet, in another report entitled ‘The unofficial mood in the 
BBC’ from 5 February 1943, Kmiecik observed that in fact the majority of the BBC staff held 
the view that Poland was unlikely to regain its east territory and that even the Polish Army 
military achievements were minimised.86 
Their views were not without justification. Mindful that military success had a direct influence 
on the political bargaining position, after defeating the Wehrmacht at Stalingrad on 2 February 
1943, Stalin was not prepared to compromise in his territorial demands. Nine days after the 
German surrender, Moscow announced that the Baltic States and Bessarabia were under their 
control and on 1 March 1943 the territory east of the Curzon line were added to the list.87 Both 
the Ministry of Information and the PWE ordered complete avoidance of the matter in all BBC 
programmes.88 The PWE Polish Region Director, Moray Maclaren, argued that, in broadcasting 
to Poland, the best policy was to ‘avoid’ the topic and ‘wait and see’ in hope that the issue 
would ‘resolve itself’. 89 Despite the fact that he was aware that the subject could be valuable 
ammunition for German propaganda, he concluded that any support for the Polish territorial 
claims could not be expressed in Polish Service broadcasts as Polish listeners would have 
accused the BBC of hypocrisy.90 
On 2 March, however, the Polish Service broadcast a Soviet attack on the Polish government, 
accusing it for being pro-Fascist and acting against the unity of Slavic nations, whilst also 
stressing its right to the eastern part of Poland on the grounds that Ukrainians and Byelorussians 
were in the majority in this region.91 The bulletins from 3 to 14 March did not survive the war, 
therefore it is impossible to establish how Sikorski’s response to the accusations was broadcast 
by the Polish Service (see chapter 2).  
In the same period the British government prohibited editors of both Polish and English 
newspapers from publishing anything about Polish-Russian relations.92 However, British editors 
broke the ban and both The Times and the Daily Worker published anti-Polish articles.93 When 
the ban was lifted in April 1943, the editors were asked to be cautious. Yet, as Hułas points out 
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the ban on the Polish press was imposed because it was critical of Sikorski’s diplomacy rather 
than to prevent the publication of anti-Soviet articles.94 It was understood that such publicity 
could have result in a collapse of the Sikorski government with a negative effect on the 
coalition.95  
The PWE directives advised a complete silence on Polish-Russian relations in the BBC Polish 
broadcasts, in the belief that the conflict could still be resolved.96 However, by the beginning of 
April, ‘discussion in any form of the eastern question (was) for obvious reason ruled out’.97 The 
Polish Service was to concentrate on the Polish Army’s gallant fight and quotations from 
Sikorski’s speech maintaining that ‘the war will not be decided on the eastern front alone but 
all battlefields in Europe’.98  
Yet, Newsome was of opinion that Maclaren and some unnamed officials in the Foreign Office 
were pro-Polish and unwisely trusted the Polish Underground and the Polish government-in-
exile.99 In order to challenge Poles’ authority, in February 1943 he approached the BBC 
European Service Controller, Ivone Kirkpatrick, however, no action was taken.100 A month later 
he complained again to Kirkpatrick that the PWE and allied governments interference in the 
European Service policies was excessive and should be stopped.101 It was, however, the Polish 
Region PWE and the Polish government which he had in mind. He argued: ‘we are not 
prepared to sacrifice our reputation for truth, honesty and sincerity, to forage the opportunity of 
establishing in Europe a genuine understanding of ourselves’.102 Newsome’s remark is 
interesting taking into account that whilst he argued that the PWE and the Foreign Office were 
pro-Polish, the Polish government-in-exile argued exactly opposite.  
Newsome’s position was greatly influenced by a Polish Underground memorandum circulated 
by the PWE Polish Region entitled ‘The Soviets in Poland’ which described Soviet partisans as 
‘band of escaped Russians prisoners, Jews, and a few Poles, who distributed Soviet propaganda 
and terrorised the Polish population’.103 Moreover, the Poles argued that partisans sponsored by 
Stalin did more harm than good. Not only did their sabotage have no significant impact but their 
actions led to German reprisals on civilians and the disclosure of members of the Polish 
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Underground. 104 Newsome saw the Polish government and Underground as anti-Soviet and, at 
the same time, believed in Stalin’s intention to seek a free and independent Poland, arguing that  
‘there was no room in the BBC for the suggestion that Polish-anti-communism was 
legitimate, equally there should be no intrinsic British objection to the attempt of Polish 
communists to take the resistance imitative away from the AK’. 105 
In his view, the memorandum was a lie, an attempt to spread anti-Soviet propaganda in Britain. 
It convinced him that the anti-Soviet stance of the Polish government and the Polish 
Underground acted against Polish communists in Poland who were engaged in anti-German 
sabotage. Yet, what angered Newsome most was that the Polish Underground appealed to 
Britain for help against Soviet partisans’ activities and the fact that Poles ‘dared to state that 
Polish resentment and distrust of Russia (were) not without justification’.106 
Against this background, the issue also arose as to whether the Soviet partisans’ activities 
should be reported by the Polish Service. Maclaren decided that it ‘should be soft-pedalled’ as it 
was a point of disagreement between Poles and Russians.107 Thus one could argue that 
Newsome was right in his assertions. But the reasoning behind this directive was extremely 
complex.  
As Stenton points out,  in response to the German anti-Bolshevik campaign following their 
defeat in Stalingrad, the policy of the British government from  February 1943  was to ‘present 
Germany worse that Russia’ in order ‘to fill minds with Nazi horror as to leave no room for 
dread of other oppressions’.108 Already in May 1942 the Polish Service broadcast had listed 
German officials involved in crimes against the Polish people and made calls to resist the 
occupant.109 However, by December 1942 Polish broadcasts were appealing to its listeners to 
restrain from resistance, because the increase in sabotage was resulting in reprisals on 
civilians.110 However, at the same time the Polish government was discouraging this course of 
action, the Soviets intensified their campaign for active sabotage in Poland. Not only had Stalin 
supported Soviet partisans’ activities in Poland but, in December 1941 on his instructions, the 
Polish communist party, called the Polish Worker’s Party (PPR) in order to disassociate itself 
with communism, was reconstructed (see chapter 3). Its military wing, the People’s Guard 
[Gwardia Ludowa] (GL), was in competition with the Polish Home Army and claimed to be the 
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true resistance force in Poland.111 Despite the fact that GL numbers were never high, its 
activities caused a great deal of trouble, resulting in the exposure of the organisation of the 
Polish Underground and the persecution of civilians.112 
Henceforth, the PWE found itself in a difficult situation; whilst they were aware that the 
Russians were listening to Polish broadcasts, ‘nothing should be said to upset them’.113 In 
January 1943, however, it was decided that encouraging sabotage was against BBC general 
policy and ‘all means of propaganda at our disposal should be used to prevent unorganised and 
premature revolt’.114 The issue remained problematic: although Poles did not want to the details 
of their sabotage to be broadcast, it was important for national morale to make the nation aware 
that resistance activities against the Germans were taking place. For this reason, the request of 
the Polish government-in-exile in March 1943 to report in BBC Polish broadcasts acts of 
resistance and German crimes against the Polish population was accepted.115 The Polish 
government was aware that this would result in the growth of terror. However, it was felt that 
steps had to be taken to challenge Soviet accusations that the Polish Underground was 
collaborating with the Nazis. 
The KatǇń MassaĐƌe  
It was in this climate that the graves of Polish officers and soldiers were discovered by the 
Germans at Katyń in April 1943. Further investigation revealed that executions carried out by 
the NKVD in spring 1940 also included police officers, representatives of the intelligentsia and 
white collar workers and landowners – in general, anyone classified by Stalin as an ‘enemy of 
the people’ (see chapter 3). In total 25,000 people were murdered. 116 As mentioned earlier, the 
location of missing Polish officers was central to the Polish government’s plan to form the 
Polish army in the USSR and from 1941 they had been unsuccessfully enquiring at the Kremlin 
regarding their whereabouts. The Soviet government, however, denied committing the murders 
and assigned the blame to the German army, which in spring 1941 was occupying the region.  
On 12 April, the German news agency Transocean broadcast an official statement stating that 
the massacre was carried out by the Red Army and a day later the same announcement was 
repeated by Berlin radio and all German controlled stations.117 The Soviet Agency TASS 
responded to the accusations on 15 April with evidence pointing to Germany’s guilt and 
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stressing that the purpose of this communiqué lay in destroying the coalition.118 The Soviet 
official announcement was broadcast across all the BBC Services, including the Polish and 
Home Service, yet it was not given prominence or reported in headlines in any of the 
broadcasts. Interestingly, instead of reporting that those killed were Polish prisoners of war used 
by the Soviets for road construction who the Soviets had not be able to evacuate before the 
Germans entered this region in the summer of 1941, the BBC reported the TASS assertion that 
the Polish officers had been employed by the Germans not by the Russians.119 It is debatable 
whether this was simply a mistake or, as Mackiewicz argues, a BBC attempt to make the Soviet 
version appear ‘more reliable’.120 Yet, with the exception of broadcasts throughout the day on 
15 April, there was no follow up of the story in the Polish Service. Nor did the Polish Service 
press review quote British, American or Polish press discussions of the issue.  
The PWE guidelines were unambiguous: ‘it is our job to help to ensure that history will record 
the Katyń Forest incident as a futile attempt by Germany to postpone defeat by political 
methods’.121 Yet, what became a point of public criticism was that the Polish government, rather 
than accuse Germans of fabrication, appealed as did the Germans, to the Red Cross to 
investigate the matter. Newsome openly expressed his view on this subject in the news 
directives for the European Service stating that the Katyń controversy did not in any respect 
change the view of the British government, which still considered the USSR as an important 
ally and stressing that ‘the attitude towards the Polish government will be regulated by the 
official policy but we should not gratuitously emphasise of warm feeling towards it’.122  
As for Polish broadcasts, the PWE emphasised that ‘silence’ was the ‘golden rule’ and that the 
appeal of the Polish government to the Red Cross to investigate the matter should only be 
broadcast on Radio Polskie.123 The Polish Service followed the guidelines and the official 
statement of the Polish government on discovery at Katyń was only broadcast by Radio 
Polskie.124 On 23 April, however, the Polish Service aired a brief Red Cross’ response to the 
Polish government, stating that they could only examine the graves if all ‘parties concerned’ 
agreed.125 However, since the Soviet Union did not agree, the Red Cross could not proceed. The 
Polish Service press review cited only papers such as The Times, which presented the discovery 
at Katyń as an attempt by Goebbels to break allied solidarity. 126 In fact, any questioning of the 
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Soviet version of events was forbidden in the media, and the BBC European Service was 
instructed to emphasise inconsistencies in the story in its broadcasts.127  
The documents published after the war demonstrate that the British government was in a 
possession of evidence which pointed to the Soviets’ responsibility for the crimes.128 Yet, as 
Mackiewicz observes, in 1943 the Soviet Union was considered a more important ally than 
Poland and maintaining the unity of the coalition was Britain’s main priority.129 Balfour 
presents a similar line, stating that there was nothing that could be done for the Poles at that 
stage of the war, but a lot could be lost if Britain took the Polish side.130 The British government 
not only fostered a belief in the Soviet version of events but also prevented any contrary 
accounts from reaching the press because, as Davies concludes, ‘Britain could not be seen as an 
ally of a country committing the same crimes as the Nazis’.131  
Care was not only taken to suppress the controversy in the British press and radio but, more 
importantly, the cablegrams of the government-in-exile, containing information related to the 
massacre were not allowed to be sent to Poland.132 However, the NKVD documents, which only 
became available in 1990, not only pointed to the guilt of the USSR but, more importantly, 
demonstrated that the order to kill over 21,000 Poles was signed by Stalin.133 This, Davies 
argues, shows that Stalin, in denying the crimes, knew exactly what he was doing. In fact, he 
‘was testing the political waters of the Grand Alliance to see how far he could go’.134  
In propaganda terms, however, the discovery at Katyń was a gift to Goebbels. Not only had he 
achieved his goal, namely breaking the allies’ coalition, but he also used the evidence pointing 
to Soviet guilt in order to convince the Poles that, in fact, communists were worse than Nazis.135 
It was also not a coincidence that Goebbels, who had already learnt about the discovery at the 
Katyń woods in March 1943, waited to release the information until April, the exact time when 
the liquidation of the Jewish Ghetto in Warsaw was taking place. It is evident that he had done 
so in order to divert world attention from the mass murder of the Jews.136 
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In April, the Polish Service did not report on the rising in the Warsaw Ghetto. However, 
broadcast on 19 April included information about the German death camps in Poland, namely 
Treblinka and Majdanek, and the next day a very brief official statement on Jewish persecution 
in Europe issued by the Inter-Allied Information Committee, stating that the Germans had 
already killed two million Jews.137 
The Polish Service bulletins from May 1943 did not survive the war, thus is impossible to 
establish how the rising was reported on (see chapter 2). However, Kochanski refers to 
Sikorski’s radio broadcast from London on 4 May 1943 in which the Polish Prime Minister 
thanked the population of Warsaw for assisting Jews during the uprising.138 Yet, she does not 
mention if that announcement was made on Radio Polskie or the Polish Service. It can be, 
however, assumed that the rising was given prominence in the BBC Polish broadcasts. The 
PWE Polish Region directives for week 13-19 May stated that the rising in the Warsaw Ghetto 
‘should be given as much publicity as possible’; it should be emphasise ‘that Hitler’s attempt to 
whip up anti-Semitic hatred and persecution in Cristian countries has been a failure’.139 
Moreover,  in the PWE directives for the Polish Service for the week 27 May -2 June, Maclaren 
argued that Poles assistance to Jews during the rising should be used as a main theme, refuting 
Stalin’s claims that the Polish Underground was passive and collaborated with Germans.140  
Breaking off diplomatic relations between Poland the Soviet Union 
The discovery of the graves only aggravated an already tense situation. Sikorski’s attempt to fix 
the situation was ill-fated. There is a consensus among historians that Stalin used the Katyń 
controversy as a pretext to break relations with Poland.141 While emphasising that the 
accusations were insulting, Stalin stressed that diplomatic relations could only be re-established 
if the Polish government recognised Soviet rights to the eastern territories. He also added new 
demands to the list, namely the dismissal of key figures who, in his view, were anti-Soviet,142 
namely President Raczkiewicz; Stanisław Kot, the former ambassador to Moscow and, from 
1943, Minister of Information; and Marian Kukiel, Minister of War responsible for Polish 
prisoners of war. On 26 April Polish listeners were informed that the Soviet Union had broken 
off relations with Poland based on the ‘attitude adopted by the Polish government’ towards the 
German allegations’.143 The communiqué stated that the USRR spoke on behalf of ‘all freedom 
loving people’, including Poles, emphasising that their grievances had been addressed only to 
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the Polish government in London who were collaborating with the Germans.144 The 
announcement was very brief and did not appear in the headlines. The press review included 
cuttings appealing to the Polish government, in the name of the common good and unity of the 
United Nations, ‘to forget’ about the disagreement over the discovery at Katyń.145 In response, 
the Polish government issued a statement affirming that their policy was ‘a friendly 
understanding between Poland and the Soviet Union on the basis of the integrity and full 
sovereignty of the Polish Republic’.146 Sikorski hoped that the break would be only temporary 
but, as Kochanski demonstrates, Stalin had been preparing for this for a long time. 147 Already in 
1941, after the Polish-Soviet Treaty was signed, he had parachuted prominent Polish 
communists into Poland in order to restore the Polish communist party whilst continuing 
support for Soviet partisan activities aimed at destroying the Polish Underground.148 His plan to 
create a Polish governmental body on Soviet soil which, he argued, could be transferred to 
Poland after the Wehrmacht was defeated suffered a setback in 1941 because of British and the 
Polish governments opposition to the idea. However, by the beginning of 1943, his plan for 
establishing a Polish puppet government was already in full swing. 149 Not only had he 
parachuted more partisans to Poland and continued to support Polish communists in Poland but, 
under his patronage, the Union of Polish Patriots (UPP), an embryo of the Polish pro-Soviet 
puppet government -in-waiting, was created in the Soviet Union in February 1943.150 The 
challenges faced by the Polish Service, notably how to report on this new political development, 
will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Conclusion  
The analysis of the Polish Region PWE directives and Polish bulletins from the period July 
1941- April 1943 demonstrates that the Polish Service undeniably followed the official line of 
the British government. As the PWE General-Director, Bruce Lockhart, points out the ‘PWE did 
not make policy, it executed it.’ 151 Macdonald, himself, claimed after the war that it was the 
Foreign Office which controlled the policy of the BBC. Yet, in his experience the cooperation 
between the Polish Service, the PWE and the Foreign Office was ‘harmonious’.152 Brigg’s 
assentation that ‘the BBC maintained a considerable degree of independence from the PWE’, is 
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also questionable as, first, the BBC broadcasts had to be written in accordance with the 
government’s foreign policy and secondly, the censors of the European Service broadcasts were 
responsible to the Foreign Office, not the BBC.153 However, because of the complex Polish-
Soviet relationship and sensitivity of Polish listeners on this matter, Polish broadcasts did not 
explore to the same extent as other BBC channels pro-Soviet propaganda. Aware of the political 
views of the Polish audience, the PWE directives advised avoidance of subjects which could 
result in losing the trust of the Polish government in London and the Polish Underground and, 
by extension, of the Polish population.  In addition, the situation of the Polish Service was 
particularly difficult because the British government did not officially declare until 1943 its 
position with regard to the Polish-Russian disagreement over the Polish eastern territory. At the 
same time, aware that the Russians were monitoring Polish broadcasts, special measures were 
also to be taken to avoid all subjects which could in any way upset ‘our ally’. After the break of 
diplomatic relations between Poland and the USSR, the broadcasts continued to omit 
uncomfortable topics and special attention was given to maintaining Polish morale. Yet, the 
main receiver as well as disseminator of the Polish Service broadcasts was the Polish 
Underground which was allied to the Polish government-in-exile. Therefore special caution had 
to be taken that the pro-Soviet policy of the British government was not interpreted by the Poles 
as anti-Polish. 
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Censorship and Propaganda April 1943- July 1944 
Introduction 
‘Our programmes would acquire an increasingly emotional anti-German tone, going 
beyond factual reporting. The political questions should fall into the background but we 
should not give an impression that we are concealing anything.’1  
This chapter covers the period from the breaking off of diplomatic relations between Poland and 
the Soviet Union in April 1943 to end of July 1944, when the Soviets started establishing their 
own administration on Polish territory. After the cessation of diplomatic relations between 
Poland and the USSR, the British government continued to persuade the Polish government-in-
exile to reach a compromise with the USSR. Caught in disagreement between two of her allies, 
Britain tried to act as a mediator but had found itself in a very difficult situation as neither 
Poland nor the USSR were willing to compromise. By mid-1943, it became evident that Stalin 
was not prepared to negotiate with regard to the Polish-Soviet border. In fact, his policy was 
based on ultimata rather than willingness to compromise. Both Eden and Churchill attempted to 
pressure the Polish government to accept Stalin’s terms. However, after Sikorski’s death in July 
1943, his successor Stanislaw Mikołajczyk, had the support of neither his Cabinet nor the Polish 
Army or indeed the leaders of the Polish Underground to make concessions towards the USSR.  
Compromise with the USSR was seen as treason and it was generally questioned why Poland 
should sacrifice her territory. Political and territorial disputes between Poland the USSR 
remained a taboo subject, but with the Red Army crossing the pre-war Polish frontier in January 
1944, it became evident that more important matters were at stake, notably Poland’s 
independence and sovereignty.  By mid-1943, propaganda directed against the Polish 
government-in-exile and the Underground, orchestrated by the Polish communists in Poland and 
the Union of Polish Patriots (UPP), an embryo of the Polish puppet government sponsored by 
Stalin, was in full swing. The analysis which follows will describe how the Polish Service was 
recognised as an important medium with the power to influence Polish attitudes and conduct 
towards their ‘liberator’. More importantly, in the period under discussion, the relationship 
between the Polish Service and the Polish Underground became central to the former remaining 
an impartial source of information, given the BBC obligation to follow the official line of the 
British government which required concealing information about crimes committed against the 
members of the Polish Underground as well as the suppression of truth about the sovietisation 
of liberated Polish territory. As the Underground was the main channel through which the 
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Polish broadcasts were distributed, the issue proved highly problematic. The Polish Service 
continued to present the motives of the Soviet leader in a positive light, stressing the importance 
of the Anglo-Polish alliance, despite Churchill’s official support for the Soviet territorial 
demands in February 1944 and few months later, Stalin’s recognition of the Polish Committee 
for National Liberation (PCNL), a joined body of the UPP and Polish communist in Poland, as 
the only legitimate and representative governmental apparatus to administrate liberated Polish 
territory. 
Creation of the Union of Polish Patriots and the Berling Army 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, Stalin had used the controversy surrounding the 
discovery of the Polish officers’ graves at Katyń as a pretext for breaking off diplomatic 
relations with Poland. The evidence demonstrates that his plan for taking control of the 
administrative apparatus in Poland and the annihilation of the Polish Underground was already 
in place in the beginning of 1943.2 In March 1943, a meeting between Stalin and prominent 
Polish communists in the USSR, namely Wanda Wasilewska, Hilary Minc and Wiktor Grosz, 
resulted in the establishment of the Union of the Polish Patriots (UPP). It is worth mentioning 
that the UPP was formed on Russian soil regardless of the fact that non-Russian organisations 
were outlawed on their territory. Their political programme called for friendship with the 
USSR, recognition of the Curzon line and discrediting of the Polish government-in-exile as a 
legitimate governmental body.3 In many respects their manifesto was similar to that of the 
exiled government; they did not refer to communist ideology, arguing instead for equal rights 
irrespective of nationality or religion. The main difference was that the UPP was promising the 
incorporation of the German northern and eastern territories after the war, namely East Prussia 
and Danzig and part of Silesia, something which the Polish government in London could not do.  
In addition, the UPP claimed that it was made up of Polish citizens expressing the will of all 
Poles. Positioning themselves as the guarantors of the freedom and independence of Poland, the 
Soviets endeavored to manipulate the Poles’ emotions by placing patriotism and pro-Soviet 
attitudes on the same level. As Davies demonstrates, ‘patriotic was a new code-word meaning 
pro-Soviet’.4 In their propaganda, special care was taken to convince the public that this 
movement came from the Poles themselves, emphasised by the names chosen for the puppet 
government (Polish Patriots), its newspaper (Free Poland), and the radio station Kościuszko 
broadcasting in Polish from the Soviet Union, named ironically after a national hero who led an 
uprising against Russia in the eighteenth century.  
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Moreover, on the UPP initiative, in May 1943 the Polish Kościuszko Division was created in 
the Soviet Union under Zygmunt Berling’s command. Formed under Soviet auspices and the 
political control of the UPP, the Kościuszko Division, which in March 1944 expanded to 
become the First Polish Army, also known as the Berling Army, claimed to be made up of 
Polish volunteers residing in the USSR. In fact, joining the army was not entirely voluntary. As 
Kochanski points out, it was important to Stalin that the army was considered to be Polish.5 In 
order to achieve his goal, in January 1943, he took the passports of all those who still remained 
in the USSR and Polish citizenship was offered to those who joined the Berling Army.6 
However, the creation of the new army faced a bigger challenge. After the departure of the 
Polish Army under Anders command from the USSR in March 1942, there was a shortage of 
high ranking military men and the majority of those who wanted to join the Berling Army were 
of Jewish origin. The UPP, in charge of the creation of the army, decided to recruit Red Army 
officers and generals, whilst soldiers with Jewish origin were told to conceal their background 
in order to win the trust of the Polish nation and to demonstrate that all Poles, regardless of their 
religion and ethnicity, supported the UPP, as the Berling Army was to become central to 
establishment of the communist rule in Poland.7 Therefore all soldiers were subjected to 
Marxist-Leninist doctrine before being sent to the battlefield. 
The creation of the UPP and the Berling Army was a difficult subject to deal with. Kirkpatrick 
argued that the BBC should not offer a platform for Soviet anti-Polish propaganda, but, at the 
same time, the Polish government should not be allowed to respond to UPP accusations on the 
air. 8 Subsequently, it was agreed that no information would be given by any of the BBC 
channels without previous consultation with the Polish authorities regarding: the UPP promises 
of the incorporation of East Prussia and Danzig after the war, the Berling Army formed under 
Soviet auspices in the USSR, and news from Russian sources about resistance to the Germans in 
Poland promoted by the communists.9 The Polish government, on the other hand, was forbidden 
to comment on UPP declarations and discussions of the Polish post-war frontiers. However, by 
November 1943 the ban on those topics was under discussion following an approach to the 
British Foreign Office by Moscow for Polish officials to speak kindly about the Kościuszko 
Division. Frank Roberts suggested that the BBC should re-evaluate its previous decision, 
arguing that it contradicted the BBC policy of impartiality and truthful reporting.10  Most of the 
Polish bulletins from this period did not survive the war, but it is clear from the analysis of the 
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PWE directives for the Polish Service that the Polish-Soviet political and territorial disputes 
remained taboo topics. It was only on 25 May 1944 that the PWE decided to break the silence 
on the Berling Army in the Polish broadcasts.11 Yet information regarding both the UPP and the 
Berling Army was given on other BBC Services prior to this date, resulting in Polish 
government complaints to the Foreign Office for describing the Berling Army as ‘a patriotic 
body liberating Poland’.12 However, this had little impact. 
͚BalaŶĐiŶg͛ pƌo-Soviet propaganda 
The PWE, aware of the political views of the listeners in Poland, continued the policy of 
avoidance regarding the Polish-Soviet border whilst highlighting the necessity of re-establishing 
diplomatic relations between the countries, a difficult undertaking given Stalin’s hostility to the 
Polish government-in-exile. The PWE directives made it clear that, in broadcasts to Poland, 
British government support of the Polish government must be emphasised but it was also 
acknowledged that the British government was ‘the sole agent of Russian policy’.13 In a speech 
broadcast to Poland on 30 June 1943, Churchill addressed Stalin as a great friend and appealed 
to the Polish government to reach an understanding with Russia. The same stance was presented 
by the British press cited in the Polish broadcasts: the Red Army was praised for its bravery and 
Maisky for his openness; however, references for the need for ‘better understanding’ suggested 
assent to Stalin’s demands.14 In a similar vein, emphasis was placed on the friendly attitude 
Poland in Stalin’s speeches and his desire to see the future Poland as a democratic and an 
independent country. In contrast, Polish politicians remained subject to censorship as was the 
case for Sikorski’s speech on 3 May 1943 when two sentences were redacted by the censor: 
first, that there must be limits to the concessions and, second, that Poland was a test case for 
allied cooperation.15 An official Polish government complaint to the to the BBC regarding this 
issue had no impact on the BBC policy of suppression of any topic which might be seen as 
offensive to the Soviet ally.16 Subsequently, the same treatment was given to his speech from 3 
July 1943 when the security censor redacted references to Wilno and Lwów and also to Danzig 
and Warsaw, cities occupied by the Germans.17  
On 4 July 1943, Sikorski died in a plane crash during take-off from Gibraltar. The new Polish 
Prime Minister, Stanisław Mikołajczyk, like his predecessor, believed that both Churchill and 
Roosevelt had leverage with Stalin and, as long he maintained their support, Polish interests 
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were secure.18 Yet, as Prażmowska points out, given the Red Army victories and the inability of 
Britain and the USA to open the second front, Eastern Europe would be left in the Soviet sphere 
of influence.19 However, Mikołajczyk’s position within his cabinet was much weaker than 
Sikorski’s. The main challenge to his authority came from newly appointed Commander-in 
Chief, General Kazimierz Sosnowski, and President Władysław Raczkiewicz, both advocating 
for a firmer approach toward the Soviet Union. As the Director-General of the PWE, Bruce 
Lockhart, observed, Poles were unrealistic in their political demands, pointing out that the 
friction within the Polish government in London and the lack of the support for the Polish Prime 
Minister was leading to widespread criticism.20 In Poland too, it was believed that eastern 
Poland had not yet been lost. On 15 August 1943, the representatives of the four major political 
parties in Poland issued a manifesto outlining, among other issues, opposition to any territorial 
concessions and calling for: 
‘a constant watchfulness concerning Soviet influence, which is becoming increasingly 
marked in the allied countries and a ceaseless recalling to their consciousness of the 
latent danger in Russian-Communist totalitarian peace aims’.21  
As Kochanski observes, they had ‘no idea of true impact of the break in relations between 
Poland and the Soviet Union’.22 Yet, taking into account, on the one hand, the limited access to 
information and, on the other, the Polish government-in-exile’s assurances that Britain and the 
USA supported Polish territorial claims, it is not surprising that the leaders of the political 
parties in Poland were not prepared to change their policy. Both the BBC Polish Service and 
Radio Polskie took an active part in convincing the Underground and, by extension, the Polish 
nation, not only that it was possible to regain occupied territory but, more importantly, that the 
independence of Poland was secure. For example, in a speech broadcast by the Polish Service 
on 29 July 1943, Mikołajczyk referred to Britain and the USA as the most important allies of 
Poland and thanked Churchill and Roosevelt for acting as mediator between Poland and the 
Soviet Union, declaring at the same time that Poland would welcome the resumption of friendly 
relations with Stalin.23 The Polish broadcasts also cited the British and American press which 
gave the impression of international support for Poland’s claims. Polish courier, Jan Nowak, 
reporting in July 1943 to Jan Rzepecki, the head of the Polish Bureau of Information and 
Propaganda [Polskie Biuro Informacji i Propagandy] (BIP) on his earlier visit to Britain, 
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stressed how shocked he was about Anglo-Saxon attitudes to Polish-Soviet affairs.24 In 
Nowak’s opinion, both Britain and the USA attached little significance to Polish affairs and the 
Poles’ view of their allies was far too idealised. In response, Rzepecki argued that the aim of 
propaganda in Poland was to maintain public morale and the will to fight the occupant. 
Therefore, in his view, pessimism was premature and would only benefit the Germans and 
Polish communists.25 According to Rzepecki, the press in a democratic country did not always 
express the official government line. Thus it was not important what newspapers and the BBC 
reported, but rather what Churchill and Roosevelt ‘think and do’.26 
Eden and other representatives of the Foreign Office such as Frank Roberts, were highly 
sceptical that Stalin would abandon his plan for the incorporation of the eastern part of Poland 
into the USSR. So was the director of the Polish Region PWE, Moray Maclaren whose job was 
further complicated because, officially, until February 1944, the British government did not 
support Stalin’s claims to the Curzon line. The struggle to remain unbiased in the Polish 
broadcasts is evident in the directive’s attempt to ‘balance’ pro-Polish and pro-Soviet 
arguments. At the same time that Polish politician were arguing increasingly in their speeches 
that the eastern part of Poland should not be sacrificed in order to please Stalin, Polish listeners 
were to be reminded about the great achievements of the Red Army and their major role in 
fighting against the Axis.27 However, when the Polish government was under attack, directives 
advised that special attention should be given to Britain’s support for the Polish government.28 
Yet, as the Polish Service Editor, Gregory Macdonald explained after the war, rather than 
‘balancing’, it was important for the Polish Service to remain neutral, given the difficult 
relations between two of Britain’s allies and the imperative that the Service should not become a 
platform for anti-Soviet or anti-Polish propaganda.29  
In November 1943, the first meeting between Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill took place in 
Tehran. Although, officially, the Polish-Soviet frontier was not on the agenda, both Churchill 
and Roosevelt agreed that Stalin’s territorial demands would be kept secret from the Polish 
government until October 1944 (see chapter 3). Roosevelt, in particular, insisted that the 
agreement was not publicised as he was counting on 6,000,000 American voters of Polish 
origins in the upcoming election.30  Yet, even prior to the meeting of the Big Three, the BBC 
had received an official guideline from the Ministry of Information to refer to the Polish-Soviet 
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border as the ‘former Polish frontier’.31The Polish authorities protested, but were directed to 
discuss the matter with the Foreign Office.32 
Both the proceedings and the outcomes of the Tehran Conference were to be treated with 
caution and, if possible avoided in the Polish Service broadcasts. 33  The Polish Service bulletins 
from this period did not survive the war and so there is no evidence of how the Conference was 
covered. However, as already demonstrated, the Polish bulletins had been written in accordance 
with the PWE guidelines and censored before they went on the air. In addition, Macdonald 
assisted Maclaren in the preparation of the PWE directives. From this point on, differentiated 
coverage of the events was out of the question.  
Between the hammer and the anvil 
The evidence of the arrests and killings of the members of the Polish Underground by the Soviet 
partisans and sponsored by Stalin the Polish communists in the eastern part of Poland were 
reaching the Polish government in London frequently.34 The Polish Service was banned from 
making any reference to these atrocities or to the fears  of the Underground, as noted by the 
PWE, that Stalin’s main goal was to make the country leaderless in order to install his own 
puppet government.35 The censorship of Polish sources was highly problematic; the 
Underground not only supplied reports on the conditions in occupied Poland but was also the 
main channel through which the BBC broadcasts were syndicated. As explained in chapter 4, 
due to the fact that the German occupants had introduced the death penalty for listening to or 
possession of a radio, it was the Underground which was the main audience for Polish 
broadcasts and distributed their content in form of the clandestine press and leaflets. 
Consequently, the Polish Service needed to adjust to the needs of the Underground rather 
appealing to mass audiences as was the case for other BBC foreign-language services (see 
chapter 1). It also meant that it was up to the Underground to decide what information was 
suitable for printing.  
Therefore, by not acknowledging those reports, the BBC risked its reputation as an unbiased 
and neutral broadcaster. The Soviet NKVD, on the other hand, was condemning the Polish 
resistance for a lack of the cooperation with the Germans. The PWE acknowledged that the 
‘neutral position in propaganda (was) generally weak’ and ‘neither dignified not useful’, 
pointing out that up to that point there had been no attempt to defend the Polish government and 
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the Underground against Soviet attacks in the Polish broadcasts.36  The BBC situation seemed to 
be unmanageable; whether or not it reported Soviet crimes, it was going to be accused of bias. 
This was not only a problem for Polish but for all languages broadcasts, including the BBC 
Home Service.  Both Poles and Russians monitored the BBC Services and any reference to 
Polish-Russians matters was interpreted as the official stance of the British government. Yet it 
was precisely for this reason that the Poles listened to the BBC. It was understood that the 
corporation was expressing the official line of the British government and its stance with regard 
to Polish-Soviet affairs was central to the strategy and propaganda of the Underground.   
With the Red Army approaching the pre-war Polish frontier, the seriousness of this state of 
affairs and the importance of breaking the silence on the Soviet imprisonment and slaughter of 
the Polish Home Army leaders and soldiers was discussed by the PWE at the highest level: 
‘Either we must endeavour to convert what would appear as the rape of a defenceless 
country into something more in conformity with the Tehran declaration, or we must 
admit that our Russian Allies have in fact different methods from those of the Anglo-
Saxon military gentleman. (…) After our long propaganda commitment in favour of the 
Polish underground movement, to present its liquidation in a favourable light, and by 
endeavouring to do so we shall certainly become vulnerable. By representing rape as 
seduction we incur the danger of acquiring the unsavoury reputation of the pimp’.37  
The memorandum concluded that the recognition of the Polish Underground as the only 
legitimate authority in Poland should be acknowledged in the BBC Polish broadcasts. In 
addition, the recognition of the Polish government-in-exile as the only government of Poland 
should be emphasised, as well as its claims to pre-war border. According to the author of the 
memorandum, this approach was particularly significant because the Underground was loyal 
only to the Polish government in London and thus any disapproval or questioning of its policies 
would have implications for their view of the BBC and the British government, resulting in a 
loss of trust of the part of the Polish public and the Polish Army. More importantly, he argued, 
the Polish broadcasts should defend the Polish authorities in Poland and in London from UPP 
attacks. The advice was ‘to express hope and belief’ that the relations between two neighbours 
would be restored whilst people’s ‘alarms and doubts’ should be voiced in a ‘measured manner 
(…) while endeavouring nevertheless to calm and not to incite them’.38 It was acknowledged 
that while this approach might not be the best solution, the situation was so complex that, even 
if the events changed ‘our position in political warfare will in any case be so difficult (…) that 
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this will make very little difference’.39 Although, the author of this memorandum is unknown, 
given tone and pro-Polish stance and support for the Polish Underground, it is likely that it was 
Moray Maclaren.  
Liberation or invasion?  
In December 1943, as the Soviet troops were approaching the Polish-Soviet border, it became 
evident that Soviet army’s entry into Poland was going to be particularly problematic. 
Officially, the British government did not recognise any territorial changes concerning Poland 
since August 1939 and this declaration was emphasised in the Polish broadcasts.40 However, as 
Maclaren observed, since diplomatic relations between Poland and Russia had been suspended, 
‘on the eve of the Soviet troops crossing the pre-war Polish frontier, Poland will be under 
invasion by a non-friendly power’. 41 However, Maclaren, was wrong in stating that Soviets 
were crossing the pre-war Polish frontier. The only territorial changes which had occurred since 
1921 concerned the occupation of Poland by Germany and the USSR, starting in September 
1939. The so-called Ribbentrop-Molotov line, dividing the country between the two 
occupations was annulled in 1941 after diplomatic relations between Poland and the USSR were 
restored.  From that point on, according to international law, the Red Army was crossing the 
Polish-Soviet border. Nonetheless, since 1941, Stalin had been questioning the Riga line, the 
pre-war Polish-Soviet frontier, which in his view, had been ‘imposed’ on the USSR (see chapter 
3).42  
Given the constant disagreement regarding the frontier, it is interesting how little was known in 
the BBC in 1944 about the origins of the Curzon line. Macdonald recollects when in 1943 
(month not given) the Polish eastern border was under attack he had suggested that Newsome 
circulate a memo about its history.43 Although Newsome agreed, it was soon announced on the 
loud speakers in all offices that it had been withdrawn. According to Macdonald, the complaint 
came from left wing staff in Bush House ‘but there was no attempt to meet my facts, to prove 
me wrong’.44 In January 1944, however, a memo written by Maclaren explaining the origin of 
the Curzon line was circulated in the BBC. According to this paper, the border established by 
the Riga Treaty (the Riga line) in 1921 was not a clear agreement between Poland and Russia.45 
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Yet, there was no reference to the fact that the Curzon line did not differ much from 
Ribbentrop-Molotov line. 
MacLaren, aware of the political implications of the Soviet army crossing of the Riga line, 
emphasised that the Polish broadcasts should refer instead to ‘1939 Polish frontier’ rather than 
saying that the Red Army had entered Poland.46 In this situation, it was also acknowledged that 
discussion of the Polish-Soviet boundary could no longer be avoided. The ban was lifted, but 
the directives highlighted that special attention should be paid to British government support for 
this ‘ambivalent settlement’.47 Significantly, the Polish Service was recognised as an influential 
medium having influence on Polish citizens’ attitudes and conduct towards their ‘liberators’. 
On 3 January 1944 the PWE issued a Special Directive for the Polish Service emphasising the 
need to ‘encourage disciplined restrain and maintenance of calmness under provocation’.48 
Moreover, the BBC Polish broadcasts should be supportive and free of ‘fears or doubts’ as ‘this 
line (was) one-sided but inevitable’ despite the fact that that population in Poland had been ‘the 
subject of provocation’ caused by the massacre at Katyń and knew about the UPP and Polish 
communist activities in Poland.49 The directive stressed that the ‘total national unity of Poles’ 
with its government in London must be highlighted in the Polish Service programmes.50 Given 
that the Polish Underground was seen as the main obstacle in reaching agreement with Stalin on 
the frontier issue, the broadcasts were also ‘to encourage’ dialogue between the Polish officials 
in London and the leaders of the Polish Underground.51 
The Polish government in London followed the guidelines, and as before, Polish officials’ 
speeches played an important role in maintaining public morale. In addressing the Polish nation 
on 5 January 1944, Mikołajczyk maintained that the Red Army should be welcomed but 
stressed, at the same time, that ‘we should have preferred to meet the Soviet troops not merely 
as allies of our allies, fighting against the common enemy, but as our own allies as well’.52 The 
Polish Premier, in referring to the history of the Polish-Soviet border, emphasised that the 
Soviet troops had entered Polish territory and it was expected that liberated land would be 
returned to the Polish government-in- exile, the only legitimate government of Poland, 
recognised by the United Kingdom and the USA. His views, however, apparently differed from 
those of the Director of the European Service, Noel Newsome, who continued to argue that 
Stalin was right in his territorial demands, while leading British newspapers, notably The Times 
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argued that ‘200 years has shown that Russian-German friendship inspired by fear of Polish 
claims means enslavement for Polish people’.53  
Polish- Soviet reconciliation 
According to a special directive dated 16 January 1944 the PWE ‘reached a turning point in 
propaganda to Poland’ as ‘for the first time the Polish government was willing to discuss all 
outstanding questions’.54 It was not, however, the first time the Polish government was keen to 
discuss the post war Polish-Russian border. As explained earlier, Mikołajczyk was neither 
prepared nor in a position to make territorial concessions towards the USSR but, as before, he 
was open for negotiation, taking as a starting point the Riga line.55 The PWE remark is puzzling 
given that it was not the Polish government which had changed its policy but the Soviets. On 11 
January 1944, the TASS Soviet agency reported that the Soviet government was ready to renew 
diplomatic relations with Poland based on ‘solid good neighbourly relations and mutual 
respect’ but on condition that Poles accept the Curzon line.56 Although the same communiqué 
attacked the Polish government for being unrepresentative, ‘detached from its people’ as well 
‘incapable of organizing an active struggle in Poland against the German invader’ and hostile 
to the USSR, Duraczyński demonstrates that both American and British authorities took this as 
a sign of Stalin’s willingness to negotiate.57 The Polish government in responding to the TASS 
communiqué issued an official statement affirming that it was also its ‘sincere desire’ to reach a 
satisfactory settlement ‘acceptable to both sides’ 58 However, he did not indicate in any way that 
it was willing to accept the Curzon line; Mikołajczyk informed Churchill that he would consider 
the Curzon line as demarcation line whilst insisting that the final decision regarding the broader 
should be settled after the hostilities ended. 59  Nevertheless, the British Foreign Office insisted 
that the BBC should state that:  
‘the Poles have made this helpful response in the face of proposals of extensive 
territorial adjustments involving half of pre-1939 Poland and a large number of Poles. 
They have however the prospect of territorial adjustments elsewhere’.60 
In the light of this misinterpretation – or lack of understanding – of events, the PWE insisted 
that the Polish government had shown willingness to compromise with regard to the eastern 
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frontier and that the Polish Service should play an important role in the negotiations because of 
their wide audience in Poland and the Polish Army around the world. The Polish Service was to 
convince its listeners about the rightness of decisions made by its government and the necessity 
of maintaining a friendly attitude towards the Soviet Union who, as their liberator, would 
guarantee Poland’s independence.61 The most important point, however, was to highlight that 
the Polish government was not giving up the territories but evaluated its principles. Yet no 
attempt was to be made to contradict the explicit communist propaganda within Poland. 
Therefore, it was important that Poles, regardless of their political views, give total support to 
this matter. In order to achieve this end ‘propaganda will be built on selling it to Poland’ rather 
than being grounded in a ‘logical argument’.62 
The Polish broadcasts were to be based on three principles, notably: that Russia was a powerful 
factor in the fight against Germany and peace in Europe could not be guaranteed without her 
participation; that Poland, in particular, should therefore be ‘encouraged to develop and 
maintain friendship with Russia’; and, most importantly, that the Polish government, ‘in the 
interest of stable organisation of a peaceful brotherhood of nations, and in consultation with 
Great Britain and the USA is making a most valuable contribution to this end’.63 Above all, in 
should be stressed, that the Polish government was not ‘sacrificing’ the eastern territories or 
abandoning its ‘principles’.64 In addition, the Polish broadcasts should emphasise that the Polish 
people in Poland and throughout the world should ‘welcome and support the action of its 
government’.65 
Both Churchill and Eden tried unsuccessfully to reason with the Polish Prime Minister to accept 
the Curzon line. The prospect of compromise between Poland and the USSR was further 
complicated by the fact that Stalin argued for removing members of the Polish government in 
London who, in his view were anti-Soviet and replacing them with communists.66 In addition, 
the Polish government was asked to make an official statement on the Katyń massacre, 
acknowledging that the crimes were committed by the Germans.67 The situation was not helped 
by the fact that on 17 January TASS announced that the Polish government had misled public 
opinion and, because there were no diplomatic relations between the Polish and the Soviet 
government, the negotiations could not take place.68 It was emphasised that it was the Polish 
government in London which was unwilling to establish friendly relations and was actively 
participating in ‘the hostile, anti-Soviet slanderous campaign of the German invaders in 
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connection with the murders at Katyn’.69 However, the main focus for the attack was the Polish 
government’s refusal to accept the Curzon line. 
In response, the Polish Service was to avoid direct comment on the Soviet rejection of the 
renewal of diplomatic relations, whilst special care was to be taken not to imply that ‘the door 
(was) finally closed’. 70 Additionally, the Polish broadcasts should avoid topics which could 
diminish the trust of Polish people. The Polish Service was also prohibited from making any 
comparison between Poland and other Baltic States where, after recapturing Latvia and Estonia 
from the Wehrmacht in 1944, the authorities had continued sovietisation and collectivization 
reform and all those who opposed the newly established puppet governments were subject to 
mass deportation.71  
HMG suppoƌt foƌ StaliŶ͛s teƌƌitoƌial deŵaŶds 
Speaking in the House of Commons on 22 February 1944, Churchill supported Stalin’s 
demands regarding the Curzon line.72 However, he pointed out that the final discussion of the 
Polish-Soviet border would occur during a post-war peace conference. With the British 
government officially backing Stalin’s claims, the PWE warned that ’it would be a fatal error in 
propaganda to encourage even the slightest territorial hopes which may not be fulfilled’.73 
Instead, broadcasting to Poland should concentrate on a more important matter, notably, 
assurance that Poland’s independence was not at stake.  
The Polish government-in-exile rejected the Curzon line whilst the leaders of the Polish 
Underground and the Polish Army made an official protest.74 Expressing the view of the Polish 
nation that the eastern part of Poland should not be sacrificed, they questioned Churchill’s pro-
Soviet stance. Given this, it is surprising that the Polish Service was told to continue ’playing’ 
on Churchill’s prestige, albeit, as Maclaren observed after visiting the Polish Troops stationed 
in Scotland, not all Poles were negative regarding the British Premier’s declaration. To his 
surprise, the morale of the Polish solders was high as they were convinced that Churchill’s 
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speech was a ‘tactical manoeuvre’.75 Maclaren reported later: ‘their veneration for Churchill 
was so great that they simply did not believe him when he said that Poland must lose Wilno’.76 
Nevertheless, knowing that the dissemination of the Polish broadcasts depended upon the 
Underground, it was expected that, after Churchill’s speech, the influence of the Polish Service 
would decrease. The matter had been discussed during a meeting in the Foreign Office on 9 
March 1944 between Maclaren, Roberts and the Assistant Under-Secretary, Oliver Harvey.77 It 
was decided that PWE should implement British policy in the BBC broadcasts with regard to 
the relations between Poland and the USSR and, in particular, the subject of the Curzon line.  In 
order to achieve this end, Maclaren had approached three accredited Polish writers with a 
proposal to contribute anonymous material in the form of talks which, after editing by the PWE, 
were to be used in the Polish BBC programmes. According to Maclaren, ‘by using first-class 
Polish journalists and writers with an expert knowledge of the country we could best put across 
the view point we wanted’.78 It was further agreed that these talks should avoid any discussion 
of future frontiers. The anonymous writers expressed views in consonance with the British 
government, notably, that Poland should accept the Curzon line. However, they stressed that 
they were genuine patriots ‘regarded as acting and writing in good faith by all but the most 
extreme of their compatriots’.79 The writers agreed to supply the talks on the condition that they 
would remained anonymous, but they wanted Mikołajczyk to be informed of their identity. 
Aware that he could not give his approval for such talks, the writers stated that they would only 
proceed if he did not express ‘define disapproval’. 80 
Consequently, Maclaren approached the Polish Prime Minister in order to obtain his consent. 
Committed to persuade Mikołajczyk, he emphasised that the talks would be labelled as the 
HMG point of view, with the entire responsibility held by the latter. No criticism of the Polish 
government would be contained in those talks; on the contrary, ‘where HMG’s policy marched 
with that of the Polish Government, we would stress our support of that Government’.81 Thus 
Mikołajczyk did not need to show his approval, simply to express a ‘lack of disapproval’. 
However, McLaren failed to convince Mikołajczyk who warned that if this plan was carried out, 
he would formally protest to the Foreign Office.82 Maclaren argued that his refusal could have 
even more profound consequences, notably, the end of PWE cooperation with the government-
in- exile.  He was determined to proceed with or without the Polish Prime Minister’s blessing, 
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pointing out that it would be better if the latter at least approved the writers. Maclaren, however, 
later admitted that Mikołajczyk’s consent was crucial; first, if he protested, the Polish Service 
staff might resign or, in a more optimistic scenario, the Polish announcer might refuse to read 
the talk and, more importantly, the Polish Underground would not disseminate any information 
which contradicted its government’s foreign policy.83  
Administration of the Polish liberated territory 
By the end of February 1944, the PWE focused on reporting on the Soviet administration of the 
liberated Polish territory and the growing propaganda of the Polish communists in Poland, 
notably the Polish Workers’ Party (PPR) and their military wing, the People’s Guard (GL), 
renamed in January 1944 the People’s Army (AL) and acting as competitor to the Polish Home 
Army (AK) (see chapter 3). In November 1943 the PPR, without consulting Moscow, 
established the State National Council (KRN), which claimed to be empowered to act on behalf 
of the nation.84 The KRN had the same goal as the UPP notably, destroying the authority of the 
Polish Underground and the Polish government in London and preparing the ground for the 
establishment of communist rule in Poland.85 However, communication between the two 
organisations was interrupted, only to be restored in the beginning of 1944, due to the 
Wehrmacht offensive in the east. The Polish Underground sent a memorandum to the Polish 
government in London which was circulated in the Foreign Office and the BBC, giving 
evidence on Polish communist behaviour and tactics and describing their propaganda as 
‘pseudonymous (and) using a cloak of extreme Polish nationalism, attacks on government-in-
exile, irresponsible resistance to the Germans and the stigmatisation of the Underground as 
cowardly’.86 Yet, the leaders of the Underground were faced with a much complex problem, 
notably their policy towards the command of the Soviet troops which had been establishing 
their own administration on ‘liberated’ Polish territory.  
A plan for a national rising against the German foe had already been drawn up in the first years 
of the war and was developed further when Polish-Soviet diplomatic relations were restored and 
it was assumed that the Polish Army formed in the Soviet Union would take part in the 
liberation of Poland.87 But in 1944, given that the Polish government in London had failed to 
restore relations with Stalin and all signs pointed that, once the Soviets liberated Poland from 
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the Germans, no attempt would be made to pass the administration to the Underground and the 
Polish government-in-exile, it was decided that steps had to be taken in order to regain Polish 
land. The Commander of the AK, Tadeusz Bór-Komorowski, instructed his soldiers to attack 
retreating German armies in the eastern provinces and reveal themselves to the Soviet 
command.88 In this way, military cooperation with the Soviets was to be established, leading to 
recognition of the AK authority and control in the region. Special orders were given from 
London by the Polish Commander-in-Chief, General Sosnowski, to announce to the Soviet 
command entering Polish soil that: 
‘by order of the Government of the Polish Republic, we present ourselves as the 
representatives of the Polish administration (as commanders of AK units) with a 
proposal to establish collaboration on these territories with the armed forces of the 
Soviet Union, for mutual action against the common enemy’.89  
It was understood that after Poland was liberated the Polish government then in exile would be 
able to return to Poland and take over the political steer but, before this could occur, the Polish 
Underground government, Delegatura, acting as the government designate in Poland, was the 
necessary political apparatus (see chapter 3). In January 1944, the Council of National Unity 
(RJN) was created which consisted of representatives of four major Polish parties. In March 
1944, the Council of National Unity announced its manifesto ‘What the Polish Nation is 
fighting for’ which argued, among other things, for international recognition of the pre-war 
Polish-Soviet border and the annexation of German territory in the north and west, as proposed 
by the allies.90 
What the Polish government and the AK did not, however, was that Stalin already had already 
given orders to disarm AK units and kill those who resisted in November 1943.91 Moreover, all 
men between 17 and 35 living on Polish ‘liberated’ territory were subject from April 1944 to 
conscription to Berling’s First Army. Those who resisted were arrested and in many cases 
deported to the Soviet Union. By July 1944 over 6,000 AK soldiers had been detained.92 
Although the criteria for conduct towards the Soviet Army and the administration of the Polish 
Underground on territory liberated from Germans, known under the cryptonym operation 
‘Tempest’, had failed in the east, they were later applied in planning for the Warsaw rising. 
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Notwithstanding, the BBC supressed information about the situation in eastern Poland. On 11 
April, in directives for the European Service, Newsome stressed that news about Polish 
demands of the Soviet Army ‘must not be broadcast’ in any of the BBC foreign language 
programmes.93 Moreover, despite the fact that the Polish Underground reports about Soviet 
misconduct had been passed to the British government by the Polish authorities in London, 
nothing was done to assist the Polish Home Army or to question Stalin’s intentions.94 Given that 
the Polish sources were not trusted in Whitehall and the Polish Underground was accused of 
anti-Soviet activities, Bór-Komorowski suggested in March 1944 that an allied commission 
should be dispatched to Poland in order to witness the anti-Polish activities orchestrated by the 
Soviet Union.95 The proposal was refused by the British Prime Minister on the grounds that 
such action would aggravate Stalin and result in the British government being accused of 
sending spies to Poland.96  
In this political climate, the future of broadcasting to Poland was particularly problematic in 
light of the consensus among the PWE officials that the Soviet occupation of Poland was highly 
probable. Already in February 1944, Maclaren observed that the Soviet military occupation of 
Poland would result in ‘feasible propaganda to Poland (being) seriously reduced’.97 A month 
later, in a private letter to Harvey, he also expressed his concerns regarding the future of the 
Polish government in London.98 In his view, there was consensus in Whitehall that it would 
cease to exist.99 However, Maclaren held the view that, as long as the British government 
recognised the Polish government, the Polish broadcasts should remind their listeners about the 
importance of supporting their government. This line was particularly important, because 
regardless of the political situation, Poles were needed to continue fighting against the Germans. 
A Special Directive for the Polish Service issued on 23 March stressed that in broadcasting to 
Poland: 
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‘our words must be rather more forceful and dramatic than we ourselves would 
consider appropriate. Our programmes would acquire an increasingly emotional anti-
German tone, going beyond factual reporting. The political questions should fall into 
the background but we should not give an impression that we are concealing 
anything.’100 
The Polish Service followed the guidelines and on 25 and 26 April reported on the cooperation 
between the Polish Underground and the Soviet command in Wołyń district and Lwów.101 On 
27 April, it reported again on the successful Polish-Soviet military cooperation, going so far as 
to suggest post-war collaboration between the Polish Underground and the Soviet Union.102  
Yet, according to dispatches received by cable from Poland in April 1944, apart from 
complaints about UPP communist propaganda and the People’s Army looting, the Underground 
maintained that the relations with the Soviet command were good.103 It was also in Poland’s 
interest to emphasise that cooperation with Soviets had been established and, more importantly, 
that the Polish Home Army was fighting against Germans and not, as claimed by the Polish 
communists and Stalin, that they had remained passive. But, as mentioned earlier, it was 
understood that the future of Poland’s independence depended on Soviet recognition of the 
Polish Underground administration on liberated territory.  
Given the mistrust of the Soviets, special precautions were taken by the Polish Underground. 
While it was acknowledged that links with the Soviet command had to be established, it was 
imperative that the organisation and structure of the Underground should be kept secret. 
Komorowski was therefore outraged when on 12 April the Polish Service broadcast the Polish 
emissary, Jerzy Lerski’s (pseudonym ‘Jur’) appeal to all Polish Underground organisations to 
reveal themselves to the Red Army command. The Director of the Polish Telegraphic Agency 
(PAT), Stefan Litauer, however, acting as a Soviet secret agent, had altered the text before 
passing it to the Director of Radio Polskie, Karol Wagner.104 Yet, what Jur said was that the 
regional commanders of the AK should welcome the Soviets with the Polish flag as ‘allies of 
our allies’ and appeal for join fight against the common enemy.105 The unverified scrip was then 
aired by both Radio Polskie and the Polish Service.  
In May Frank Roberts expressed his concern regarding Soviet propaganda directed against the 
Polish government and the Polish Underground, urging the Foreign Office to take a firmer 
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stance toward the USSR.106  He admitted that the Soviet accusations were found untrue and that 
it was Stalin’s aim to discredit the Polish Home Army’s actions, given their loyalty to the Polish 
government-in-exile, which the Soviet leader considered unrepresentative of the Polish nation. 
However, he argued, the Foreign Office was in a difficult situation as the Polish Underground 
was the only source which contradicted the Soviet accusations whilst the Soviets had a 
monopoly on the reporting of developments in eastern Europe. Moreover, as Roberts observed, 
the British press supported the Soviet version of events and it was also clear that Stalin did not 
want British government intervention into Polish-Soviet affairs. Therefore, he argued, 
‘mentioning those issues on radio would only make situation worse’.107 While his advice was 
that the BBC should report on the Polish Home Army operations against Germans in Poland, he 
emphasised that ‘we should not … “answer back” when the Russians resort to misleading 
allegations’.108 
Reporting on Berling Army and anti-Polish propaganda 
On 25 May the Polish Service was instructed to break the silence about the Berling Army, 
which by then was also ‘liberating’ Poland, because few days earlier Churchill had made 
reference in a speech to the Polish troops fighting alongside the Soviet forces. The issue had 
been on an agenda at a meeting dealing with broadcasts to Poland at which there was discussion 
on Maclaren’s directive that it was unwise to refrain from reporting on the Berling Army when 
people in Poland knew about its existence.109 In his view, it would be far worse if information 
came from the Polish or Soviet sources, possibly resulting in civil war. Thus, while it was 
admissible for the Polish Service to mention the Berling Army in its broadcasts, it was not 
necessary to refer to its connection to the UPP, because ‘although their leaders speak in 
provocative manner it does not mean that it is the official line of Stalin’.110 
The PWE directives for the BBC Polish broadcasts, however, illustrate the difficulties in 
dealing with this subject. In May, the Polish Service was instructed to report that Berling Army 
was made up of patriotic Poles, while highlighting that the political views of the army’s leaders 
should be avoided.111 It was not only officers’ support for communists’ ideology which was 
problematic, but their allegiance to the UPP, which openly challenged the Polish government-
in-exile’s authority. By June, Maclaren was advising caution in reporting about Berling Army. 
‘What we know about them’, he argued, ‘is derived from propaganda material’.112 Maclaren 
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further argued that the political leaders of that army ‘may cause us embarrassment in the future’ 
and so the Polish Service should concentrate instead on the Polish Underground, given the 
extent of national support and the Home Army willingness to cooperate with the Soviet 
Union.113   
Prior to this, on  21 May, all the BBC channels had been banned from referring to the Berling 
Army; instead the term the Polish forces in the USSR was to be used and it was forbidden to 
mention the political views of their leaders.114 This was done to disconnect them from any 
political connection with the UPP and the USSR.115 It was noted that men conscripted to the 
Berling units would hold considerable influence in Poland since they would return to Poland 
before the Polish Army under Anders’ command, then fighting in Italy with the Allied forces. 
Subsequently, they would become an important part of the Polish Service listenership; for this 
reason, the BBC should refrain from talking unfavourably about the Berling units.116 
An examination of the Polish Service bulletins, however, demonstrates that in May the topic 
continued to be avoided. Nothing was said about the UPP, the Berling Army or, indeed, about 
the Polish-Soviet affairs and the news concentrated instead on the situation on the western front. 
Nor were any of these issues discussed in the press review, probably because, as Frank Roberts 
observed, most of the British press was pro-Soviet.117 According to the British ambassador to 
the Polish government-in-exile, Owen O’Malley, however, by mid-1944 pro-Soviet meant anti-
Polish and was: 
‘stimulated by all Government departments, nearly all newspapers, the BBC, the Army 
Bureau of Current Affairs, the Army Education Department, the Political Warfare 
Executive, and every other organ of publicity susceptible to official influence’.118  
The Polish Service Editor, Gregory Macdonald, however, whilst observing that ‘the BBC had 
no political opinion and was required to broadcasts statements made by the government’, 
recollects in describing the challenges caused by the Polish-Soviet political turbulences that: 
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‘over and over again we had to take the decisions whether to conceal the truth which 
might well endanger morale, or whether to give it, and I am glad to say, that however 
painful the process, at least the Polish people, for whom we had so deep sympathy, 
were never deceived from London’.119 
Yet, the Polish government -in-exile did not share his views. In May the Polish Ministry of 
Information liaison to the BBC, Jan Baliński, complained that the European Service reported 
stories ‘which were untrue and out of balance’.120 He argued that ‘The Polish government is a 
subject of political speculations and hasty conclusions and delicacy of Polish-Russian relations 
may lead to international misunderstanding jeopardising European reconciliation’.121 As an 
example, Baliński cited Clement Fuller’s report broadcast on the BBC that, during the 
conference in New York, the Polish Prime Minister had said that Poles wished to approach the 
Russian government.122 However, what the Polish Prime Minister had in fact said was that ‘both 
governments have a duty to collaborate with each other’.123 Even more controversial was the 
broadcast which falsely claimed that the Russians had arrived in Poland and, under their 
umbrella, had created a council which included all Polish parties.124 Baliński argued that 
information about Poland should be verified with the Polish Ministry of Information before 
broadcast. Kirkpatrick, the European Service Controller, responded that the BBC was willing to 
cooperate with the Polish authorities and verify information about the Polish government and 
the Polish Underground and the military, but not about Poles in the USSR.125  
Broadcasting to Poland was confronted with an even bigger challenge when on 22 June 1944 
Polish communists and the UPP joined forces and formed the Polish Committee of National 
Liberation (PCNL), a month later recognised by Stalin as the only legitimate Polish 
governmental body to administrate ‘liberated’ territory.126 In response to this political 
development, the PWE directives for the Polish Service stressed the importance of avoiding 
reports that the situation was ‘hopeless’, instead placing emphasis on the British government 
position that the Polish government in London was the only government of Poland.127 In 
addition, the Polish government and Underground calls for full cooperation with the Red Army 
should be reported without reference to the fact that, up to that point, this had not been 
achieved. 128 Moreover, the broadcasts must discourage a premature rising and emphasise that 
                                                          
119 MPC, Macdonald’s notes, undated. 
120 BBC WAC, E1/1148/4, 1 May 1944. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Kochanski, op. cit., p. 445. 
127 NA, FO 371/39425, PWE Directives for Polish Service, week 6-12 July 1944. 
128 Ibid. 
 183 
such orders could only be issued by the government in London.129 Acknowledgement of the 
Underground heroic resistance against the Germans and of the Polish people’s suffering were to 
be the main themes in the broadcasts. 
By the end of July, Stalin’s political motives for the elimination of the Polish Underground were 
in the open. In Wilno and Lwów, where communication between the Underground and the 
Soviet command had previously been established, the regional AK commanders had been 
invited for talks, only to be arrested and deported to the USSR.130 Although Mikołajczyk had 
appealed to Churchill to intervene with Stalin, the British Prime Minister offered no challenge 
to the arrests of the AK members but instead attacked the AK for fighting in cities which were 
the subject of dispute with the USSR and urged Mikołajczyk to go to Moscow in order to find a 
compromise.131 The Polish government also tried to secure the combatant rights of the AK as 
part of the Polish Forces. This would mean that the AK would be protected by international law 
and the killing and arrests of the AK soldiers by the Soviets would be recognised as a crime, 
something what the Churchill and Roosevelt were not prepared to do.132 Those rights were 
finally given to the AK only during the Warsaw rising, and only after four weeks of Polish 
government appeals to the allies (see chapter 7). The bulletins from June and July 1944 did not 
survive, therefore it is impossible to know how these developments were reported.  
Conclusion 
The analysis of the PWE directives demonstrates that the Polish Service had been recognised as 
an important medium of British foreign policy, having significant impact on the political views 
of its listeners. Although it was acknowledged that Polish broadcasts could not become a 
platform for anti-Polish or anti-Russian propaganda, it is evident that the Service attempted to 
convince its listeners about the necessity of accepting Stalin’s territorial demands. It is 
important to note that in the dispute over the Polish-Soviet border, only the Polish government 
was criticised for its unwillingness to compromise whilst Stalin’s standpoint was not 
questioned. At the same time, the ‘compromise’ to which the BBC and the British press were 
referring, became a euphemism for bowing to Stalin’s terms.  It is also interesting that whilst 
attempts were made to prevent the Polish government from discussing the post-war Polish 
borders, British papers such as The Times and the Daily Mail, published articles in support of 
maintaining the Curzon line.  Moreover, special care was taken by the Polish Service to avoid 
not only anything that could upset Stalin but also could undermine the Polish government and 
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the Underground’s authority.  Given that the Underground was the main channel through which 
the Polish broadcasts were distributed, the support for this organisation remained central to the 
end of the war.  However, with the establishment of Soviet administration on Polish liberated 
territory and the growing importance of the communists in Poland, the challenge of the future 
audience had to be addressed. The next chapter, which deals exclusively with period of the 
Warsaw rising, demonstrates further challenges for the Polish Service, in particular, in a period 
when Stalin’s political manoeuvring, including his plans for the occupation of Poland and 
annihilation of the Polish Home Army had come into the open. 
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Coverage of the Warsaw Rising: 1 August – 2 October 1944 
 
Introduction 
‘Continue to play up the Poles’ gallant fight in Warsaw and avoid any suggestions that 
the Red Army is delaying its assault for any reasons other than those which delayed the 
fall of other great fortresses until they have been fully investigated and their garrisons 
cut off’.1 
This chapter examines the Polish Service coverage of the Warsaw rising in the context of 
political and military developments and the extent to which the broadcasts were influenced by 
the British government’s foreign policy. During the Battle of Warsaw, it became transparent 
that Stalin’s main objective was to install a communist government in Poland and annihilate the 
Polish Underground. For over two weeks the Soviet Union denied that the uprising was even 
taking place and after finally acknowledging it, Stalin not only failed to assist the insurgents, but 
refused the Allied Air Forces to land on the Soviet bases. The principle of maintaining the unity 
of the allied coalition resulted in the withholding of information from Polish listeners and the 
British public despite the fact that daily reports from Warsaw were received in London. The 
analysis is based on the Polish Service bulletins from 1 August 1944 to 2 October 1944, the 
Political Warfare Executive (PWE) directives for the Polish Service and the BBC European 
Service directives. It is supported by an examination of the broadcasts of the Home Service in 
order to demonstrate that in spite of BBC awareness that the Poles were also monitoring other 
BBC stations, domestic UK coverage of the uprising differed from that of the Polish Service. 
Political situation before the rising  
In the week just before the outbreak of the rising, the BBC Polish Service continued to assure its 
listeners that the British government still recognised the Polish government-in-exile and was 
acknowledging the Polish Underground’s part in the liberation of Poland. These assurances 
were particularly important given Stalin’s claims that the Polish Committee of National 
Liberation (PCNL), also known as the Lublin Committee, was the only representative 
governmental body in Poland and that the Polish Underground had collaborated with Germans 
(see chapter 7). Recognising that Poles were afraid of Soviet occupation, the PWE Polish region 
stressed that they had to be kept calm and restrained. Therefore, the broadcasts should 
emphasise the British government pledges to maintain the territorial status quo in Europe which 
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could be only achieved if agreement between Poland and the Soviet Union was reached. 2 In 
addition, given that the Polish Prime Minister, Stanisław Mikołajczyk, had the full support of 
Polish citizens, the broadcasts were to highlight his ‘willingness’ to resume negotiations with 
Stalin.3 
The same line was taken by the BBC and the British press which presented Stalin as ‘an 
architect of enduring peace’ and supported his claims to the Polish eastern territory.4  On 25 
July, the BBC Home Service broadcast a Soviet Foreign Office statement claiming that they had 
no plans to set up their own administration in Poland; on the contrary, the Soviet Union wished 
to help Poles to liberate their country and establish ‘a free, independent and democratic 
Poland’.5 Yet, the arrangements with regard to the future government were to be made only 
with the Lublin Committee, which Stalin recognised as the only legal authority in Poland. The 
broadcast finished with the emotional avowal: ‘The Soviet government repeats! It does not wish 
to acquire any part of Polish territory or to change the social structure of Poland’.6 Although 
the Polish Service bulletins from June and July 1944 did not survive the war, it can be assumed 
that this was also broadcast to Poland, partly because official statements were usually broadcast 
by the Polish Service and, more importantly, because it was in line with British government 
foreign policy to convince the Poles that the USSR should be seen as a rescuer and a friendly 
neighbour. 
This propaganda line, however, was met in Poland with disbelief in the light of the arrests, 
killings and deportations of the soldiers of the Polish Home Army (AK) by the Soviets (see 
chapter 7). The information regarding these atrocities came from Polish sources and, given that 
the Polish Underground was seen as anti-Soviet, their authenticity was questioned. Yet, the 
evidence pointing to Soviet misconduct was overwhelming. In particular, the establishment of 
the communist administration of liberated Polish territory under the PCNL umbrella had a 
massive impact on Polish public opinion; it resulted in fear that the main interest of the USSR 
was the occupation of their country.7 At the same time as operation ‘Tempest’ [Burza]was 
taking place in the eastern part of Poland, the Polish government approached Eden regarding the 
granting of combatant rights for the Polish Home Army, not only so they would be protected 
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against German but, more importantly, Soviet atrocities.8 Combatant rights, however, were only 
granted in the fifth week of the rising. 
Outbreak of the Warsaw rising  
The Warsaw rising started on 1 August 1944. The cable informing about the outbreak was 
received by Polish telegraphists at Branes Lodge in London the same day.9 However, because 
the message did not have the authorisation of the AK command, it was ignored.10 It was only on 
2 August, when the Commander of AK, Tadeusz Bór-Komorowki, confirmed that the rising had 
begun, that the Polish government released information to the public. The British and American 
governments claimed that it had taken them by total surprise; Stalin did not acknowledge that 
the uprising was taking place until 13 August.11 Yet, Moscow radio had already appealed on 29 
July to the citizens of Warsaw to assist the liberation of the capital and, a day later, the Soviet 
controlled station Kościuszko broadcast in Polish:  
‘Soviet forces are advancing forcefully and approaching Praga (…) people of the 
Capital! To arms! May the whole population rise like a stone wall around the CNL 
(Committee of National Liberation) and the capital’s Underground Army!’ 12  
London was aware of these broadcasts; dispatches from the eastern front were also confirming 
that the Red Army was preparing for the liberation of the Polish capital. The broadcasts of the 
Polish Service and Radio Polskie, however, were in sharp contrast with Soviet appeals; instead 
of ‘to arms’, they advised: ‘be patient, do not strike too soon’.13 
Contrary to what was claimed, it was not a secret that the AK was planning an uprising and 
more importantly, as Macdonald in 1971 recollected, ‘everyone was expecting it’.14 The Polish 
Service editor explains: 
‘In the BBC (…) we were waiting for it. (…) the Soviet communiqués told of the 
victorious advance of the Red Armies towards the Vistula. We knew also from the 
monitoring of broadcasts that Radio Moscow and Radio Kosciuszko were calling on the 
people of Warsaw to rise. (But)…some of us knew more’. I knew (…) of Operation 
Burza by the Home Army, (…) that in the general plan for the Warsaw rising the 
                                                          
8 Ciechanowski, The Warsaw Rising of 1944 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 67. 
9  Davies, N., Rising’ 44: The Battle for Warsaw (London: Macmillan, 2003), pp. 11-13. 
10 Siemaszko, Z., Dziewięć Spojrzeń na Powstanie Warszawskie w latach 1969-2014 ( London: 
Siemaszko, 2014), p. 13. 
11 Davies, op. cit., p. 164. 
12 Ibid, p. 165. Praga refers to suburbs of Warsaw east of river Vistula. 
13  Briggs, A., The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom: The War of Words, Vol. 3 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 619.  
14 BBC WAC, Macdonald’s papers and articles, ‘The battle of Warsaw’, 1971, p. 5. 
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Government Delegation and the Home Army Commander had discretion when to begin 
the battle, within certain dates. Of course, the British Government and General Staff 
had also been informed, though they themselves had their difficulties– in liaison with 
the Kremlin and the Red Army.’15 
This was further confirmed in the dispatches from the eastern front. The Times reported on 1 
August that the Russian High Command had announced the previous night that Marshal 
Rocossovsky’s men were fighting within 10 miles from Warsaw. ‘It is clear’, The Times 
concluded ‘that a bridgehead has been established over the river above the city’.16 The Times 
dispatch was also included in the Polish Service press review.17  
The BBC Home Service followed the same line. On 1 August it reported at 7:00 am that the 
Russians were 12 miles from the Polish capital and were getting ready for the liberation. The 
afternoon bulletin gave a further update, announcing another advance of 9 miles towards 
Warsaw. The broadcast of the Polish Service was more detailed: ‘the Red Army captured three 
Warsaw suburbs: Wolomin, Radzymin and Otwock and was 15 kilometres from the heart of the 
city’.18 According to this broadcast, the AK had cooperated with the Red Army and an air fight 
was taking place between Russians and Germans over Warsaw; both reports were untrue. First, 
no cooperation or communication had been established between Warsaw and the Russian 
command; all messages sent by the insurgents to the Soviet command were ignored; and, 
secondly, Stalin had given orders forbidding the Red air force to fly over the Polish capital.19 
In addition, before news of the outbreak of the Warsaw rising had reached London, the director 
of the PWE Polish Region, Moray Maclaren, together with one of the BBC programme writer, 
Louis MacNeice, had prepared a programme celebrating the liberation of the Polish capital by 
the Red Army.20 This programme, written already on 31 July and recorded on 1 August, also 
highlighted the desire of the Polish nation for good relations with the USSR and acknowledged 
the Polish Underground’s achievements. Given that it touched on sensitive subjects, permission 
for broadcast was required from the Foreign Office.21 In general, the Foreign Office official, 
Frank Roberts, argued that it was a good idea to broadcast such programme but had reservations 
regarding ‘the playing up of the Polish Underground Army and the Polish Underground 
State’.22 The BBC was willing to modify the script, but became concerned that the Polish 
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announcer would inform the Polish government about the changes. Nevertheless on 4 August 
the Foreign Office changed its mind; there was a veto on the broadcast of the programme by all 
BBC Services.23 However the European Service directives referred on 1 August to an item 
prepared by the European Service news desk called ‘The Fall of Warsaw’ and required all the 
BBC foreign Services to broadcast it and to play Polish and Russians anthems after the main 
news.24 It is likely that the programme in question had been prepared by Maclaren and 
MacNeice, but because only written bulletins survived the war, it is impossible to verify that 
this was indeed the case (see chapter 2). 
Reporting on first week of Warsaw rising (2-7 August) 
Following the Polish government official statement on the afternoon of 2 August about the 
outbreak of the rising, all the BBC Services broadcast the news. On the same day Churchill also 
confirmed this news in the House of Commons. 25  Macdonald recollects that the typescript with 
the recording had arrived between 1 and 2pm. However, it could not be broadcast before 3:30 
pm because it had to be first translated and then approved by Newsome.26 The news was first 
given in the bulletin at 5:45 pm. Only the first three minutes of this bulletin, however, belonged 
to the Polish Service whilst the remaining 12 to Radio Polskie; the news about the outbreak of 
the rising was included in Radio Polskie while the main story in the Polish Service was 
Churchill’s review of the war situation in a speech to House of Commons.27 It was reported by 
Radio Polskie that ‘the Polish Home Army begun their open fight aiming at the mastering of 
Warsaw’ instead of ‘liberating’ as originally written.28 The term was changed by the policy 
censor, A. R. Birley. The additional security and policy stamps on the page with the 
announcement, indicate that the information was added at the last minute. But there was also 
another reason for this course of action; as Macdonald points out, when information about the 
development at the eastern front was delivered at 3:00 pm, Soviet sources had not mentioned 
anything about the outbreak of the rising.29 The news was eventually broadcast by the Polish 
Service at 7:45 pm, but again the word ‘liberation’ was redacted. Instead it was announced: ‘the 
Polish Home Army began their open fight aiming at the liberation to gain control of Warsaw’.30 
It was also claimed that the Russians were in the Praga suburbs.  
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The directives for the European Service, however, urged all foreign broadcasts to report that the 
Red Army was ‘converging on Warsaw’.31  The Polish Service also cited Churchill’s speech to 
House of Commons, in which the British Premier had argued that the Russians had ‘liberation 
in their hands’, and, therefore, that Poles must maintain friendly attitudes towards their 
liberator. However, two sentences from Churchill’s speech were redacted by the policy and 
security censor: ‘I salute Marshal Stalin, that great champion of his country and I firmly believe 
that our 20 years treaty with Russia will prove to be one of the most lasting and durable factors 
in preserving the peace order, and progress of Europe’; and that it was ‘bravely Russian arms’ 
which liberated Poland.32 Although the BBC was entitled to follow the official British 
government line, it was understood that some of parts of Churchill’s statement could be 
interpreted as anti-Polish and, given the already tense situation between Poland and the USSR, 
it was deemed prudent to omit these references.  
In the first week of fighting, the PWE directives did not address the subject of the rising but 
instead concentrated on the Polish-Soviet relationship. On 3 August, the director of the Polish 
Region PWE argued that in broadcasts to Poland ‘we must evoke the maximum of friendly 
confidence in Russia (but) without committing ourselves to any specific implications of what 
this relationship should be now and after’.33 In addition, Polish listeners should be told to join 
the Berling Army (see chapter 7). This appeal, however, was not broadcast by the Polish 
Service. It is likely that Macdonald, who took an active part in the preparation of the PWE 
directives for the Polish Service, protested against such a message being aired. 
In those first days of the rising, both the BBC Home and the Polish Service reported on further 
Russian progress towards Warsaw. On 3 August, the Polish Service reported that the AK 
actions were co-ordinated with the Russian advance and that liaison with the Soviet command 
had been established. However, the commander of the AK, Tadeusz Bór-Komorowski, cabled 
London next day, protesting that this information was untrue.34 According to the Director of 
Radio Polskie, Karol Wagner, the editor of Radio Polskie objected to this information being 
broadcast, pointing out that it was false, but he was told to ‘shut up’.35 On 4 September, the 
Polish Service went as far as to claim that Poles together with the Red Army were ‘clearing the 
Germans out of Praga suburbs’.36 Interestingly, the original script stated that it was the ‘Polish 
patriots’ who were assisting the Red Army, referring to members of the Union of the Polish 
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Patriots (UPP), an organisation formed by Polish communists in the Soviet Union in 1943, 
which had merged with Polish communists in Poland (PPR) in July 1944 to become the Polish 
Committee of National Liberation (PCNL), the only legitimate administrative organ recognised 
by Stalin (see chapter 7). This demonstrates that the Polish Service was relying on Soviet 
sources. However, the term ‘Polish patriots’ was redacted by the security censor and replaced 
with ‘Poles’. It seems that the intention of the Polish broadcast was to indicate that not only the 
communists but all Poles, including the Polish Underground, were cooperating with the Soviets 
and, more controversially, that the Red Army was present in the capital. By 5 August, however, 
the Polish Underground reported back to London that there had been no joint action of Poles 
and Russians and the movement of the Red Army had halted. Newsome instructed the European 
Services to 
‘continue to play up the Poles’ gallant fight in Warsaw and avoid any suggestions that 
the Red Army is delaying its assault for any reasons other than those which delayed the 
fall of other great fortresses until they have been fully investigated and their garrisons 
cut off’.37  
On 6 August the Polish Service coverage included the Bór communiqué acknowledging that the 
movement of Rokossovsky’s army ‘quieted down three days ago’.38 Yet, in the evening bulletin, 
the reference to the fact that the Russian forces were ‘staying silent’ was crossed out in blue 
pencil, indicating that in the security censor’s view, the report was no longer suitable for the 
broadcast.39 The same censorship policy was applied next day and, in place of the Bór 
communiqué, it was reported that Russians had extended their bridgehead across upper Vistula, 
capturing 60 places.40  
 In the first week of the uprising, the newspaper review of the Polish Service concentrated on 
quoting British newspapers commentaries on the liberation of Paris and, with the exception of a 
Daily Herald article on 5 August referring to the Polish Underground fighting against the 
Germans, nothing more had been said on this topic. Yet, Radio Polskie claimed in its broadcast 
on 7 August that all leading British papers had discussed the rising, perhaps in order to create 
the illusion that the rising was receiving widespread attention.41 
The BBC Home Service mentioned the outbreak of the rising for the first time on 2 August at 
7:00 pm. However, in contrast to claims made after the war, it was not reported as the most 
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important news of the day.42 In fact, the information did not made headlines and the later 
bulletins on the same day did not mention it at all. The headlines were occupied by the allied 
landings in Normandy and the news of the Red Army’s victories.43 In the following days, it 
continued to report on Soviet progress, but, by 7 August, had fallen silent on the subject. This 
led Macdonald to intervene in order to press all BBC Services to broadcast news about the 
Warsaw rising as ‘it seemed that it was going to be played down’.44 
The inconsistency of security and policy censorship demonstrates that the BBC relied on Soviet 
sources and ignored the reports of the Polish Underground. Although the progress of the Red 
Army was consistent with Soviet Home Service broadcasts picked up by the BBC Monitoring 
Service, the Soviet bulletins did not acknowledge that the uprising was taking place.45 But, as 
Davies points out, all reports from the eastern front had to pass through the hands of the Soviet 
censor, which meant that the news in the press and the BBC in many cases was not up to date. 46 
At the same time, not even the Polish Underground could believe that Stalin would give orders 
for the Red Army to withhold. The analysis of the bulletins also demonstrates that, although the 
directives and guidelines were the same, the extent to which they were exercised varied, leaving 
space for personal interpretation.  
Second week of the rising (8- 14 August) 
In the beginning of the second week of rising the European Service was instructed to avoid the 
topic of the Soviet army not entering Warsaw, and instead to report on Soviet liberation of the 
Baltic area and East Prussia.47 At this stage, however, it was believed that there was no reason 
other than the purely military for the Russian delay as ‘the reorganisation of the Russian supply 
system was necessary’.48 The information given in this period was in fact inconsistent across all 
the BBC broadcasts. Whilst the BBC Home and European Services continued to report on the 
Red Army progress, the Polish Service acknowledged that in fact it was not true.49 On 10 
August an official statement by the Deputy Prime Minister and Delegate of the Government in 
Poland, Jan Jankowski, which stated that from 3 August the Soviet progress toward Warsaw had 
ceased, was aired only by the Polish Service.  
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In this period, prominence was given to Polish Prime Minister Mikołajczyk’s statement on his 
return from a visit to Moscow in the last days of July 1944 in an attempt to reach agreement on 
the post-war Polish-Soviet border.  The resumption of talks with Stalin was met in London with 
both enthusiasm and apprehension as it was understood that allied assistance to insurgents 
depended on its outcome. However, although Newsome was of the opinion that prominence 
should be given to the meeting, the Foreign Office, on the request of the Soviet government, 
stopped Fleet Street and the BBC from reporting on the Moscow talks.50 In failing to report 
what had happened, the BBC was risking its reputation as a reliable source of information since 
everyone in Poland knew that Mikołajczyk was meeting with Stalin and the Lublin Committee 
in Moscow. Only, on his return to London, did the Polish Service broadcast his public statement 
of 10 August, emphasising that the talks were very successful and had taken place in ‘a friendly 
atmosphere’. 51  
Mikołajczyk’s statement proclaimed that the ‘heroic Red Army was liberating the Polish lands 
with the direct help of the soldiers and people of the Polish Underground as the leaders of 
Poland’ whilst, with regard to other issues, ‘no definite conclusion had been made’.52 In fact, no 
agreement had been reached over either the border or the composition of the future Polish 
government; Stalin demanded recognition of the Curzon line whilst representatives of the 
Lublin Committee, namely, Bolesław Bierut and Edward Osóbka-Morawski, sought the 
annulment of the Polish constitution of 1935, thus challenging the legitimacy of the Polish 
government-in-exile.53 Yet, Mikołajczyk had received Stalin’s assurance of Soviet assistance to 
the insurgents. Given Stalin’s denial that uprising in Warsaw was taking place, it was a big 
success.54 Some historians, however, such as Norman Davies argue that by 2 August Stalin had 
already ordered his troops to withhold and, later, failed to approve Rokossovsky’s new 
offensive plan, drafted on 8 August.55 Borodziej disagrees, pointing out that, despite the opening 
of the Russian archive in 1990s, the gap from 8 August through 16 September in the file on 
‘Stalin and the Warsaw Rising’ means that there is not enough evidence pointing to this 
conclusion.56  It would seem, however, that Stalin’s motives with regard to the uprising were 
purely political and that it was not in his interest to assist the AK, particularly since the Polish 
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Premier had refused to accept his ultimata. Nonetheless, at this point, a setback caused by 
military factors could not be excluded. 
The lack of Red Army support and the absence of a Soviet reply were not the only concerns of 
the AK; it was assumed that British and USA aircraft and the Polish parachute brigade would 
assist insurgents. As Bór explained in his memoirs: 
‘Everyone in Poland knew that in eastern Poland there were American bases for 
shuttle- bombing operations. Everyone knew, too, about the bombing of Bucharest, 
Polesi and Koenigsberg, all of which were further from English bases than was Warsaw 
(…). Everybody had heard the BBC praise Polish operational achievements on land, 
sea and in the air (…) that was why the population of Warsaw (…) was unable to 
understand the argument that air operations over the capital from British bases were 
impossible on account of the heavy losses’.57 
This issue was not addressed by the Polish Service. Bór’s complaints about the absence of 
British and American help were never broadcast by the BBC. For instance, in the broadcast on 
12 August the part of Bór’s communiqué implying that no one was helping Warsaw was 
redacted by the censor.58 In Bush House, Newsome did not hesitate to openly criticise Bór’s 
communiqués which he thought were ‘exaggerated and generally irritating, especially his 
appeals for help’.59 The content of the Polish Service bulletins differed in significant respects 
from what was happening behind closed doors in Westminster. As Davies points out, different 
British agencies not only followed different policies but, more importantly, were issuing 
contradictory advice. 60 Whilst Churchill, the War Ministry and SOE campaigned for urgent 
support for Warsaw, the Foreign Office was against it. In addition, as Roosevelt was not 
interested in becoming involved in matters which, in his view, concerned the Soviet sphere of 
influence, there was no pressure on Stalin to respond to British and Polish demands. Yet, the 
Polish Service broadcasts served their purpose; on 10 August ‘people in Warsaw gathered in the 
streets and cheered: The Polish government, Great Britain and USA’.61 It is worth mentioning 
that during the rising, Radio Polskie was subject to less censorship than the Polish Service. For 
instance, on 8 August in a Radio Polskie programme for the Polish Forces, Bór’s communiqué 
stating that Warsaw had still not received any help from the USSR was broadcast.62 The 
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reference to the fact that the insurgents had not received help from Britain and the USA was 
redacted. 
The situation changed on 13 August, nearly two weeks after the rising broke out, when TASS 
issued an official communiqué stating: 
‘No attempt was made by the London Poles to inform the Soviet Command of their 
intentions (…). In consequence, full responsibility for the events in Warsaw will fall 
exclusively on Polish émigré circles in London’.63  
This was not broadcast by the Polish or Home Service. However, Bór notes in his memoirs that 
on the same day, notably 13 August, it was broadcast both from Moscow and the BBC in 
London to Poland.64 Yet, neither the Underground nor the Polish Government had ever claimed 
that they were in contact with the Soviet command. On the contrary, Bór immediately dismissed 
as fabricated the Polish broadcast from London claiming that the Home Army in Warsaw had 
established communication with the Red Amy.65 It is thus surprising that a day later the Polish 
Service announced that ‘Marshal Stalin was impressed with the sacrifice and bravery of the 
Home Army’.66 Taking into account that Stalin had denounced the action of the AK as criminal, 
it is highly unlikely that these were his words. 
Stalin had not only made his position clear to Poles but, more importantly, to the Western 
leaders. Both British and American ambassadors to Moscow were informed that ‘Russia does 
not want to be associated with any adventure in Warsaw’. 67  At the same time, permission for 
the landing of allied aircraft on Soviet airfields was denied. From this point the Soviet attitude 
to the rising was brought into the open; as Harriman later assessed, ‘the Soviet Government’s 
refusal (to help Warsaw) (was) not based on operational difficulties, but ruthless political 
calculation’.68 Not only was the Soviet Union refusing to help the insurgents, but they were 
attempting to stop other allies doing so. Żenczykowski goes as far as to argue that Stalin issued 
a ‘death warrant on Warsaw’.69  Yet, the Soviet statement was concealed both from the British 
public and, more significantly, from the Polish government in London; officially, allied air 
forces were still waiting for clearance from the Russians.70 Consequently, the Foreign Office 
informed the BBC that the plan to send both the RAF and the Soviet Air Force to assist the 
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insurgents was still in progress.71 Contrary to Macdonald’s claim that the Polish Service 
presented both Polish and Soviet points of view, quoting British and Polish press opinion, in the 
second week of the uprising and in spite of discussion in the British press regarding the lack of 
allies’ help, none of these sources was cited in the Polish press review. 
The BBC Home Service in the second week of fighting continued to report on further progress 
of the Soviet Army towards Warsaw, including its arrival on 14 August at a point only 12 miles 
north east of Warsaw. Communiqués and appeals for help and ammunition from the Polish 
Commander of the Underground Army were included occasionally, while the Home Service 
remained silent on the Mikołajczyk visit to Moscow. On 9 August, there was a brief mention 
that the talks had been suspended and that the Polish Prime Minister was to speak with the 
Lublin Committee, emphasising that a ‘free and independent Poland (…) is in the interest of the 
USSR’.72 
On night of 13-14 August the RAF dropped supplies over Warsaw and on 15 August, Bór’s 
communiqué thanking the RAF pilots was broadcast by the Polish Service. It also included a 
description of the situation in the Polish capital, but there was no reference to the position of the 
Soviet army. In this period, the Polish Service bulletins concentrated on reporting the liberation 
of Paris and the gallant fight of the Polish Forces in Normandy and Italy. With regard to the 
Soviet offensive, the liberation of the Baltic States was given prominence while accounts of the 
military actions on the other side of the Vistula were confusing.73 The bulletins of the Home 
Service did not differ much and the rising still did not make headlines.74 Yet, on 18 August, the 
Home Service broadcast the false claim that the RAF had been dropping supplies over Warsaw 
since the beginning of the rising. The Polish Ministry of Information complained and further 
demanded an explanation why, up to that point, the BBC had used the terms ‘fight’, ‘defence’ 
and ‘battle’ rather than ‘uprising’ to describe the AK actions.75 
The Soviet government statement from 13 August was addressed in the PWE directives for the 
Polish Service on 17 August, where it was stressed that, in the broadcasts to Poland, ‘we should 
be careful not to hint that the early rising (…) is in need of any excuse or exoneration’.76 In 
addressing the matter of appeals for help and the fact that no efficient assistance had been given 
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to insurgents, the Polish Service ‘should not hint at an immediate relief of Warsaw within a 
matter of days, but should rather point to the difficulty of such an operation, using the analogy 
of the German delays before Kiev and Odessa’.77 More importantly, German weakness, the 
main theme  of PWE Central Directives  was not to be used in relation to the eastern front. The 
guidelines for other European Services were the same: ‘report factually the gallant fight of the 
Poles in Warsaw, and give all news of Allied assistance reaching them, but avoid comment on 
the timing or coordination of their efforts’.78 The Polish broadcasts were to maintain that the 
Russian delay in the advance on Warsaw was a ‘temporary hold-up’ due to ‘determined 
German attempts to stop them before final advance on Berlin’.79 Furthermore British and 
American government support for Mikołajczyk’s efforts to reach compromise with Stalin was to 
be highlighted. 80  
In accordance with those directives, the Polish Service was reporting that the Russians had 
overcome ‘fierce resistance’ but, at the same time, stating that they had ‘extended their 
bridgehead across the Vistula and the German attacks were being repelled’.81 On 19 August, 
Stalin’s communiqué on further progress on the left bank of the Vistula and the capture of 
Sandomierz was cited. On the next day it was reported that the ‘Russians advanced at many 
points (…) again tightening their rings around the remnants of three German divisions on west 
bank of the Vistula’ whereas the evening broadcast emphasised that ‘it is only a matter of 
waiting until the Russian High Command judges the time ripe to make its final break-through 
attack’.82 It was further added: 
‘There are signs that the relentless Russian attacks are recommencing. After an 
advance of 500 to 600 km on the centre front, a pause for regrouping and for the 
purpose of moving bases for supply and maintenance nearer the front was certain. It is 
a sign of the complete competence of the Russian High Command that during this 
period the Germans have been unable to revile the pressure on them on any part of the 
front (…) it was a clever Russian move to obtain at least one large and firm bridgehead 
over the Vistula in the first phase of their operations’.83  
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In addition, as in previous weeks, no attention was given to the uprising in the Polish Service 
press review where the focus was on the liberation of Italy and Paris and the situation in 
Normandy. 
In the third week of fighting there was a very important development when the Polish Service 
confirmed that the broadcasts of the insurgents’ shortwave radio station, Błyskawica 
(‘Lightning’) could be heard in London. Nowak recalls: 
‘On 15 August ‘a happy event occurred (…). In the evening London for the first time 
confirmed radio reception of Lightning and repeated the first of the broadcasts given 
that morning. Incredible excitement! After a fortnight's struggle in the face of great 
difficulties the technicians had their moment of glory, and the journalists, writers, and 
poets knew that they were not talking to themselves. From then on, all those involved in 
programs broadcast in the morning sat next to their sets at night to listen to their own 
words returning from far away.84 
Bór, in contrast, writes in his memoirs that the BBC confirmed reception of Błyskawica on 17 
August.85 Whilst Błyskawica is not mentioned in the BBC Home Service bulletins at all, the 
Polish Service refers to it only on 17 and 20 August. However, is very unclear when exactly the 
first broadcast from Warsaw was picked up by the Monitoring Service. 
Błyskawica went on air for the first time on 8 August and from that day transmitted daily in 
Polish and English.  It was controlled by the Polish Underground, but an arrangement was also 
made for the pre-war Polskie Radio employees to broadcast on Błyskawica wavelengths. 
Transfer of English broadcasts to Polskie Radio airtime followed and Błyskawica was referred 
to in the Monitoring Service transcripts as the Warsaw broadcasting station of Polskie Radio.86 
The English bulletins were prepared by Jan Nowak and translated and announced by London 
born Adam Truszkowski, pseudonym ‘Tomicki’. The first English programme went on air on 8 
August at 14:30; later versions were broadcast at 10:15 and 22:30. Overall 77 broadcasts in 
English went on air during the rising.87 
Mazur and Ziółek claim that the BBC confirmed on 8 August that the broadcast was heard in 
London.88 Macdonald correspondingly argues that he received a digest from the BBC 
Monitoring Service on the same day.89  Moreover, an unpublished BBC paper, written after the 
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war, also claims that, from that day, the ccommuniqués from Błyskawica station were 
rebroadcast fully every afternoon by the Polish Service.90  Błyskawica broadcasts were also 
monitored by the Polish government at Barnes Lodge and recorded on discs and it was claimed 
after the war that these discs were used in the Polish Service programmes. However, when discs 
with music were played in the Polish Service broadcasts, the title of the song and length of the 
recording were indicated on the bulletin scrips. Yet, there are no information on the Polish 
Service bulletins referring to these recordings. 
According to Nowak, the first confirmation that broadcasts from Warsaw were picked by the 
BBC Monitoring Service was received on 15 August. The surviving BBC Monitoring papers 
and the BBC bulletins, both in Polish and English, however, indicate something different.  
According to the BBC Monitoring transcripts, the broadcast from Warsaw was heard for the 
first time on 12 August.91 Then, there is a big gap in the transcripts until 22 August. 
Thus it is extremely puzzling that in the Summary of the BBC World Broadcasts, based on BBC 
Monitoring transcripts, the broadcast from Błyskawica in English at 2:30 pm and in Polish at 
10:00 am had already been mentioned on 21 August. From 22 August onwards, Błyskawica 
appears daily in both the transcripts and in the BBC Summaries. The last broadcast was picked 
up on 2 September when the station had to be moved after the district where it was located fell 
into German hands. Ironically, it was transferred to the former USSR Embassy in Warsaw.92  
The Monitoring Service records are of particularly important historical value, since they 
demonstrate what was known to the BBC and, by extension, to the British government about the 
situation in Warsaw during the rising. The Błyskawica broadcasts allowed the Polish 
Underground to directly address western leaders for the first time. They included detailed 
reports of fighting in the capital, German crimes committed against Poles, the screening of tanks 
with women and children and the mass shooting of civilians, as well as information about 
Soviet arrests of AK officers and party members in the east Poland who were later imprisoned 
in the ex-Nazi extermination camp at Majdanek.93 It should be emphasised that the PCNL 
almost certainly knew about these events. In addition, the Błyskawica broadcasts from 24 
August, discussed the lack of the Soviet assistance, and mentioned that cooperation between AK 
and the Soviet troops had been established in the period 1-4 August in the Lublin district. It is 
likely that this information was misinterpreted by the Monitoring and later by the BBC Polish 
Service which reported that liaison between the two was established in Warsaw, thus suggesting 
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that the Soviets were assisting the insurgents, which was not the case.94 In fact, the Soviet army 
withdrawal from the Lublin district on 5 August had resulted in AK soldiers being surrounded 
by German troops and taken into captivity. This information was included in the same 
Błyskawica programme and is also mentioned in the Monitoring Summaries. Yet it was not 
reported by either the Polish or the Home Service.   
The Warsaw broadcasters also openly challenged on air Stalin’s claims that the Soviet troops 
were not in a position to assist the rising. Whilst they thanked Britain for her contributions, they 
asked in the form of rhetoric questions why the Soviets had not helped when they were so close. 
‘We do not want to make any charges or to cast suspicions (...) but we cannot understand why 
help did not come’.95 However, what was released to the BBC remains an open question, and, 
cannot be resolved until the BBC Monitoring Service papers on Warsaw rising, which are still 
classified, will be open for research (see chapter 2). 
Week 22–28 August 
From 22 August, as Davies observed, the USSR policy changed from passive to active hostility 
as the NKVD received orders to capture and disarm all members of the AK who fell into their 
hands.96 Moreover, Churchill became more anxious regarding coverage of the rising and 
directly complained to the British Minister of Information, Brendan Bracken, about suppression 
of information in the British press. In his view ‘there (was) no need to mention the strange and 
sinister behaviour of the Russians’, but he questioned the censorship policy: ‘is there any 
reason why consequences of such behaviour should not be made public?’ 97 Bracken argued that 
the British press did not have access to any reliable information since, in his opinion, the Polish 
sources were not trustworthy, and adding that: ‘the press (…) distrusted Polish sources in 
London, especially the Polish Minister of Information, who was regarded in Fleet Street as an 
incompetent ass (whereas)…our public (…) regard Poles as a feckless race’.98  
This argument, however, seems to be spurious as John Ward, a RAF Flight Lieutenant who 
escaped from a German POW camp in 1941 and joined the Polish Underground, had sent over 
65 Morse code and telegraph dispatches to London during the rising. 99  Not only did The Times 
offer him a position as its war correspondent but his dispatches were circulated in the MoI 
Cabinet and War Office. Even more curious is the fact that Ward’s name is not mentioned in 
any history of The Times, whilst his contributions to the rising are widely recognised in Poland. 
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Churchill, however, was aware of the importance of Ward’s articles and demanded an 
explanation of why were they supressed. Bracken responded that ‘if the government is willing to 
release the reports we have received from Ward (…) I think I can persuade the newspapers to 
publish them’.100  
In this period the PWE directives for the Polish Service laid emphasis on reporting the gallant 
fight of the insurgents.101  However, the refusal of Soviet help was not addressed by the PWE, 
nor reported by the Polish Service. The lack of cooperation between the Home and Red Army 
received no mention whilst both the BBC Home and Polish Service continued to report on 
further Russian progress. On 26 August the Błyskawica broadcast suggested that the Polish 
Home Army was helping the Soviet Army by diversionary action against the Germans.102 A 
comparison of BBC Monitoring Service digests and the Polish Service bulletins demonstrates 
that all issues related to the lack of Soviet, British and American support, as well as information 
regarding the arrests of the AK soldiers and conscription to Berling’s Army, were suppressed. 
The British government also remained silent with regard to the lack of help for Warsaw, and 
Bracken opposed discussion of the issue to British press as, in his view, any hint at Soviet 
refusal for allied aircraft to land on their bases would work against allied unity. However, on 26 
August the Economist published an article which, by comparing the liberation of Paris with 
Warsaw, pointed out that Poles had not been given moral or material assistance from their allies 
and, instead, were being accused of acting prematurely.103 The author also observed that the 
Russians had not only refused allied planes permission to land on their bases but also on allied 
airfields behind the Soviet line. The article appeared in the Radio Polskie bulletin but was not 
cited in the Polish Service press review which cited the News Chronicle from 24 August on the 
Russian progress towards Warsaw.104 
In BBC circles, however, the Polish Service editor, Gregory Macdonald, actively campaigned 
against the suppression of news from Warsaw, and did not hesitate to criticise the BBC Home 
Service and Fleet Street for playing down the rising. His memo, written in the fourth week of 
the insurrection, directly attacking the Russians for their political manoeuvring and the media 
for not giving inadequate space to the rising, was circulated in Westminster and Fleet Street.105 
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Week 29 August- 5 September 
In the fifth week of the rising it became evident that the lack of help from the allies to the 
insurgents could not be avoided any longer. In particular, Vernon Bartlett’s article in the News 
Chronicle on 29 August had a significant impact on British public opinion. The author openly 
criticised the Soviet denial of access to its air bases, pointing out that Stalin, who had previously 
promised to assist Warsawians, was now threatening the leaders of the Polish Home Army with 
court-martial and refusing to recognise their combat rights.  Newsome instructed all the 
European Services editors to broadcast Bartlett’s article.106 It seems that it was at this point that 
his pro-Soviet feelings evaporated. In the European Service news directives, Newsome did not 
hesitate to vent his rage on the Soviet Union, stating:  
‘The Nazis tried to destroy Allied unity but unsuccessfully. Whilst the attitude of Britain 
in this trouble remained obscure and silence was maintained on the whole question of 
Polish unity, Polish-Soviet relations and the battle of Warsaw, there was some chance 
of this Nazi hope being nourished by this embarrassed silence! Now we have to come 
into the open (…) to show that we are not afraid to tell Russians when we consider them 
behaving badly … to tell Poles when they are behaving foolishly and that we are not 
afraid to state uncompromisingly our adherence to our basic principles of 
determination to uphold the cause of justice and international relations even when this 
involves saying unkindly words to our greatest military ally’.107 
It became evident that Stalin was using the rising in order to achieve his goal, namely purging 
the AK and establishing his own puppet government. On 29 August, there was another 
important development when both the British and the US governments eventually decided to 
grant the AK combat rights.108 On 31 August, the head of the Polish region PWE, Moray 
Maclaren acknowledged that broadcasting to Poland was becoming highly problematic as Poles 
were not only fighting for liberation from Germany, but feared Soviet occupation and were 
losing trust in the West.109 He argued that special care should be taken in relation to the 
reliability of sources, as the communists were giving contradictory accounts of events to the 
Polish Underground. Yet, the European Service, in accordance with directives, was required to 
continue reporting that Poles and Russians were fighting together.110 
On 29 August, the Polish Service concentrated on reporting the press conference organised by 
the Polish government at which Mikołajczyk announced that an agreement was going to be 
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reached with the Lublin Committee and that the Polish communist party (PPR) would be 
included in the future Polish government. However, the Polish-Soviet frontier would be 
resolved after the war. The conference was in fact organised at the insistence of the British 
Foreign Office, that the Polish Premier publicly dispel the stories that the Soviets held down the 
AK.111 Mikołajczyk’s statement finished with appeals for help not only to Churchill and 
Roosevelt but also to Stalin. Yet the speech, was reported in full only by Radio Polskie.  
On 1 September, the Polish Commander-in-chief, General Kazimierz Sosnowski, issued an 
Order of the Day. In addressing the Polish Home Army, Sosnowski accused not only the Soviet 
Union but also Britain for abandoning Poland, concluding that ‘if the people of Warsaw… are to 
be made the victims of mass slaughter –then the consciousness of the whole world will be 
burdened with a dreadful sin’.112 His order was reported four days later in full only by Radio 
Polskie, whilst the Polish Service omitted the above passage and only cited the reference to the 
sacrifice of the Polish nation. Similar grievances were echoed in a speech delivered by the 
Polish Minister of Information, Stanisław Kot, on 1 September, commemorating the German 
attack on Poland and highlighting that the absence of help was ‘casts(ing) a tragic shameful 
shadow on the Allies and their capacity to solve other great problems ahead of them’.113 Again, 
the speech was broadcast in full by Radio Polskie whilst the Polish Service stated simply that 
‘Professor Kot reviewed the tributes to Poland in the British Press on the 5th anniversary of the 
outbreak of the war in the Radio Polskie bulletin’.114 The bulletin followed an appeal from the 
Polish Pen Club in London to all journalists in Britain to break silence regarding the lack of 
help for insurgents and an appeal from of the United Committee of the Polish-American 
Associations to assist Warsawians and for the Soviet Union to change her policy regarding 
Poland. There was also appeal from the French nation to help Warsaw. 
In the fifth week of fighting the Polish Service press review included articles from newspapers 
such as the Observer, the New York Herald Tribune and the Manchester Guardian which 
criticised the Soviet Union’s conduct towards Poland. The stance of the last two papers’ stance 
was particularly surprising, as they were known previously for supporting Soviet policies. The 
Times was also quoted. The paper, however, argued that the situation in Warsaw was a 
‘misunderstanding’ and that reports that the Soviet army stopped before the gates of the capital 
were a rumour. However, a sentence claiming that Soviet ‘reluctance’ to help was justified 
because the Polish Underground was anti-Soviet was redacted by the policy censor.115 
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In the BBC Home Service, on 30 August, Bór’s communiqués appear in the headlines for the 
first time.116 As in other Services, on 1 September prominence was given to the anniversary of 
the German attack on Poland.  Polish-Soviet relations were discussed in detail whilst reference 
to Mikołajczyk’s speech finished with an appeal to Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt for 
assistance with the words: ‘public opinion is watching’.117 Whereas on 4 September Warsaw 
was not mentioned at all, the evening bulletins the next day paid special attention to 
Sosnowski’s previously mentioned Order of the Day and the response from members of the 
House of Commons and the British press.118 Nevertheless, in the fifth week of the rising both 
the Polish and the Home Service continued to report on the Russian ‘methodical’ progress 
towards the capital. This contradicted a German official report broadcast by Radio Berlin which 
described the movement of the Red Army as ‘strangely sluggish’.119 
Week 6- 12 September 
At that point, maintaining the morale of the population of Warsaw became a significant issue. 
On 6 September the Polish Service broadcast letters from King George VI and Roosevelt to the 
people of Warsaw and further appeals for help from the Scottish Committee for Polish 
Freedom.120  The next day, the Polish Service also reported the ‘sharp attack’ of the Lublin 
Committee on the Polish government, but no details were given. 121 The PWE directives for the 
Polish Service in this period emphasised that ‘any attempts to justify or explain the Warsaw 
rising (or) the inadequacy of the support which it received and its tragic failure’ should be 
avoided whilst Sosnowski’s Order of the Day was to be played down as there was a danger of 
making him a hero given his popularity in Poland. 122 More importantly, the articles regarding 
conditions in the parts of Poland administrated by the Lublin Committee should be supressed 
and, instead, the Polish broadcasts should concentrate on the gallant fight of the Polish Army 
Forces in the West. At the same time, the central PWE directives stressed that the European 
broadcasts should avoid any explanations or justifications as to‘the failure of the rising becomes 
apparent’.123  
Moreover, Newsome while maintaining that ‘there will be no appeasement towards Russia’, 
argued that: 
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‘If the situation in Poland will not progress satisfactorily, this is not to be attributed to 
a Soviet desire to dominate Poland but to suspicions in Moscow –which have not been 
unfed –that there among some Poles of influence extreme nationalistic tendencies which 
take the form of hostility to Russia. (…) Any Polish Government cleared of all such 
suspicious will be entirely free to maintain a political, social, economic system which 
owns more inspiration to the West than to the East’.124 
The treatment of the AK soldiers by the NKVD and the Polish communists became a 
particularly difficult subject to deal with. On 18 August, Edward Raczyński, handed Eden a 
report nearly 10 pages long  prepared by the Polish Underground with detailed accounts of 
crimes committed by the Soviets and the Polish communists against Polish citizens and, in 
particular, on AK members.125 Most shocking, however, was the cablegram sent to London on 
19 August, claiming that the Soviets were filling the concentration camp at Majdanek, 
previously liberated from Germans, with AK soldiers.126  According to reports monitored by the 
BBC from the Polish station Błyskawica, from the beginning of August, 2,700 officers and 
soldiers as well as representatives of the political parties in Poland were imprisoned in 
Majdanek.127 None of these reports were made public.  
Instead, following the PWE directives, the Polish Service gave prominence to Syrop’s 
dispatches from Belgium whilst Sosnowski’s attacks on Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt were 
silenced. On 12 September, however, the Polish Service aired the Polish government’s official 
statement countering the Soviet accusations of Bór’s failure to inform the Soviet High 
Command of the exact dropping points. It included reference to Mikołajczyk’s conversation 
with Stalin and information passed to Moscow by the British military mission.128 In the Home 
Service, the BBC kept quiet on Polish-Soviet relations; between 8 and 10 September the rising 
was not even mentioned once whereas the reports from the eastern front discussed only the 
liberation of Rumania.  
In the press review, the Polish Service quoted newspapers which both supported and criticised 
the conduct of the USSR towards the rising. It included reference to the New Statement claims 
that the Polish government had given Stalin reason to be suspicious, but also to the Bartlett 
article in the News Chronicle on 6 September which pointed out that the Soviet leader’s 
behaviour was unacceptable while nonetheless condemning Sosnowski’s speech resulting in 
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support of the anti-Soviet outlook of London Poles. Most of Bartlett’s article, however, was 
redacted by the censor, and only his view on Sosnowski’s order was reported.129 
Week 13-19 September 
On 13 September Stalin eventually agreed for the allied planes to fly over Warsaw. On the same 
day, the Polish Service broadcast messages of appreciation from Poland and the Polish 
government thanking British, American, Polish and South African airmen for delivering food 
and ammunition.  Nothing, however, was mentioned about the insufficiency of those supplies.130  
On 15 September Stalin’s official announcement was transmitted on the capture of Praga by the 
Red Amy and the Polish troops. The Polish troops to which Stalin had referred, however, were 
the First Army, created in the USSR in 1943. As already mentioned, the European Service 
directives instructed all editors to play the Polish and Soviet anthems when the Red Army 
entered the capital.131 The bulletins also referred to Soviet airmen supplying food and 
ammunition. These supplies, however, were dropped in wheat bags without parachutes, 
resulting in their spilling when hitting the ground. The evening broadcasts included the Lublin 
Committee appeal to Warsawians: 
‘help is coming from the heroic Red Army and Kosciuszko division. (…) whatever the 
intentions of those who started the rising prematurely and without agreement with the 
high command of the Red Army (…) we are with you, with all our hearts’.132  
On 16 September the Polish Service reported that Bór had established close contact with the 
units of the Red Army.133 This information, however, was untrue. In the seventh week of the 
rising communication with the Russian commander, Rokossovsky, still had not been established 
and Bór asked for the Polish government to pass on his message via the Soviet embassy in 
London. The Soviet ambassador, Victor Lebedev, refused to accept the note; it was eventually 
sent by the British Foreign Office to Moscow, but it had no impact.134  
On 18 September, the Polish Service concentrated on reporting the dropping of supplies by the 
USA Air Force. By this point, however, most of the city was in German hands, and most of the 
containers failed to be delivered to insurgents. The Polish Prime Minister’s speech thanking 
allies for help and assistance was broadcast next day, referring to Warsaw as a ‘symbol of the 
united efforts of the British Empire, USSR and USA’.135 This speech, however, was not his idea. 
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After Stalin had agreed to British and American pilots using his air bases, the Foreign Office 
had approached the Polish government to give a statement ‘outright’ that HMG had done 
everything they could to help the insurgents.136 Mikołajczyk’s speech was then submitted to the 
Foreign Office to be approved.137 As Bell observes, the fact that the Stalin allowed for the allied 
aircraft to eventually land on their airfield was considered in Whitehall as a big success and all 
efforts were employed to present it in the press and the BBC as the symbol of allied unity. For 
the same reasons, the Soviet refusal for a second operation was not released to the media.138 
The coverage of the rising by the Home Service was similar. It was in this period that Warsaw 
was finally given adequate attention. Between 13 and 17 September the fighting in the capital 
made headlines every single day in nearly every bulletin. However, it seems that the rising was 
given prominence due to the change in the Russian policy towards insurgents rather than in 
recognition of the events in Warsaw. The role of the Polish Underground was underplayed. 
According to the broadcasts there was no sign of the AK soldiers in the suburbs of Praga; it was 
the Red and Polish Army, referred to as Berling’s Army, that had fought Germans. It was added 
that Soviet troops were greatly welcomed and their bravery acknowledge by the Warsawians.139 
It is apparent, however, that the BBC relied heavily on Soviet sources as the reports from Bór 
differed. By 18 September Warsaw was again forgotten and nothing was reported on the 
situation until 22 September. 
Week 20-26 September 
Between 20 and 23 September, the Polish Service reported that the Russians were helping the 
Polish Home Army and a day later, according to the Bór communiqué, the Polish Underground 
had allegedly established liaison with the Soviets in three main areas of the Polish defence in 
the capital. In the press review, prominence was given to the Polish newspapers printed in 
London, such as the Polish Daily Worker and Polish Daily, which argued that the ‘eyes of the 
world were concentrated on Warsaw’.140 This, however, was not true; by this point it had 
become clear that the British could do nothing more for Warsaw and the upcoming collapse of 
the rising had become a rather uncomfortable subject, discussed less than enthusiastically in the 
press or on the BBC Home Service where the headlines were at this point occupied with the 
victories in France and Belgium. 141 On 26 September, in his speech to the House of Commons, 
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Churchill attempted to justify not only the British but also the Soviet failure to assist the Polish 
Home Army: 
‘HMG always made it clear that we were too far to support the general rising to Poland 
(…) Great Britain always supported cooperation between Poland and the Soviet Union 
despite formidable and practical difficulties (and)… we furnished military supplies by 
air’ (…). As soon as the government learnt that the rising had begun they expressed to 
the Soviet government that they would bring such aid to the Polish insurgents as lay in 
their power. The Soviet armies were at that time engaged in heavy fighting to the east 
and north east of Warsaw but when operational plans permitted, they sent supplies to 
the Polish forces and provided air cover. (…) This assistance had been gratefully 
acknowledged by the Polish Prime Minister and the Polish Commander-in Chief in 
Warsaw’.142 
Ultimately, the speech which Mikołajczyk gave on 19 September was used against him. In 
contrast, Churchill’s speech was cited in full in both the BBC Home and the Polish Service. It 
was emphasised that the RAF and USA Air Force had played a great part in supplying the 
Polish capital. This led the Home Service to conclude that Sosnowski was wrong to criticise the 
British and American governments for not helping Poland.143 
Week 27 September-2 October 
In the last week of the rising the headlines of the Polish Service broadcasts were devoted to 
Churchill’s speech and special emphasis was put on the Red Army’s ‘great assistance’ to the 
insurgents.144  The Lord Mayor of London’s appeal to the Mayor of Warsaw was quoted: ‘We in 
London should not rest easy if we did not know that every possible effort was being made to 
send help to your tragic city.’145 The press review of the Polish Service gave prominence to The 
Times article reporting that ‘the House cheered loudly when Mr Churchill prefaced an answer 
on Warsaw’.146 The broadcast further concentrated on coverage of the question session 
following Churchill’s speech. Not all Members of Parliament, however, were content with the 
HMG policy with regard to Poland. Eden, who took charge of answering the questions, 
followed the same line as Churchill and emphasised that the British government did everything 
that it could.147 Nevertheless, he argued that there was never a plan for HMG to assist the rising. 
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Eden’s reply to Sir A. Knox’s question why Russians did not help the insurgents is worth 
quoting in full: 
‘My honourable friend is asking me why one of our allies did not give assistance to 
another of our allies. This is a question which might well be discussed in this House. 
But, I would rather give consideration to my reply’. 148  
The Foreign Office Minister further denied that the NKVD was arresting members of the AK: 
he had raised this matter with Stalin who had informed him that it was a false accusation. But he 
added that ‘in the current situation of delicacy (there is) a difficulty in asserting the facts’. In his 
conclusion, Eden clarified that, after all, it ‘is not HMG’s business to be responsible or get 
involved in the disagreement between two allies’.149 
On 28 September the Polish Service coverage focused on passages from Churchill’s speech 
arguing for Poland to accept the border line proposed by Stalin who ‘wants a free and 
independent neighbour’.150 The majority of the London press agreed with Churchill; the Polish 
Service also stressed that the USSR deserved a friendly neighbour. Two days later Soviet 
sources were cited, labelling Bór as a criminal who should be arrested as well as The Times 
article claiming that the Russians had provided supplies for Warsawians and blaming the AK 
for making the ‘irresponsible’ decision to start uprising.151 Yet the press review omitted any 
reference to the rising, focusing on developments on the western front. The same line was 
followed by the Home Service and from 27-29 September the rising was not mentioned at all.  
On 2 October the BBC reported that the Soviet Air force was very active in Warsaw. In the 
broadcast to Europe the BBC did not give any prominence to the situation in Warsaw as 
Newsome argued that ‘the best wisdom (was) silence’.152 
The fall of Warsaw was reported for the first time by the Polish Section on 3 October at 5:45 
pm. Only German crimes were discussed. On the Home Service the information about the 
capitulation did not come from Polish but Soviet sources. It was followed by quotes from TASS 
that Bór was absent throughout the rising.153 When addressing the reasons for the rising’s 
failure, it was announced that the Germans were too strong and that the Allies and the USSR did 
everything in their power to help.154 The Polish Service press review the next day included an 
article in the Manchester Guardian, criticising all allies for the policy towards the insurgents.155 
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Yet, discussion on the causes of the collapse of the rising became an uncomfortable subject: in 
the following days the Polish Service focused on reporting on the western front, omitting any 
reference to the political reasons or impact of the failure of the rising. 
Conclusion 
In order to maintain the unity of the coalition, the BBC, acting as the mouthpiece of the 
government, supressed information about the retreat of the Red Army and continued to give 
false information about its progress. Stalin’s refusal to allow the Allied air forces to land on 
Soviet bases led Nicholas to argue that during the rising the ‘British government deliberately 
misled the BBC and the press while vainly attempting to coerce Russia by threatening to release 
the truth’.156 The impartiality of the Polish Service was compromised by withholding accurate 
information about the Red Army progress and the political motives which lay behind Stalin’s 
decision to withdraw his troops. Eden admitted in his memoirs that, although the Germans held 
up the Soviet advance ‘Stalin (…) was content to see the Underground and intellectual leaders 
of Poland destroyed’.157 Moreover, contrary to what was claimed after the war, the rising had 
not been given prominence on all BBC Services.158 It made headlines twice on the Home 
Service, on one occasion about its collapse. The coverage was better in the European Service 
but even Macdonald admitted that it was significantly toned down. The PWE Polish Region 
directives did not address the subject of the rising until 17 August. The selectiveness of the 
material used in the Polish Service broadcasts also demonstrates that information which threw 
light on Soviet Union political aspirations were expunged. Moreover, the press review was not, 
as it was claimed after the war, objective. In fact, the suppression of the news in this period led 
the head of the PWE Polish region, Moray Maclaren, to admit after the rising had collapsed, that 
the Poles were betrayed.159  Feeling personally responsible, he suffered a nervous breakdown 
and retired from the political world.160 The ‘Battle of Warsaw’ became the prologue to the Cold 
War; it was at this point that Stalin demonstrated to the West his uncompromising position on 
the Soviet political sphere of influence. As Macdonald observed: ‘the Cold War was simply the 
process by which the West lost its illusions about Stalin’s policy’.161 
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Censorship and propaganda October 1944-July 1945 
 
Introduction 
This chapter explores a period after the collapse of the Warsaw rising in October 1944 to the 
German surrender and the allies’ withdrawal of the recognition of the Polish government in 
London in July 1945. In political and diplomatic terms, the collapse of the Warsaw Rising had 
catastrophic consequences. Over 15,000 Polish Home Army (AK) soldiers were killed in action, 
5,000 wounded and approximately the same number were taken into captivity by the Germans.1 
As a result, the Underground organisation, and particularly its communication structure, was 
seriously interrupted and the majority of the posts in Warsaw monitoring the BBC were 
destroyed. Aware of the situation, the head of the Polish Region PWE, Moray Maclaren, 
acknowledged on 12 October 1944 that they could no longer rely on the Underground for the 
distribution of the bulletins, declaring that this would affect their policy towards the Polish 
audience.2 Because the broadcasts were no longer directed to professional listeners, but to ‘the 
ordinary man (…) who [was] not well informed’, he argued that ‘we do not have to be afraid 
anymore of talking down to our audience’ and ‘subtleties’ should be avoided as ‘not much 
should be expected’ from listeners in Poland.3  
In the eastern part of Poland administrated by the Polish Committee of National Liberation 
(PCNL), also known as the Lublin Committee, Polish communists took steps aimed at the 
interruption of communication between the east and the west of Poland and, more importantly, 
between Poland and the government-in-exile. Passed on 30 October 1944 by the Lublin 
Committee, the Defence of State decree introduced new categories of crimes punishable by 
death, notably, possession of, or knowledge of someone who possessed, a radio receiver.4 
According to Underground reports, people caught listening or in possession of private radio 
were to be ‘shot in the head on spot’ but, listening to official announcements in public or work 
places was allowed and encouraged.5 Moreover, in October NKVD launched operation ‘Sejm’, 
aimed at the liquidation of the Polish Underground and targeting any signs of nationalism. 6 In 
December the new leader of the Polish Home Army (AK), General Okulicki, who succeeded 
Tadeusz Bór-Komorowski after the fall of the Warsaw rising, cabled the Polish government in 
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London warning that NKVD was more efficient than the Gestapo.7 Although the report was 
passed to Eden, the information remained concealed from the public. What is more, the Polish 
paper Wiadomości Polskie [Polish News], printed in London, was closed down after publishing 
an article about the Polish Home Army soldiers arrested and sent to Siberia,.8  Questioned in the 
House of Commons, Eden also denied repeatedly until the end of the war, having any 
knowledge of crimes and deportations for which the Lublin Committee and the NKVD were 
responsible.9 The same approach was to be taken by the Polish Service; the PWE advised that 
the information about disturbances or acts of terrorism in the areas administrated by the Lublin 
Committee should be avoided.10 The Polish Service followed the PWE guidelines and did not 
report on these issues.11 
The Moscow Conference  
After the rising, the relationship between Poland and the Soviet Union remained tense. The 
Polish government attitude regarding the acceptance of the Curzon line remained unchanged. 
However, the Polish Prime Minister was genuinely anxious that some compromise should be 
reached as it was not only the territorial losses which were now at stake, but also the 
independence of Poland. Persuaded by Churchill, Mikołajczyk agreed to meet with Stalin, 
although he made it clear that his position regarding the Polish-Soviet border remained 
unchanged. By the same token, Stalin, as Kochanski points out:  
‘had not budged from his demand for recognition of the Curzon Line and, now that he 
had the Lublin Committee doing his bidding in Poland, he only needed to be seen to be 
talking to Mikolajczyk in order to satisfy the British and American governments; he had 
no intention of making a deal with the Polish Government in London’.12  
Nevertheless, both sides agreed to discuss Polish affairs and between 13 and 16 October 1944, 
representatives of the British and Polish governments and of the PCNL met in Moscow. 
Churchill and Eden were joined by Mikołajczyk and two other members of the Polish Cabinet 
namely, Stanisław Grabski and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tadeusz Romer, whilst the PCNL 
was represented by Bolesław Bierut and Edward Osóbka-Morawski. Kochanski argues that 
Roosevelt did not attend the conference since it was taking place only few days before the 
presidential election in the USA and it was felt that his presence could have had a negative 
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influence on Polish-American voters.13 Yet his absence also demonstrates that he was unwilling 
to keep his promise to support the Polish government or to admit that he had already agreed to 
Stalin’s territorial demands.  
The meeting of the Polish, Soviet and British representatives was given prominence in the 
Polish Service and it was emphasised that the conference proceeded in a friendly atmosphere.14 
The TASS communiqué was quoted, stressing the Soviet hosts’ welcoming approach towards 
their guests. Nevertheless, the proceedings of the conference were kept secret. Nor were details 
given after the conference ended. On 21 October the Polish Service reported that important 
progress had been made regarding the Polish question, but what exactly it meant for the future 
of Poland was not revealed.15 According to the same broadcast the discussions had ‘ notably 
narrowed differences and dispelled misconceptions’, adding: ‘conversations are continuing 
on outstanding points’.16 The British involvement in those negotiations was an important factor 
in political and diplomatic terms; it was recognised that the Polish broadcasts should highlight 
the fact that Britain showed great interest in Polish affairs and, more importantly, that Stalin 
welcomed the HMG position.17 Once again the Polish nation was assured of Britain’s strong 
position in diplomatic negotiations with Stalin, reinforcing the conviction that, as long as 
Churchill would not agree to the USSR demands, any changes to Poland’s territory or 
government could not be enforced.  
Similar treatment was given to the meeting between Mikołajczyk and Bierut. It was reported 
that ‘the conference helped the Polish representatives to ascertain each other’s views’ and that 
the Polish Prime Minister was returning to London to seek Cabinet authorisation to resume the 
talks with the Lublin Committee; again no details as to what was discussed or agreed were 
given.18 In the following days the Polish Service continued to report on the positive outcome of 
the conference. An article in The Times on 21 October was quoted claiming that Mikołajczyk 
and Stalin got on well together and that Mikołajczyk ‘strove earnestly for settlement’.19 
According to the Polish Minister of Information, Adam Pragier, all the British and American 
press reported that the talks were successful. Polish listeners were also reminded that Stalin’s 
main interest was a free and independent Poland and his demand for the Curzon line was 
justified. However, this optimistic tone was overshadowed by the Lublin Committee’s statement 
from previous day with the headline ‘violent attacks on Mikolajczyk’ which criticised the Polish 
Premier and blamed his government and him personally for acts of terrorism in the liberated 
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areas of Poland. 20 At the same time the Polish government-in-exile was accused for misleading 
international opinion by giving a contradictory account of events.21  
In fact, while no progress was made nor compromise reached during the Moscow conference, 
the Polish government’s misconceptions were clearly dispelled when Mikołajczyk was 
informed by Molotov that both Churchill and Roosevelt had already agreed to the Curzon Line 
in November 1943 in Tehran. He was also offered a position as the Prime Minister in the future 
government by the PCNL chairman. The price, however, was very high: 75% of places were to 
be given to representatives of the PCNL whilst only 25% to the non-communist parties.22 A 
positive outcome of the conference, however,  was that Stalin assured Mikołajczyk in a private 
conversation that Poland would remain as a democratic state; according to the Soviet leader 
there was ‘no place for communism in Poland’.23  Although Mikołajczyk rejected the PCNL 
offer in relation to the composition of the future government, unlike the Polish Council of 
Ministers, he was willing to accept the Curzon Line. The crisis within the Polish Cabinet caused 
by this difference of opinion and which led eventually to Mikołajczyk’s resignation was 
subjected to censorship and supressed from broadcasts.24 
CƌitiĐisŵ of Polish ͚stuďďoƌŶŶess͛  
On 27 October the Polish Service broadcast Churchill’s official statement to the House of 
Commons regarding the HMG position on Poland and the outcome of talks at Kremlin.  
Although his speech started optimistically, emphasising that the agreement between Poland and 
the Soviet Union was nearer, he blamed the Polish government for the current state of affairs, 
arguing that 
‘had the Polish government taken the advice that the British government had given 
them at the beginning of the year, the complication produced by the formation of the 
PCNL would not have arisen’. 25 
The need for compromise and acceptance of Stalin’s terms was once more highlighted, as well 
as the fact that it was in the interest of the Great Powers to reconstruct the Polish state: 
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‘It is a comfort to feel that Britain and Soviet Russia (…) and the United States, are all 
firmly agreed on the recreation of a strong, free, independent, sovereign Poland loyal 
to the Allies and friendly to her great neighbour and liberator, Russia’.26 
But he also reaffirmed that the government-in-exile was the only legitimate Polish 
governmental body recognised by HMG.  
Despite the fact that Churchill was very clear that Poland had to compromise, the Commander 
of the Polish Home Army (AK), General Okulicki was of opinion that the British government 
had only agreed to the Soviet demands because defeating Germany was its priority and that, 
after this was achieved, all concessions would come to an end.27 According to his propaganda 
directives, with the increased British influence in Europe, the support for Moscow would 
become more entrenched.28 Therefore the attitude towards Britain of the Polish Underground 
remained unchanged. As the Polish Home Army was faithfully fighting the Germans, Okulicki 
argued, so the British government should fulfil the promises given to Poland.29  
The Underground seems to have misinterpreted and misjudged the British government attitude 
towards the Polish problem and to its relationship with the USSR. Not only had Churchill 
clearly stated that the Polish government must accept Soviet demands but the same argument 
was expressed in the PWE directives for Polish Service with particular emphasis upon the fact 
that  
‘the recent Moscow discussions should be represented to have fulfilled a useful purpose 
in convincing all parties participating in them of the inadvisability of the further 
prolongation of the present inconclusive situation in Poland and Polish-Russian 
affairs’.30 
Moreover, the official line of the British government was to be plainly indicated in the BBC 
Polish broadcasts, notably, that ‘any settlement of outstanding disputes must involve territorial 
revision’.31 However, a significant influence on the Underground’s interpretation of the Polish-
Soviet relations at that time was the Polish government in London belief that the fate of eastern 
Poland could still be changed; the Polish Cabinet persisted in its refusal to compromise, on the 
grounds that Roosevelt had not expressed his position on the Curzon Line.32 Mikołajczyk 
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disillusioned with the current situation and isolated in his views, resigned from office on 24 
November 1944.  
 
The ƌespoŶse to AƌĐiszeǁski͛s goǀeƌŶŵeŶt 
Mikołajczyk was succeeded by a member of the Socialist Party, Tomasz Arciszewski, 
evacuated from Poland just before the outbreak of the Warsaw rising. Churchill did not hesitate 
to openly express his disapproval concerning the changes in the Polish government.33 He knew 
that Stalin would use Mikołaczyk’s resignation as an argument to demonstrate the instability of 
the Polish government-in-exile (see chapter 3). Churchill’s views were echoed in the PWE 
directives for the Polish Service, stating that HMG could not give the same level of support to 
the newly formed Polish government led by Tomasz Arciszewski. 34 The Polish Service was 
also to report on the PCNL attacks on the new Polish government.35 However, a week later, 
Maclaren informed the Polish Service Editor, Gregory Macdonald, that in fact there was no 
clear policy regarding how to report on changes within the Polish government and only violent 
anti-Russian talks would be censored.36 
The future of the Polish state continued to be central to British foreign affairs. There was a 
widespread consensus among British politicians that the future of Poland and, more importantly 
diplomatic relations between Poland and the Soviet Union would, if unresolved, have a far 
reaching negative impact on United Nations’ cooperation and post war peace in the world.37 The 
British government also felt obligated to restore Poland’s independence; after all, it was 
claimed, Britain went to war because of Poland.  
Umiastowski argues that the need for the support of public opinion for government  policy was 
the main reason why Churchill opened a debate on the Polish question in the House of 
Commons on 15 December 1944.38 Rather than presenting new arguments, the Prime Minister 
proceeded by quoting from his own speeches of February 1944 on his return from Tehran and 
from a more recent speech in October 1944 – in both cases presenting the same argument, 
notably, that Poland had to accept the Curzon Line.39 Referring to the Red Army sacrifice, he 
argued that Poland ought to ‘make the great gift to Russia’.40 However, Churchill also expressed 
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his doubt that the PCNL was representative and lawful, emphasising that it was necessary for 
the Polish government-in-exile to resume talks with Stalin. The debate which followed the 
Premier’s speech elicited great support for Poland from the members of the House of Commons 
and others who were invited, such as Miss Rathbone representing the Combined English 
Universities or Mr. Pickthorn from Cambridge University. Although there were some 
differences with regard to the future of the Polish-Soviet broader, there was consensus regarding 
the PCNL, which was labelled as ‘bogus’.41 Other significant facts emerged during the debate, 
notably, that all hopes for any kind of progress were focused on Mikołajczyk, described by 
Churchill as ‘the only light which burns for Poland in the immediate future’.42  
In fact, Arciszewski had not been mentioned in his speech at all whilst those who rejected 
Soviet terms were labelled as ‘obstinate and inflexible (…) whose veto was like the former 
Liberum Veto, which played so great a part in the ruin of Poland’.43 This contradicted 
Arciszewski’s report back to Poland. Not only did Arciszewski not refer to Churchill’s speech 
in detail but he also argued that the Members of the British Parliament expressed favourable 
opinions about ‘us’.44  Moreover, in the same report, the Polish Prime Minister stated that the 
US Secretary of State, Edward Stettinius, was in support of Polish government policy regarding 
the border issue and had assured them that the independence of Poland was a US government 
war objective.45 However, as Mr. Pickthorn had highlighted during the debate, the Polish 
government seemed oblivious of the American policy outlined earlier by Stettinius, that 
‘the specific question of a guarantee of the Polish frontier by this Government (USA 
government) was not, and could not have been, at issue since this Government's 
traditional policy of not guaranteeing frontiers in Europe is well known’.46  
This statement was not cabled to the Polish Underground leaders in view of the persistent belief 
of the Polish government-in-exile that the USA had a decisive voice in the Polish-Soviet 
matters. Although Arciszewski was right in asserting that Poland received great support in the 
House of Commons and, more importantly, that Soviet political manoeuvring had been 
discussed, no steps were proposed in the debate as to how to address this issue; the main focus 
was on the question of continuity of HMG involvement in Polish-Soviet affairs. Kochanski goes 
as far as to assert that Churchill in his speech on 15 December ‘effectively washed his hands of 
the Poles’.47  
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Unfortunately the Polish Service bulletins from December 1944 did not survive the war, but it 
can be assumed that Churchill’s speech was aired, because the BBC European Service 
directives emphasised the necessity of broadcasting it across all the BBC stations.48 
Nevertheless, it was noted that, since his statement had been widely criticised in the Polish, 
British and American press for contravening the Atlantic Charter which guaranteed no territorial 
changes without full consent of countries involved, only quotes from the British press showing 
the ‘wisdom, justice and consistency of the British government policy’ should be included.49 
On 31 December the PCNL transformed itself into the Provisional Government of Poland 
[Tymczasowy Rzad Polski], recognised on 4 January 1945 by the USSR as the only legitimate 
government of Poland (see chapter 3). In the Polish Service broadcasts prominence was to be 
given to the fact that Britain still recognised the Polish government-in-exile whilst the PCNL 
transformation into the Provisional government should be ‘played down’.50 In addition, 
Mikołajczyk’s article in The Times, in which he assured readers that Poland would not become a 
communist state and emphasised the necessity of reaching settlement with the USSR before the 
end of the war, was to be aired across all BBC channels.51  Furthermore, on 12 January 1945 the 
Red Army resumed its offensive on Warsaw and on 17 January Warsaw was ‘liberated’. 
Although the directives stressed that the Soviet offensive should be presented as ‘well 
organised’ and there should be no mention that it was due to German miscalculations, the word 
‘liberation’ should not be used in the bulletins when referring to Warsaw. 52 Listeners were also 
to be ‘reminded discreetly or led to remind themselves’ about the important part, played by the 
American army.53  
Censoring of the communication with Poland 
By mid-December 1944 the Foreign Office became anxious about the exchange of information 
between the Polish government in London and Poland, and messages which could be considered 
anti-Soviet were seen as a particular threat to British-Soviet diplomatic relations. Therefore, in 
the light of the upcoming conference of the Big Three, it was felt that all necessary steps should 
be taken in order to control the Polish communication channels. On 22 December 1944 Eden 
informed Edward Raczyński, that all communication between Poland and the government-in-
exile would be subjected to HMG censorship.54 Eden argued: 
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‘not that a ban should be placed upon all communication to Poland, but simply that (…) 
control should be exercised so that His Majesty’s Government is aware of all the 
messages that pass between Poland and this country’.55  
On 27 December, however, the Foreign Office requested that all communication with Russian-
occupied Poland must cease.56  The exchange of information with German occupied territory 
was allowed but instead, of the previous arrangement with the SOE, when the messages were 
‘post-censored’, the request was made for all information to be censored prior to sending, 
including the material carried by couriers. A few weeks later, although the ban on 
communication with the Polish territory occupied by the Soviets was lifted, the pre-censorship 
remained.57 Eden highlighted that nothing could be said that in anyway could upset Stalin, 
especially in the time before conference of the ‘Big Three’ at Yalta.58 After the conference had 
started, telegraphic communication with Soviet occupied Poland was prohibited again but, as 
Raczyński observes, nothing was said about cables from Poland.59 Although communication 
with German occupied Poland was permitted, as late as a month after the conference was over, 
the Polish Underground complained that the Polish government in London had not informed 
them about the plans for the future or ‘maybe the government did not have a plan? 60 This 
demonstrates the extent to which censorship was exercised, and more importantly, that the 
Underground – and consequently the Polish nation – had to rely on Polish broadcasts form 
London for information; however, it should be recalled that all the speeches of Polish 
government officials were subject to the Foreign Office censorship.   
The Yalta Conference  
During the conference of the Big Three held at Yalta, also known as the Crimea Conference, 
which took place between 4 and 11 February 1945, the main topic on the agenda was the future 
of the Polish state. The agreement, made without the Polish government-in-exile present or 
consenting, reaffirmed the Soviet right to the Curzon Line and outlined a plan for the creation of 
the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity in Poland, which was to be based on the 
existing Provisional government in Poland but reorganised ‘on a border democratic basis with 
the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from abroad’.61 The ambassadors of 
the USSR, the USA and Great Britain, namely Molotov, Harriman and Clark Kerr respectively, 
were held responsible for supervising the meeting of all parties involved and the 
‘reorganisation’ of the Polish government which to take place in Moscow. After this 
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reorganisation had been achieved, the newly established Polish Provisional Government would 
be pledged to hold free and ‘unfettered’ elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal 
suffrage and secret ballot.62 It was also stressed that all democratic and anti-Nazi Parties had the 
right to take part and put forward their candidates. The Yalta declaration concluded that only 
then would the British, American and Soviet governments establish diplomatic relations with 
the newly formed Polish government.63  
Interestingly, however, the future of the Polish government-in-exile had already been discussed 
in January 1945 by the BBC. In a document entitled Guidelines from the BBC News Room, 
there was discussion of a memorandum from the Polish Ambassador in London, Edward 
Raczyński, delivered to the British Under-Secretary of State for the Foreign Office, Sir 
Alexander Cadogan, and, in particular, his proposal to create the International Committee or 
Commission to govern Poland until the end of the war and his argument that no territorial 
changes should place until after the war.64 The author of this guidelines, stated that the British 
government would turn down Raczyńki’s suggestions; instead the plan was to ‘build 
up Mikołajczyk and send him to the Lublin Poles and so eventually  to wash out the Poles in 
London, whom we now recognise’. He further added that ‘this line suits Russians who find 
Lublin convenient, capable of strengthening and general improvement’. 65 
The Polish Service reported the Yalta declaration in detail. Although the Polish Service Editor, 
Gregory MacDonald, was briefed by the Foreign Office on how to report on the agreement and 
told not only to present it in a positive light but more importantly to recommend it to Poles, he 
refused to do so. 66 As Macdonald recalls: 
‘On the principle that the truth must be told we reported it faithfully to Poland, quoting 
newspaper comments for and against it. But no single talk was ever broadcast in Polish 
recommending the Yalta Agreement to Polish listeners, although it was the policy of the 
major Allies, because no broadcaster in London had a right to dictate to Poles in a 
matter which they saw as a vital national interest’. 67 
Moreover, talking about his job as the Editor of the Polish Service after the war, Macdonald 
proclaimed that: 
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‘At every point I tried to justify and defend Poland’s national interests where they were 
under attack – at the same time representing British national interest to the Poles. The 
strategy was frequently successful, because both sides knew (or ought to have 
appreciated) exactly what I was doing’.68 
The Yalta declaration, which was broadcast though the day on 12 and 13 February, also 
included reference to the Atlantic Charter, for which Macdonald had been criticised by Walter 
Adams of the Political Intelligence Department (PID).69 It was a sensitive subject as it included 
reference to the self-determination of the nation, whilst the PWE central directives for all the 
BBC European Services emphasised that 
‘our job is clearly to do all we can to promote the widest possible acceptance amongst 
the Poles of the solution of their country’s political and territorial questions arrived at 
by the Crimea Conference’.70 
Macdonald, however, recollects that whilst the declaration was presented favourably on other 
BBC Services, everyone in the Polish Service newsroom was aware that it was very sad news 
for Poland, and it was reported without any comment.71  
Yet analysis of the Polish Service bulletins demonstrates that, although, as Macdonald 
explained, the Polish Service did not recommend the agreement to Poles, the Polish Service’ 
press review only cited newspapers which supported the agreement. This included The Times 
reporting that: ‘under the shelter of this agreement it is scarcely conceivable that the rival 
Polish authorities can fail to come  to terms in the Provisional Government of National Unity’; 
the Daily Mail  which called the conference ‘a landmark in human history’; left-wing papers 
such as the Daily Herald expressing the view that ‘at least the impression was removed that the 
Provisional government was a puppet government of Russia’; and the Manchester Guardian 
acknowledging that the Soviet Union ‘has shown herself to move a long way towards meeting 
the Western Allies’. 72 The same line was followed by the Daily Telegraph, cited in the Polish 
bulletin on 14 February, commenting that ‘yet in no other point does the Yalta Agreement 
reflect more or better a spirit of reciprocal’. 73 Nothing, however, was said about acceptance of 
the Soviet Union’s right to the Curzon line.  
Significantly, newspapers which criticised the agreement were not included in the press review. 
For example, The Scotsman’s article on 13 February argued that ‘Russia had had her way, and 
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the new Poland can hardly be recognised as a really independent state’ or the Observer’s view 
that ‘judgement on the Polish settlement depended heavily on the interpretation to be given to 
the word ‘democratic’.74 In fact, the Polish Service press review omitted any reference to the 
discussion taking place in the British press regarding the rightness of the Yalta agreement and 
instead concentrated on news from the frontline.75 As Macdonald claims, although the Polish 
Service did not recommend the Yalta declaration to the Poles, it can be argued that it used the 
press review to present it in a positive light. The PWE official, H.C Bowen, observed himself on 
26 February that the Polish Service had given full information about the Crimean declaration in 
accordance with the guidelines received from the Foreign Office and had quoted ‘respectable 
British press’.76 He argued in the same letter that, in order to help further in ‘conveying our case 
to Poland’, official statements should be reported in the Polish broadcasts.  
However, on 14 February, Macdonald was approached by Mr. Jagodziński from the Polish news 
agency Polpress, which was under the control of Polish communists in Poland, requesting that 
the Polish Service should either recommend the Yalta declaration to Polish listeners or include 
Polpress articles in the Polish Service press review.77 Jagodziński explained to the Polish 
Service Editor that Poles would greatly benefit from accepting the Yalta terms, yet if such a 
recommendation were broadcast by Radio Lublin, a station run by Polish communists in the 
eastern part of Poland, Poles would not trust it as they would assume that it was propaganda 
coming from the Kremlin. However, he emphasised that Poles believe anything broadcast by the 
BBC. Therefore, if the Yalta declaration was endorsed by the Polish Service, it would have a 
great impact on public opinion in Poland. Macdonald, however, refused. 
On 13 February 1945 the Polish government in London made an official protest regarding the 
Yalta declaration, which was compared to the fifth partition of Poland and attacked for 
‘legalisation of the Soviet government into Poland’s internal affairs’.78 The agreement 
condemned because it had been made without Polish government participation, authorisation or 
knowledge and, more importantly, it violated the Atlantic Charter which guaranteed the right of 
every nation to defend its interests. In these circumstances, it was argued, the Polish government 
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could not recognise the agreement reached by the Three Powers but also, given the arguments 
above, it did not have power to ‘bind the Polish Nation’79.  
The official Polish government protest regarding the Yalta agreement was broadcast by the 
Polish Service on 14 February, yet it was not, as claimed in the Radio Polskie broadcast, given 
prominence in all the BBC Services and the America Calling programme. 80 In fact, the protest 
was redacted by the policy censor in all the Polish Service morning and afternoon bulletins on 
14 February. There was a note on the 4:45pm bulletin that protest could be broadcast by all 
European Services excluding the Polish Service. By the evening the policy, had been changed 
and the Polish Service broadcast at 7:45pm that: 
‘the Polish government in London last night issued a communiqué in which they 
declared that the decisions of the Crimea Conference concerning Poland “cannot be 
recognised by the Polish Government and cannot bind the Polish nation”’.81 
Yet, the reference to the protest was not reported in detail, as asserted previously by Radio 
Polskie. It was in fact very brief and passages comparing the Agreement to ‘a fifth partition of 
Poland, now accomplished by her allies’ were omitted.  
In this period special attention was given to Polish officials’ statements which, according to the 
Foreign Office, were to help conveying ‘our case in Poland’. 82 Subject to Foreign Office 
censorship, they offered a moderate view on Yalta. The Polish Prime Minister, in voicing doubt 
as to whether the Crimean agreement gave Poland adequate guarantees, was reported as 
expressing his confidence in the USA and the United Kingdom ‘fulfilling their duty towards 
their first ally’. 83  The Polish Service also broadcast Mikołajczyk’s response to the Crimea 
declaration, in which he expressed his dissatisfaction that Poland was not invited to the talks 
whilst pointing out that the Polish government policy of ‘wait and see’ was especially harmful 
for Poland.84 The speech of former Polish Minister of Information, Stanisław Kot, was also 
aired, presenting a more optimistic view of the future of Poland, and maintaining the belief that 
Poland could be restored as a democratic state if the representatives of the CNL were pushed 
out.85 He was also of opinion that power was shifting from London to the Polish political parties 
in Poland.86  
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Nevertheless, an analysis of the Polish Service bulletins demonstrates that in the days following 
the Yalta conference the political questions regarding the future of the Polish state took a back 
seat. More information was given on Radio Polskie which continued discussion of the Yalta 
agreement but also informed the Polish audience about the protests of the Polish miners and 
workers in France and the Polish editors in charge of the Polish dailies in the USA; none of 
those protest, however, was reported by the Polish Service. 87 Nor did the press review include 
the British press view of the protest of the Polish government. Yet, the discussion of this subject 
continued in the British press with Alistair Forbes arguing in the Daily Mail on 20 February that 
‘the Yalta documents might need the total redefinition of a number of English words, including 
‘democratic’ and ‘freedom-loving’.88 
The agreement reached at Yalta was also not welcomed by the Polish Armed Forces. Since they 
were continuing to fight on the western front, it was feared that the soldiers might revolt. 
Therefore, the appeals of the Polish government in London, for restraint and order and for 
people to behave in a ‘dignified manner’ were given prominence in the Polish broadcasts. 89 
Emphasis was placed on preserving solidarity as well as maintaining their brotherhood with the 
armed forces of Britain, Canada and USA with whom ‘they have been bound by the bloodshed 
in their common struggle’.90  The General Anders’ Order of the Day maintained a similar tone, 
although he did not hesitate to express his aversion to the Yalta agreement. His full speech was 
broadcast only by Radio Polskie whilst the criticism of the agreement was cut off in the Polish 
Service bulletins.91   
Debate in the House of Commons (27 February 1945) 
On 27 February 1945 a debate was opened in the House of Commons regarding the Yalta 
declaration with Churchill seeking the support of Members of the Parliament for the motion on 
Crimea, particularly the agreement concerning the future of Poland. Churchill’s speech, 
broadcast in detail by the Polish Service, again attacked the London Poles stating that ‘there 
would be no Lublin Committee no provisional government if Poles accepted our faithful counsel 
of a year ago’; at the same time, he claimed that both the Lublin Committee and the Soviet 
army were received with ‘great joy in large areas of Poland, (and) many of the cities changed 
hands without a shot being fired’.92 However the sentence:  ‘none of the terrible business of 
underground armies being shot by both sides which we feared’, referring to the German and 
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Soviet armies, was redacted by the policy censor, A.R. Birley.93 Churchill further argued that 
the Soviet government’s ‘word is their bond’ and that ‘no government stands more to its 
obligations, even in their own despite, than the Russian Soviet government’.94 This sentence was 
also redacted by A.R. Birley. The British Premier’s avowal of Stalin’s good will and assertion 
of Poland’s independence contradicted the other points he was making, notably the offer of 
British citizenship to Polish soldiers who might feel that it was not safe to return to their country 
after the war. 95 Thus, Churchill acknowledged that there was a basis for the complaints of 
Polish soldiers about Soviet persecution.   
The Yalta agreement was met with reserve in the House of Commons; in particular, the 
acceptance of the Curzon Line on Soviet terms and the fact that it was forced on the Polish 
nation were the subject of strong criticism. There was also widespread scepticism with regard to 
the prospect of holding free elections in Poland after the war. As a result, 22 Conservative MPs 
tabled an amendment to Churchill’s confidence motion, seeking to add that 
‘remembering that Great  Britain took up arms (…) to defend Poland (…) and in which 
the overriding motive was the prevention of the domination by a strong nation of its 
weaker neighbours, the House regrets the decision to transfer to another power the 
territory of an Ally contrary to treaty and to article two of the Atlantic Charter; and 
furthermore regrets the failure to ensure to those nations which have been liberated 
from German oppression the full right to choose their own government, free from the 
influence of any other power’. 96 
 
As Radio Polskie noted in their broadcast, the motion was prepared in such manner that it 
was difficult to vote against it.97 The debate was widely covered by the Polish Service whilst the 
press review, for the first time since the Yalta declaration was announced, consisted of quotes 
condemning the agreement, with even left-wing newspapers such as the New Herald criticising 
the Big Three for settling Polish matters without the representatives of the Polish government 
being present. The same view was expressed by a member of the Labour Party, Arthur 
Greenwood, arguing that the agreement had been reached behind Poland’s back.98 According to 
Eden however, ‘when the Soviet government stated that they would accept the Curzon line with 
adjustments, all in favour of Poland, it could not be said that it was a grave injustice to 
                                                          
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Full speech in: Hansard, nr. 39, vol. 408, pp. 1275/1285, 27 February 1945. 
96 BBC WAC, Polish Service Bulletins, 27 February 1945. 
97 Ibid, Radio Polskie bulletin, 5:45pm, 21 February 1945. 
98 Ibid, 5:45pm, 27 February 1945. 
 226 
Poland’.99 While also making it clear that relations between Poland and the British government 
had changed, he nonetheless assured listeners about the bright future of their country, when 
Poland ‘would be strong or even stronger than before’.100 Interestingly, on the same day a Daily 
Telegraph article reporting on crimes committed against the Polish people by the Soviets and 
the disappearance of 2 million Poles to Siberia was quoted in the Polish Service bulletin.101 It 
was the first time the Polish Service openly acknowledged Soviet atrocities.  The bulletins from 
March and April 1945 did not survive the war but, in May, Polish-Soviet affairs continued to be 
a sensitive subject. For example, a passage of the speech of Polish President, Władysław 
Raczkiewicz’s broadcast on 3 May was redacted, in which he stated that it was his hope that: 
‘Poland will receive from the liberating allied armies adequate help and protection and 
when freedom will triumph in Poland, they will be able to return to a free and 
independent fatherland together with their other brothers scattered all over the world. 
This hope, which had been brought with the precious blood of our country which was 
the first to rise against German totalitarianism, is nourished to-day by the entire 
martyred Polish nation’.102  
The San Francisco Conference and arrest of the Polish Underground leaders  
From the beginning, the creation of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity was a 
fiasco. The Yalta declaration clearly stated that the representatives of the Provisional 
government, the Polish Underground and the Polish government-in-exile should take part in the 
formation of the future Polish government. However, according to Molotov, the Provisional 
government was given the right of veto and rejected most of the names put forward by the 
British and American governments, including Mikołajczyk, before they were invited to 
Moscow.103 Molotov also declined to allow Allied observers into Poland on the grounds that 
they would ‘sting the national pride of the Poles to the quick’.104 Both Churchill and Roosevelt 
insisted on a fast resolution because of the upcoming conference of the United Nations in San 
Francisco planned for April 1945 where Poland was to be one of the signatories. However, as 
Churchill noted in his memoirs, as much as they were under pressure for the formation of a new 
government in Poland, it was in Stalin’s interest to delay as long as possible. 105 Soviet troops 
were in Poland and the Lublin Poles were purging Poland and liquidising any signs of 
nationalism; contrary to what Stalin had claimed earlier, the process of collectivisation and 
nationalisation was already in progress whilst most of Polish industry was moved to the 
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USSR.106 Stalin further argued that only Poles who publicly accept the Crimean declaration 
would be considered as candidates for joining the Moscow talks. Mikołajczyk, conscious of the 
seriousness of the situation and the necessity of having a voice in the creation of the new 
government, made a public statement, published in The Times and also broadcast by the Polish 
Service.107 However, he did not declare that he accepted the Curzon line and, on this basis, his 
participation was declined. As a result, since Stalin did not recognise the Polish government-in-
exile whilst the USA and Great Britain did not recognise the Provisional government, Poland 
was not represented at the United Nations conference in San Francisco (see chapter 3). The 
Polish government officially protested but without effect.108 Consequently it attempted to send 
unofficial representation, but the USA government refused to grant the visas; only Aleksander 
Bregman and Zygmunt Lityński from the Polish Ministry of Information attended the 
conference, yet not as the official representatives of the Polish government, but as journalists.109 
The conference of the United Nations at San Francisco opened on 25 April 1945. The major 
issue under discussion was post-war security and maintenance of peace (see chapter 3).110 
Although Poland was not present, representatives of the Soviet republics established during the 
war, namely the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist 
Republic, were invited. On 3 May, Molotov informed Eden and Stettinius that 16 of the Polish 
Underground leaders invited to talks in Moscow had been arrested by the NKVD on charges of 
diversionary activities against the Red Army and maintaining illegal radio transmitters in the 
Soviet rear.111 In diplomatic terms, this issue was a major blow to British-Soviet relations since 
it was the British government which had supplied the list of names to Stalin and guaranteed 
protection of those who were to travel to Moscow. The information about the missing Poles had 
already reached London on 1 April 1945 and the British Embassy in Moscow unsuccessfully 
intervened to try to establish information regarding their disappearance; although they had 
already been interrogated in the prison at Lubianka, Molotov claimed that he knew nothing 
about the Polish underground leaders’ whereabouts.112  
By the beginning of May, however, the question of their disappearance was raised in the House 
of Commons and, on 2 May, the Polish Service quoted the announcement of Minister of State, 
Richard Law, that the British government was pressing the Soviets for answers.113 A day later, 
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Arciszewski’s speech, which also addressed the issue of the missing Poles, was broadcast.114 It 
was not until 5 May, when an official statement was issued by Eden and Stettinius, that the 
Polish Service reported on the arrest of the Polish Underground leaders.115 Questions were 
asked as to why they had been arrested and were going to be put on trial?  Why now? And why 
both American and the British officials had lied about their arrest? Yet, the full report 
explaining the circumstances of their capture and the offenses the Poles were charged with was 
not given prominence until 22 May. In addition, the discussion of the responsibility of the 
British government and the Inter-Allied Commission and the demand for intervention voiced by 
the British and the Polish press were not reported or quoted in the Polish Service press review 
from 12 May onwards.  
The show trial of the 16 Polish underground leaders, which started on 18 June 1945, was widely 
covered by all BBC Services; representatives of western and American Embassies as well as the 
foreign correspondents were invited.  All but one of the 16 Poles had pleaded wholly or partly 
guilty to the charges against them and confessed that they were acting on the orders of the 
Polish government-in-exile. Paradoxically the 16 were accused of leading the underground 
organisation and not submitting to Red Army command, actions which should have been seen 
as a symbol of patriotism rather than a crime. Moreover, in international law, it was illegal for a 
foreign court to prosecute the defendants (see chapter 3). No protest, however, was made by any 
of the Allies. Whilst the BBC directives emphasised that the trial should be reported objectively, 
and there should not be indications of whether if they were guilty or innocent, The Times 
correspondent was quoted in the Polish broadcast as saying that ‘compared with those of 
English court-martials, the proceedings seemed informal’.116 Space was also given to the 
Manchester Guardian article arguing that the trial simply aimed to please the western allies.  As 
the Soviet prosecutor pointed out, in Soviet law, the 16  should be shot but ‘because we live in 
days of joyful victory and these men are no longer dangerous to the Soviet Union which is 
mightier than ever’ they received prison sentences.117 It must be noted that, at the time the trial 
was taking place, the Polish politicians approved by Stalin were taking part in a meeting in 
Moscow to discuss the creation of the new Polish government, according to the Polish Service, 
‘in the most friendly atmosphere’.118  
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End of War 
The war officially ended on 7 May 1945 but, as the last Polish government delegate in Poland, 
Stefan Korboński reported back to London, ‘Warsaw acknowledged the news lukewarmly’, 
adding: ‘for us it does not change anything’. 119 Nor were the Polish soldiers or prisoners full of 
joy. Fearful of reprisals, Polish prisoners from the liberated labour camps in Germany refused to 
go back home. Challenged in the House of Commons by the Conservative MP Commander 
Bower, Churchill announced that the Supreme Commander in Chief would continue to provide 
shelter for Polish prisoners ‘as long as conditions make it impractical or undesirable for them to 
be repatriated or otherwise provided for’, clarifying that those unwilling to go home or ‘in 
danger of reprisals’ would not be send back against their will.120 His statement, broadcast by 
the Polish Service finished with an expression of hope that conditions in Poland would soon 
change. Yet only few days after the German surrender, Churchill expressed his anxieties 
regarding Stalin’s ‘misinterpretation’ of the Yalta decisions and attitude towards Poland. In a 
private letter to American President, Truman, he had already argued on 12 May 1945 that: 
‘an iron curtain is drawn upon their front. We do not know what is going on behind, 
there seems little doubt that the whole of the region east of the line Lubeck-Trieste-
Corfu will soon be completely in their (Soviet) hands’.121 
The Polish Service continued to play an important role in this period, broadcasting SHAEF 
(Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force) announcements directed to displaced 
people and prisoners from liberated German labour camps.122 These communiqués, which 
addressed prisoners of all nationalities, carried a special message for the Poles. Unlike others 
who received instructions how to return to their country of origin, Polish citizens were offered 
‘an opportunity’ to indicate whether they wished to return to Poland.123 Polish Soldiers were 
also offered to stay in the United Kingdom. Yet after the Polish Provisional government of 
National Unity was established in June 1945, the Polish Service broadcasts encouraged the 
soldiers to go back home. 124 Special broadcasts were introduced, emphasising the ‘welcoming’ 
attitude of new government in Poland.114   On 6 July 1945, both the USA and Britain withdrew 
recognition of the Polish government-in-exile. Following the fall of the ‘Iron Curtain’ in 1946, 
the Polish Service entered a new period in their broadcasts, becoming a platform of anti-
communism propaganda. 
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Conclusion 
After the Warsaw rising the Polish Service continued to play an important role as a medium of 
the British government. The PWE directives for the Polish Service, written in accordance with 
British foreign policy, attempted to convince Polish listeners of the friendly attitude of the 
USSR and assure them of the allies’ guarantees of the reconstruction of Poland as an 
independent state. Although the Polish Service broadcasts maintained that Poland was still an 
important ally, it became apparent that its fate had been already decided in November 1943 
during the Tehran conference and, in fact, all further meetings of the Big Three only confirmed 
what had been already agreed. While it cannot be argued that the broadcasts of the Polish 
Service were biased, they were definitely not neutral. The selection of information and quotes 
from the press in the bulletins played a significant role in presenting in a positive light key 
political developments such as the formation of the Polish Provisional Government of National 
Unity. Polish officials’ speeches that were subjected to Foreign Office censorship were 
recognised as having an enormous impact on listeners in Poland and acted as assurance of the 
allies’ pledges.  Nevertheless, analysis of the European Service broadcasts demonstrates that the 
political and diplomatic disputes related to Poland were not considered important. In fact, in the 
period 1944-1945, Poland was hardly mentioned. Taking into account that the main decisions 
regarding the future of Poland were made in this period, and the critical response of the Polish 
government–in-exile, it is also puzzling that there was not much discussion on those issues 
during the weekly meetings of the representatives of the BBC, Polish Service, the Polish 
Ministry of Information and the Foreign Office. The Polish Service continued to report on 
controversial subjects such as the trial of 16 members of the Polish Underground or VE–Day 
celebrations, to which the Polish government was not invited. However, it did not become 
critical of the Soviet regime until elections in Poland in 1947. Paradoxically, Poles subjected by 
the German occupants to the death penalty for listening to foreign stations in 1939, were 
exposed to the same laws by its ‘liberator', cutting off the Polish nation from the outside world 
with an ‘Iron Curtain’.
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Conclusion 
 
During the Second World War the BBC Polish Service became an important source of information 
in Poland. Although listening to, or possessing, a radio was punishable by death under the German 
occupation, Poles were willing to risk their lives in order to access the information. For many, the 
BBC remained the only contact with the outside world, whilst listening itself became a symbol of 
resistance. The broadcasts from London had an enormous impact on listeners in Poland, allowing 
them to keep in contact with the Polish government which, after the fall of France had taken refuge 
in Britain.  Polish officials often spoke on air, playing an important role in maintaining public 
morale. The broadcasts not only connected Poland with the rest of the world and informed Poles 
about what was happening in their own country, but also supported Allied intelligence and the 
sabotage of German actions. The Polish Underground, which acted more as a secret state than 
simply a resistance movement, monitored the Polish Service broadcasts and distributed the content 
in the form of clandestine newspapers and leaflets. These broadcasts were important not only 
because of their news value but also because the BBC was considered the mouthpiece of the British 
government and, as Britain was seen as the most important ally, her foreign policy and support in 
Polish-Soviet disputes were central to the future of Poland. 
Funded by Treasury Grant, the BBC Polish Service, like other BBC European Services, was 
required to comply with the official policy of the British government which, throughout the war, 
pursued a pro-Soviet direction. Acting as the ‘Voice of Britain’, it presented news from the British 
point of view. Polish programmes were subject to political and military censorship whereby, after 
USSR accession to the Allies’ coalition, anything considered anti-Soviet was expunged. However, 
even prior to Stalin joining the Grand Alliance, the Polish Service was forbidden to mention the 
Soviet occupation in their broadcasts, the main reason being the refusal of the League of Nations to 
recognise the USSR attack on Poland in 1939 as a crime.  Topics such as living conditions, 
deportations, the arrest and murder of the Polish intelligentsia and soldiers were outlawed, as was 
reference to the population in USSR occupied territory. Although the ban was lifted in January 
1941, British-Soviet diplomatic relations continued to influence Polish broadcasts. Subjects such as 
disputes over the Polish-Soviet eastern border, the deportation of Polish citizens to the gulags, the 
discovery of the Polish officers’ graves in Katyń and the arrests of members of the Polish Home 
Army by the Soviets were labelled as ‘sensitive’ and consequently supressed. As a result, the 
impartiality and credibility of the BBC were questioned by Polish listeners.  
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After the cessation of diplomatic relations between Poland and the USSR in 1943, the subject of the 
post-war Polish-Soviet border became a major preoccupation for the Polish government-in-exile, 
with the British government willing to act as mediator between Mikołajczyk and Stalin. The Polish 
Service was recognised as a powerful medium in these negotiations and was used as a platform for 
convincing the Polish public to assent to the Soviet Union’s territorial demands. The pledges of 
both Stalin and Churchill of a future independent and sovereign Polish state were often mentioned 
in the Polish broadcasts. However, as the acceptance of the Curzon line did not have the support of 
the Polish population, and in particular, of the leaders of the Polish Underground, it was 
acknowledged that this policy could not be based on logical argument, but rather had to be ‘sold’ to 
Poland.1 The British government, although aware of Soviet political manoeuvring, arrests and 
killings, shielded information from the public and required broadcasts to Poland to assume ‘an 
increasingly emotional anti-German tone’ in order to portray the Nazis as the greater of two evils; 
political issues were to be presented only by way of background.2 Yet special care was also taken to 
avoid the impression that information was being concealed. Similar treatment was given to the 
coverage of the Warsaw rising in 1944 when the Polish Service failed to give Polish listeners a 
comprehensive picture of the actual political and military situation. Although the Political Warfare 
Executive (PWE) had already acknowledged in February 1944 that it was highly probable that the 
Soviet Union would occupy Poland, right until the end of the war the BBC Polish Service continued 
to suppress information which could in any way undermine the Soviet Union position as a friendly 
neighbouring country and guarantor of Poland’s independence. Any BBC criticism of Stalin or the 
Polish communists would have threatened the British government hope for good relations with the 
USSR after the war. More importantly, cross-listening was an issue: all other BBC programmes 
tended to favour the Soviet rather than the Polish stance and departure from this policy would have 
undermined consistency, a fundamental principle of the BBC.  
Analysis of the Polish Service bulletins and the PWE directives also demonstrates that the Polish 
Service was not independent from the PWE or, by extension, the government.  As the head of the 
PWE, Bruce Lockhart, rightly concluded, ‘the PWE did not make policy, it executed it’.3 Policy 
censors of the BBC broadcasts were responsible to the Foreign Office, demonstrating that the BBC 
was required to follow official foreign policy, an understandable position given that the country was 
in a state of war. In fact, it seems rather unlikely that any government at any time would have left 
broadcasters total freedom in the presentation of foreign affairs which could potentially affect 
diplomatic relations with another country and its international position. Even the former BBC 
                                                          
1 BBC WAC, R34 /663, PWE Special Directive for Polish Service, 16 January 1944. 
2 NA, FO 371/39422, PWE Directives for Poland, 23 March 1944. 
3 Lockhart, R. H. B., Comes the Reckoning (London: Arno Press, 1972), p. 185. 
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official historian, Asa Briggs, seems to contradict himself; whilst insisting that the BBC was 
independent from the PWE, he observes that the PWE policy was different in each country and in 
fact there is insufficient evidence to fully assess the relationship between the BBC and the PWE. 
One of the aims of this thesis was to establish the extent to which the Polish government-in-exile 
had influence over the Polish Service broadcasts. The examination of primary sources shows that 
the Polish authorities’ attempts to influence the BBC Polish programmes were not entirely 
successful. Their observations and feedback were taken into consideration and efforts made to 
establish good relationships and cooperation with its broadcasting arm, Radio Polskie, and the 
Polish Ministry of Information. However, while the Polish Service appreciated the needs of 
listeners in Poland, Polish officials’ complaints regarding the treatment of Polish political affairs – 
which, in most cases, centred on misrepresentation of Polish interests – did not carry sufficient 
weight to change the content of the broadcasts. By the same token, although most Polish exiled 
politicians, including both Polish Prime Ministers, namely Sikorski and Mikołajczyk, complained 
behind closed doors about the Polish Service broadcasts, publically praising them while making 
sure that speeches destined for airing gave no hint of any disagreement between Poland and Britain. 
Maintaining allied unity was not the only British priority. It was equally important that Polish 
listeners were under the impression that Poland was considered an important ally. Yet analysis of 
Polish and British government correspondence and documents demonstrates that, in fact, after the 
breaking off of diplomatic relations between Poland and the Soviet Union in 1943, Poland was 
perceived by Britain as an ‘inconvenient ally’, particularly because the Foreign Office assumed that 
establishing a good relationship with Stalin was pivotal to a lasting peace after the war ended. 
It was also the aim of this thesis to establish who listened to the Polish Service and what people 
thought about its programmes. Based on an analysis of both Polish and English sources, it appears 
that the main audience for the BBC Polish broadcasts was the Polish Underground, which 
monitored and distributed its content through the clandestine press and leaflets. This is not to say 
that the programmes were not accessed by individuals. However, given the death penalty for 
listening to or the possession of a radio under the German occupation, this was uncommon. 
Listening to the radio was not forbidden under the Soviet occupation, but records of the patterns of 
listenership and feedback from the audience in this region are very limited, thus making it 
impossible to draw overall conclusions. 
What is clear from the examination of the documents is the prominent role of the BBC Polish 
broadcasts which were considered by the Polish Underground an important source of information 
recognised for its news value. Yet, as in case of the Polish government in London, in order to 
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maintain public morale under the occupation, a central plank of Polish Underground propaganda 
was to convince their countrymen that Poland was an important ally which they could rely on to 
regain the eastern territory after the war. After the collapse of the Warsaw rising in 1944 this view 
started slowly losing credibility and it was only with the Yalta declaration that the Polish 
Underground leaders acknowledged the real state of affairs. In private, complaints about the Polish 
Service were made not only about its imperfect understanding of Underground needs, but also 
regarding the absence of coverage of Soviet political crimes committed against Polish citizens. 
However, it was understood that British priorities lay in maintaining allied unity, a policy which the 
Polish government-in-exile supported. Yet, even when concerns were expressed by the 
Underground with regard to Britain’s support for the Polish case, this information was withheld 
from the public. 
An examination of the records also demonstrates that the BBC was considered by Poles as a 
mouthpiece of the British government and, for this reason alone, was regarded as a significant 
source of information for the Polish Underground on the direction of British foreign policy. While it 
was recognised that the British broadcaster was attempting to provide objective and unbiased 
coverage, there was also an awareness that BBC programmes were reflecting the view of its 
government. Therefore, it is evident that Polish Underground grievances were directed against the 
British government policy which was favourable to the USSR rather than the Polish Service. 
The compliance of the Polish Underground with the Polish government-in-exile’s policy also 
became problematic for the BBC and, by extension, for the British authorities because they could 
not criticise the Underground as the main syndicator of its bulletins. It was also understood that 
attempts to convince Poles to accept the Curzon line could be only achieved if Mikołajczyk was 
able to convince the Underground leaders.  When the Polish Prime Minister failed to do so, the 
emphasis of the Polish Service was on the necessity for Polish-Soviet negotiations and 
Mikołajczyk’s willingness to engage in dialogue with Stalin and, later, on assurances that the Soviet 
Union sought to establish friendly relations with Poland. Nonetheless, every effort was taken to 
avoid upsetting members of the Underground, as it was feared that the BBC would lose credibility 
in the eyes of the Poles.  
Another conclusion which can be drawn from this research is the impact of the personalities 
involved in policy making, taking into account their own political views and agendas. In particular, 
it is evident that the Director of the European Service, Noel Newsome, had considerable influence 
on the shape of the broadcasts and direction of propaganda. While the BBC could not contradict the 
official line of the British government, his pro-Soviet outlook, admiration for Stalin and, more 
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importantly, his openly expressed dislike for the Polish government representatives and the Polish 
Underground have to be taken into account. In particular, his Propaganda Background Notes were 
valued by his colleagues who, in many cases, were unfamiliar with the background of the Polish-
Soviet territorial dispute and relied on his view that the USSR was right to demand the 
incorporation of the Polish eastern provinces. What not many people in BBC circles, however, 
knew, that the Curzon line did not differ much from the Ribbentrop-Molotov line agreed between 
the Germans and Soviets in August 1939, that divided Poland into Nazi and Soviet "spheres of 
influence”. 
The impact of individuals on the Polish broadcasts is evident, in particular, in the role of the Polish 
Service editors. While Winch was difficult and disliked by the Polish Service staff, Radio Polskie 
and the Polish Ministry of Information, it would seem that his successor, Gregory Macdonald, 
played a substantial role in improving both Polish broadcasts and relations with the Polish 
authorities in London. It is clear from his papers that he wished that he could have done more for 
Poland, especially after the Yalta declaration when the feeling of the betrayal of Poland was 
widespread among those who saw through Stalin’s political manoeuvring. And despite the fact that 
he was required to follow the official British government line, which did not always lie in the 
national interests of Poland, it is apparent that he supported the Polish case in as far as his position 
allowed. 
Finally, this research set out to analyse previously undiscovered material on the Polish Service and, 
more importantly, to throw new light on the contemporary understanding of diplomatic relations 
between the allies and, in particular, between Britain, Poland and the Soviet Union. This 
relationship was important not only in context of the Second World War, but also in the ways in 
which the wartime work of the Polish Service have been interpreted in its aftermath. Three essential 
points have to be explained here: the majority of the Polish government-in-exile stayed in the UK 
after the war had ended; with the fall of the iron curtain, the Polish government was reconstructed in 
London; and the Polish Service, which continued to broadcast to Poland, not only became an 
alternative to the Polish stations controlled by the communists, but also established itself as an 
unbiased and objective source of information, associated by the audience overseas with democratic 
values and freedom of speech.  
Thus, for example, a leaflet celebrating the 50th anniversary of the Polish Service in 1989, 
emphasised the Polish Service role during the Second World War as a significant and unbiased 
source of news. This assessment of the BBC Polish Service has prevailed until recently, with 
Pszenicki’s History of the Polish Service arguing that the BBC Polish programmes during the war 
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were impartial and that censorship was ‘pragmatic’ in character rather than political.4 It is 
noteworthy that the chapter on the Polish Service during World War II of his book is not based on 
analysis of primary sources, but rather on his own conclusions drawn from secondary sources. 
Other writers, however, in particular, Wyrwa and Grabowski, whose work focuses on Radio 
Polskie, the Polish government-in-exile and its relations with the BBC, question this interpretation.5  
However, this thesis is the first to examine so far unseen BBC archival material on the work of the 
Polish Service. Supported by the PWE directives for the Polish Service and other documents of the 
Polish government-in-exile and the Polish Underground, it demonstrates that, although the Polish 
Service attempted to be objective, impartial and neutral, this was achieved by selectiveness rather 
than by presenting both Polish and Soviet sides of the argument. The BBC main aim during the 
wartime period was to present itself as the ‘Voice of Britain’ and to avoid its broadcasts becoming a 
platform for political disputes, especially disagreements between her allies. Yet its policy was 
sometimes fluid in the pursuit of British government diplomatic ends as can be observed in the 
Polish Service coverage of the discovery of the Polish officers’ graves at Katyń, the Warsaw rising, 
the Yalta conference or the Polish Home Army activities. It can be also argued that it was in the 
interest of the Polish government, which continued its work in London after the war, not to 
challenge the official BBC account of its wartime position as a symbol of impartiality, credibility 
and the ‘weapon of war’. Yet the examination of Polish Service records points to the conclusion 
that its programmes were selective in nature and failed to fully inform Polish listeners about the 
diplomatic situation involving their country. The fact that the Polish Service was regarded as the 
main source of information, expressing the views of the British government and quoting the British 
press in its Polish broadcasts also created the impression that Poland had the backing of the UK. 
However, this line was also maintained by the Polish officials, who by emphasising this point in 
their speeches, played an important part in deluding the leaders of the Polish Underground, and by 
extension, the Polish nation, that they could bargain with Stalin. 
This thesis contributes to the current state of knowledge and understanding of the role of the BBC 
European Service during the Second World War as well as to studies on wartime propaganda and 
psychological warfare. In particular, recognition of the Polish Service as an important medium in 
furthering the British government’ s political and diplomatic ends demonstrates the power of 
transnational broadcasting as an instrument of propaganda. At the same time, the BBC Polish 
                                                          
4 Pszenicki, K., Tu Mówi Londyn: Historia Sekcji Polskiej BBC  (Warsaw: Rosner & Wspólnicy, 2009), p. 74. 
5 Wyrwa, T., Audycje Radiowe nadawane z Londynu, Zeszyty Historyczne, nr. 116 Paris, 1996;  Grabowski, 
Z., Radio Polskie w Londynie,  in Polskie Radio w Czasie Drugiej Wojny Światowej, (ed.) Budzyński, A., & 
Jasiewicz, K., (Warsaw: Polskie Radio SA, 2015). 
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broadcasts were described by many listeners as a ‘light in the darkness’, bringing hope that the fight 
against the Germans was continuing and, more importantly, that Poland had not been forgotten. 
Despite the fact, that listeners in Poland questioned the objectivity of BBC reporting on Polish-
Soviet affairs, its broadcasts were praised for their news value and factual reporting and, in 
particular, their coverage of the conduct of the war. The fact that Poles, exposed to harsh conditions 
under the occupation, could listen to broadcasts in their own language, and more importantly, to the 
speeches of both Polish and British officials acknowledging their suffering and speaking to them 
directly was a major factor in maintaining public morale. It is hoped that the insights emerging from 
this study and, in particular, from the previously unanalysed documents of the Polish Service, will 
serve as a platform for further scholarly investigation. 
  
 238 
Bibliography 
Primary sources 
 
BBC Written Archives, Caversham 
BBC Polish Service Bulletins, 1941–1945 
BBC Home Service Bulletins, 1944 
 
E1/1147, Polish Booklet: English text of unpublished material on the work of the Polish Service 
E1/1148, Polish Broadcasts: Minutes of Meetings, 1940–1945 
E1/1149, Polish Service, 1940–1953 
E1/1150, Polskie Radio: 1939–1949 
E2/13, Allied Governments Broadcast: Poland, 1940–1945  
E2/128, Foreign General, Central Directives PWE/ PID, 1941–1945 
E2/131, European News Directives, 1941–1945 
E2/135, Special Directives, Noel Newsome, 1940–1943 
E2/138, Weekly General Directives/ Weekly Propaganda Weekly Notes, 1941–1942 
E2/140, Director of External Broadcasting: Papers, 1939–1940 
E2/182, European Divisional Meetings: Minutes, 1941–1945 
E2/184, European Intelligence Papers, European Audience Estimates, 1943–1944 
E2/186, European Intelligence Papers, Intelligence Reports: Europe, 1940–1941 
E2/188, European Intelligence Papers, Studies of European Audiences, 1941–1944 
E2/192, European Intelligence Papers, Surreys od European Audiences: Enemy Occupied Countries 
other than France, 1941–1943 
E2/201, European Intelligence Papers; Wireless Receiving sets in Europe, 1943–1944 
E2/206, European Service, 1940–1945 
E2/350, Guide to the Overseas Service, 1941–1945 
E2/460, Overseas Programme Development, 1940–1948 
E2/482, Polish Newsletters, 1941 –1942 
E2/499, Radio Agony Columns in Wartime, 1940–1941 
E2/557, Tour of Foreign Broadcast, 1938–39 
E40/236, European Service Papers World Service Registry, Poland, 1942–1957 
R13/192 External Service, Polish Section, 1939–1947 
R28/19, News Background Notes, 1942–1944 
R34/516, Policy: Poland, 1939–1944 
 239 
R34/663, Propaganda Directives, Polish Service, 1944 
L1/1,183/1, Gregory Macdonald, Personal file 
L1/1,552/1, Zbigniew Grabowski, Personal file 
L1/2,054/1, Konrad Syrop, Personal file 
Collection of Macdonald’s articles 
BBC Monitoring Papers, Daily Digests of World Broadcasts, 1944 
BBC Year Books and Handbooks, 1939–1945 
 
The National Archives, Kew  
FO 371/26718, Broadcasts to Poland, 1941 
FO 371/26755, Polish-Soviet Relations, 1941 
FO 371/31092, Poland, Subversive Activities – BBC broadcasts to Poland, 1942 
FO 371/34555, PWE: Propaganda Directives for Poland,1943 
FO 371/34556, PWE Directives for Polish Service, 1943 
FO 371/39405, Polish-Soviet Relations, 1944 
FO 371/ 39424, PWE Directives for Poland, 1944 
FO 371/39422, PWE Directives for Poland, 1944 
FO 371/ 39425, PWE Directives for Poland, 1944 
FO 371/39427, PWE Directives for Poland, 1944 
FO 371/39493, Status of the Polish Underground Army, 1944  
FO 371/39494, Polish Home Army and help for Warsaw, 1944 
FO 371/39499, Rising in Warsaw, 1944 
FO 954/19B/479, Private Office Papers of Sir Anthony Eden, 1943 
FO 898/ 225, PWE Policy and Planning, 1942–1945 
FO, 898/226, PWE: Polish and Czechoslovak, 1942–1944 
FO 898/227, Russo- Polish Relations: The Katyn Wood Murders, 1943–1944 
FO  898/228, Director-General’s Files, 1943–1945 
CAB, 65/43, War Cabinet: Minutes, 1944 
Taylor, P. M., Allied propaganda in World War II: the complete record of the Political Warfare 
Executive (FO 898): from the Public Records Office London, Microfilm (London: National 
Archives, 2003-2005). 
 
 
 
 240 
The Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge 
Papers of Douglas E Ritchie and Noel Newsome 
Neri 1/1, Daily Directives, 1940–1944 
Neri 3/1, Broadcasting Policy During the War, 1939–45 
Neri 3/2, Formulation of Broadcasting Policy During the War, 1945 
Neri 3/5, Intake Reports monitoring broadcasts in Germany, Italy, Britain and Occupied Territories, 
1940–1941 
Neri 3/8, BBC Overseas Service Weekly, extracts from correspondence and reports, 1940–1941 
Neri 3/10, History of the European Service during the War by Douglas Ritchie, 1945 
Neri 6/8, Information papers on Poland during the War, 1939–1945 
 
The Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum, London 
Kol. 15, Teczka Eydziatowicza, 1941–1943 
Kol. 25/36, Wagner’s Report, 1943 
Kol. 183, Skrzynka, Stroński, 1940–1943 
Kol. 434, BBC, Korespondencja, 1940–1944 
A.10.8/1 – Polskie Radio, Sprawy Organizacyjne, 1940 
 
The Polish Underground Movement Study Trust, London 
2.3.11.1, Odzial VI Sztabu NW, propaganda, korespondencja, depesze, notatki, wycinki prasowe, 
1940–1945 
 
Imperial War Museum, Duxford 
J75, BBC Monitoring Service Transcripts: Poland, 1944. 
 
Macdonald Private Collection, France 
Undated notes by Gregory Macdonald 
Hansard Papers 
HC Debate, vol. 406, December 1944 
HC Debate, vol.408, February 1945 
 
The Times Digital Archive 
The Times, 1944 
 241 
 
Secondary sources 
Arnold, K., Preston, P., Kinnebroch, S., (eds.), The Handbook of European Communication History 
(New Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, in press 2016). 
Balfour, M., Propaganda in War, 1939-1945: Organisations, Policies, and Publics, in Britain and 
Germany (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979). 
Bartoszewski. W., Dni Walczącej Stolicy: Kronika Powstania Warszawskiego (Warsaw: Krąg, 
1984). 
Bell, P.M.H., John Bull and the Bear: British Public Opinion, Foreign Policy and the Soviet Union, 
1941-1945 (London: Hodder Arnold, 1990). 
Bennett, J., British Broadcasting and the Danish Resistance Movement (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1966). 
Black, J. B., Organising the Propaganda Instrument: The British Experience (Netherlands: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1975). 
British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Katyn:  British Reactions to the Katyn Massacre, 1943-
2003 (London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2003). 
Borodziej, W., The Warsaw Uprising of 1944 (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006). 
Borowiec, A., Destroy Warsaw! Hitler's punishment, Stalin's revenge (Connecticut: Praeger 
Publisher, 2001). 
Bór-Komorowski, T, The Secret Army (Barnsley: Frontline, 2011). 
Briggs, A., The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom: The War of Words, Vol. 3 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1995). 
Briggs, A., The Golden Age, of Wireless (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965). 
Brinson, C., & Dove, R. (ed.) Stimme der Wahrheit’. German-Language Broadcasting by the BBC 
(Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2003). 
Budny, M.,  Wspomnienia Nefrasobliwe (London: Polska Fundacja Kulturowa, 1985). 
Budzyński, A., & Jasiewicz, K., Polskie Radio w Czasie Drugiej Wojny Światowej, (Warsaw: 
Polskie Radio SA, 2015). 
Burns, T., The BBC: Public Institution and Private World (London: Macmillan, 1977). 
Carruthers, S. L., The Media at War: Communication and conflict in the Twentieth Century 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). 
 242 
Chadwick, K., ‘Radio Propaganda and Public Opinion under Endgame Vichy: The Impact of 
Philippe Henriot’, French History, 25, 2011, pp. 232-52. 
Chadwick, K., ‘The Battle of the Airwaves: Philippe Henriot and the Free French in 1944’, BBC 
History Magazine, 11 (7), 2010, pp. 50-54. 
Chróściel, P., ‘Zarys dziejów sekcji polskiej radia BBC: 1939-1995’, University of Warsaw, 
Journalism and Political Studies Department, 1995, unpublished. 
Churchill, W., The Second World War: Triumph and Tragedy, vol. 6 (Boston: Houghton,1954). 
Ciechanowski, The Warsaw Rising of 1944 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
Cienciala, A. M., at al., Katyn: A Crime Without Punishment (Yale University Press: New Haven, 
2007). 
Connelly, M., & Welch, D. War and the Media: Reportage and Propaganda, 1900-2003 (London: 
IB Tauris & Co Ltd, 2005). 
Cruickshank, C., The Fourth Arm: Psychological Warfare: 1938-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1981). 
Cull, N. J.& Culbert, D. H & Welch, D., Propaganda and Mass Persuasion: A Historical 
Encyclopaedia, 1500 to the Present ( Oxford:  ABC-CLIO, 2003). 
Curran, J., & Seaton, J., Power without Responsibility: Press, Broadcasting and the Internet in 
Britain (London: Taylor & Francis, 2010). 
Cyra, A., Ochotnik do Auschwitz – Witold Pilecki 1901–1948 (Oświęcim: Rytm, 2000). 
Czarnocka, H., Garliński, J., Iranek-Osmecki, K., Otocki, W., Pełczyński, T.,  Armia Krajowa w 
Dokumentach: October 1944-July 1945, vol. 1-6 (London: Ossolineum, 1981). 
Davies, N., The God’s Playground: A History of Poland, Vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005). 
Davies, N., Europe: A History (London: Pimlico, 1997). 
Davis, N., Rising ’44: The Battle for Warsaw (London: Macmillan, 2003). 
Delmer, S., Black Boomerang: An Autobiography (London: Secker & Warburg, 1962). 
Dennis P., Conflict and Chaos in Eastern Europe. (London: St. Martin's Press, 1995). 
Dewey, J., The Public and its Problems (New York: H. Holt & Company, 1927). 
Diggs-Brown, B., Strategic Public Relations: Audience Focused Practice (International edition: 
Wadsworth Publishing Co Inc., 2011). 
Diller, A., Rundfunkpolitik im Dritten Reich (Munchen: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1980). 
 243 
Dubicki, T., Nalęcz, D., Stirling, T., Polsko-Brytyjska Wspólpraca Wywiadowcza podczas II Wojny 
Światowej (Warsaw: Naczelna Dyrekcja Archiwów Państwowych, 2004). 
Duraczyński, E.,  Między Londynem a Warszawą: Lipiec 1943 – lipiec 1944 (Warsaw: Ksiażka i 
Wiedza,1986). 
Duraczyński, E, Rząd Polski na Uchodźstwie: 1939-1945 (Warsaw: Ksiażka i Wiedza, 1993). 
Eberhardt, P.,  Migracje polityczne na ziemiach polskich:1939-1950 (Poznań: Instytut 
Zachodni, 2011). 
Eden, A., The Eden Memories: The Reckoning (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965). 
BBC, European Service of the BBC: Two Decades of Broadcasting to Europe, 1938-58 (London: 
BBC, 1958). 
Ellul, J., Propaganda: The formation of men's attitudes (New York: Knopf, 1965). 
Ferenc Piotrowska, M., & Zakrzewski, F., Archiwum Ringelbluma. Konspiracyjne Archiwum 
Warszawy, Nasłuchy radiowe w getcie warszawskim, vol. 22,Warszawa, in press.  
Ferenc, M., ‘The Ringgelblum historians use of radio as a source on the progress of the war’, paper 
presented at the BBC Monitoring and the Second World War workshop, Imperial War 
Museum, London, January 1916. 
Ferguson, N., The War of the World: History's Age of Hatred (London: Penguin, 2012). 
Fisher, B. B (2007, April) The Katyn Controversy: Stalin's Killing Field. Retrieved from Central 
Intelligence Agency Web site: < https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-
intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/winter99-00/art6.html. 
Fleming, M., Auschwitz, the Allies and Censorship of the Holocaust (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014). 
Foot, M.R.D., SOE: Special Operations Executive 1940-1946 (London: Pimlico, 1999). 
Garliński, J., Fighting Auschwitz-The Resistance Movement in the Concentration Camp (London: 
London: Julian Friedmann Publishers Ltd.1975). 
Garliński, J., The Polish Underground State 1939–1945, Journal of Contemporary History,10 (2), 
Sage Publications, 1975, pp. 219–259.  
Garnett, D. The Secret History of PWE: The Political Warfare Executive, 1939-1945 (London: St. 
Ermin's Press, 2002). 
Gilbert, M., Auschwitz and the Allies: How the Allies responded to the news of Hitler’s Final 
Solution (London: Michael Joseph, 1981). 
Gillespie, M., & Webb, A. Diasporas and Diplomacy: Cosmopolitan contact zones at the BBC 
World Service :1932–2012 (London: Routledge, 2013). 
 244 
Grabowski, Z., Sekcja Polska BBC, ‘Na Antenie’, nr. 119, February 1973, London, pp. 24-26. 
Grisewood, H., One thing at a Time (London: Hutchinson, 1968). 
Hale, J. Radio Power: Propaganda and International Broadcasting (London: Elek, 1975). 
Halski, C., 6 Lat: Perypetie Wojenne, 1939-1945, (London: Caldra House, 1991). 
Harris, J. D., ‘Broadcasting the Massacres: An Analysis of the BBC’s Contemporary Coverage of 
the Holocaust’, Yad Vashem Studies 25, 1996, pp. 65–98. 
Harrison, E., Radio and the Performance of Government: Broadcasting by the Czechoslovaks in 
Exile in London, 1939-45, University of Bristol, School of Modern Languages, March 
2015, unpublished.  
Herman. E. S & Chomsky N., Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media 
(London: Vintage, 1994). 
Huxley, A., Brave New World (London: Vintage Books: 2007). 
Herling-Grudziński, G., A World Apart: Imprisonment in a Soviet Labour Camp during World War 
II (London: Penguin, 1996). 
Hułas, M., Goście czy intruźi?: Rząd polski na uchodźctwie, wrzesień 1939-lipiec 1943 (Warsaw: 
PAN, 1996). 
Jackall, R., Propaganda (London: Macmillan, 1995). 
Jowett, G., What Is Propaganda, and How Does It Differ from Persuasion (London: Sage, 2005). 
Jowett, G. S., & O'Donnell, V., Propaganda & Persuasion, 6th ed. (London: Sage, 2015). 
Kacewicz, G. V., Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the Polish Government in Exile, 1939-1945, 
Studies in Contemporary History, Vol. 3 (London: Springer, 1979). 
Kadell, F., Katyń w Oczach Zachodu (Warsaw: PWN, 2012). 
Karski, J., Story of a Secret State: My Report to the World (London: Penguin, 2012). 
Karski, J., Great Powers and Poland (Lanham: University Press of America, 1985). 
Kenny, M., A Place for Memory: The Interface between Individual and Collective History, 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 41, No. 3, July, 1999. 
Kępiński, A.,  Ukraina – po obu stronach Dniestru (Poznań: Zysk i S-ka, 2013). 
Kirchmayer, J.,  Powstanie Warszawskie (Warsaw: Wiedza i Ksiażka, 1978). 
Kirkpatrick, I., The Inner Circle (London: Macmillan, 1959). 
 245 
Kochanski, H., The Eagle Unbowed: Poland and the Poles in the Second World War (London: 
Penguin Books, 2012). 
Korboński, S., W Imieniu Rzeczy -Pospolitej (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Bellona, 1991). 
Knightley, P., The First Casualty: The War correspondent as Hero and Myth-Maker from the 
Crimea to Iraq (London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004). 
Kwatkowski,M. J., Polskie Radio w Konspiracji: 1939-1944 (Warsaw: Pańtwowy Instytut 
Wydawniczhy 1989). 
Lasswell, H. D. Propaganda Technique in the World War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927). 
Laqueur, W., The Terrible Secret: Suppression of the Truth about Hitler’s Final Solution, (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1980). 
Launchbury, C., Music, Poetry, Propaganda: Constructing French Cultural Soundscapes at the 
BBC during the Second World War (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2012). 
Lebow, R.N., Kansteiner, W., Fogu, C., The Memory of Politics in Postwar Europe (London: Duke 
University Press, 2006). 
Leitgeber, B., Bez Przesądow i Lęku: z Albumu Poznańskiego Dyplomaty, Malarza I Podróżnika 
(Poznań: Media Rodzina of Poznań, 1979). 
Lerski, J., Emisariusz Jur (Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicz Interim, 1989). 
Lippmann, W., Public Opinion (London: Transaction Publishers, 1922). 
Lo Biundo, E., London Calling Italy: The Propaganda of Radio London during 1943 (Milan: 
Edizioni Unicopli, 2014). 
Lockhart, R. H. B., Comes the Reckoning (London: Arno Press, 1972). 
Lockhart, R.H.B., The Diaries of Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, 1939-1965 (ed.) Kenneth Young 
(London: Macmillan, 1980). 
Luneau, A., Radio Londres: Les voix de la Liberte: 1940:45 (Paris: Perrin, 2005). 
Mair, J., & Keeble, R. L. (ed.) Beyond Trust: Hype and Hope in the British Media (Suffolk: Arima 
Publishing, 2008). 
Mackiewicz, J., Katyń, Zbrodia bez sądu i kary (Warsaw: Antyk, 1997). 
Mackiewicz, S., Cenzura Angielska a Katyń, Dziennik Związków, nr 292, 1952. 
Mansell, G., Let Truth Be Told: 50 Years of BBC External Broadcasting (London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, 1982). 
Mazur G., Biuro Informacji i Propagandy: SZP-ZWZ-AK, 1939-45 (Warsaw: Instytut Wydawniczy 
Pax, 1987). 
 246 
McLaine, I., Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Information in World War 
II (London: Allen & Unwin, 1979). 
Mikołajczyk, S., The Rape of Poland: Pattern of Soviet Aggression (New York: Whittlesey House, 
1948). 
Meissner. J., Pióro ze Skrzydeł (Warsaw: Iskra, 1976). 
Mole, R., The Baltic States from the Soviet Union to the European Union: Identity, Discourse and 
Power in the Post-Communist Transition of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (London: 
Routledge, 2012). 
Nelson, R. A., A Chronology and Glossary of Propaganda in the United States (Westport: 
Greenwood Press, 1996). 
Newcourt- Nowogrodzki, S., Black Propaganda (London: Sutton Publishing, 2005). 
Nicholas, S., The Echo of War: Home Front Propaganda and the Wartime BBC, 1939-1945 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996). 
Nicholas Terry, ‘Conﬂicting Signals: British Intelligence on the Final Solution through Radio 
Intercepts and Other Sources’, 1941–1942’, Yad Vashem Studies 32, 2004, pp. 351–396. 
Nora, P., ‘Between Memory and History: Les Lieux De Mémoire’. Representations, University of 
California Press, no. 26, 1989, pp. 7–24. 
Nowak, J., Kurier z Warsawy (Warsaw: Znak, 2003). 
Nye, J., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). 
O’ Malley, O., Phantom Caravan (London: Murray, 1954). 
Pawley, E., BBC Engineering 1922-1972BBC (London: BBC, 1972). 
Piotrowski, T., Poland's Holocaust: Ethnic Strife, Collaboration with Occupying Forces and 
Genocide (New York: McFarland, 1997). 
Ponsonby, A., Falsehood in Wartime: Propaganda Lies of the First World War (London: G. Allen 
& Unwin Ltd., 1928). 
Pospieszalski, A., ‘Wojna na Słowa’,Wiadomości, London, 25 Apr 1971. 
Pragier, A., Czas Przeszły Dokonany (London: Świderski, 1966). 
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Annex 1: Biographies of Polish Section staff 
Grabowski, Zbigniew was born in Cracow, 22 December 1903. He studied Philosophy, English 
and French literature at Jagiellonian University in Cracow. Grabowski continued post-graduate 
studies in Paris and Oxford, and completed a PhD in 1930 in London. Later, he became a freelance 
journalists and contributed political articles to all leading Polish newspapers and periodicals. He 
also worked for the then large Polish newspaper, Cracow Illustrated Currier (IKC). From 1933 
to1935 Grabowski became a correspondent for IKC and Radio Polskie in Berlin and from 1937 to 
1939 in London for the same organisations. In September 1939 he was employed as a Senior 
Announcer/translator in the BBC Polish Service where he worked until 1941. Later Grabowski 
became a lecturer to the British Army on International Affairs at the University of Bristol, the 
Ministry of Information and the British Council. He also worked as Editor of Radio Polskie (1941-
1943), at the Polish Ministry of Information (1943–1944), from 1944 to1945 at the Polish Desk in 
the Office of War Information at the American Embassy and in the years 1945-1946 as British war 
correspondent in London. He re-joined the Polish Service in December 1946 as a Programme 
Organiser. In 1964 he became an Editor of the Polish magazine Kontynenty printed in London and 
held this position until 1966. Grabowski also made a name for himself as a translator, in particular, 
of books by Conrad, Huxley and Lawrence, as well as foreign affairs’ journals. He also pursued a 
career as a critic and writer, publishing under his own name as well as under pseudonyms Anna 
Grey, Antoni Jawnuta and Axel Heyst. His publications include: Monograph about Walter Pater 
(1929), Ciszy lasu i twojej ciszy (1931), Europe Expects England (1943), Stones and Flowers 
(1944), Anna (1946), Rosa Mystica (1966), Fatherland Europe (1967) and The English 
Psychoanalysed, (1997). In 1969 Grabowski emigrated to Canada where he died in 1974.1 
Kmiecik, Edward was born on 2 March 1915 in Berlin. He studied law and political economy at 
the University of Berlin. After graduation he began his career as a journalist working for Polish 
dailies in Germany such as Nowiny, Gazeta Olsztyńska, Naród, Dziennik Polski and the journal 
Polak w Niemczech. Kmiecik also worked for the Polish news agency PAT. After the war broke 
out, he worked at the Polish Council of Ministers’ shortwave station and after capitulation escaped 
from Poland to France where he joined the Polish Army. After the fall of France in 1940 he joined 
the Polish Army in Scotland. In 1942, Kmecik, was released for military service and started his 
work as the Dawn Editor in the Polish Service and Radio Polskie until June 1994 when he decided 
to work for the American military radio station in Luxemburg where he remained until May 1946. 
                                                          
1 BBC WAC, Lϭ/ ϭ,ϱϱϮ/ϭ, Gƌaďoǁski͛s peƌsoŶal file. 
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Later, he worked as the Director of the Polish broadcasts for Poles living in Germany at a radio 
station in Frankfurt. He came back to Poland in 1947, where he continued his work as journalist. In 
1958, however, he moved to Washington where he worked as Secretary at the Polish Embassy. He 
died in 1977. 
Syrop, Konrad was of Jewish origin, born on 9 August 1914 in Vienna.  He became a 
correspondent for the Polish Courier in France, Belgium, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, 
and Finland and, from August 1938, London. Syrop started his work as announcer/translator in the 
Polish Service in September 1939. From February to July 1941, he served with the Polish Armed 
Forces. On his return from the frontline, Syrop was promoted to the position of Polish Service 
Programme Assistant, working at the same time as Producer and script writer for tBBC European 
Service. In 1944 Syrop was sent to France, Belgium and Holland as a BBC correspondent. In June 
1945 he was promoted to Senior Producer in the BBC European Production Department and in 
1956 to Head of the Central European Service Department and Chairman of the Bush House 
Modernisation Working Party. In May 1946 Herman Grisewood supported his application for 
naturalisation. He retired in 1974 and he was awarded an OBE in 1975. From 1983 he chaired the 
Copyright Licensing Agency. Syrop was a writer. His books include: Spring in October: The Story 
of the Polish Revolution (1956), Poland: Between the Hammer and the Anvil (1968), Poland in 
Perspective (1982). He died in London 1989.  
Lutosławski, Antoni Tadeusz was born in France, 10 December 1913. Before the outbreak of the 
Second World War, he worked for Polskie Radio in Warsaw. From September 1939 until 1941, he 
was employed at the BBC Polish Service as announcer/translator. He also worked in Radio Polskie 
in London until 30 June 1942.  
Macdonald Gregory was born in Boston on 19 February 1903. Educated at Douai and at Wadham 
College in Oxford, where he read history.2 Later at the School of Slavonic Studies, he specialised in 
Polish political history. From 1924 Macdonald worked as a journalist in London and regularly 
contributed to the Catholic Times and to the G.K. Chesterton Weekly.3He also worked as 
correspondent to the Warsaw Weekly. After 1927 he became secretary of the Anglo-Polish Society, 
the Polish Relief Found and consultant to the Polish Embassy in London. In June 1941, Macdonald 
started his career at the BBC; first as the scriptwriter at the European Production Section and from 
December the same year, in the BBC Spanish/Portuguese Service as a sub-editor.4 He also worked 
                                                          
2 Obituary by Maurice Latey, 1987. 
3 G. K.'s Weekly was a British publication founded in 1925 by G. K. Chesterton.  
4 BBC WAC, L1/1, 183/1, Macdonald’s personal file. 
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at the Polish Research Centre in London at the same time. In February 1942 he became the Editor 
of the Polish Service; to a large extent this promotion was influenced by the perseverance of the 
Polish government-in-exile, which sought to, replace Michael Winch. Macdonald held this position 
to the end of the war and in 1945 he became Head of the Central European Service. In 1958 he 
briefly took charge of BBC Russian broadcasts. Macdonald who, after the fall of the Iron Curtain, 
was of the opinion that Poland had been betrayed by the West, became a vigorous broadcaster and 
journalist unmasking the real face of Soviet rule in the Eastern Block. He continued to contribute to 
this cause to the end of his life. After the Second World War, Macdonald also became a Member of 
the East Europe Committee of the British Council and in 1961 received an OBE. His achievements 
during the war and in the communist period were widely recognised by the Polish Government in 
London, anti-communism activists, scholars and, most of all, Polish Service listeners. In 1955 he 
was honoured with one of the highest Polish orders, the Polonia Resituta, by the Polish government-
in-exile. Macdonald died on 30 July 1987.  
Wagner, Karol, real surname Pieńkowski, was born on 3 January 1909 in the Polish city of 
Sokołówka. He studied Law at Warsaw University. In 1935 Wagner became a speaker for Polskie 
Radio and in 1938 was promoted to the position of Director of Foreign Broadcasts. After the 
German invasion of Poland in 1939, Wagner escaped through Romania and France to England and 
from, February 1941, worked as an Announcer/translator in the Polish Service. In 1942 he became 
the vice-director at the Polish Ministry of Information in London and, in July 1943, a Director of 
the Radio Department, a position which he held until July 1945. From July 1949 to 1955 Wagner 
was in charge of the Polish Section of Radio Madrid. Between 1955 and1974 he worked as the 
Director of Radio Free Europe in New York and from 1974 to 1976 as the Assistant Director in a 
radio station in Munich. He died in Italy in January 1988. 
Żuławski Marek, the famous Polish painter and graphic artist, was born in Rome on 13 April 1908. 
He studied simultaneously law at Warsaw University and painting at the Academy of Arts in 
Warsaw. However, after two years he gave up law and concentrated on his career as an artist. In 
1935, he received a scholarship to study in Paris and later in London. From 1940 Żuławski worked 
as Announcer/translator/ in the Polish Service and continued to work for the BBC after the war as 
an art critic. Żuławski is primarily known for his paintings. However, he also established his name 
in the literary world as an author of Romanticism, Classicism and Back Again, From Hogarth to 
Bacon and a memoir entitled A Study for Self-Portrait. He died on 30 March 1985 in London.   
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Annex II: Index of key Polish, British and Soviet actors  
Ambler, E. F.  – BBC Assistant General Establishment Officer (1938-1940) 
Anders, Władysław – Commander of the Polish Army in the Soviet Union (1941–1943); 
Commander of the Polish 2nd Corps, part of the Polish Arm Forces in the West (1944) 
Arciszewski, Tomasz – Polish Prime Minister-in-exile (29 November 1944–2 July 1947) 
Barker, Arthur – BBC Foreign Language News Editor (1939) 
Barker, V.D. – BBC European Language Supervisor (1940) 
Bauer-Czarnomski, Franciszek – Polish Embassy Press Attaché (1939–1940) 
Berling, Zygmunt –  Commander of the Tadeusz Kościuszko Infantry Division in the USSR 
(1943); Commander of the Polish First Army (1944) 
Bierut Bolesław – Leader of the Homeland National Council (1943), Member of the Polish 
Committee of National Liberation (1944), President of Poland (1947) 
Birley, A. R. – BBC European Service Policy Editor (1942–1945) 
Bracke, Brendon –British Minister of Information (July 1941–May 1945) 
Bór-Komorowski, Tadeusz – Commander of the Polish Home Army (March 1943–October 1944) 
Bullock, Allan – BBC European Talks Editor (1940–1944) 
Cadogan, Alexander – British Under-Secretary of State for the Foreign Office (1938–1948) 
Campbell, Robin – BBC Polish Service Language Supervisor (1939–1940) 
Chamberlain, Neville – British Prime Minister (May 1937–May 1940) 
Churchill Winston –  British Prime Minister (May 1940–July 1945) 
Clark Kerr, Archibald –British Ambassador to Moscow (1942–1946) 
Cooper, Duff – British Minister of Information (May 1940 –July 1941) 
Dalton, Hugh – The Minister of Economic Warfare (May 1940–February 1942) 
Eden, Anthony – British Foreign Minister (December 1940–July 1945) 
Edwards, Donald – BBC European Service News Editor (1942–1944), Assistant of the BBC 
European Service Director (1944–1945) 
Frank, Hans – Governor General of the General Government in Poland (1939–1945) 
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Gomulka, Władysław – First Secretary of the Polish Workers’ Party (1943–1948); Deputy Prime 
Minister of  the Provisional Government of the Republic of Poland (January–June 19450, Deputy 
Prime Minister of the Provisional Government of National Unity (1945–1947) 
Grant Duff, Sheila – BBC Czech Service Editor (1942–1944) 
Griffin, Jonathan – Head of the BBC European Service Intelligence Department (1941–1942) 
Grisewood, Harman –  BBC Assistant Director Programme Planning (1939–1941); BBC 
European Service Assistant Controller (1941–1944); BBC European Service Controller (August 
1944– May 1945) 
Harriman, Averell – American Ambassador to the Soviet Union (October 1943–January 1946) 
Hodson, D. M. – BBC European Service Night Editor (1942–1943) 
Jundziłł-Baliński, Jan – Liaison Officer between Polish Ministry of Information and the BBC 
(November 1940–May 1945) 
Karski, Jan – Member of the Polish Underground and Polish Courier 
Kirkpatrick, Ivone – Foreign Advisor to the BBC (1941); BBC European Service (October 1941–
August 1944); Liaison between the BBC and PWE (1941–1944) 
Kisielewski, Józef – Directors of Radio Polskie (June 1940–December 1942) 
Kmiecik, Edward – BBC Polish Servcie and Radio Polskie Dawn Editor (1942–1944) 
Korboński, Stefan – Head of the Polish Directorate of Civil Resistance (1942–1944); Chief of the 
Department of Internal Affairs in Poland (August 1944 –March 1945); Government Delegate in 
Poland (March 1945–June 1945) 
Kot, Stanisław – Polish Minister of Internal Affairs (1939–1941), Polish Ambassador to the USSR 
(1941–1942); Polish Minister of Information (January 1943–July 1943) 
Marian, Kukiel –Vice–Minister of War of the Polish government–in–exile (1939–1940); General 
Officer Commanding the 1st Polish Corps based in Scotland (1940–1942); Minister of War of the 
government–in-exile (1943–1945) 
Lockhart, Bruce – PWE Director-General (1941–1945); British liaison officer to the Czechoslovak 
government-in-exile (1944-1945) 
Macdonald, Gregory – BBC Polish Service Editor (February1942–May 1945) 
Maclaren, Moray – Head of the PWE Polish Region (February 1942–November 1944) 
Maisky, Ivan – Soviet Ambassador to Britain (1939–1943); Deputy Commissar of Foreign Affairs 
in Moscow (1943–1945) 
Meissner, Janusz – Director of Radio Polskie (December 1942 –July 1943) 
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Mikołajczyk, Stanisław – Polish Prime Minister-in-exile (July 1943–November 1944) 
Molotov, Vyacheslav –  Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs (May 1939–March 1949) 
Mościcki, Ignacy – Polish President (June 1929–September 1939) 
Newsome, Noel – BBC European Service News Editor (June 1940 –December 1941); Director of 
the European Service (December 1941–October 1944) 
Nowak, Jan– Member of the Polish Underground and Polish Courier 
O’Malley, Owen – British Ambassador to the Polish government-in-exile (1941–1945) 
Okulicki, Leopold – Commander of the Polish Home Army (October 1944–January 1945) 
Osóbka–Morawski, Edward – Chairman of the Polish Committee of National Liberation (July 
1944 –October 1944); Prime Minister of the Provisional Government of National Unity (June 1945 
–February 1947.  
Parker, Gibson – BBC European Productions Supervisor (1941–1942)  
Pragier, Adam – Polish Minister of Information (1944–1949)  
Purves, Gillian – BBC Intelligence Department for Poland (1940–1944) 
Raczkiewicz, Władysław– Polish President-in-exile (September 1939–June 1947) 
Raczyński, Edward – Polish Ambassador in London (1939–1941), Minister of Foreign Affairs 
(August 1941–July 1943) 
Ratajski, Cyryl – Deputy Prime Minister in Poland (1940–1942) 
Ritchie, Douglas – Assistant Director of the European Service (1941–1944); BBC Director of 
theEuropean News Department (1944–1946) 
Roberts, Frank – Head of the Central Department of the Foreign Office (1939–1945) 
Romer, Tadeusz – Polish Ambassador to the USSR (1942–1943); Minister of Foreign Affairs 
(1943–1944) 
Rowecki, Stefan –  Commander of the Polish Home Army (June 1940 –June 1943) 
Russell, F.G. – BBC European Service Day Policy Editor (1942–1944) 
Rydz-Śmigły, Edward – Polish Commander-in-chief of Polish Forces (1939) 
Rzepecki, Jan – Head of the Polish Bureau of Information and Propaganda (December 1939–
October 1944) 
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Savery, Frank – Foreign Office Counsellor to the Polish Embassy in London; BBC East European 
Language Supervisor (1941–1944) 
Sikorski, Władysław – Polish Prime Minister (1939–1943) 
Simpson, Stanley –  BBC Polish Service Sub-Editor (1943–1945) 
Sosnowski, Kazimierz –  Liaison with the Polish Underground. 
Spey, J. M. – BBC European Service Dawn Bulletins Policy Editor (1944) 
Starzyński, Stefan –Mayor of Warsaw (1934–1939) 
Stettinius, Edward – US Secretary of State (December 1944–June 1945) 
Stroński, Stanisław– Polish Minister of Information (1939–1943) 
Thewes, J.A.P. – BBC European Service Dawn Policy Editor (1944–1945) 
Wagner, Karol – Director of Radio Polskie (July 1943–July 1945) 
Winch, Michael – BBC Polish Service Editor (1940–1942) 
Zalewski, August–  Minister of the Foreign Affairs (1939–1941) 
Zazio, Evelyn – BBC Polish Sub-Editor (1943–1945) 
 
 
 
 257 
Annex III:  Second World War Timeline including important events 
related to Polish-Soviet affairs 
 
 
1939 
1 September – Germany invades Poland 
3 September – Great Britain and France declare war on Germany 
17 September– The Soviet Union invades Poland from the east 
17 September – The Polish government flees into exile to France via Romania 
28 September – Capitulation of Warsaw 
30 November – The Soviet Union invades Finland 
 
1940 
5 March – Incorporation of the Polish east territories by the USSR as West Ukraine and West 
Byelorussia  
9 April – Germany invades Denmark and Norway 
10 May 10 – 22 June – Germany attacks France and Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Belgium  
22 June – fall of France 
10 June – Italy enters the war 
14 June – The USSR occupation of the Baltic States  
10 July –  Hitler attack on Britain 
27 September – Germany, Italy, and Japan sign the Tripartite Pact 
28 October 1940 – Italy invades Greece 
31 October – Britain defeats Germany 
20–23 November – Slovakia, Hungary and Romania join the Axis. 
 
1941 
5 January – Creation of the Polish Workers’ Party in Poland 
February – The Germans send the Afrika Korps to North Africa 
1 March – Bulgaria joins the Axis 
6 April – Germany, Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria invade Yugoslavia 
17 April – Germany and Bulgaria invade Greece  
22 June – Germany and its Axis partners invade the Soviet Union 
12 July – Anglo-Soviet Treaty 
30 July – Polish-Soviet Treaty 
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14 August – Britain, the USA and USSR sign the Atlantic Charter  
7 December – Japan bombs Pearl Harbour 
8 December – The United States declares war on Japan, entering World War II 
 
1943 
2 February – The USSR defeats Wehrmacht troops at Stalingrad   
March – Creation of the Union of the Polish Patriots in the USSR (formally recognised by Stalin in 
June) 
13 April – Germans broadcast information about the discovery of the Polish officers’ graves at 
Katyń 
19 April –16 May – Warsaw Ghetto Uprising 
25 April – The USSR breaks off diplomatic relations with Poland 
4 July – Sikorski dies in a plane crash in Gibraltar  
14 July – Stanisław Mikołajczyk becomes Polish Prime Minister-in-exile 
28 November – 1 December – Conference at Tehran 
31 December – Transformation of the Polish Workers’ Party into Homeland National Council  
 
1944 
4–5 January – The Soviet Army crosses pre-war Polish -Soviet border  
6 June – Beginning of the D-Day Landings  
1 August – Beginning of the Warsaw Rising 
3 August – Mikołajczyk’s meeting with Stalin in Moscow 
25 August – Liberation of Paris 
2 October – Collapse of the Warsaw Rising 
24 November – Resignation of Mikołajczyk 
29 November – Tomasz Arciszewski becomes new Polish Prime Minister-in-exile 
31 December –  Establishment of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Poland 
 
1945 
12 January – The Soviets liberate Warsaw and Cracow  
19 January – Disbanding of the Polish Home Army 
4 –11 February – Yalta Conference 
27 March – Arrest of 16 leaders of the Polish Underground by the NKVD 
16 April – The Soviets launch their final offensive, encircling Berlin 
25 April – 26 June – United Nations Conference in San Francisco  
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30 April – Hitler commits suicide 
7 May – Surrender of Germany  
21 June – Establishment of the Polish Government of National Unity 
6 July – Withdrawal of recognition of the Polish government-in-exile by Britain and the USA 
 
 
 
